State v. Watson , 2023 Ohio 3137 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Watson, 2023-Ohio-3137.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2022CA00145
CORTEZ WENDALL WATSON :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 22CR1420A
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 6, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE STONE KATHLEEN O. TATARSKY
Prosecuting Attorney 236 Third Street S.W.
By: VICKI L. DESANTIS Suite 100 Carnegie Building
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Cortez Wendell Watson [“Watson”] appeals his
convictions and sentences after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 27, 2022, Watson was arrested and charged with murder,
felonious assault and having weapons while under disability for the shooting death of T.B.
at the Rodeway Inn in Jackson Township, Stark County, Ohio the night before. On July
7, 2022, after a preliminary hearing in the Massillon Municipal Court, Watson’s case was
bound over to the Stark County Grand Jury. On July 15, 2022, Watson’s retained counsel
filed a Notice of Appearance with the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. [Docket
Entry No. 1].
{¶3} On September 1, 2022, the Stark County Grand Jury returned an Indictment
charging Watson with Murder [felony murder], a violation of R. C. 2903.02(B)(D), an
unclassified felony, Felonious Assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(D)(1)(a), a felony
of the second degree, Having Weapons While under Disability, a violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(3)(B), a felony of the third degree and Tampering With Evidence, a violation
of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)(B), a felony of the third degree. Both the murder charge and the
felonious assault charge contained firearm specifications, R. C. 2941.145(A).
{¶4} Watson did not waive his speedy trial rights. On September 6, 2022,
Watson filed a Demand for Discovery and a Notice of Intention to Use Evidence. [Docket
Entry No. 8]. The state filed a Bill of Particulars on September 9, 2022. [Docket Entry
No. 11]. Trial was scheduled for September 26, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 15].
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 3
{¶5} Watson filed his witness list on September 21, 2022, listing four potential
witnesses. [Docket Entry No. 25]. An updated witness list listing five potential witnesses
was filed by Watson on September 23, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 27]. On September 23,
2022, the state filed a motion in limine asking to exclude from trial the use of alleged other
bad acts of the decedent. [Docket Entry No. 28]. A notice of appearance as co-counsel
was filed by Watson on September 26, 2022 listing attorney Gaitanos as co-counsel for
attorney Shamansky.
{¶6} Watson's jury trial began on September 26, 2022.
Shot Fired at Rodeway Inn
{¶7} On June 26, 2022, Jackson Township Police Officer Jeffrey Aynes was
patrolling the Best Western Motel on Sunset Strip. Around 11:25 pm, he heard a loud
pop. Around the same time, he received a dispatch call to the Rodeway Inn, across the
street from the Best Western for a "male in the parking lot laying down bleeding." 2T. at
411.
{¶8} Officer Aynes drove to the front of the Rodeway building and saw a group
of people grilling in front of a room in no apparent distress. Id. at 42. Officer Aynes drove
to the back of the building where he saw two males--one a hotel staff person--standing
over the man on the ground. Id. 42; State’s Exhibit 2. Officer Aynes put his protective
gloves on, got his medical kit and went to the male to render aid. Id. at 43. The male had
a weak pulse, was foaming at the mouth and Aynes saw wounds on the male's wrist and
chest. The male was shirtless, wearing blue jeans and black Nike briefs. State's Exhibit
1 For clarity, the transcript from Watson’s jury trial will be referred to as, “__T.__,” signifying the
volume and the page number.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 4
2. The medics arrived, took control of the male's care and Officer Aynes went with the
motel manager to look at surveillance videos. Id. at 45.
{¶9} The videos reviewed by Officer Ayers showed the shirtless male running
from the front of the building to the back losing blood and his flip flops. 2T. at 48; State's
Exhibit 1H; State’s Exhibit 3. The video also showed a black male wearing a black shirt
with a Black Fist logo on the back, camouflage long shorts, tennis shoes and a Cleveland
Browns ball cap pull a handgun from his waistband and shoot the shirtless male. State's
Exhibit 1U; State’s Exhibit 3.
Cortez Watson identified as shooter
{¶10} Jackson Township Detective Dustin McDannold, the lead investigator,
arrived at the scene around 1:00 am, June 27, 2022. 2T. at 116. He learned that the
male found on the ground with wounds to his arm and chest had died. He talked to the
patrol officers on the scene and viewed the Rodeway Inn videotapes that covered the
entire property. He learned from the videos that a shooting occurred outside Room 215
at 11:28 p.m. 2T. at 118-119; State’s Exhibit 3. He also viewed a videotape from the
Benjamin Transportation Service that showed the male and a woman in the back seat
leaving the Best Western Motel parking lot. State's Exhibit 12.
{¶11} Further investigation through a law enforcement database that matched
phone numbers with names revealed that Benjamin Transportation was called by K.C.,
Watson’s girlfriend, for a pickup at the Rodeway Inn. 2T. at 48-50; State’s Exhibit 3. The
pick-up spot was later changed to the Best Western across the street. Id. at 120. That
same database matched the Benjamin Transportation drop off point as an address on
Plain Avenue belonging to the mother of Watson. Id. at 120-121.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 5
{¶12} Detectives identified the shooting victim as T.B. through the LEADS
database. 2T. at 55. Further investigation revealed that T.B. and his girlfriend had rented
Room 309 that evening. No weapons were found in Room 309 or on the body of T.B.
2T. at 98, 106.
{¶13} Detective Dustin McDannold positively identified Watson from the LEADS
license photo compared to the security footage. Id. 122. Detective McDannold testified
that he could see T.B. walking and talking to Watson on the video. Id. at 144; State’s
Exhibit 3. Detective McDannold testified that T.B. did not have anything in his hands. Id.
145. He further testified that he could see Watson advance upon T.B. Id. at 145. It
appears T.B. is speaking with his hands. Id. at 144, 145. Watson can be seen going
around the car towards T.B. and discharging a firearm at T.B., who is backing up at that
point. Id. The entire interaction was less than ten seconds. Id. at 145. There was no
audio on the videos at the motel. Id. at 150.
