State v. Allmon ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v Allmon, 
    2023-Ohio-3878
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              :         No. 112357
    v.                                :
    MALCOLM ALLMON,                                   :
    Defendant-Appellee.               :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 26, 2023
    Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-20-649767-B
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Daniel Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
    for appellant.
    Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
    Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the sentence imposed on
    defendant Malcolm Allmon (“Allmon”) in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-649767-B
    and claims the following error:
    The trial court erred in failing to journalize the maximum term in
    accordance with R.C. 2929.14 and R.C. 2929.144.
    We affirm Allmon’s sentence but remand the case to the trial court to
    issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry separately setting forth the minimum and
    maximum prison terms on each of Allmon’s convictions.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-649767-B, Allmon pleaded guilty to one
    count of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a Reagan Tokes
    qualifying first-degree felony; one count of aggravated burglary in violation of
    R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a Reagan Tokes qualifying first-degree felony; and one count
    of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a Reagan Tokes
    qualifying first-degree felony. The trial court set forth a three-year prison term
    on each count, and, pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, sentenced Allmon to “a
    minimum prison term of sentence of 3 year(s) and a maximum prison term of 4.5
    year(s) on the underlying offense(s).” The court indicated that the sentences
    would run concurrent to each other. This appeal followed.
    II. Law and Analysis
    In its sole assignment of error, the state argues the trial court erred in
    failing to properly journalize the maximum prison term in accordance with R.C.
    2929.14 and 2929.144. The state does not argue that the trial court failed to
    impose the appropriate maximum term; it contends the journalization of the
    sentence was not in accordance with R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.144.
    R.C. 2929.14 governs prison terms and states, in relevant part:
    (1)(a) For a felony of the first degree committed on or after March 22,
    2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated
    minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven,
    eight, nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum term that is
    determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except
    that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony
    specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the offense, the
    specific language of that section shall control in determining the
    minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum
    term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be
    considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed
    under this division.
    * * *
    (2)(a) For a felony of the second degree committed on or after March
    22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a
    stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six,
    seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant
    to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that
    criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different
    minimum term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that
    section shall control in determining the minimum term or otherwise
    sentencing the offender but the minimum term or sentence imposed
    under that specific language shall be considered for purposes of the
    Revised Code as if it had been imposed under this division.
    (Emphasis added.) Thus, under R.C. 2929.13(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a), the trial court
    must impose an indefinite prison term for each qualifying first- or second-degree
    felony, and the maximum term must be calculated in accordance with R.C.
    2929.144. As relevant here, R.C. 2929.144(B)(3) provides:
    If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one or
    more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree,
    and if the court orders that all of the prison terms imposed are to run
    concurrently, the maximum term shall be equal to the longest of the
    minimum terms imposed on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or
    (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a qualifying felony of
    the first or second degree for which the sentence is being imposed plus
    fifty per cent of the longest minimum term for the most serious
    qualifying felony being sentenced.
    The state argues the trial court failed to comply with R.C.
    2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a) because the court imposed “a definite sentence as
    to each count with an overall maximum term.” (State’s appellant brief p. 4.) The
    sentencing entry states, in relevant part:
    The court imposes a minimum prison term of 3 year(s) and a maximum
    prison term of 4.5 years on the underlying offense(s).
    The sentencing entry imposes an indefinite prison sentence on all
    counts collectively rather than imposing a minimum and maximum prison term
    on each count individually as required by R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a).
    The sentence is, therefore, contrary to law.
    Judgment affirmed but case remanded to the trial court to issue a nunc
    pro tunc judgment entry setting forth the minimum and maximum prison terms
    on each of Allmon’s convictions.
    It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s
    convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
    MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 112357

Judges: E.T. Gallagher

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2023