Kent State Univ. v. Manley ( 2023 )

[Cite as Kent State Univ. v. Manley, 2023-Ohio-4650.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY, :
C/O STATE OF OHIO
COLLECTIONS ENFORCEMENT, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112551
v. :
ERICA E. MANLEY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 21, 2023
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-20-931391
Appearances:
Keith D. Weiner & Associates Co., LPA., and Suzana
Pastor, for appellee.
Erica E. Manley, pro se.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant, Erica E. Manley, pro se, appeals from the trial
court’s judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of plaintiff-appellee,
Kent State University1 and ordering judgment against her in the amount of
$16,517.68, plus collection costs and interest. Finding some merit to the appeal, we
reverse and remand.
I. Background
In March 2020, Kent State filed a two-count complaint against
Manley. Count One asserted a claim on an account, contending that Manley was
indebted to Kent State on an account for tuition and other educational services in
the amount of $17,049.40, as set forth on the statement of Manley’s account with
Kent State’s Bursar’s Office that was attached to the complaint. Count Two set forth
a claim for unjust enrichment, alleging that Manley had been unjustly enriched in
the amount of $17,049.40 for failing to pay Kent State for educational and other
services rendered.
Manley timely answered the complaint and asserted various defenses,
including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, failure to join all necessary parties, and lack of service. She also
asserted a counterclaim containing 11 different counts against Kent State and its
counsel.
1 The Ohio Attorney General’s Office is authorized by law to collect debt owed to
the state of Ohio. R.C. 131.02. The Collections Enforcement Section of that office is
responsible for collecting outstanding debt for various entities, including public
universities. The complaint identifies the plaintiff as “Kent State University c/o State of
Ohio Collections Enforcement.” For ease of reference, we will refer to the plaintiff as Kent
State.
In her counterclaim, Manley alleged that she registered for graduate-
level courses for the spring 2015 semester at Kent State and applied for federal
student aid funds to cover her tuition and living expenses. She alleged that in early
2015, Kent State advised her that her federal student loan had been disbursed. As
demonstrated on the statement of Manley’s account attached to Kent State’s
complaint, a $9,013 credit remained after Kent State applied the loan proceeds to
Manley’s tuition, and that amount was transferred by Kent State on March 17, 2015,
to Higher One, Inc., a third-party entity that Kent State had contracted with to,
among other things, disburse student loan proceeds.
Manley alleged in her counterclaim that the refund due her was
transferred to Higher One without her consent or authorization and, further, that
she did not accept Higher One’s terms, conditions, and fees required to open an
account with Higher One in order to obtain her refund. Manley’s counterclaim
detailed alleged communications between her, the Bursar’s Office at Kent State, and
Higher One in which she first asked Kent State and then Higher One to mail a refund
check to her, and when that did not happen, to cancel her student loan. She alleged
that the refund from Higher One was never delivered to her and, as a result, she was
unable to attend classes at Kent State because she did not have funds to pay for class
supplies or sufficient funds for living expenses so she could quit work to attend class.
Among the 11 counts in her counterclaim, Manley alleged that Kent
State’s actions were in violation of federal law regarding the disbursement of loan
proceeds, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,
and that Kent State’s complaint improperly calculated the collection costs and
interest due. Manley also sought a declaratory judgment that Kent State had
engaged in unconscionable practices and an injunction enjoining Kent State from
violating consumer protection and debt collection laws. The trial court subsequently
granted Kent State’s motion to dismiss Manley’s counterclaim and denied Manley’s
motion for leave to file an amended counterclaim.
Manley also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing, among other things, that a plaintiff may not recover under
a theory of unjust enrichment when the parties’ relationship is governed by a
contract, Kent State never properly served her with the complaint, and it failed to
join Higher One, a necessary and indispensable party, in the action.