The autopsy
{¶14} Dr. David Dolinak, a forensic pathologist with the Cuyahoga County
Coroner's office, performed an autopsy on the body of T.B. on June 27, 2022. He found
a gunshot wound that went through his right forearm, through his mid chest and the left
forearm. 2T. at 205. There was no exit wound and an orange colored polymer bullet was
recovered from the body and entered into evidence. State's Exhibit 6. Dr. Dolinak opined
that T.B. died from gunshot wounds.
{¶15} During the autopsy blood and urine specimens were taken from T.B.'s body
and toxicology tests were done. Several drugs were found in his system including
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 6
methamphetamine, amphetamine, fentanyl, marijuana, norfentanyl and acetyl fentanyl.
State's Exhibit 15.
Watson testifies at trial
{¶16} Watson testified that he knew T.B. through A.M., the woman T.B. was with
at the Roadway Inn on June 26. Watson knew T.B. as "T.J.". 3T. at 58. He knew him
as a violent man with "high powered drug use." Id. at 58. Watson testified that two weeks
prior, T.B. pulled up in a car to a party where Watson was and pulled out a black firearm.
Id. at 61. Watson further testified that about a week after that incident, T.B. pulled up in
a car and fired a gun two times while Watson was sitting on the porch. Id. at 65.
{¶17} Watson testified that on June 26, 2022, he was with his girlfriend, K.C. at
the Rodeway to party and barbeque with his friends. K.C. rented a room and Watson
was drinking some beers with his friends.
{¶18} Watson testified that he saw T.B. talking loudly with his girlfriend, agitated,
moving his hands in the air. See, State’s Exhibit 3. Then, T.B. started walking behind
Watson who had joined the partygoers by the barbeque grill. Id. T.B. can be seen in the
security video appearing almost 30 seconds after Watson had walked past the same
location. State’s Exhibit 3. Watson can be seen talking and drinking outside the motel
room with his girlfriend and another male, while a third man is tending to a charcoal grill
at 11:27:26 p.m. T.B. first appears in the video walking toward the group at 11:28:11 p.m.
T.B. stops at the front of an automobile and speaks with Watson at 11:28:24 p.m. Watson
begins advancing and T.B. begins backing up at 11:28.31. Watson fires his gun at T.B.
at 11:28:33 p.m.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 7
{¶19} Watson testified to the encounter at trial. Remembering their past
interactions, Watson was scared. Watson testified that T.B. said something to him,
I can’t understand what he’s saying. I turn. I say what? What? Are
you talking to me? And he said you can’t run now bitch ass N---, I’m going
to kill you.
3T. at 72. Watson testified that he was extremely frightened and scared. This was the
closest T.B. had ever been to him and he knew he was coming to threaten him. 3T. at
74. Watson testified he was nervous when T.B. started moving his hands and when he
said those words, he just reacted. Id. at 78. Watson testified that T.B. was “reaching
toward his pocket.” Id. at 92. However, Watson admitted T.B. had his hands up and he
did not see any weapon. Id.at 92-93. Watson testified, “I fire one shot, he turns and runs."
3T. at 76. Watson saw T.B. run off and did not think T.B. was hit by the bullet. Watson
testified that he did not pursue him. Id. at 77. He was just glad that he was gone from
the area.
Rodeway security video show T.B. running and collapsing onto the ground at
11:28 p.m. State’s Exhibit 3. The videos show Watson remain with the people by the
barbeque grill with a cup and cigarette in his hand. State's Exhibit 3.
Watson testified that he saw the police, got scared because he knew he could not
have a firearm, panicked, and ran. 3T. at 82. Watson and his girlfriend can be seen
walking toward the Best Western motel at 11:36 p.m. State’s Exhibit 3. Watson can be
seen waiting with his girlfriend to catch a cab at the Best Western motel at 11:40 p.m.
State’s Exhibit 11. Watson is then seen ducking down inside the cab as it pulls away
from the scene at 11:55 p.m. State’s Exhibit 12.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 8
{¶20} J.J. proffered his testimony. 3T. at 106-117. J.J. did not know T.B.
personally, but knew of him. Id. at 107. J.J. testified that T.B. had been accused of
“cutting parts off of my friend’s car…” 3T. at 107. The friend and T.B. exchanged words
over the accusation. Id. A week later T.B. pulled over to another friend’s house and
brandished a pistol out of the car window. Id. Watson was present when this incident
occurred. Id. A week after that, T.B. pulled up and actually fired the gun in their direction.
Id. at 108. J.J. testified that he never saw T.B. outside of those two incidents. Id. at 110.
Because J.J. did not know him, Watson told J.J. that the individual with the gun was T.B.
Id. at 113. J.J. was not present for the current shooting.
{¶21} After hearing the evidence, viewing several videotapes, and receiving
instructions from the trial court, the jury began its deliberations. It returned with a
unanimous verdict of guilty to all charges in the indictment.
{¶22} Watson returned to the trial court for sentencing on October 5, 2022. The
trial court accepted the jury's verdict and sentenced Watson to fifteen years to life for
murder, three years on the gun specification, three years for having weapons under
disability and two years for tampering with evidence. The trial court merged the felonious
assault conviction with the murder conviction. Watson's aggregate prison sentence is
twenty- three years to life.
Assignments of Error
{¶23} Watson raises four Assignments of Error,
{¶24} “I. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 9
CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶25} “II. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF MURDER WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT ACT IN SELF
DEFENSE.
{¶26} “III. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR TAMPERING WITH
EVIDENCE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE.
{¶27} “IV. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF [J.J.].”
I.
{¶28} In his First Assignment of Error, Watson argues that Defense counsel's
performance prior to trial, during the trial and after the trial was deficient. Watson presents
several areas in which he contends his trial counsel was deficient and further argues any
one and the accumulation of his tactics or lack of them warrants a reversal of appellant's
convictions and a new trial.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW.
{¶29} To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 10
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,
693(1984). A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a
court's need to consider the other. Strickland at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at
699; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 2000-Ohio-448, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000).
