Morrison v. Morrison ( 2024 )

[Cite as Morrison v. Morrison, 2024-Ohio-1741.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY
RICK MORRISON, CASE NO. 2023-G-0015
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
DESIREE MORRISON,
Trial Court No. 2019 DC 000400
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: May 6, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz and Kelley R. Tauring, Stafford Law Co., L.P.A.,
North Point Tower, 1001 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 1300, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).
Jay F. Crook, Jay F. Crook, Attorney at Law, LLC, 30601 Euclid Avenue, Wickliffe, OH
44092 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Desiree Morrison, appeals from the judgments of the
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, denying her request for a continuance and
ruling on various issues during the divorce hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm
the decision of the lower court.
{¶2} On May 8, 2019, plaintiff-appellee, Rick Morrison, filed a Complaint for
Divorce. Desiree filed an Answer and Counterclaim.
{¶3} From 2019 to 2022, various motions to continue hearings in the matter were
filed by both parties, citing scheduling conflicts, time needed for discovery, and other
matters.
{¶4} The divorce trial commenced on June 22, 2022, and the matter was tried
on multiple dates. An additional trial date was scheduled for November 7, 2022. On
November 3, 2022, Desiree’s counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel, stating
that Desiree “terminated the attorney-client relationship.” A Magistrate’s Order was filed
on November 4, releasing counsel. On the morning of November 7, Desiree filed a Motion
for Emergency Continuance, in which she requested that the hearing scheduled for that
day be continued. She argued that “plaintiff and Defendant agree[d] to terminate their
respective Counsel and work[] collaboratively on a settlement agreement.” She
contended that Rick had terminated his attorney on October 31, 2022 in writing, she
subsequently terminated her counsel, and she no longer had representation. She
attached an unsigned copy of a letter from Rick to his counsel, dated October 31, in which
Rick stated that counsel was terminated and he would proceed pro se. The magistrate
issued an order denying the continuance, noting that the matter had been pending since
May 8, 2019.
{¶5} The hearing proceeded on that date. At the commencement, the magistrate
inquired of Desiree, “Are you going to proceed without an attorney through the balance
of these proceedings?” She responded, “No.” The magistrate indicated that no
continuance would be granted for any reason: “[t]his is way over the supreme court
guidelines and the case has to be disposed of.” Cross-examination of Desiree
commenced and the hearing proceeded.
{¶6} Rick was questioned by his counsel. Desiree commenced cross-
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examination and various objections were raised to the form and content of her questions.
During Desiree’s testimony, the magistrate concluded the trial and did not permit her to
testify further. After Desiree argued that she did not have evidence or witnesses prepared
because of her lack of counsel, and interrupting Rick’s counsel several times, the
magistrate ordered her out of the courtroom and found that the hearing was concluded.
{¶7} Desiree filed a Motion to Set Aside the magistrate’s November 7, 2022 order
denying her continuance, which was denied.
{¶8} A Magistrate’s Decision was filed on April 5, 2023, which recommended
granting the divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. It found the house should be sold
and the proceeds divided equally, each spouse should keep their retirement accounts,
and no spousal support should be awarded.
{¶9} Desiree, through counsel, filed Objections to the Magistrate’s Decision on
April 24, 2023, objecting to the denial of her request for a continuance and various factual
findings made by the magistrate. Rick filed a Motion to Dismiss the Objections, arguing
that they were untimely filed. On May 3, 2023, Desiree filed a Brief in Opposition and
Motion to Accept Filing Instanter, arguing there was excusable neglect in the late filing.
{¶10} A Judgment Entry of Divorce was filed on May 4, 2023. The court found no
errors or defects on the face of the Magistrate’s Decision and adopted it. It also found
that “[n]either party filed objections to the Magistrate’s Decision.” It did not rule on the
motions relating to Desiree’s objections.
{¶11} Desiree timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:
{¶12} “[1.] Trial court abused its discretion in not considering out of rule filed
objections.
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{¶13} “[2.] A court commits plain error when it denies a motion to continue when
the grounds for the continuance are alleged settlement by the parties and termination of
counsel, subsequently denies pro se counsel the right to ask questions, issues orders not
to argue their position and/or to argue with opposing counsel and terminates the pro se
part[y’s] cross examination of a witness, direct testimony and the trial over the objection
of the pro se party.”
{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Desiree argues that it was error for the trial
court not to grant the motion for leave to file the objections instanter, arguing that “[a]fter
nearly four years of litigation, littered with continuances granted in favor of Mr. Morrison,
a three day delay is not sufficient grounds for Mr. Morrison to claim any sort of prejudice.”
