State v. Suggs , 2024 Ohio 1961 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Suggs, 2024-Ohio-1961.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. Nos. 30896
30897
Appellee
v.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
JAHLIN SUGGS ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Appellant COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE Nos. CR 21 12 4347
CR 22 01 0236(B)
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 22, 2024
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jahlin Suggs, appeals from two judgments of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} One afternoon in January 2022, gunfire erupted on Chittenden Street in Akron. At
the time, two Akron Police Department officers were driving north on that street. The officers
spotted a maroon car parked in the middle of the street. Four people were standing outside the car,
one of whom they later identified as Suggs. Suggs was standing on the back passenger’s side of
the car holding a rifle. The officers saw him enter the car along with the three other people. As
the officers reached the maroon car and activated their cruiser’s overhead lights, someone else in
the area began shooting. When the gunshots stopped, Suggs and another man jumped out of the
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right rear passenger door of the maroon car and fled. One of the officers ran after them on foot.
He eventually apprehended Suggs.
{¶3} When the police searched the maroon car, they found five firearms: two rifles and
three handguns. They also found 23 spent casings from a rifle on the ground and 12 spent casings
from two handguns. A house to the east of the maroon car sustained bullet damage, as did two
cars parked nearby the house. The police spoke with people at the house and learned one of them
had sustained a fresh graze wound from a bullet. The police found two spent casings on the porch
of the house.
{¶4} In Criminal Case No. CR 2022-01-0236(B), Suggs was charged with improperly
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises
(i.e., a public road), and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. He also was charged
with several firearm specifications, specifications for engaging in a drive-by shooting, and
forfeiture specifications related to the confiscated firearms. The trial court later dismissed the
drive-by shooting specifications.
{¶5} A jury found Suggs guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to a total of
eight to ten and a half years in prison.
{¶6} Suggs now appeals from his convictions and raises five assignments of error for
review. To facilitate our review, we reorder several of his assignments of error.
II.
{¶7} Before turning to the merits of Suggs’ assignments of error, we must address the
second judgment from which he has appealed. Suggs was charged with improperly handling
firearms in a motor vehicle in Criminal Case No. CR 2021-12-4347. That incident occurred about
six weeks before the incident in Criminal Case No. CR 2022-01-0236(B). The trial court initially
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consolidated the two cases for trial. On the day of trial, however, the court continued the trial in
Criminal Case No. CR 2021-12-4347. Suggs ultimately pleaded guilty in that case. He then filed
an appeal in that case (C.A. No. 30897) as well as an appeal in this case (C.A. No. 30896). At his
request, this Court consolidated his two appeals for briefing, argument, and decision.
{¶8} The appellate brief Suggs has filed only addresses the judgment in Criminal Case
No. CR 2022-01-0236(B). He has not assigned any errors regarding Criminal Case CR No. 2021-
12-4347. This Court will not formulate an argument on his behalf. See State v. Beverly, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 28627, 2019-Ohio-957, ¶ 6. Accordingly, the judgment in C.A. No. 30897 is
affirmed. Our opinion only concerns the convictions in Criminal Case No. CR 2022-01-0236(B).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
JAHLIN’S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT BASED UPON SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW[.]
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Suggs argues his convictions are based on
insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues there was no evidence he knowingly aided and
abetted another person in discharging a firearm. We disagree.
{¶10} Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which
we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out this
review, our “function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such
evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id.4
{¶11} R.C. 2923.161 defines the offense of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a
habitation. Relevant to this appeal, it forbids any person without a privilege from “knowingly * *
* [d]ischarg[ing] a firearm at or into an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary
habitation of any individual * * *.” R.C. 2923.161(A)(1). “A person acts knowingly, regardless
of purpose, when the person is aware that [his] conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when [he] is aware that
such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶12} R.C. 2923.162 defines the offense of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited
premises. Relevant to this appeal, it forbids any person from “[d]ischarg[ing] a firearm upon or
over a public road or highway.” R.C. 2923.162(A)(3).
{¶13} Finally, R.C. 2923.16 defines the offense of improperly handling firearms in a
motor vehicle. Relevant to this appeal, it forbids any person from “knowingly transport[ing] or
[having] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the
operator or any passenger without leaving the vehicle.” R.C. 2923.16(B).