Failure to waive speedy trial rights
{¶30} Watson first posits that his trial counsel did not have sufficient time to
prepare to defend him at trial and, therefore, he should have waived Watson’s right to a
speedy trial.
{¶31} Watson was arrested on June 28, 2022 and remained in jail throughout the
case. On July 7, 2022, after a preliminary hearing in the Massillon Municipal Court,
Watson’s case was bound over to the Stark County Grand Jury. Retained counsel filed
a Notice of Appearance on Watson’s behalf in his case in the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas on July 15, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 1]. The jury trial began on
September 26, 2022. Thus, counsel was representing Watson at least seventy-three
days prior to the start of trial.
{¶32} In State v. Ramey, the Ohio Supreme Court summarized the applicable law
concerning speedy trial,
The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of a criminal
defendant that is guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I,
Section 10. See also State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425, 715 N.E.2d
540 (1999). States have the authority to prescribe reasonable periods in
which a trial must be held that are consistent with constitutional
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 11
requirements. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). “In response to this authority, Ohio enacted R.C.
2945.71, which designates specific time requirements for the state to bring
an accused to trial.” Hughes at 425, 715 N.E.2d 540. The prosecution and
the trial courts have a mandatory duty to try an accused within the time
frame provided by the statute. State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 105, 362
N.E.2d 1216 (1977); see also State v. Cutcher, 56 Ohio St.2d 383, 384, 384
N.E.2d 275 (1978). Strict compliance with the statute is required. State v.
Davis, 46 Ohio St.2d 444, 448, 349 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
A defendant charged with a felony “[s]hall be brought to trial within
two hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.” R.C. 2945.71(C)(2).
For purposes of calculating speedy-trial time, “each day during which the
accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted
as three days.” R.C. 2945.71(E). Thus, subject to certain tolling events, a
jailed defendant must be tried within 90 days. Id.132 Ohio St.3d 309, 2021-Ohio-2904, 971 N.E.2d 937, ¶¶14-15. Thus, the legislature
has deemed ninety days in which to bring an incarcerated individual to trial to be
reasonable. A longer period “threatens to produce more than one sort of harm, including
‘oppressive pre-trial incarceration,’ ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and ‘the
possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired’ by dimming memories and loss
of exculpatory evidence.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,654, 112 S.Ct. 2686,
120 L.Ed.2d 520(1992), quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In this case, retained counsel had seventy-three days during which
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 12
he filed for discovery and filed two witness lists. Co-counsel was also present during
pretrial conferences and at trial.
{¶33} Thus, we do not find under the facts presented here that the mere failure to
waive Watson’s constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial in and of itself fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudiced the defendant resulting
in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.
Failure to cross-examine
{¶34} Watson next argues that his counsel’s failure to cross-examine the coroner
who perform the autopsy amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,
Watson argues that the toxicology report on T.B. showed the prolific number of drugs in
his system including significant amounts of amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Watson contends that several scientific studies have demonstrated that violent behavior
increases during periods of methamphetamine use, and suggests his counsel should
have cross-examined the coroner on this subject.
{¶35} The scope of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy, and
debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hoffner,
102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 45; State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio
St.3d 320, 339, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000). In addition, to fairly assess counsel’s
performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.
{¶36} Nothing in the record establishes that the coroner is qualified to testify that
violent behavior increases during periods of drug use. “Nothing in the record indicates
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 13
what kind of testimony [he] could have provided. Establishing that would require proof
outside the record, such as affidavits demonstrating the probable testimony. Such a claim
is not appropriately considered on a direct appeal.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378,
390–391, 721 N.E.2d 52, 65 (2000) (rejecting claim of ineffectiveness for counsel’s failure
to utilize an expert on eyewitness identification); State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 606,
734 N.E.2d 345, 357(2000) (rejecting claim of ineffectiveness for counsel’s failure to
pursue MRI testing in the penalty phase). There is nothing in the record from which we
can determine whether such evidence would have been favorable to Watson and caused
the outcome of the trial to be different. State v. Coleman, 45 Ohio St.2d 298, 307-308,
544 N.E.2d 622(1989).
{¶37} However, even assuming arguendo counsel’s failure to cross-examine the
coroner concerning the decedent’s drug usage reflected deficient performance, Watson
cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. We note that the jury heard evidence of the
drugs in T.B.’s system at the time of his death. 2T. at 211-212. The jury further heard
testimony that drugs make individuals more agitated from trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Officer Aynes. 2T. at 73. Additionally, the jury was able to observe the
decedent and Watson in real time on the motel’s video surveillance footage.
{¶38} Thus, Watson has not shown that there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s error, the result of his trial would have been different.
Failure to mount an effective self-defense theory
{¶39} Watson argues that his trial counsel did not comply with Crim. R. 12.2.
Watson argues that the trial court’s refusal to allow J.J. to testify to the prior violent
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 14
acts of T.B. that he witnessed was because his trial counsel failed to comply with
Crim. R. 12.2.
{¶40} Crim. R. 12.2. states in pertinent part:
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer
evidence or argue self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that
person's residence, the defendant shall, not less than thirty days before
trial in a felony case and fourteen days before trial in a misdemeanor
case, give notice in writing of such intent. The notice shall include
specific information as to any prior incidents or circumstances upon
which defendant intends to offer evidence related to conduct of the
alleged victim, and the names and addresses of any witness’s
defendant may call at trial to offer testimony related to the defense. If
the defendant fails to file such written notice, the court may exclude
evidence offered by the defendant related to the defense, unless the
court determines that in the interest of justice such evidence should be
admitted.
{¶41} Prior to the start of trial, the trial judge addressed the state’s motion in limine
to exclude bad acts testimony concerning the decedent. 1T. at 207. The judge did not
mention Crim.R. 12.2; rather, the focus of the discussion was Evid. R. 404 and 405. Id.
at 213. The court permitted both counsel to further research the issue.
{¶42} The trial judge addressed the issue again after the state had rested its case.