Kent State then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial
court granted. The court then denied Manley’s motion to dismiss as moot. Manley
filed an appeal, which this court dismissed for lack of a final appealable order as
required by R.C. 2505.02 because the trial court had not addressed the 11 counts in
Manley’s counterclaim, including her claim for a declaratory judgment, and thus,
they remained pending. Kent State Univ. v. Manley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110111,
Motion No. 546460 (May 10, 2021) (“Manley I”).
Upon remand, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry that
included a ruling that “each and every counterclaim asserted and/or stated by the
defendant in her answer and counterclaim are dismissed.” Manley again appealed.
This court again dismissed the appeal, finding the trial court’s judgment entry was
a nullity because the trial court entered the judgment without jurisdiction while the
case was pending in the Ohio Supreme Court. Kent State Univ. v. Manley, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 111483, 2022-Ohio-4512 (“Manley II”).
Upon remand, the trial court issued a judgment entry dismissing all
of Manley’s counterclaims and granting Kent State’s motion to dismiss Manley’s
claim for declaratory relief due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Manley again
appealed. We now have a final appealable order and will consider the appeal. For
clarity, we consider some assignments of error out of order.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Sufficiency of Service
In her first assignment of error, Manley contends that she was never
served with Kent State’s complaint and, therefore, the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over her. Manley does not dispute that service by certified mail was sent
to her home address but contends that she was not served with the complaint
because someone fraudulently signed her name on the certified mail receipt.
This court considered and rejected the same argument in Manley II.
This court found that “Manley did not present any evidence other then her own self-
serving assertion that her signature was forged by someone.” Kent State, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 111483, 2022-Ohio-4512 at ¶ 22. The court stated:
Self-serving testimony is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
proper service for obvious reasons; any party could change his or her
signature in order to claim lack of service. To allow parties to avoid
service with self-serving testimony would encourage abuse of the
process and make it difficult to obtain service. Manley did not provide
any evidence, other than her own self-serving testimony, to establish
lack of service. Therefore, she failed to rebut the presumption of proper
service, and the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Manley.
Id. at ¶ 28.
Our previous determination that the trial court had jurisdiction to
hear Kent State’s claim is the law of the case. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine,
“the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on legal
questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both trial and
reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984); accord
Rimmer v. CitiFinancial Inc., 2020-Ohio-99, 151 N.E.3d 988, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). The
law-of-the-case doctrine ensures consistency of results in a case, prevents endless
litigation by settling issues, and preserves the structure of superior and inferior
courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline, 74
Ohio St.3d 402, 404, 659 N.E.2d 781 (1996).
Because our prior decision in Manley II that the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear Kent State’s claims is the law of the case, the first assignment of
error is overruled.
B. Joinder of Indispensable Party
Section 13 of the Borrower’s Rights and Responsibilities Statement
regarding the federal student loan Manley obtained in 2015 states:
If your school credits your loan money to your account and the amount
credited is more than the amount of your tuition and fees, room and
board, and other authorized charges, the excess amount is called a
credit balance. Unless you authorize your school to hold the credit
balance for you, your school must pay you the credit balance within the
following timeframes:
If the credit balance occurs after the first day of class of a payment
period (your school can tell you this date), your school must pay you
the credit balance no later than 14 days after the date the balance
occurs.
If the credit balance occurs on or before the first day of class of a
payment period, your school must pay you the credit balance no later
than 14 days after the first day of class of the payment period.
(Kent State motion for summary judgment, Exhibit D6.)
In an email from the Kent State Bursar’s Office to Manley dated April
14, 2015, Kent State informed Manley that Higher One was “the company that works
with Kent State to disburse any refund” and that to obtain her refund, Manley should
go online to select her refund preference with Higher One of either a paper check,
direct deposit, or a free checking account. (Appellant’s brief in opposition to motion
for summary judgment, Exhibit N2) The Bursar’s Office acknowledged that
pursuant to federal regulations, the Office had up to 14 days after receipt of loan
proceeds to issue a credit refund and informed Manley that “[y]our Federal Direct
Unsubsidized Loan transferred to your Bursar account on 03/17/15 and we issued
the refund for you the same day.” The Office told Manley that it had therefore
“followed the appropriate federal regulations” but that Manley’s refund was delayed
because she had not set up a refund preference with Higher One.