{¶14} Complicity is governed by R.C. 2923.03. Relevant to this appeal, the statute
prohibits any person “acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense”
from “[a]id[ing] or abet[ting] another in committing the offense * * *.” R.C. 2923.02(A)(2). “To
support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting * * *, the evidence must show that the
defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the
commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State
v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. “Such intent may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the crime,” id. at syllabus, and “the presence, companionship, and
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conduct of the defendant before and after the offense is committed.” In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d
512, 2006-Ohio-3056, ¶ 13.
{¶15} Detective Jeffrey Woolley testified that he heard gunshots as he and his supervisor
were driving northbound on Chittenden Street. As his cruiser crested a hill, Detective Woolley
saw a maroon car parked in the center of the street. The car was facing southbound such that its
front end was facing toward his approaching cruiser. He observed four people standing outside
the car and a plume of smoke hovering above the car. One person then entered the driver’s seat,
and a second person entered the front passenger seat. The other two people initially remained
standing outside. Detective Woolley testified that those two people were standing on the passenger
side of the car nearest the trunk. They were both holding rifles and were pointing the rifles toward
the houses to the east (i.e., over the car). As the police cruiser approached, Detective Woolley saw
those people climb into the right rear passenger door with their rifles.
{¶16} Detective Woolley parked his cruiser directly in front of the maroon car and
activated his overhead lights. He then heard a second volley of gunshots. Although the source of
those gunshots was unclear, he noted that they were not coming from inside the maroon car. He
testified that, when the second volley of gunshots stopped, the right rear passenger door of the
maroon car opened and the two people who had been holding the rifles fled. He chased after them
on foot. The people ran together for a considerable distance before splitting apart to run around a
house. Detective Woolley continued to chase one of the individuals and apprehended him shortly
thereafter. Detective Woolley identified that individual as Suggs. He testified that Suggs was
wearing a face mask when he apprehended him.
{¶17} Detective Woolley confirmed that he only heard two sets of gunshots that day: the
initial volley he heard while driving northbound on Chittenden Street and the second volley he
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heard before exiting his cruiser. He testified that the plume of smoke he saw hovering over the
maroon car was consistent with multiple gunshots having been fired from that spot.
{¶18} Sergeant Patrick Dugan was riding as a passenger in Detective Woolley’s cruiser
when this incident occurred. He confirmed that they discovered a maroon car parked in the middle
of Chittenden Street after Detective Woolley heard gunshots. Sergeant Dugan observed a haze in
the air around the maroon car. He testified the haze was consistent with recent gunfire. He also
detected the distinct smell of gunpowder in the air.
{¶19} Sergeant Dugan saw two people jump out of the right rear passenger door of the
maroon car and flee. He testified that both people were dressed entirely in black. While Detective
Woolley chased after the two people who fled, Sergeant Dugan approached the maroon car. He
found one person in the driver’s seat and a second person in the front passenger’s seat. He testified
that both people were wearing black face masks and body armor.
{¶20} Detective Daniel Gump documented the scene as part of the crime scene unit. He
testified that a search of the maroon car uncovered a total of five firearms. The police found an
RAK-47 rifle on the backseat, an Anderson AR-14 rifle on the backseat floorboard, a handgun
wedged between the driver’s seat and center console, a handgun in a lower center console storage
area, and a handgun on the front passenger seat floorboard area. Detective Gump testified that the
RAK-47 rifle was empty upon recovery. Meanwhile, the Anderson AR-14’s magazine was loaded
with ammunition. When Detective Gump removed that magazine to clear the weapon, a live round
fell out of the rifle. The detective confirmed that was an unusual event. He testified that the event
was consistent with a possible misfeed. He explained that a misfeed could result when a firearm
fails to bring a fresh cartridge into the barrel following a discharge.
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{¶21} Detective Gump testified that the police collected 23 rifle casings from the area
around the maroon car as well as 12 casings from a 9mm handgun. The police discovered bullet
damage to a nearby house to the east of the maroon car. They also discovered recent bullet damage
on two separate cars parked near the house to the east of the maroon car.