3T. at 39. During this discussion the trial judge does review Crim.R. 12.2. Id. at 42. The
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 15
judge indicated that he would not allow the testimony under Evid.R. 404 and also because
of the lack of compliance with Crim.R. 12.2. Id. at 50-51.
{¶43} J.J.’s name was provided to the state in both the defendant’s witness list
filed September 21, 2022 and the updated witness list filed September 23, 2022.
{¶44} We note that Crim R. 12.2 is a rule of procedure, not a rule of evidence.
The rule requires only that the defense notify the state of evidence that the defense may
offer in support of his self-defense claim. It does not appear to this Court to make the
evidence admissible at trial, per se. Whether any particular piece of evidence is
admissible at trial would be determined by the Rules of Evidence, not the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In the case at bar, the trial court also ruled the testimony of J.J.
inadmissible under Evid. R. 404 and 405.
{¶45} Even if counsel’s failure to comply with Crim R. 12.2 reflected deficient
performance, Watson has failed to establish prejudice under Strickland.
{¶46} The trial judge did permit Watson to present his self-defense case to the
jury and further instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense. The jury heard Watson
himself testify concerning the prior violent acts of T.B. and how they affected him.
Further, the jury was able to view the actors and their actions in real time via the
surveillance videos. Watson fails to elucidate how J.J.’s corroboration of the
instances of T.B.’s conduct would have led the jury to find Watson not guilty of
murder.
{¶47} Thus, Watson has not shown that there was a reasonable probability that,
but for J.J.’s testimony, the result of his trial would have been different.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 16
Failure to attend significant court proceedings
{¶48} Watson next argues that his lead counsel was ineffective because co-
counsel attended the arraignment and pre-trial conferences. We find, however, that
argument to lack merit. We note that co-counsel also represented Watson, along with
lead counsel, during Watson’s jury trial. Watson was represented by competent counsel
at all stages of the case. Watson has not shown that there was a reasonable probability
that, but for lead counsel’s failure to personally attend pre-trial conferences, the result of
his trial would have been different.
Failure to sever the weapons under disability charge from the remaining
charges
{¶49} Watson argues trial counsel was ineffective in not asking to have the Having
Weapons While under Disability charge severed and tried separately by the trial judge.
Watson contends because of trial counsel's inaction, the jury heard about Watson's prior
felony record which could have been avoided. He argues that such evidence clearly
prejudiced Watson as the jury learned he was a convicted felon.
{¶50} Prior to voir dire, trial counsel stipulated to Watson's prior conviction in 2009
for possession of cocaine and, also stipulated to the operability of the firearm. 1T. at 7;
4T. at 52.
{¶51} A defendant has no constitutional right to determine trial tactics and strategy
of counsel. State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 72, 717 N.E.2d 298(1999); State v.
Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 150; State v. Donkers,
170 Ohio App.3d 509, 867 N.E.2d 903, 2007-Ohio-1557, ¶ 183(11th Dist.). Rather,
decisions about viable defenses are the exclusive domain of defense counsel after
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 17
consulting with the defendant. Id. When there is no demonstration that counsel failed to
research the facts or the law or that counsel was ignorant of a crucial defense, a reviewing
court defers to counsel's judgment in the matter. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49,
402 N.E.2d 1189(1980), citing People v. Miller, 7 Cal.3d 562, 573-574, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841,
498 P.2d 1089(1972); State v. Wiley, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-340, 2004-Ohio-1008 at ¶ 21.
Even if the wisdom of an approach is questionable, “debatable trial tactics” do not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. “Poor tactics of experienced counsel,
however, even with disastrous result, may hardly be considered lack of due process * *
*.” State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 48, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980) (quoting United States
v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir.1963), certiorari denied 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1112, 10
L.Ed.2d 143.
{¶52} As part of his defense, Watson explained to the jury why he left the scene
after he shot T.B. Watson testified during his trial that he left the scene and did not stay
to speak to the police after the shooting because he was not permitted to have a firearm.
Thus, counsel may have made a tactical decision to allow the jury to hear that Watson
had a 12-year-old conviction for possessing cocaine rather than leaving the jury to
speculate as to a more nefarious reason why he could not possess a weapon.
{¶53} In light of the overwhelming evidence of Watson’s guilt, we find that even if
counsel’s failure to have the charges severed for trial reflected deficient performance,
Watson has failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. Watson has not shown that
there was a reasonable probability that, but for the jury being aware of his prior conviction
for possession of cocaine, the jury would have found him not guilty of murder.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 18
Failure to object to testimony from law enforcement regarding search
warrants
{¶54} Watson suggests that search warrants required a neutral judge to decide
sufficient probable cause to demonstrate that a search was warranted for a crime that
occurred. Allowing the investigating police officers to testify that they had obtained search
warrants for T.B.’s room and Watson’s room at the Rodeway Inn essentially told that jury
that Watson was involved with a murder thereby destroying his presumption of innocence.
Therefore, Watson submits, his trial counsel’s failure to object to this testimony and
request a limiting instruction amounted to ineffective assistance.
{¶55} “‘The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347, 715 N.E.2d
136 (1999), quoting State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988).
A defendant must also show that he was materially prejudiced by the failure to object.
Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d at 244, 527 N.E.2d 831. Accord, State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d
118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 233.
{¶56} It is unlikely that the trial judge would have prevented the testimony even if
counsel had objected. The testimony merely informed the jury about the protocol the
police used to investigate the crime. The jury was informed that the police legally and
properly searched the rooms during the investigation. Watson never denied shooting T.B.