Manley contends that Kent State did not comply with the federal
regulations, however, and thus is not entitled to recover any monies from her
because placing her loan refund with a third party within 14 days of receipt is not
the same as issuing the refund directly to her. She contends that Higher One, as an
agent of Kent State, likewise did not timely deliver the credit refund to her, in
violation of the federal regulations, and thus is exposed to “potential suit and
sanctions.” Accordingly, she contends that Higher One was a necessary and
indispensable party to the action and the trial court therefore erred in denying her
motion to dismiss because Kent State did not join Higher One in the action.
Civ.R. 19 requires a person who is subject to service of process to be
joined as a party if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (a) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (b) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest, or (3) he has an interest
relating to the subject of the action as an assignor, assignee, subrogor,
or subrogee.
Civ.R. 19(A). If such a person cannot be made a party, Civ.R. 19(B) provides that
“the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable.” The factors to be considered in determining
whether a person is indispensable include: to what extent a judgment rendered in
the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those who are already
parties; the extent to which the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; whether a
judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; and whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Civ.R. 19(B).
Manley has not shown that Higher One is an indispensable or even
necessary party under Civ.R. 19. At issue in this case is whether Manley owes Kent
State federal student loan monies that Kent State alleges it returned to the U.S.
Department of Education because Manley did not attend the courses in which she
had enrolled, rendering her ineligible to retain the funds. (See Kent State’s motion
for summary judgment, p. 6.) In short, this case involves the recovery by Kent State
of a disputed debt. Based on the record before us, it appears that complete relief can
be afforded the parties in this action without Kent State joining Higher One, who
does not have an interest in the matter nor is an assignor, assignee, subrogor, or
subrogee. Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that anyone is at risk of
incurring multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations or would otherwise be
prejudiced by Higher One’s absence from the case. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in denying Manley’s motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable
party, and the second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Unjust-Enrichment Claim
In her fourth assignment of error, Manley contends that the trial
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss Kent State’s unjust-enrichment claim
and then in granting summary judgment to Kent State on the claim. We agree.
Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has or retains money or
benefits that in justice and equity belong to another. Gallo v. Westfield Natl. Ins.
Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91893, 2009-Ohio-1094, ¶ 18. To recover for unjust
enrichment in Ohio, a plaintiff must show (1) it conferred a benefit upon the
defendant, (2) the defendant knew of the benefit, and (3) it would be unjust to allow
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment. Meyer v. Chieffo, 193 Ohio
App.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-1670, 950 N.E.2d 1027, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). Because claims for
unjust enrichment are equitable claims based on quasi-contract (i.e., a contract
created by law) they are only available in the absence of an enforceable contract.
Deffren v. Johnson, 2021-Ohio-817, 169 N.E.3d 270, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.); Zara Constr.,
Inc. v. Belcastro, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2021 CA 0039, 2022-Ohio-788, ¶ 62. A
plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment when an express
contract covers the same subject. Fox Consulting Group, Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of
Pittsburgh, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210250, 2022-Ohio-1215, ¶ 11, citing
Ryan v. Rival Mfg. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-810032, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS
14729, 3 (Dec. 16, 1981); Gallo at ¶ 19.
As this court has recognized, “‘[t]he relationship between a student
and a university is contractual in nature.’” Cleveland State Univ. v. Simpson, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108058, 2019-Ohio-2240, ¶ 15, quoting Spafford v. Cuyahoga
Community College, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84786, 2005-Ohio-1672, ¶ 34. “The
terms of the contract are found in the university’s handbooks, catalogs, policies, and
brochures supplied to the students.” Cleveland State Univ. at id., citing Leiby v.
Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1281, 2006-Ohio-2831, ¶ 15.