{¶22} A forensic scientist from the firearms division at the Bureau of Criminal
Identification compared the casings from the scene with the firearms recovered from the maroon
car. He testified that all 23 rifle casings matched casings he fired from the AK-47 rifle. He also
testified that he was able to match all 12 of the 9mm casings to two separate 9mm handguns the
police recovered from the maroon car.
{¶23} Detective Walter Morris testified about two jail calls Suggs placed after the
shooting. The first call took place the day after the shooting. During that call, Suggs told someone
the police arrived on scene “when we was shooting.” The second call took place three days after
the shooting. During that call, Suggs responded to someone’s question about why he and the other
rear seat passenger did not dispose of their guns. He stated: “If we woulda got out with them
b*tches, they woulda fapped us down.” Detective Morris testified that he was familiar with the
terminology Suggs employed. He testified that Suggs was “talking about the police would have
shot them down if they would have been running with the guns in hand.”
{¶24} Suggs argues that the State never proved he knowingly discharged a firearm, loaded
a firearm, handed someone a firearm, or performed any other action to aid and abet another person
in discharging a firearm. According to Suggs, the evidence only showed that shots were fired
outside the maroon car, he was a passenger in the car, and there were firearms in the car. Thus, he
argues, the State failed to meet its burden of production.
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{¶25} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have concluded that the State proved its case against Suggs beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The jury heard testimony that Suggs
was holding a rifle when the police arrived and left it in the backseat of the maroon car when he
fled on foot. Suggs was wearing all black clothing and a face mask. Likewise, the other occupants
of the car wore all black clothing and face masks, and the driver and front seat passenger had on
body armor. One of the rifles the police found in the backseat discharged 23 rounds in the area.
The other rifle was loaded, and the live round that fell from it was circumstantial evidence of a
possible misfeed. A rational trier of fact could have concluded that Suggs either fired the 23 rounds
from the RAK-47 rifle, fired a round from the Anderson AR-14 rifle before experiencing a
misfeed, or aided and abetted the other occupants of the car by brandishing the Anderson AR-14
rifle while they fired their weapons. Suggs has not shown that his convictions are based on
insufficient evidence. Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
JAHLIN’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE[.]
{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Suggs argues his convictions are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶27} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is
required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th
Dist.1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence
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weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29290, 2019-
Ohio-3970, ¶ 26. This Court “will not overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight
of the evidence simply because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over
another version.” State v. Warren, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29455, 2020-Ohio-6990, ¶ 25, quoting
State v. Tolliver, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010986, 2017-Ohio-4214, ¶ 15.
{¶28} Suggs argues the jury lost its way by convicting him because there was “no
evidence” he knew what was going to happen or aided another person in discharging a firearm.
He reiterates that, at best, the evidence showed (1) people outside the maroon car fired shots, and
(2) he was sitting in the maroon car with a rifle at his feet. He argues that he attempted to
demonstrate other people were responsible for the shooting. Because the State failed to meet its
burden of persuasion, Suggs argues, his convictions must be reversed.
{¶29} To the extent Suggs argues there was “no evidence” to support his convictions, his
argument sounds in sufficiency rather than weight. See State v. Yatson, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
20CA011658, 2022-Ohio-2621, ¶ 69. Sufficiency tests the State’s burden of production while
manifest weight tests its burden of persuasion. State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 21CA011729,
2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 10. Thus, manifest weight challenges concern the reliability or believability
of the State’s evidence, not its adequacy. Id. We have already determined that Suggs’ convictions
are based on sufficient evidence. See Discussion of Assignment of Error I, supra. We decline to
revisit that issue. In reviewing Suggs’ second assignment of error, we confine our review to the
limited weight challenge he has presented; to wit: that the jury lost its way when it failed to
conclude that other people were responsible for the shooting.
{¶30} Suggs relied on cross-examination at trial. During their respective cross-
examinations, several officers admitted that at least one member of law enforcement responded to
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the scene of the shooting in a face mask because it was cold that day. Defense counsel used that
testimony to argue that Suggs wore a face mask for a legitimate reason. Both Detective Woolley
and Sergeant Dugan admitted that they never saw anyone from the maroon car fire a weapon.