Watson never denied having the gun used to shoot T.B. Watson was arrested for
shooting T.B. Thus, the jury could infer that Watson was involved with a crime, even a
murder, without the evidence relating to the search warrants.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 19
{¶57} In any event, the presumption of innocence was fully explained in the voir
dire and the jury instructions. See, State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164,
793 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 75. “[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. United
States, 506 U.S. 534, 540, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). “A presumption
always exists that the jury has followed the instructions given to it by the trial court,” Pang
v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 187, 559 N.E.2d 1313(1990), at paragraph four of the
syllabus, rehearing denied, 54 Ohio St.3d 716, 562 N.E.2d 163, approving and following
State v. Fox, 133 Ohio St. 154, 12 N.E.2d 413(1938); Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62,
165 N.E. 566(1929).
{¶58} Even if counsel’s failure to object to testimony concerning the police
obtaining search warrants could be construed as deficit performance, Watson has failed
to establish prejudice under Strickland. Watson has not shown that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for the testimony concerning the search warrants, the
result of his trial would have been different.
Failure to object to testimony from law enforcement that Watson was in jail or
request a limiting instruction
{¶59} Watson next argues that trial counsel failed to object or request a curative
instruction when Detective McDannold testified he collected Watson’s DNA from Watson
at the Stark County Jail. Watson contends that the fact that he was in jail destroyed the
presumption of innocence in the eyes of the jury.
{¶60} We note that the detective’s testimony concerning jail was not solicited by
the prosecutor. The statement was isolated and occurred when the detective was
explaining his collection of the evidence and the chain of custody. 2T. at 147. The
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 20
evidence that Watson was in jail related solely to when Watson’s DNA was collected by
the detective and does not convey that Watson was in jail from the time of his arrest to
the time of trial.
{¶61} The failure to request a curative instruction may have been a tactical
decision by counsel to avoid calling additional attention to the statement which, in and of
itself, created no prejudice to Watson in light of the totality of the evidence adduced. In
addition, the presumption of innocence was fully explained in the voir dire and the jury
instructions. See, State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d
446, ¶ 75.
{¶62} Even if counsel’s failure to object reflected deficient performance, Watson
has failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. Watson has not shown that there was
a reasonable probability that, but for the jury being aware that he was in jail at the time
the detective collected his DNA, the result of his trial would have been different.
Failure to request an expert witness to testify to the effect of drugs found in
the T.B.'s system
{¶63} Watson suggests that an expert opinion and testimony that discussed the
effects of the drugs taken by T.B. on his demeanor and violent words and actions would
have substantially supported Watson's theory of self-defense.
{¶64} “Nothing in the record indicates what kind of testimony an * * * expert could
have provided. Establishing that would require proof outside the record, such as affidavits
demonstrating the probable testimony. Such a claim is not appropriately considered on
a direct appeal.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390–391, 721 N.E.2d 52, 65
(2000) (rejecting claim of ineffectiveness for counsel’s failure to utilize an expert on
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 21
eyewitness identification); State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 606, 734 N.E.2d 345,
357(2000) (rejecting claim of ineffectiveness for counsel’s failure to pursue MRI testing in
the penalty phase). There is nothing in the record from which we can determine whether
such evidence would have been favorable to Watson and caused the outcome of the trial
to be different. State v. Coleman, 45 Ohio St.2d 298, 307-308, 544 N.E.2d 622(1989).
Further, the jury was able to view the actors and their actions before, during, and after
the shooting in real time via the surveillance videos.
{¶65} Thus, we reject Watson’s claim that counsel’s failure to request an expert
to testify to the effect of drugs found in the victim's system constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Disrespect of the trial court judge in front of the jury
{¶66} Watson contends that animosity and disrespect of Watson's trial counsel to
the court was viewed by the jury. However, Watson cites to only the following as evidence
in support of his claim,
THE COURT: Hey counsel, you’re starting to repeat yourself over
and over.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m sorry, Judge
THE COURT: That’s okay. Its closing argument.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I - - I don’t want – I don’t want you to be
angry with me.
THE COURT: I’m not angry one bit. I’m just doing my job as judge.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t want you think [sic.] I’m –
THE COURT: That’s all.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 22
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t want you to think I’m screwing up. I
want to - -
[THE COURT]: I’m not saying anyone is screwing up. I just said- -
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I want to meet the court’s expectations. I’ll
move on.
THE COURT: Wait. Wait a minute. Let’s have a sidebar.
4T. at 92. The remaining exchange occurred outside the hearing of the jury. Id. Watson
cites to no other place in the record to support his assertion that defense counsel
displayed animosity and disrespect toward the trial judge.
{¶67} Even if counsel’s attitude and remarks reflected deficient performance,
which we do not find to be the case, Watson has failed to establish prejudice under
Strickland. Watson has not shown that there was a reasonable probability that, but for
the exchange between the judge and defense counsel, the result of his trial would have
been different.
Cumulative errors
{¶68} Watson contends all of these issues collectively amounted to cumulative
error.
{¶69} In State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003–Ohio–5059, 796 N.E.2d 506,
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative error. However, as
explained in State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006–Ohio–4853, 854 N.E.2d 150,
¶197, it is simply not enough to intone the phrase “cumulative error.” State v. Sapp, 105
Ohio St.3d 104, 2004–Ohio–7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶103.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 23
{¶70} Watson cites the doctrine of cumulative error, lists, or incorporates the
previous assignments of error, and gives no analysis or explanation as to why or how the
errors have had a prejudicial cumulative effect. Thus, this assignment of error has no
substance under Bethel and Sapp.
{¶71} Further, where we have found that the trial court did not err, cumulative error
is simply inapplicable. State v. Carter, 5th Dist. Stark No.2002CA00125, 2003–Ohio-
1313 at ¶37. To the extent that we have found that any claimed error of the trial court
was harmless, or that claimed error did not rise to the level of plain error, we conclude
that the cumulative effect of such claimed errors is also harmless because taken together,
they did not materially affect the verdict. State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 89–90,
2004–Ohio–6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, 270 at ¶ 185.
{¶72} Watson’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶73} In his Second Assignment of Error, Watson argues that the manifest weight
of the evidence supports that he acted in self-defense when he shot T.B.
Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight
{¶74} The state’s new burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim
beyond a reasonable doubt is subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal. State v.
Messenger, Slip Op. No. 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶27.
{¶75} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a
manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the
evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 24
stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.
Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).
{¶76} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v.
Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of
appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982)
(quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865
N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins. As one Court has explained,
When faced with a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, we
must consider whether the state “carried its burden of persuasion” before
the trial court. State v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26;
see State v. Martin, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Unlike the
burden of production, which concerns a party’s duty to introduce enough
evidence on an issue, the burden of persuasion represents a party’s duty to
convince the factfinder to view the facts in his or her favor. Messenger at ¶
17. Therefore, in order for us to conclude that the factfinder’s adjudication
of conflicting evidence ran counter to the manifest weight of the evidence—
which we reserve for only the most exceptional circumstances—we must
find that the factfinder disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that
weighed against conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387-
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 25
388, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We accordingly sit as a “thirteenth juror” in
this respect. Id.State v. Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 8.
{¶77} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may
not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.
1983). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized: “‘[I]n determining whether the
judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable
intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment
and the finding of facts. * * *.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.2d
517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,
461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,
Section 603, at 191–192 (1978).
{¶78} Further, to reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel
reviewing the case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio
Constitution. Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4,
citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 26
{¶79} Watson was convicted of felony murder pursuant to R. C. 2903.02(B) which
provides that "[no] person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the
offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of
the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the
Revised Code."
{¶80} When an accused asserts the defense of self-defense he does not seek to
negate any of the elements of the offense which the state is required to prove. Self-
defense is not merely a denial or contradiction of evidence offered by the state to prove
the essential elements of the charged crime. Rather, it is an admission of the prohibited
conduct coupled with a claim that the surrounding facts or circumstances exempt the
accused from liability therefor— “justification for admitted conduct.” State v. Poole, 33
Ohio St.2d 18, 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
{¶81} In order to determine the respective duties with respect to a self-defense
claim, we must turn to R.C. 2901.05(B)(1),
(B)(1) A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of another,
or defense of that person’s residence. If, at the trial of a person who is
accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of force against
another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused
person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of
that person’s residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense, defense
of another, or defense of that person’s residence, as the case may be.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 27
{¶82} Under R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) there are two burdens. State v. Davidson-Dixon,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109557, 2021-Ohio-1485, ¶ 18. The defendant has the initial
burden of production, which is the burden of producing evidence “that tends to support”
that the defendant used the force in self-defense. State v. Messenger, Slip Op. 2022-
Ohio-4462, 2022 WL 17824346, ¶ 21. The burden then shifts to the state under its burden
of persuasion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use the
force in self-defense. Id. at ¶ 24. In other words, if the evidence tends to support that the
defendant acted in self-defense, then the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); Id. at ¶26; State
v. Gatewood, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190654, 2021-Ohio-3325, ¶ 68. The state need
only disprove one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to
sustain its burden. State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 490 N.E.2d 893(1986).
Accord, State v. Carney, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶31; State
v. Staats, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2019CA00181, ¶ 28.
{¶83} At the close of Watson’s jury trial, the trial court provided the jury with
an instruction regarding self-defense, which means that the trial court concluded that
the record contained evidence that tends to support that Watson used the force in self-
defense when he shot and killed T.B. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). State v. Messenger, Slip Op.
2022-Ohio-4462, 2022 WL 17824346, ¶ 26. The guilty verdict means that the state met
its burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson was not
acting in self-defense when he killed T.B. Id.{¶84} When deadly force is used, the elements of self-defense that the state must
now disprove at least one of are: (1) Watson was not at fault in creating the situation
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 28
giving rise to the affray, (2) Watson had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest
belief even if mistaken that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and
that he did not use more force than necessary to defend against the attack and (3) Watson
must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio
St.2d 74, 79, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979) (citations omitted); See also, State v. Barker, 2nd
Dist. Montgomery, 2022-Ohio-3756, 199 N.E.3d 626, ¶27; State v. Evans, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 79895, 2002-Ohio-2610, 2002 WL 1041745, ¶ 53; State v. Hamilton, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2001-04-098, 2002-Ohio-3862, 2002 WL 1758358, ¶17.
{¶85} As to the third element of self-defense, we note that the trial court instructed
the jury in accordance with the recently amended “stand your ground” law in Ohio. 4T. at
44. That law now indicates that “a person has no duty to retreat before using self-defense
* * * if that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.” R.C.
2901.09(B); State v. Messenger, Slip Op. 2022-Ohio-4462, 2022 WL 17824346, ¶10.
“‘Simply put, the new ‘stand your ground’ law removes, in most cases, the duty to retreat
before using self-defense.’” State v. Degahson, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-35, 2022-
Ohio-2972, ¶ 15. State v. Mitchell, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220471, 2023-Ohio-2604, ¶
17; State v. Robinette, 5th Dist. Stark No 2021 CA 00124, 2023-Ohio-5, 205 N.E.3d 633,
¶51.
{¶86} The second element of self-defense “is a combined subjective and objective
test.” State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 673 N.E.2d 1339 (1997). The person’s
belief must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he must subjectively
believe he needed to resort to force to defend himself or the other person. Id. at 330–
331, 673 N.E.2d 1339.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 29
“The objective part of the test requires consideration of ‘whether,
considering all of the defendant’s particular characteristics, knowledge, or
lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, and conditions at the time of the
attack,’ a reasonable person would believe that danger was imminent.”
State v. Hendrickson, 4th Dist. No. 08CA12, 2009-Ohio-4416, 2009 WL
2682158, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Keith, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 08AP–28,
08AP–29, 2008-Ohio-6122, ¶ 23, citing Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d at 330, 673
N.E.2d 1339. The subjective part requires consideration of whether the
defendant himself actually believed that he was in imminent danger. Id.State v. Bundy, 4th Dist. Pike No. 11 CA 818, 2012-Ohio-3934, ¶54; Accord, State v.
Wilson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210535, 2022-Ohio-3801, ¶13.