She argues that the delay in filing the objections was excusable neglect given that Desiree
needed time to secure counsel.
{¶15} We initially note that the trial court did not address the objections or motion
requesting leave to file instanter. “[A] trial court’s failure to rule on a motion creates a
presumption that the trial court overruled the motion.” Cunnane-Gygli v. MacDougal, 11th
Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2597, 2005-Ohio-3258, ¶ 20; Ferbstein v. Silver, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 18684, 1998 WL 388976, *3 (July 8, 1998) (the court’s failure to respond to
the leave to file objections constituted the presumption it was overruled).
{¶16} “A party may file written objections to a magistrate's decision within
fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the
decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i).” Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b)(i). “If no timely objections are filed, the court may adopt a magistrate’s
decision, unless it determines that there is an error of law or other defect evident on the
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face of the magistrate’s decision.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c).
{¶17} Here, the objections were not timely since the Magistrate’s Decision was
filed on April 5. Objections were due on April 19 but were not filed until April 24. Desiree
does not dispute that her objections were untimely but argues that the court should have
granted leave to file them and considered their merits.
{¶18} A trial court “may consider untimely objections” if it has not yet entered a
final judgment. Dejak v. Dejak, 2019-Ohio-3236, 141 N.E.3d 522, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.).
Where objections are not timely filed, leave may be granted under Civ.R. 6(B). Hale v.
Hale, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2005-L-101 and 2005-L-114, 2006-Ohio-5164, ¶ 32; Gorombol
v. Gorombol, 11th Dist. Lake No. 95-L-036, 1996 WL 494760, *1 (Aug. 9, 1996) (leave to
file late objections can be granted under Civ.R. 6(B)). Civ.R. 6(B) provides: “When by
these rules * * * an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect.”
{¶19} Rulings on motions for leave to file untimely objections are reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Hale at ¶ 32 (rulings on motions under Civ.R. 6 to file
untimely objections are reviewed for an abuse of discretion); State ex rel. Lindenschmidt
v. Butler Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 72 Ohio St.3d 464, 465, 650 N.E.2d 1343 (1995); see
White v. Grange Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29151, 2022-Ohio-497, ¶ 75 (“the trial
court refused to consider [appellant’s] objections because they were untimely, which was
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within the court's broad discretion”). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to
exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist.
Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th
Ed.2004).
{¶20} Desiree argues that the delay in filing her objections was the result of
excusable neglect because there was a delay in obtaining counsel and a misreading of
the three-day rule, and that the short delay in filing did not cause prejudice.
{¶21} “Courts have held that the following are examples of excusable neglect:
where default judgment was entered against a party who had no knowledge or notice of
the pending litigation; where the movant’s attorney suffered from personal illness; and
where counsel failed to appear for trial because he had not received notice of a
rescheduled trial date. * * * In contrast, neglect has been held to be inexcusable when a
party’s inaction can be characterized as a disregard for the judicial system.” Hasch v.
Hasch, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-127, 2008-Ohio-1689, ¶ 26. “The determination of
whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable must take into consideration all the
surrounding facts and circumstances, and courts must be mindful of the admonition that
cases should be decided on their merits, where possible, rather than procedural grounds.”
Lindenschmidt at 466. “A majority of the cases finding excusable neglect also have found
unusual or special circumstances that justified the neglect of the party or attorney.”
(Citation omitted.) Whitehouse v. Customer is Everything!, Ltd., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-
L-069, 2007-Ohio-6936, ¶ 43. “[E]xcusable neglect is not present if the party seeking
relief could have prevented the circumstances from occurring.” (Citation omitted.) Am.
Express Natl. Bank v. Bush, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2019-L-130 and 2020-L-029, 2020-
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Ohio-4424, ¶ 32.
{¶22} We find that the court did not err in choosing not to grant leave to file
objections or consider the untimely objections. While Desiree argues that she needed
time to hire counsel, the trial ended in November 2022, she obtained counsel to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law in January 2023, and the Magistrate’s Decision
was entered in April 2023. Desiree fails to explain why she could not have hired counsel
in the interim expecting that a decision would be issued. Further, the record indicates
that counsel was retained to file objections on April 11 and the objections were not due
until April 19. In Planin v. Planin, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2005-G-2644, 2006-Ohio-2933,
this court addressed a situation where the appellant indicated he did not receive the
magistrate’s decision from his attorney until nine days after it had been filed and found
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for an extension of time to
file objections to the magistrate’s decision. It held that “[i]f [appellant] received his copy
on March 19, he should have realized that objections needed to be filed by March 24”
and, at the least, sought additional time to file objections prior to that time. Id. at ¶ 17.
