State v. Eckard ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Eckard, 2023-Ohio-4090.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 9-23-32
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
BRYSON A. ECKARD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 22-CR-485
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 13, 2023
APPEARANCES:
W. Joseph Edwards for Appellant
Raymond A. Grogan, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 9-23-32
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Bryson Eckard (“Eckard”), brings this appeal
from the April 6, 2023, judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court
sentencing him to prison after a jury convicted him of Robbery. On appeal, Eckard
argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On September 14, 2022, Eckard was indicted for Robbery in violation
of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), a second degree felony. Eckard pled not guilty to the charge
and proceeded to a jury trial, which was held January 31, 2023. After hearing the
evidence, the jury convicted Eckard of Robbery as charged.
{¶3} On April 6, 2023, Eckard was sentenced to serve an indefinite prison
term of 8 to 12 years on the Robbery charge. Because Eckard was on postrelease
control at the time he was convicted in this case, the trial court imposed an
additional, consecutive 12-month prison term. Eckard brings the instant appeal from
the trial court’s judgment, asserting the following assignment of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in entering a finding of guilty because the
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶4} In his assignment of error, Eckard argues that his Robbery conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{¶5} In reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting
testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52. In doing so,
this court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.” Id.{¶6} Nevertheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier-of-fact appropriate
discretion on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10
Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly
in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’
should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d
Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio
St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Controlling Statute
{¶7} Eckard was convicted of Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2),
which reads as follows:
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(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in
fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the
following:
***
(2) Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on
another[.]
Evidence Presented
{¶8} On September 1, 2022, after it had gotten dark, D.J. was sitting on a
chair in his front yard on Chestnut Street in Marion drinking alcoholic beverages
when he was approached by Eckard. D.J. testified that he did not know Eckard and
that Eckard demanded money. D.J. testified that Eckard also called him by his
brother’s name.
{¶9} When D.J. informed Eckard that he did not have any money, Eckard
demanded that D.J. give up his jewelry instead. Eckard took two silver necklaces
and two silver bracelets from D.J., punched D.J. in the face, then ran off “through
somebody’s yard.” (Tr. at 152). A photograph showing swelling on the side of D.J.’s
face was introduced into evidence.
{¶10} A man named R.B. lived across the street and he came outside when
he heard yelling and screaming. When R.B. went outside, he saw Eckard in the road
“messing with a backpack,” trying to shove stuff into it. (Tr. at 173-174). R.B.
testified that Eckard was mumbling something about “defend[ing]” the area and that
Eckard said something about having to go and “brought up something about the
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police.” (Tr. at 174). Eckard started to walk away but then police officers came from
both ends of the road.
{¶11} Officers from the Marion Police Department responded to the
Chestnut Street area to a call for service regarding a “strong arm robbery.” A
description of the assailant was given as a man in maroon pants and a black bandana.
As the officers approached the area, they located Eckard, wearing the described
clothing.
{¶12} An officer activated his overhead lights and made contact with Eckard,
explaining that Eckard matched a description of a person who had just committed a
robbery in the area. Eckard responded that the police had no evidence to stop him.
The officer told Eckard he was going to be “investigatively detained,” and Eckard
took off running, dropping his backpack as he ran. Eckard was soon caught on foot
by the police. He had D.J.’s bracelet in his pocket and D.J.’s necklaces in his
backpack.
{¶13} Eckard testified in his own defense at trial. He claimed that he came
across D.J. while walking home from a girl’s house. Eckard testified that D.J. was
looking at him, that D.J. was “ducking behind cars,” and that D.J. was “Spiderman
crawling” on the lawn. (Tr. at 212). Eckard testified that he thought the behavior
was odd and he asked D.J. what he was doing. Eckard testified that D.J. was very
drunk, stumbling and muttering, and that D.J. responded that they were in front of
his house. Eckard demanded that D.J. prove that he lived there.
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{¶14} Eckard testified that D.J. gave him his necklaces and his bracelets as
some sort of collateral while D.J. went and got his aunt to prove he lived in the
home. “We made a deal that when he went inside to give me the jewelry, so he knew
that he was gonna come back outside with his aunt.” (Tr. at 220). D.J.’s aunt came
outside and told Eckard that D.J. did in fact stay at the residence.
{¶15} Eckard claimed that he told D.J.’s aunt that he was going to hold onto
D.J.’s jewelry until D.J. was sober and could explain his actions. Eckard testified he
gave D.J.’s aunt his name so that D.J. could contact him on Facebook, and he then
left.
{¶16} Eckard claimed that he only ran from police because he had a
substantial amount of meth on him. He testified that he did not know how the police
did not find the meth, that perhaps it fell out of his pocket as he ran or left it at the
girl’s house. Eckard acknowledged that he had multiple prior convictions and that
he had only been released from incarceration approximately 10 days before this
incident.
Analysis
{¶17} After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence presented clearly
established the elements of a robbery. D.J. testified that Eckard struck him in the
face, causing physical harm, during or after Eckard stole D.J.’s jewelry.
{¶18} Eckard claims on appeal that D.J.’s testimony regarding the incident
was not credible because D.J. testified that he had consumed a substantial amount
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of alcohol,1 but Eckard was found with D.J.’s jewelry in his possession. D.J. also
had swelling to his face where he said he had been struck, and Eckard ran from the
police when he was questioned about the robbery.
{¶19} The jury did not find Eckard’s testimony credible and we will not
second-guess a jury’s credibility determinations, particularly where they are
overwhelmingly supported by the record. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231
(1967). This is simply not a case where the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction. State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9.
Therefore, we do not find that the jury clearly lost its way or created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Eckard’s assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to Eckard in the particulars assigned
and argued, his assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Marion
County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/hls
1
D.J. admitted in his testimony to consuming as many as nine 24-ounce cans of beer that day. Nevertheless,
he testified he remembered the incident clearly and identified Eckard at trial.
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