Accordingly, because the relationship between Kent State and Manley
is contractual in nature, Kent State’s unjust-enrichment claim fails as a matter of
law, and thus, the trial court erred in denying Manley’s motion to dismiss the claim.
Furthermore, because the claim was still improperly pending when Kent State filed
its motion for summary judgment, the trial court should have granted summary
judgment to Manley on the unjust-enrichment claim. See Guilford v. Athena
Career Acad., N.D.Ohio No. 3:19 CV 2208, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205975, 13 (Sept.
3, 2020) (plaintiff-student’s unjust-enrichment claim for tuition she paid to
defendant-academy that was not refunded to her following her dismissal failed as a
matter of law because the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was
contractual in nature and therefore, summary judgment was granted to the
defendant).
The fourth assignment of error is sustained.
D. Summary Judgment
In her fifth assignment of error, Manley contends that the trial court
erred in granting Kent State’s motion for summary judgment. As discussed above,
the trial court erred to the extent it granted summary judgment to Kent State on its
claim for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, our analysis is limited to whether the trial
court properly granted summary judgment on Count One of Kent State’s complaint,
action on an account.
Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there
is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably to the party
against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can only reach a conclusion
that is adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio
St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio
St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
The moving party has the initial burden of setting forth specific facts
that demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio
St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this
burden, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. at 293. If the moving party
meets this burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth
specific facts using evidence permitted by Civ.R. 56(C) to show that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving
party fails to meet this burden. Id.
We review the trial court’s judgment de novo, using the same
standard that the trial court applies under Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,
77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Accordingly, we stand in the shoes
of the trial court and conduct an independent review of the record.
In its motion for summary judgment, Kent State explained its claim
as follows:
Defendant enrolled in courses with Plaintiff for the Spring 2015
semester and received an award of federal financial aid in the form of
federal Stafford Loans to pay for those courses, including a refund
check in the amount of $9,013.00. Defendant subsequently did not
attend the courses in which she enrolled, rendering her ineligible to
retain any of the financial aid she received, and necessitating the return
of all of those funds by Plaintiff to the U.S. Department of Education,
$9,013.00 of which Plaintiff paid out of pocket due to Defendant’s
refusal to disgorge herself of the improperly retained refund, as
mandated by Title IV and U.S. Department of Education Guidelines.
Despite repeated demand from and by Plaintiff, Defendant has
consistently failed and refused to return the improperly retained funds,
and has likewise failed to tender payment for the balance due.
(Kent State motion for summary judgment, p. 6.)
Attached as Exhibit A to Kent State’s motion is an “Account Detail”
from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office showing that Kent State certified the
account to the Attorney General on February 6, 2017, and the balance due as of
March 19, 2020, was $17,049, which included the original balance due of $11,110,
plus interest of $1,519.18 and miscellaneous costs of $4,420.22. Attached as Exhibit
B is a statement of Manley’s account with Kent State’s Bursar’s Office. The
statement reflects a balance due of $11,110 as of June 3, 2015. Entries on the account
show that Manley’s student loan proceeds were applied to her account on March 17,
2015, and her credit refund of $9,013 was placed with Higher One the same day.
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 are the front and back copies, respectively, of a check dated
April 6, 2015, in the amount of $9,013 from Higher One “as agent” for the “KSU
Refund” payable to Manley and endorsed by Manley and deposited with the Navy
Federal Credit Union on April 17, 2015.2
Attached as Exhibits C-1 through C-5 are invoices from the Kent State
Bursar’s Office dated June 10, 2015; September 17, 2015; February 22, 2016; July 8,
2016; and November 1, 2016, seeking payment from Manley of $11,110. Exhibit C-
6 is a copy of a letter dated December 7, 2016, from Kent State to Manley advising
2 Thus, Manley’s assertion in her counterclaim that she never received the credit
refund is wholly refuted by the record.