Further, defense counsel was able to elicit testimony tending to show that someone at a house to
the east of the maroon car shot at the maroon car. Sergeant Dugan admitted that he saw bullet
holes in the maroon car after arresting its occupants. The police also found several shell casings
on the porch of a house to the east of the maroon car. Detective Morris attempted to interview the
people he found at that house, one of whom had a fresh graze wound from a bullet. He admitted
the people were uncooperative. He also admitted that at least one of the occupants of the maroon
car said someone at the house had fired at them. Finally, Detective Morris admitted that all four
occupants of the maroon car were charged in connection with the shooting.
{¶31} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case
where the evidence weighs heavily against Suggs’ convictions. See Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, at
¶ 26. The jury heard testimony that Detective Woolley saw Suggs wearing a face mask and holding
a rifle when he arrived on scene. Of the two rifles the police found inside the car, one was used to
fire 23 rounds and the other was loaded and had possibly experienced a misfeed. Even if no one
saw Suggs fire one of the rifles, he said in his jail call that the police “pulled up when we was
shooting.” (Emphasis added.) He also fled from the scene when Detective Woolley attempted to
execute a stop. See State v. Nichols, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24900, 2010-Ohio-5737, ¶ 11, quoting
State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 27 (1997) (“It is an established principle of law that ‘[f]light
from justice * * * may be indicative of a consciousness of guilt.’”). The jury was in the best
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and Suggs’ claim that he was not actively involved
in the shooting. See State v. Steible, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 21CA011787, 2023-Ohio-281, ¶ 20.
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“This Court will not overturn a verdict on a manifest weight challenge simply because the jury
chose to believe the State’s version of the events.” State v. Harris, 9th Dist. Medina No.
23CA0012-M, 2024-Ohio-196, ¶ 19. Suggs has not shown this is the exceptional case where the
evidence weighs heavily against his convictions. See Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. Accordingly,
his second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE FROM THE
JURY.
{¶32} In his fourth assignment of error, Suggs argues the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to allow him to present three exhibits to the jury. Upon review, we reject his argument.
{¶33} “[A] trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and
this Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of
discretion and material prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Mitchell, 9th Dist. Medina No.
21CA0071-M, 2022-Ohio-3176, ¶ 30, quoting Drew v. Marino, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21458,
2004-Ohio-1071, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983).
{¶34} Suggs sought to introduce three exhibits at trial. Exhibit J was a dispositional order
of the Juvenile Court. It showed that S.S., the other person who was holding a rifle when the police
arrived, was adjudicated a serious youthful offender for carrying a concealed weapon, receiving
stolen property, and improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation. Exhibits K and L
were sentencing entries for J.M. He was present in the house to the east of the maroon car during
the shooting and sustained a fresh graze wound from a bullet. The sentencing entries showed J.M.
pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed weapon and improperly handling a firearm in a motor
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vehicle. One of his offenses occurred five months before the shooting in this matter and the other
occurred three days after the shooting. According to Suggs, Exhibits J, K, and L tended to show
that S.S. was the one who fired the rifle in this matter, J.M. possessed a handgun, and J.M. fired
his gun at the occupants of the maroon car.
{¶35} Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded Exhibits J, K,
and L, we cannot conclude that Suggs has demonstrated resulting, material prejudice. See Mitchell
at ¶ 30, quoting Drew at ¶ 8. The jury heard testimony that both Suggs and another individual
were holding rifles. One of those rifles discharged 23 rounds, and there was circumstantial
evidence tending to show that the other loaded rifle experienced a misfeed. Even if S.S. admitted
he improperly discharged a firearm, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Suggs also was
guilty either as a principal offender or as an aider and abettor. See State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. Lorain
No. 22CA011858, 2023-Ohio-3683, ¶ 12. Further, the fact that J.M. possessed a handgun at
various points before and after the shooting is inapposite. The jury heard testimony that the police
found shell casings on the porch of the house to the east of the maroon car. Thus, there was already
evidence that someone at that house discharged a firearm. Suggs has not explained why it was
necessary for him to identify that individual as J.M. At best, evidence tending to show J.M.
possessed a gun was cumulative in nature. See State v. Dawson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28311,
2017-Ohio-2833, ¶ 23. Because Suggs has not shown that the trial court’s exclusion of Exhibits
J, K, and L resulted in material prejudice to him, his fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
JAHLIN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL[.]
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{¶36} In his third assignment of error, Suggs argues that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney did not pursue a theory of self-defense or defense of others. For
the following reasons, we reject his argument.
