In re A.C. ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re A.C., 2024-Ohio-1661.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: A.C., A MINOR CHILD. : APPEAL NOS. C-230359
C-230360
: C-230361
TRIAL NOS. 19-005532X
: 19-003199X
19-003198X
: O P I N I O N.
Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 1, 2024
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W.
Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Ohio,
Office of the Ohio Public Defender and Timothy B. Hackett, Assistant State Public
Defender, for Defendant-Appellee A.C.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the state of Ohio appeals from the trial court’s
decision granting defendant-appellee A.C.’s motion for early judicial release from the
custody of the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”). As an initial question, the
parties dispute our jurisdiction to consider these appeals. Because the state sought
leave to appeal from final appealable orders under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), we have
jurisdiction to resolve these cases. We do so by holding that, on the specific record
before us, the juvenile court had discretion to grant early judicial release, because it
was not a party to the plea agreement between the state and A.C. that limited A.C.’s
ability to receive judicial release and because no evidence exists in the record that the
juvenile court adopted this provision at A.C.’s disposition. We therefore affirm the
judgments of the juvenile court.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶2} The charges against A.C. arose from his involvement in an armed
robbery. The parties negotiated a plea agreement, but A.C. requested additional time
at a December 18, 2019 hearing to review its terms before agreeing on the record. Five
days later, on December 23, 2019, the parties entered a written plea agreement that
was signed by A.C., his counsel, and the prosecutor. Under the terms of the written
agreement, A.C. agreed to admit to involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery,
and felonious assault, with gun specifications as to each charge. The parties
contemplated a disposition under which A.C. would be committed to DYS for a period
of 48 months to his 21st birthday.
{¶3} In addition, the written plea agreement contained the following
provision as to A.C.’s ability to receive early release from DYS:
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
I also understand that I am freely and voluntarily agreeing as a
condition of this agreed plea with the State that I will NOT receive ANY
form of early release during the ENTIRE TERM OF MY
INCARCERATION. I understand that I am freely and voluntarily
agreeing that I will serve the entire term of incarceration listed above
and that this Court will not reduce my sentence or release me early in
any way. I understand and freely and voluntarily agree that this Court
will deny any motion for any type of early release filed by me or on my
behalf without a hearing. I understand and freely and voluntarily agree
that, as a result of this agreed plea, this Court has no discretion to even
consider any motion for any type of early release filed by me or on my
behalf, and will deny any motion for any type of early release filed by me
or on my behalf without any further consideration.
{¶4} The juvenile court entered judgment entries on December 23, 2019,
reflecting that A.C. admitted the offenses that day as contemplated by the plea
agreement. According to the judgment entries, the juvenile court accepted A.C.’s
admissions to the offenses and reviewed a relevant victim impact statement. The
judgment entries do not specifically reference the provision in the written plea
agreement regarding A.C.’s ability to receive early release. We lack a transcript in the
record of the December 23, 2019 hearing, so we have no information as to whether the
juvenile court reviewed the early release provision with A.C. or otherwise verbally
adopted it prior to entering judgment against him.
{¶5} A.C.’s dispositions were entered the same day as his plea. The juvenile
court imposed the agreed-upon dispositions: an aggregate commitment to DYS of 48
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
months to A.C.’s 21st birthday. Additionally, the juvenile court found that A.C. was a
serious youthful offender (“SYO”) and sentenced A.C. to an aggregate prison term of
18 years in the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, which it stayed pending
his successful completion of A.C.’s DYS commitment.
{¶6} A.C. moved for early judicial release from DYS on November 19, 2021,
which the juvenile court denied. He moved for early judicial release again on August
30, 2022. The juvenile court held a hearing on A.C.’s motion on June 6, 2023.
{¶7} At the hearing, A.C.’s counsel explained that early judicial release was
warranted given A.C.’s significant progress at DYS. His counsel further explained that
A.C. had completed substance abuse programming and individual therapy. A.C. had
also graduated from high school and started taking college courses. He had completed
over 426 hours of community service. Additionally, his parole officer testified that
A.C. was a leader at DYS, very respectful of staff, and always willing to assist. Staff
from DYS also testified to A.C.’s respectful and thoughtful demeanor. A.C.’s mentor
further testified that A.C. had matured and taken full advantage of the opportunities
presented to him at DYS. A.C.’s mother also testified that A.C. could live with her upon
release and that he would abide by her rules.