{¶87} Here, the evidence does not support that Watson possessed the necessary
objective and subjective beliefs he was in imminent or immediate danger of death or great
bodily harm. Generally, neither words alone nor fear itself will constitute evidence of
serious provocation. "[W]ords alone will not constitute reasonably sufficient provocation
to incite the use of deadly force in most situations." State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630,
634-45, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992).” Fear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of
emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or fit of rage." State v. Mack, 82
Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 694 N.E.2d 1328. Cases have held that a victim's simple pushing
or punching does not constitute sufficient provocation to incite the use of deadly force in
most situations. See, State v. Koballa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82013, 2003-Ohio-3535(concluding that sufficient provocation did not exist when the victim grabbed the
defendant by the testicles and the arm); State v. Poe 4th Dist. Jackson No. 00CA9, 2000-
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 30
Ohio-1966 (concluding that the victim's conduct in approaching the defendant with a
hammer and stating "come on" did not constitute sufficient provocation). State v. Pack,
4th Dist. Pike No. 93CA525, 1994 WL 274429(June 20, 1994) ("We find that a mere shove
and a swing (which appellant by his own testimony ducked) are insufficient as a matter of
law to constitute serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite or arouse appellant
into using deadly force."). Although stated in terms of provocation, we find the same
analysis would apply to whether a defendant, by reason of the actions of the victim,
possessed the necessary objective and subjective beliefs he was in imminent or
immediate danger of death or great bodily harm. State v. Becker, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022
CA 0069, 2023-Ohio-601, ¶27.
{¶88} Implicit in the second element of self-defense is the requirement that the
degree of force used was warranted under the circumstances and proportionate to the
perceived threat. State v. Kean, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-427, 2019-Ohio-1171, ¶
58. As to the degree of force that is permitted, the defendant is privileged to use the
amount of force that is reasonably necessary to repel the attack. State v. Williford, 49
Ohio St. 3d 247, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990). In other words, one may use a commensurate
amount of force as the circumstances require to protect oneself against an attack. Akron
v. Dokes, 31 Ohio App.3d 24, 25, 507 N.E.2d 1158 (9th Dist. 1986).
{¶89} Watson testified to only verbal threats made by T.B. prior to Watson’s use
of deadly force. The video evidence shows T.B. was shirtless, unarmed, and was backing
up with his arms raised, hands empty, when Watson appears to step forward towards
T.B., while pulling out his pistol from his waistband, and shot T.B. The video evidence
shows that T.B. did not charge Watson; did not raise a fist to Watson; and that T.B. was
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 31
not within arm’s reach of Watson. Even setting aside the question of who the aggressor
was, Watson testified that T.B. did not have any sort of weapon in his hands at any time
during the altercation. If Watson’s fear was only of physical harm, he was allowed by law
only to use an amount of force that was warranted under the circumstances and
proportionate to the perceived threat. Watson’s decision to shoot T.B. was deadly force
and was disproportionate to the threat he faced under these circumstances.
{¶90} While Watson was free to argue that he was justified in using deadly force,
and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly, the jury may have chosen to discredit
his testimony. The jury saw Watson and all the witnesses subjected to cross-
examination. The jury also reviewed the Rodeway surveillance video, Best Western
surveillance video, and the video from the Benjamin Transportation Company showing
the events as they happened in real time.
{¶91} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that
there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the
crimes for which Watson was convicted. We further find there is substantial evidence
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson was not acting in self-defense when
he killed T.B., and further, the degree of force used by Watson was unwarranted under
the circumstances and disproportionate to the perceived threat. Therefore, in light of the
evidence discussed above, as well as the record in its entirety, we do not find the jury
clearly lost its way concluding that Watson murdered T.B. and that he was not acting in
self-defense. We do not find that the jury disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence
that weighed against conviction.
{¶92} Watson’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 32
III.
{¶93} In his Third Assignment of Error, Watson contends that there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; further he argues the
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶94} Watson argues that the state based its theory of tampering with evidence
on the discovery of the Ruger pistol in Room 215. He claims, however, that the video
evidence and the testimony of law enforcement do not support the finding that Watson
attempted to conceal the weapon. It was found in plain view under the air conditioner
and/or a chair. It was not thrown in a waste basket or hidden in a drawer.
Standard of Appellate Review– Sufficiency of the Evidence.
{¶95} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in
conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of
a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92,
136 S.Ct. 616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence
involves a question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio
St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the
elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v.
Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13.
{¶96} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not
ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574
N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 33
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474,
2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do
not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if believed,
[the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001),
quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus; Walker 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶31. We will
not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could
not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d
70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421,
430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-
5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the
average mind that Watson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Tampering with
Evidence
{¶97} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) provides that “no person, knowing that an official
proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall
* * * alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to
impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]”
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 34
{¶98} Thus, to prove tampering with evidence, the state had to prove that Watson
(1) had knowledge that an official proceeding or investigation was in progress or likely to
be instituted; (2) altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the potential evidence; and
(3) for the purpose of impairing the potential evidence’s availability or value in such
proceeding or investigation. State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11
N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 11. A conviction for tampering with evidence pursuant to R.C.
2921.12(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the value or availability
of evidence that related to an existing or likely official investigation or proceeding.
Likelihood is measured at the time of the act of alleged tampering. Straley, ¶19.
{¶99} T.B. and his girlfriend rented Room 309; Room 223 was rented by K.C.,
Watson's girlfriend. 2T. at 94, 122. Detective Shanklin reviewed the security footage
and noted the shooting occurred in front of Room 215. 2T. at 90-91. Because he saw
people go into that room after the shooting, he obtained a search warrant for that room.
Detective Shanklin searched Room 215 and found a Ruger silver/black pistol under the
air conditioning unit and/or a chair.
{¶100} Watson knew the police were arriving. He did not give the pistol to the
police or direct the police to where the pistol he had used to shoot T.B. could be found.