{¶37} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,
112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, an appellant must establish: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient to the extent
that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment[;]” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an
objective standard of reasonable representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989),
paragraph two of the syllabus. To establish prejudice, an appellant must show that there existed a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. State v. Sowell, 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138.
{¶38} According to Suggs, had his attorney raised a claim of self-defense or defense of
others, there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have allowed him to introduce
Exhibits J, K, and L at trial. See Discussion of Assignment of Error IV, supra. Suggs argues that
evidence would have shown J.M. was known to carry a gun and was willing to discharge it.
{¶39} Even assuming defense counsel engaged in deficient performance by not arguing
self-defense or defense of others, Suggs has not shown that there is a reasonable probability the
error affected the outcome of his trial. See Sowell at ¶ 138. There was testimony that Suggs and
the other three occupants of the maroon car were dressed entirely in black, were wearing face
masks, and had five firearms at their disposal. There also was testimony that both the driver and
front seat passenger were wearing body armor. The jury reasonably could have concluded that the
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occupants of the car were prepared to use their firearms when they arrived on Chittenden Street.
Moreover, Detective Woolley only heard two sets of gunfire: the initial volley he heard while
driving northbound on Chittenden Street and the second volley he heard before exiting his cruiser.
The smoke he and Sergeant Dugan observed hovering over the maroon car was already present
when the second volley of shots occurred. Thus, the jury reasonably could have concluded that
one or more individuals from the house to the east fired a gun at the maroon car after its occupants
fired their guns. While the police found two casings on the porch of the house, they found a total
of 35 casings on the street around the maroon car. The jury also heard testimony that Suggs fled
from the police in the aftermath of the shooting. Based on these facts and circumstances, we
cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel’s failure to
argue self-defense or defense of others, the jury would not have convicted Suggs. Upon review,
Suggs has not met his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. His third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE A FLEEING JURY
INSTRUCTION[.]
{¶40} In his fifth assignment of error, Suggs argues the trial court erred when it issued the
jury a flight instruction. We reject his argument.
{¶41} “[A] trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are
relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.”
State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Crim.R. 30(A).
“[E]vidence of flight is admissible as it tends to show consciousness of guilt. * * * [A] jury
instruction on flight is appropriate if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
charge.” State v. Villa, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008773, 2006-Ohio-4529, ¶ 29. See also State
15
v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240 (“Requested jury instructions should
ordinarily be given if they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the
case, and if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction.”).
{¶42} “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to give or not give jury instructions for
an abuse of discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Calise,
9th Dist. Summit No. 26027, 2012-Ohio-4797, ¶ 68. An abuse of discretion implies the trial court's
decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 217. When
applying an abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its own
judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
{¶43} Suggs argues the trial court abused its discretion when it issued the jury a flight
instruction because the evidence showed he only ran to avoid being shot. He argues that at least
one person in the house to the east of the maroon car was firing at him and the other occupants.
He also notes that, in a jail call, he specifically expressed a concern he had about being shot by the
police. He argues “[i]t is axiomatic that when one is in the middle of a barrage of gunfire, the urge
to live and run is normal.”
{¶44} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court went so far as
to abuse its discretion when it issued the jury a flight instruction. See Calise at ¶ 68. The trial
court was not required to accept any alternative explanation Suggs might have offered for his
behavior that day. The record reflects that he was standing outside the maroon car when the police
arrived. At that point, no one was firing a gun. Suggs chose to enter the maroon car with the rifle
he was carrying. He then fled the maroon car after the second volley of gunfire ended. He did not
immediately stop when Detective Woolley chased him on foot. Rather, he and his companion ran
for a considerable distance before the detective finally succeeded in apprehending him. During
16
the jail call he placed, Suggs did not say that he ran from the car to avoid getting shot. He indicated
that, to avoid getting shot, he and his companion left their rifles in the car when they ran. Based
on the evidence, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the State produced sufficient
evidence to warrant a flight instruction. See State v. Deel, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30384, 2023-
Ohio-2862, ¶ 30. Accordingly, Suggs’ fifth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶45} Suggs’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgments of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
FOR THE COURT
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SUTTON, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
WESLEY C. BUCHANAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.