{¶8} The state argued that the time that A.C. had already served was not
enough for rehabilitation and accountability. When the juvenile court inquired as to
why that time was insufficient, the state maintained that there was more that A.C.
could and should do, without specifically describing any specific programming
remaining for A.C. to complete.
{¶9} In resolving A.C.’s early release motion, the juvenile court found that, as
a minor, A.C. was not capable of entering into the plea agreement under contract law.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
The juvenile court granted A.C.’s motion for early judicial release and noted that his
SYO sentence remained pending until A.C. turned 21.
{¶10} The state moved for leave to appeal under R.C. 2945.67(A). The state
proposed two assignments of error: (1) the juvenile court erred when it granted early
judicial release contrary to the plea agreement between the parties that was adopted
by the juvenile court; and (2) the juvenile court erred when it held a hearing on A.C.’s
motion without giving any of the victims a meaningful opportunity to attend the
hearing or to make a statement.
{¶11} We granted the state’s motion as to the first proposed assignment of
error. But we denied the state’s motion as to the second proposed assignment of error,
because the state did not show a probability that the claimed error occurred. We also
requested that the parties address the issue of whether the state’s appeal by leave of
court must be from a final appealable order. The parties briefed this issue at our
request, as well as the state’s assignment of error. We consider each issue in turn.
Final Appealable Order
{¶12} The state sought leave to appeal under R.C. 2945.67(A). This statute
permits the state to “appeal as a matter of right any decision of a trial court in a
criminal case, or any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which grants a
motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, information, a motion
to suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized property or grants post-
conviction relief.” For any other decision, except the final verdict, the state may appeal
by leave of the court. See R.C. 2945.67(A). Notably, the statute does not specify
whether an appeal by leave of court must be from a final appealable order.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶13} Ohio courts have been inconsistent as to this issue, requiring final
appealable orders as a prerequisite to leave under R.C. 2945.67(A) in some cases and
dispensing with the finality requirement in others. See State v. Jones, 2017-Ohio-
5758, 94 N.E.3d 971, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). Because we conclude that the state sought leave
to appeal from final appealable orders under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) in this case, we do
not need to resolve the broader question of whether R.C. 2945.67(A) excuses the
finality requirement. The state has met that requirement here, whether it needed to
or not.
{¶14} R.C. 2502.02(B)(2) provides that an order that affects a substantial
right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after
judgment constitutes a final appealable order. Judicial release proceedings are
undoubtedly special proceedings. See State v. Ogle, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 16CA22,
2017-Ohio-869, ¶ 8. Thus, that component of finality under R.C. 2502.02(B)(2) is
easily established.
{¶15} With regard to whether a substantial right is affected in this case, R.C.
2505.02(A)(1) defines a substantial right as “a right that the United States
Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure
entitles a person to enforce or protect.” “An order affects a substantial right for the
purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the
right effectively.” Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317,
950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 7.
{¶16} The state identified its right to enforce the plea agreement as the
substantial right that was affected by the juvenile court’s order. We agree. Because
the state is seeking to have its benefit of the bargain enforced under contract law, and
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that is a right afforded under the common law, the state has identified a substantial
right that meets the requirements of R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). Accordingly, the juvenile
court’s early release order affected the state’s substantial rights in a special proceeding
under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), and the state therefore sought leave to appeal from final
appealable orders. We therefore have jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the
state’s assignment of error.
Breach of Plea Agreement
{¶17} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues the juvenile court erred
in granting A.C. early judicial release in contravention of the plea agreement. We review
decisions granting early release for an abuse of discretion. See In re G.S., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 86832, 2006-Ohio-3161, ¶ 10.