Here, counsel had several days to prepare objections and, if he could not have completed
the objections by April 19, could have at least filed a request for more time to file
objections before the deadline for objections.
{¶23} In support of her argument that the trial court abused its discretion, Desiree
cites Linville v. Kratochvill, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3161, 2014-Ohio-1153. In
Linville, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
appellant should not be granted leave to file his answer where he filed a motion for leave
only a week after his answer was due since there was not significant delay and no
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prejudice was demonstrated. Id. at ¶ 20-22. In Linville, the circumstances were different
than in the present matter since the denial of the request to file an answer resulted in
default judgment and prevented the appellant a chance to make any arguments on the
merits of the case. Here, the matter proceeded for several years and multiple hearings
were held, all of which permitted Desiree a chance to argue the merits of her case.
{¶24} Desiree also argues that, given the length of time the matter had been
pending before the court and the numerous delays and continuances throughout, the brief
delay in filing the objections should have been permitted and did not cause prejudice.
However, we do not find that prior delays in the trial impacted whether Desiree could have
complied with the rules for timely filing expressly set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i). It has
been held that filing even one day late can justify denial of leave if the court exercises its
discretion to determine that there was no excusable neglect. Hale, 2006-Ohio-5164, at ¶
33. Further, in In re Thut, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-138, 2005-Ohio-4647, this court
found no abuse of discretion in denying an extension where there had previously been
extensions granted, noting that “[b]y the time the motion at issue was filed, we believe the
trial court was attempting to avoid further delays of the case, and denied the motion in an
effort to promote judicial efficiency and bring the estate proceedings to a conclusion.” Id.
at ¶ 21.
{¶25} While Desiree does not present any specific argument as to this issue, she
also notes in her issue for review that confusion over the three-day rule justified the late
filing. Pursuant to Civ.R. 6(D), “[w]henever a party has the right or is required to do some
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice * * *
upon that party and the notice or paper is served upon that party by mail or commercial
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carrier service * * *, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.” Authority in this
district and from the Supreme Court clearly indicates that the three-day rule does not
apply to the 14-day deadline for timely filing objections to the magistrate’s decision under
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i). Duganitz v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 92 Ohio St.3d 556, 557, 751
N.E.2d 1058 (2001); B-Right Trucking Co. v. Warfab Field Machining and Erection Corp.,
11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-T-0072, 2001 WL 1602687, *2 (Dec. 14, 2001). Counsel
had no basis for believing that it did apply and we do not find this to be excusable neglect.
{¶26} The first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶27} In her second assignment of error, Desiree argues that multiple aspects of
the proceedings below constituted plain error, including the denial of her right to cross-
examine on certain issues and terminating her testimony/the trial, all of which she
contends were precipitated by the denial of her request for a continuance.
{¶28} First, Desiree argues that it was an abuse of discretion to deny her request
for a continuance prior to the commencement of the final day of trial. The decision
whether to grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Polk v.
Polk, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2006-T-0048, 2007-Ohio-2049, ¶ 8. An appellate court
applies a balancing test to a ruling on a motion to continue, balancing the court’s interest
in controlling its docket and efficiency with the potential prejudice to the moving party.
Waldorf v. Waldorf, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-0094, 2015-Ohio-1207, ¶ 11; State v.
Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981) (“[w]eighed against any potential
prejudice to a defendant are concerns such as a court’s right to control its own docket
and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice”). Factors to be
considered include: “(1) the length of the delay requested; (2) whether other continuances
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have been requested and received; (3) the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses,
opposing counsel, and the court; (4) whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons
or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; (5) whether the defendant contributed to
the circumstance which gives rise to the request for the continuance; and (6) other
relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.” Id.{¶29} Desiree requested a continuance because she terminated her counsel a
few days before the final scheduled trial hearing date. The following evidence was
presented in relation to the circumstances surrounding the termination of counsel:
Pursuant to an October 31, 2022 letter entered into evidence by Rick, a copy of which
was also attached to Desiree’s Motion for Continuance, Rick indicated to his counsel,
Attorney Stafford, that he wished to terminate him. Neither copy of the letter
demonstrates on its face that it was sent to counsel but statements made by Attorney
Stafford at the hearing appear to indicate it was provided to him, since there was a line of
questioning indicating previous discussion with Rick about the letter. Also presented was
an undated text message from Desiree to Rick indicating that he should e-mail Attorney
Stafford “again” and request that he withdraw as counsel of record. Desiree could not
recall the date it was sent. A November 3, 2022 e-mail to Desiree’s counsel, attached to
her Motion to Continue, stated that Rick had terminated Attorney Stafford, she requested
that her counsel withdraw, and indicated the two parties would be proceeding pro se. On
the same date, Desiree’s counsel filed a notice of withdrawal and a magistrate’s order
was issued on the following day releasing Desiree’s counsel.