Manley that her past due account would be assigned to the Ohio Attorney General’s
Office for collection 14 days from the date of the letter if the past due balance was
not paid in full by that time. Exhibits D-1 through D-10 are copies of the Master
Promissory Note signed by Manley on March 12, 2015, including its terms and
conditions and the borrower’s rights and responsibilities statement. Exhibit E-1
through E-2 is a copy of R.C. 131.02.
Exhibits F-1 and F-2 are copies of an affidavit from Brian Metzbower,
the collections supervisor in the Collections Enforcement Section of the Ohio
Attorney General’s Office, in which Metzbower avers that on February 6, 2017, Kent
State certified Manley’s debt of $11,110 for collection by the Attorney General
pursuant to R.C. 131.02, and that the current balance due was $17,380.18, with
interest and collection costs continuing to accrue.3 Finally, Exhibit G is a copy of an
affidavit by Alison Murphy, a manager with Keith D. Weiner & Assoc. Co., L.P.A.,
averring that she is familiar with the case of Cleveland State Univ. v. Manley, had
gathered the financial records concerning the case, and the exhibits attached to Kent
State’s motion for summary judgment were true and accurate copies of the originals.
Kent State subsequently filed a motion for leave to file an amended affidavit, which
3 Metzbower’s interest and collection costs calculations differed from the interest
and collection costs sought by Kent State in its motion for summary judgment.
the trial court granted, for Murphy to indicate that the case referred to in her
affidavit was actually this case, not a case involving Cleveland State University.4
In its motion for summary judgment, Kent State argued that as
evidenced by the affidavits and exhibits attached to its motion, there were no
genuine issues of material fact that Manley was indebted to Kent State on her
account for tuition and educational services rendered in the amount of $17,049.40,
of which $11,110 was principal; $4,420.22 was collection costs; and $1,519.18 was
accrued interest.
In her brief in opposition to Kent State’s motion for summary
judgment, Manley argued that there were disputed genuine issues of material fact
that precluded a grant of summary judgment to Kent State. Specifically, she argued
that Kent State did not disburse the credit refund to her, in breach of the contract
between her and Kent State, within 14 days of its disbursement of her federal student
loan monies. She pointed out that Section 13 of the Borrower’s Rights and
Responsibilities statement regarding the promissory note that she signed to obtain
her student loan states that, as previously quoted in paragraph 15 of this opinion,
any credit balance after a school credits the student loan money to the student’s
account must be paid to the student by the school within the following timeframes:
(1) within 14 days after the credit balance occurs if the credit balance occurs after the
first day of class of a payment period; or (2) within 14 days after the first day of class
4 Notably absent from Kent State’s exhibits was any evidence that it returned the
credit refund to the U.S. Department of Education.
of the payment period if the credit balance occurs on or before the first day of class
of a payment period. Likewise, 34 C.F.R. 668.164(h)(2), regarding the disbursement
of student loan funds by an institution of higher learning, requires that credit
balances must be paid
directly to the student or parent as soon as possible, but no later than —
(i) Fourteen (14) days after the balance occurred if the credit
balance occurred after the first day of class of a payment period;
or
(ii) Fourteen (14) days after the first day of class of a payment period
if the credit balance occurred on or before the first day of class of
that payment period.
Additionally, 34 C.F.R. 668.164(d)(4)(i)(A)(6) provides that an
institution that uses a third-party servicer such as Higher One to refund credit
balances students must ensure that a student who does not make an affirmative
selection with the third-party servicer regarding how the student is to receive her
payment, “is paid the full amount of the credit balance within the appropriate time-
period specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, using a method specified in
paragraph (d)(1) of this section.” Paragraph (d)(1) states that an institution makes
a direct payment to a student when it (1) initiates an electronic funds transfer to the
student’s existing financial account; (2) issues a check to the student; (3) or
dispenses cash to the student.
Kent State asserts that it is a party to the agreement between Manley
and the U.S. Department of Education (i.e., the promissory note signed by Manley)
by virtue of Manley’s enrollment with Kent State for the spring 2015 semester.