{¶18} The state advances several arguments as to why the juvenile court
abused its discretion in agreeing to release A.C. from DYS before the expiration of his
48-month minimum commitment. First, the state argues that the juvenile court erred
in reasoning that, as a minor, A.C. could not enter a contractual agreement. The state
is correct. Under well-settled Ohio law, minors are indeed competent to enter into
plea agreements in delinquency cases. State v. Rafferty, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26724,
2015-Ohio-1629, ¶ 65 (collecting cases).
{¶19} But this does not end the inquiry, as we must examine the terms of A.C.’s
plea agreement and the scope of the juvenile court’s discretion to determine whether
the order granting A.C. early release actually constituted a breach. “[G]enerally
speaking, a trial court is not bound by a recommended sentence and enjoys the
discretion to reject a plea agreement or impose a different sentence.” State v. Shaw,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C- 230089, 2023-Ohio-3230, ¶ 6. But if the trial court involves
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
itself in the plea negotiations or agrees to the terms of the agreement, it is bound by
the plea agreement. State v. Reynolds, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106979, 2019-Ohio-
630, ¶ 11; see State v. Vargyas, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-068, 2021-Ohio-3383,
¶ 19; State v. Vari, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07-MA-142, 2010-Ohio-1300, ¶ 24; State
v. Carter, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006-Ohio-0027, 2006-Ohio-5822, ¶ 7. To
become bound by the state’s negotiated plea with a defendant in this manner, a trial
court must give the defendant specific assurances on the record. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶20} The state contends that the juvenile court breached the terms of A.C.’s
plea agreement by granting A.C.’s motion for early release. There are several problems
with this argument.
{¶21} For one, the plea agreement was exclusively executed between and
signed by A.C. and the state. On the record before us, we see no evidence that the
juvenile court intended to be bound by its terms. In its judgment entries, the juvenile
court did indicate that the entries were made “in accordance with the agreed plea * * *
attached here to and incorporated by reference here in [sic].” But the entries described
A.C.’s disposition without noting any limitations on the juvenile court’s authority to
grant early judicial release. In this way, the reference to “plea agreement” in the
entries appears to be nothing more than an acknowledgment by the juvenile court that
A.C.’s disposition complied with the disposition he agreed to in the plea agreement.
{¶22} Moreover, without a transcript of what transpired at the plea hearing,
we cannot ascertain whether the juvenile court provided specific assurances to A.C.
sufficient to bind the juvenile court to the provision in the plea agreement that
restricted A.C. from receiving early release. See Carter at ¶ 7 (“a trial court is not
bound by the state’s negotiated plea agreement with a defendant unless the trial court
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
gives specific assurances”). And “[i]n the absence of transcripts allowing appellate
review of an assignment of error, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings
below.” State v. Cross, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230179, 2024-Ohio-268, ¶ 10, citing
Knapp v. Edward Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.3d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980).
{¶23} The terms of the plea agreement do not contradict this conclusion.
Under the terms of the plea agreement, A.C. never agreed not to seek early judicial
release. Rather, the language of the plea agreement constrained the action of the
juvenile court, not A.C. To this end, the early release provision stated that the juvenile
court would not reduce A.C.’s sentence or release him early and would deny any
motion for early release that A.C. might file without holding a hearing. But without a
transcript of the plea hearing, we cannot determine whether the juvenile court actually
informed A.C. that it had no authority to grant early judicial release as outlined in the
plea agreement. And in the absence of evidence that the juvenile court acquiesced to
the early release provision and agreed to be bound by it, we cannot conclude that the
juvenile court breached the plea agreement by granting A.C.’s motion for early release.
{¶24} This is not to be read as a suggestion that trial courts cannot bind their
discretion to grant judicial release by becoming parties to plea agreements. To the
contrary, where a more complete record reveals that the trial court intended to be
bound by the terms of a plea agreement, a trial court may engage in a breach by acting
in violation of what the parties contemplated. But based on the limited record before
us in A.C.’s case, we hold that the juvenile court maintained its discretion to grant early
release, because there is no evidence that the juvenile court became a party to the plea
agreement that limited A.C.’s ability to leave DYS custody early. We therefore overrule
the state’s assignment of error and affirm the judgments of the juvenile court.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgments affirmed.