{¶30} Desiree argues that there “were grounds, tantamount to fraud, with regards
to [her] decision to terminate her counsel under the belief that the parties would resolve
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the matter privately and directly.” She argued at the hearing and in her motion that she
and Rick had agreed to settle the matter and both agreed to terminate their counsel. She
contended that Rick reached this agreement in an attempt to cause her to proceed pro
se and obtain a strategic advantage. However, Rick and his counsel argued to the
contrary at trial. Rick appeared with counsel, demonstrating he had not terminated the
relationship. Rick’s counsel argued that Desiree was trying to control the circumstances
of the trial, that she was “play[ing] a game” and “manipulated the situation,” and disputed
Desiree’s argument that Rick suggested firing their counsel. Rick testified that Desiree
had prepared the letter for him to sign terminating his counsel. The undated text message
to Rick referenced above, which Desiree conceded she authored, stated: “You need to
e-mail Stafford again and tell him to please immediately file your notice of withdrawal as
counsel of record as I previously instructed you to do in writing and verbally. If you show
me that you e-mailed him that today, I'll be ready to settle with you.” The text message
appears to indicate Desiree encouraged him to fire counsel. Further, while she argues
that the parties entered into a settlement agreement causing her to fire counsel, it is clear
they ultimately did not settle. In her motion for a continuance, Desiree stated that the two
“made significant progress on settling and will have” a settlement agreement prepared
shortly, not that they had already completed a settlement agreement in the matter.
{¶31} It is evident that the court took into consideration the foregoing
circumstances in denying the continuance. The magistrate indicated on the record that it
“was at the 12th hour that the letter went out asking Mr. Rosenthal [Desiree’s counsel] to
recuse himself basically” and the letters provided by Desiree relating to termination of
counsel were “dated relatively recently.” This supports a finding that inconvenience may
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be caused to the opposing party since the continuance was requested on the morning of
the hearing. We also observe that in the factual findings in this matter, the magistrate
found Desiree lacked credibility. This may have impacted the magistrate’s decision as to
which party was truthful regarding the circumstances surrounding the termination of
counsel and supports a finding that Desiree contributed to the circumstances which led
her to seek the continuance. Finally, both parties had previously requested continuances
of various hearing dates which caused delay in the proceedings and led the court to
advise the parties that further continuances would not be granted. These factors all weigh
in favor of the denial of the continuance.
{¶32} While Desiree argues that the years-long delay in the matter was caused
by Rick seeking repeated continuances, the record reveals that there were also delays
due to COVID as well as several motions filed by Desiree’s counsel seeking to reschedule
hearings or trial dates on January 30, 2020, June 10, 2020, and June 16, 2022. The trial
court was justified in considering that the matter had already been delayed as well as the
fact that the continuance requested here was during an ongoing trial.
{¶33} Desiree argues that other errors throughout the proceedings resulted in an
unfair trial. She concedes that a plain error standard applies to the court’s adoption of
factual findings and legal conclusions in the final divorce decree where timely objections
were not filed but contends that such error occurred. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). “In appeals
of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the
extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no
objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the
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underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d
1099 (1997), syllabus.
{¶34} Desiree argues that it was unfair to require her to proceed pro se as it
prevented her from being able to ask appropriate questions and introduce evidence on
her behalf. As noted above, it is evident the magistrate found that Desiree was
responsible for having to proceed pro se due to her decision to terminate counsel while
the hearings in this matter were proceeding. While this court has “recognize[d] the difficult
task a pro se litigant faces when representing himself” it has followed the rule that “‘[a]
pro se litigant is held to the same standard as other litigants and is not entitled to special
treatment from the court.’” (Citations omitted.) Henderson v. Henderson, 11th Dist.
Geauga No. 2012-G-3118, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22; Lopshire v. Lopshire, 11th Dist.