Watson fled the scene leaving the pistol behind. Watson did not leave the pistol on the
bed or the desk; rather he removed the pistol from his waistband, placed it inside a room
that he was not associated with, and placed it behind a chair, and underneath the wall
mounted air conditioning unit. The jury could infer that he did so in an attempt to prevent
the police from locating it. The jury was able to view a photograph of exactly where the
pistol was placed when it was discovered by the police. 2T. at 100; State’s Exhibit 1-P.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 35
{¶101} Viewing the evidence in the case at bar in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Watson knowing the police were investigating the shooting death
of T.B. concealed, or removed the potential evidence for the purpose of impairing the
potential evidence’s availability or value in such investigation.
{¶102} We hold, therefore, that the state met its burden of production regarding
each element of the crime of tampering with evidence and, accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence to submit the charge to the jury and to support Watson’s conviction.
Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight
{¶103} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a
manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the
evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as
stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.
Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).
{¶104} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v.
Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of
appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982)
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 36
(quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865
N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins. As one Court has explained,
When faced with a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, we
must consider whether the state “carried its burden of persuasion” before
the trial court. State v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26;
see State v. Martin, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Unlike the
burden of production, which concerns a party’s duty to introduce enough
evidence on an issue, the burden of persuasion represents a party’s duty to
convince the factfinder to view the facts in his or her favor. Messenger at ¶
17. Therefore, in order for us to conclude that the factfinder’s adjudication
of conflicting evidence ran counter to the manifest weight of the evidence—
which we reserve for only the most exceptional circumstances—we must
find that the factfinder disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that
weighed against conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387-
388, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We accordingly sit as a “thirteenth juror” in
this respect. Id.State v. Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 8.
{¶105} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may
not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.
1983). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized: “‘[I]n determining whether the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 37
judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable
intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment
and the finding of facts. * * *.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.2d
517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,
461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,
Section 603, at 191–192 (1978).
{¶106} Further, to reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel
reviewing the case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio
Constitution. Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4,
citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
{¶107} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon
the entire record in this matter we find Watson’s conviction for tampering with evidence
is not against the sufficiency or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the
jury appears to have fairly and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury
heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of Watson’s guilt.
{¶108} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 38
cannot reach the conclusion that the trier of facts lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. We do not find the jury erred when it found Watson guilty. Taken
as a whole, the testimony and record contain ample evidence of Watson’s responsibility
for the crime of tampering with evidence. The jury was able to observe the witnesses,
including Watson, testify subject to cross-examination. The jury was able to view a
photograph of exactly where the pistol was placed when it was discovered by the police.
2T. at 100; State’s Exhibit 1-P.
{¶109} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that
there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the
crime of tampering with evidence for which Watson was convicted. We do not find that
the jury disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that weighed against conviction.
{¶110} Watson’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
IV.
{¶111} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Watson argues that the trial judge
violated his right to present a meaningful defense by excluding the testimony of J.J.
Specifically, Watson argues that J.J.’s testimony was admissible because it would support
his self-defense claim in that it would corroborate why Watson believed T.B. would kill or
severely injure him.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶112} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the
rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d
1056 (1991).
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 39
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court violated Watson’s right to
present a meaningful defense by excluding the testimony of a defense witness
concerning specific acts of the decedent
{¶113} Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a meaningful
defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986).
A defendant has an absolute right to prepare an adequate defense under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and a right to due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir.
2000). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to offer the
testimony of witnesses and compel their attendance is constitutionally protected.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the right to present a witness to establish a
defense is a fundamental element of due process of law. Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32
Ohio St.3d 1, 4–5, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987).
{¶114} As we noted in our disposition of Watson’s First Assignment of Error, the
trial judge did permit Watson to present his self-defense case to the jury and further
instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense. The jury heard Watson himself testify
concerning the prior violent acts of T.B. and how they affected him. Further, the jury
was able to view the actors and their actions in real time via the surveillance videos.
{¶115} Assuming arguendo that the trial judge erred in excluding the testimony of
J.J., we would still find no reversible error. Where, as here, the defendant has objected
to a claimed error in the trial court, an appellate court reviews error under a harmless
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 40
error standard set forth in Crim.R. 52(A). State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-
297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15.
{¶116} Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal cases and
provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.” Under the harmless-error standard of review, “the
government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial
rights of the defendant.” State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004–Ohio–297, 802 N.E.2d
643, ¶ 15, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d
508 (1993). An appellate court is required to reverse the conviction when the state is
unable to meet its burden. Perry at ¶ 15. See, also, State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605,
2022-Ohio-1556, 200 N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 22.
{¶117} The following analysis was established to guide appellate courts in
determining whether an error has affected the substantial rights of a defendant, thereby
requiring a new trial. First, it must be determined whether the defendant was prejudiced
by the error, i.e., whether the error had an impact on the verdict. State v. Morris, 141
Ohio St.3d 399, 2014–Ohio–5052, 24 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 25 and 27. Second, it must be
determined whether the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 28.
Lastly, once the prejudicial evidence is excised, the remaining evidence is weighed to
determine whether it establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
¶ 29, 33. See also, State v. Harris, 142 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015–Ohio–166, 28 N.E.3d 1256,
¶ 36–37.
{¶118} The jury heard the evidence of T.B.’s prior encounters with Watson from
Watson himself. J.J. was not present when Watson shot T.B. At best, J.J.’s testimony
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00145 41
corroborates Watson’s testimony concerning the prior encounters with T.B. As we noted
in our disposition of Watson’s Second Assignment of Error, the video evidence and the
testimony establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson was not acting in self-
defense at the time that he shot T.B. and further, the degree of force used by Watson
was unwarranted under the circumstances and disproportionate to the perceived threat.
We therefore find that the exclusion of J.J.’s testimony did not change the result of
the trial and had no impact on the verdict. The exclusion of J.J.’s testimony, if error,
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶119} Further we find that even if we consider J.J.’s testimony, the testimony does
not overcome the overwhelming evidence that supports the finding that Watson did not
possess the necessary objective and subjective beliefs he was in imminent or immediate
danger of death or great bodily harm at the time he shot T.B. and further, that the degree
of force used by Watson was unwarranted under the circumstances and disproportionate
to the perceived threat.
{¶120} Watson’s Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶121} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Hoffman, J., and
King, J., concur