CROUSE, J., concurs.
ZAYAS, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
ZAYAS, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶25} I agree that a judgment granting a motion for judicial release constitutes
a final appealable order when the breach of a plea agreement is argued. See State v.
Dowler, 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA7, 2015-Ohio-5027, ¶ 17 (“[H]olding that the denial
of a motion for judicial release affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding
and thus constitutes a final appealable order when the state breaches a plea agreement
by opposing the judicial release.”); State v. Jimenez, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24609,
2009-Ohio-4337, ¶ 6 (because the defendant has argued that the plea agreement was
breached when the court denied the motion for judicial release, the order is final and
appealable).
{¶26} I respectfully dissent because A.C. entered into a binding plea
agreement with the state, which the juvenile court approved and incorporated into the
judicial entry, where he agreed to serve the entire term of his juvenile disposition,
effectively waiving his eligibility for judicial release. Accordingly, the juvenile court
erred in granting judicial release and the judgments should be reversed.
{¶27} A.C. negotiated a comprehensive written plea agreement with the state
entitled “ENTRY WITHDRAWING PLEA OF GUILTY/NOT GUILTY AND
ENTERING AGREED PLEA OF ADMIT/GUILTY WITHDRAWING REQUEST FOR
RELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION, PLACING DEFENDANT AT A
DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES INCARCERATION FACILITY AND
IMPOSING A SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER DIPOSITION” (“SYO”), herein
after the “agreed plea.” In the agreed plea, A.C. admitted to the juvenile charges, pled
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
guilty to the SYO charges, and agreed to the juvenile disposition and the SYO sentence.
In exchange, the state agreed not to bind over the cases to adult court, amended the
murder charge to involuntary manslaughter, and dismissed a gun specification.
Additionally, the agreed plea included an agreed traditional juvenile disposition
setting out the agreed juvenile detention periods for each offense, and an agreed SYO
dispositional sentence that was “stayed pending the successful completion of the
traditional juvenile disposition imposed.”
{¶28} As part of the agreed plea, A.C. promised, in two provisions, to “serve
the entire term of incarceration” with respect to the agreed juvenile disposition. In the
first provision, A.C. agreed that his “ENTIRE TERM OF INCARCERATION will be
served ONLY at one of the three following Department of Youth Services Juvenile
Correctional Facilities * * *.” A.C. further promised that “as a condition of this agreed
plea with the state that I will NOT receive ANY form of early release during the
ENTIRE TERM OF MY INCARCERATION. I understand that I am freely and
voluntarily agreeing that I will serve the entire term of incarceration listed above and
that this Court will not reduce my sentence or release early in any way.” A.C., his
counsel, and the prosecutor signed the written plea agreement which included the
extensive disposition and sentencing agreement.
{¶29} The juvenile court approved the agreed plea, including the imposition
of the “Agreed Traditional Juvenile Disposition” and the “Agreed Serious Youthful
Offender Dispositional Sentence” contained in the plea. The judicial entry reflects that
the juvenile disposition was imposed, “All in accordance with the accompanying entry
of this date, incorporated herein by reference.” The court further stated that the
disposition and SYO sentence were, “All in accordance with the agreed plea and
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
sentencing entry attached here to and incorporated by reference here in.” The agreed
plea was attached to and incorporated into the judicial entry.
{¶30} Once the court accepted the agreed plea, “it [was] also bound to that
agreement.” State v. Elliott, 2021-Ohio-424, 168 N.E.3d 33, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). See State
v. Fenderson, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-14-015 and E-14-021, 2015-Ohio-565, ¶ 13 (“When
a trial court accepts a plea bargain and makes a promise to impose sentence in a certain
manner, consistent with the agreement, it becomes bound by said promise.”); State v.