Portage No. 2008-P-0034, 2008-Ohio-5946, ¶ 32, quoting Metzenbaum v. Gates, 11th
Dist. Geauga No. 2003-G-2503, 2004-Ohio-2924, ¶ 7, citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co.,
111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363, 676 N.E.2d 171 (8th Dist.1996). “[T]he court cannot simply
disregard the rules in order to accommodate a party who fails to obtain counsel.” (Citation
omitted.) Henderson at ¶ 22. In June 2022, the court “denied” defense counsel’s notice
of a conflict with the trial date, noting that the magistrate “has made it clear” to both sides
that no continuances would be granted and if counsel was not able to attend, substitute
counsel shall attend. The court clearly advised that it would not be further continuing the
matter but, nonetheless, Desiree decided to terminate counsel. This resulted in the fact
that she proceeded in this trial pro se.
{¶35} The magistrate did not commit plain error in sustaining objections to the
form and scope of improper questions as the court was not required to allow such
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questions simply because Desiree proceeded pro se. Although she argues that she was
not permitted to ask questions or give testimony on topics that Rick’s counsel had been
allowed to address, we observe that she did not object to questions posed by Rick’s
counsel. While, in her fact summary, Desiree points to the court’s failure to allow her to
ask questions about Rick’s assets and bank accounts, she does not present specific
argument as to how disallowing such questions impacted the outcome of the matter. In
re Dryer, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18040, 2000 WL 331770, *3 (Mar. 31, 2000) (while
the defendant was impaired in supporting her claims when her request for a continuance
was denied and she proceeded unrepresented, the court did not find an abuse of
discretion in denying her continuance since she failed to demonstrate the evidence she
would have presented and the resulting prejudice: “frustration is not prejudice”). See also
Molzon v. Molzon, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0024, 2022-Ohio-1634, ¶ 59 (the
defendant could have made an argument to vacate the magistrate’s decision on her
continuance by demonstrating in her objections any prejudice and by proffering evidence
that would have been presented at trial). To the extent that Desiree takes issue with the
failure to allow questions about the settlement agreement that was never completed, we
do not find that this was relevant to or impacted the final decree of divorce and disposition
of property.
{¶36} Desiree also argues that it was plain error to terminate her cross-
examination of Rick and to end the trial before she completed the presentation of her
case. The magistrate terminated Desiree’s cross-examination of Rick after she had
asked repeated questions about the settlement and property distribution discussions
between the two parties and objections had been sustained on those grounds. During
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Desiree’s testimony, the magistrate concluded the trial and did not permit her to testify
further. Throughout the trial, the following occurred: the magistrate sustained objections
to many of Desiree’s questions as lacking relevance or being repetitive; Desiree argued
with Rick’s counsel; Rick’s counsel noted “the length of time it’s taking and the apparent
looks she’s giving everyone,” which the court took notice of; Rick’s counsel stated he
believed Desiree was “staring down” his client during questioning; the magistrate stated
on the record that “the defendant is stopping and staring at the Court and that’s not
appropriate”; the magistrate stated that Desiree had been arguing with the court; and the
magistrate found that Desiree had “gone over the line” by making statements about
counsel’s failure to follow the “ethics code.” After Desiree acknowledged that she had no
further evidence or witnesses, the magistrate then ordered her out of the courtroom and
concluded the hearing.
{¶37} Evid. R. 611(A) provides: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.” The record indicates that the court terminated cross-examination
questioning and the trial because Desiree was asking irrelevant or repeated questions,
was arguing with the court and counsel, was delaying the trial by stopping and staring at
the magistrate, and may have been “staring down” Rick while he was on the witness
stand. In this case, and particularly where the magistrate was in the best position to
evaluate Desiree’s conduct, we do not find that it erred in exercising its control over the
trial to terminate Desiree’s cross-examination and presentation of her case or any
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additional argumentation in favor of her positions. See State v. Goetzman, 11th Dist.
Trumbull No. 92-T-4728, 1993 WL 164701, *3 (Apr. 30, 1993) (the trial court did not err
in ending the appellant’s closing argument where he was warned to address relevant
arguments but failed to do so). While Desiree argues that the court’s actions in
terminating the presentation of her case prevented her from submitting documentary
evidence and evidence relating to Rick’s assets, it was evident from the record that
Desiree did not have additional evidence or witnesses to present at the time the matter
concluded as she stated on the record that she “could not get to the evidence” given her
termination of counsel and she believed that the court would not be ready for her
witnesses on that day. The court’s termination did not prevent her from presenting
additional witnesses or exhibits.
{¶38} The second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶39} For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Geauga County Court of
Common Pleas are affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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