Hitt, 9th Dist. Summit No. C.A. 29048, 2019-Ohio-2201, ¶ 22 (“Nonetheless, a plea
agreement may become binding on the trial court when it accepts a plea bargain and
makes a promise to impose sentence in a certain manner, consistent with the
agreement.”). Here, the juvenile court imposed the agreed disposition and sentence
in accordance with the plea and attached the plea to its judicial entry, incorporating
and accepting the agreed plea. See id. A.C. has not asserted or argued that the juvenile
court did not accept the agreed plea.
{¶31} Plea agreements are essential to the prompt disposition of criminal
proceedings. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427(1971). “Principles of contract law are generally applicable to the interpretation and
enforcement of plea agreements.” State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-
4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 50. “The intent of the parties to a [plea agreement] resides in
the ordinary meaning of the language and terms employed in the agreement.” State
v. Lezatte, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008131, 2003-Ohio-1472, ¶ 8. “[E]ffect must be
given to the intention of the state and the defendant in their plea bargain, and courts
should enforce what they perceive to be the terms of the original plea agreement.”
State v. Dye, 127 Ohio St.3d 357, 2010-Ohio-5728, 939 N.E.2d 1217, ¶ 22.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶32} Significantly, it is undisputed that A.C. signed an agreed disposition as
part of his negotiated plea where he agreed to serve the entire disposition, effectively
waiving his eligibility for judicial release. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 106390, 2018-Ohio-4774, ¶ 4, 24 (Concluding that Sykes was ineligible for judicial
release because he agreed to serve his sentence “in totality,” and “the trial court
accepted the plea agreement in its entirety and stated at sentencing that it was
imposing the agreed-upon sentence.”); State v. Drake, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
109883 and 109884, 2021-Ohio-2589, ¶ 21 (“Therefore, we find the terms of Drake's
plea agreement with the state expressly required him to serve the agreed sentence for
the involuntary manslaughter count, which made his prison term mandatory
rendering Drake ineligible for judicial release.”).
{¶33} Despite the agreement to serve the entire term of incarceration, A.C.
filed a motion seeking judicial release. At the hearing, A.C. acknowledged that as part
of his agreed plea, he agreed to forego judicial release. A.C. did not challenge the
validity or the enforceability of the agreed plea. Rather, he requested the court to
“recognize his significant progress at DYS and grant his judicial release.” The state
opposed the motion, reminding the court that A.C. agreed to serve the full juvenile
sentence and seeking to enforce the agreed plea that was approved by the parties, the
witnesses, and the victims.
{¶34} The motion was considered by the juvenile judge that succeeded the
judge that had presided over the original plea, disposition, and sentencing hearing.
The juvenile court sua sponte determined that children are incapable of entering into
contracts and refused to uphold the plea. As the majority correctly acknowledged,
“[u]nder well-settled Ohio law, minors are indeed competent to enter into plea
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
agreements in delinquency cases. State v. Rafferty, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26724,
2015-Ohio-1629, ¶ 65 (collecting cases).” Because the juvenile court erred in
determining the plea was unenforceable, this court should reverse the juvenile court’s
judgments.
{¶35} Notably, A.C. never challenged the validity or enforceability of the
agreed plea, did not appeal the original disposition, did not deny that he violated the
terms of the plea, and did not challenge the court’s acceptance of the agreed plea.
Rather, A.C. argued in his brief that the term is unenforceable because the parties
cannot agree to “deprive juvenile courts of their power to grant release,” in violation
of the separation-of-powers doctrine and public policy. Yet the majority concludes the
agreed plea need not be enforced by sua sponte raising two issues that were not argued
or briefed by the parties1: (1) A.C. did not violate the plea; and (2) the transcript of the
plea hearing is necessary to resolve the assignment of error.
{¶36} The majority appears to conclude that A.C. did not violate the agreed
plea because he “never agreed not to seek early release.” However, A.C. agreed to serve
his entire juvenile disposition, rendering him ineligible for judicial release. Where the
agreed-upon disposition includes an express condition that the offender will serve the
entire term of incarceration, “it becomes a binding contractual term that renders the
offender ineligible for judicial release.” Sykes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106390, 2018-
Ohio-4774, at ¶ 28.
1 The majority abandons its “role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present,” Greenlaw v.
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), by injecting new
arguments into this case. “The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal
questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147,
131 S.Ct. 746, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011), fn. 10, quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177,
(D.C.Cir.1983). “[W]e cannot write a party’s brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule
in the party’s favor. That’s not how an adversarial system of adjudication works.” Xue Juan Chen
v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.2013).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶37} The majority determines, despite the express language in the agreed
plea and judicial entry and the fact that the agreed plea was made part of and filed with
the judicial entry, “there is no evidence that the juvenile court became a party to the
plea agreement that limited A.C.’s ability to leave DYS custody early.”2 However, as
previously discussed, once the court accepted the agreed plea, “it [was] also bound to
that agreement.” Elliott, 2021-Ohio-424, 168 N.E.3d 33, at ¶ 11. Additionally, a trial
court speaks through its journal entry. State v. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-
Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 15. And here, the entry expressly indicated that the
juvenile court imposed the agreed disposition and incorporated the plea agreement by
reference into the entry.
{¶38} Moreover, A.C. did not allege that his plea was involuntary or otherwise
deficient, necessitating a review of the plea colloquy. To the contrary, during the
hearing on the motion for judicial release, A.C. acknowledged to the court that he
promised not to seek judicial release as part of his plea. Had A.C. argued that the court
modified or rejected the waiver of judicial release during the plea hearing, it was
incumbent on A.C. to file the transcript. See App.R. 9(B)(5)(b).
{¶39} The majority relies on an inapposite case, State v. Carter, 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2006-Ohio-0027, 2006-Ohio-5822, to conclude that, “To become
bound by the state’s negotiated plea with a defendant in this manner, a trial court must
give the defendant specific assurances on the record.” In Carter, the defendant
entered into a written plea agreement with the state that included a recommended
sentence and an agreement that the state would not oppose judicial release after one
2 The record indicates that the prosecutor, A.C.’s counsel, and the juvenile judge discussed the
substance of the agreed plea and “enunciated a plea arrangement that had been agreed to” by the
parties. The prosecutor prepared the plea agreement based on those discussions. Thus, the juvenile
court participated in the plea negotiations with defense counsel and the prosecutor.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
year. Id. at ¶ 9-10. The plea made clear that the “Prosecutor’s recommendation
does not have to be followed by the Court.” Id. at ¶ 11. When the trial court denied the
motion for judicial release, Carter appealed claiming that the trial court breached the
plea. Id. at ¶ 5-6. Relying solely on the written plea agreement, the court held that the
trial court was not bound by the state’s recommendation. Id. at ¶ 14. The court further
noted that no transcript of the plea hearing was provided to establish any oral
assurances by the court that contradicted the plea. Id. at ¶ 12-14. The court presumed
the validity of the plea proceedings, enforced the written plea, and affirmed the denial
of the motion. Id. at ¶ 13. Notably, if the majority presumed the regularity of the plea
proceedings in this case, as the Carter court did, it would have enforced the written
agreed plea, absent the plea transcript.
{¶40} Even if, as the majority claims, the juvenile court was required to
provide “specific assurances to A.C.” in addition to accepting the agreed plea,
disposition, and sentence, and incorporating the plea into the judicial entry, res
judicata bars a challenge to the plea. State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-
5206, 147 N.E.3d 623, ¶ 36 (Kennedy, J., concurring separately), citing State v.
Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59-60. By not filing a
direct appeal to challenge any issues related to his original plea colloquy, any challenge
to the plea is barred by res judicata. See State v. Greene, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-20-
06, 2020-Ohio-533, ¶ 13. Therefore, the transcript of the plea colloquy is
inconsequential to the resolution of this appeal.
{¶41} A.C. negotiated an agreed plea with the state that included an explicit
term to serve his entire juvenile disposition. The agreed plea was a valid and
enforceable contract that mutually bound the parties to its terms. Accordingly, I would
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the cause to the juvenile court to
vacate the entries granting judicial release.3
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
3 Because A.C. breached the agreed plea, whether the judge also failed to abide by the agreed plea
need not be determined.
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