(Appellee Brief, p. 4-5.) As a party to the agreement, Kent State is therefore bound
by its terms, which required it to timely disburse Manley’s credit refund.
Kent State argues that its disbursement was timely because it
transferred the credit refund to Higher One, its third-party servicer, on March 17,
2015, the same day the student loan funds were credited to Manley’s account with
the Bursar’s Office. There is a genuine issue of material fact, however, regarding
whether this transfer was sufficient to qualify as a timely disbursement of the credit
refund. As acknowledged by Kent State in the April 14, 2015 email from the Bursar’s
Office to Manley, Manley did not set up an account with Higher One because she did
not agree with Higher One’s terms and conditions required to set up an account.
(Exhibit N2, Appellant’s brief in opposition to Kent State’s motion for summary
judgment.) Therefore, as also noted in the email, Manley did not make an
affirmative choice with the servicer regarding how she was to receive her refund.
Because she did not do so, Kent State was required to ensure that Manley received
her credit refund within the time requirements set forth in the note and in 34 C.F.R.
668.164(h)(2): no later than 14 days after March 17, 2015, when the credit occurred,
if March 17, 2015, was after the first day of class of the payment period; or no later
than 14 days after the first day of class of the payment period if the credit balance
occurred before the first day of class for the payment period.
Manley received the credit refund check from Higher One on April 7,
2015. The record is silent, however, as to when the first day of class was for the
relevant payment period. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Manley timely received her credit refund.
There is also a genuine issue of material fact whether Kent State’s
claim is barred because, as argued by Manley in her brief in opposition to Kent
State’s motion for summary judgment, Kent State did not timely certify its claim to
the Ohio Attorney General.
As noted earlier, the Ohio Attorney General has statutory authority to
pursue collection actions against individuals indebted to the state, including actions
for the collection of unpaid student accounts. Oliver v. Ohio State Univ., Ct. of Cl.
No. 2007-04745-AD, 2008-Ohio-4201, ¶ 12. The amount due must be certified to
the Attorney General for collection within the time frames set forth in R.C.
131.02(A). With respect to the collection of student accounts, R.C. 131.02 states, “In
the case of an amount payable by a student enrolled in a state institution of higher
education, the amount shall be certified within the later of forty-five days after the
amount is due or the tenth day after the beginning of the next academic semester,
quarter, or other session following the session for which the payment is payable.”
There is no dispute that Kent State certified Manley’s debt to the
Ohio Attorney General on February 6, 2017. Kent State argues that the claim was
timely certified because it sent a letter to Manley dated December 7, 2016, in which
it advised her that her student account was “past due” and the account would be
certified to the Attorney General’s Office for further collection 14 days from the date
of the letter if the past due balance was not paid in full. Kent State asserts that
Manley’s account was certified “exactly 45 days later” and thus, was in compliance
with the law.
Kent State misreads the statute. In the absence of a definition of a
word or phrase used in a statute, words are to be given their common, ordinary, and
accepted meaning. State v. Nelson, 162 Ohio St.3d 338, 2020-Ohio-3690, 165
N.E.3d 1110, ¶ 18. If the meaning of the statue is unambiguous and definite, it must
be applied as written. Id. at ¶ 17. Furthermore, a court may not add words to an
unambiguous statute but must apply the statute as written. Davis v. Davis, 115 Ohio
St.3d 180, 2007-Ohio-5049, 8783 N.E.2d 1305, ¶ 15.
R.C. 131.02 does not contain the word “past,” such that, as argued by
Kent State, proper certification can occur the later of 45 days after an account is
“past due” or 10 days after the start of the next academic period. Rather, under R.C.
131.02, Manley’s account was required to be certified to the Ohio Attorney General
the later of 45 days after “the amount is due” or 10 days after the beginning of the
next academic semester, quarter, or other session following the session for which
the payment was payable.
Exhibit A2 to Kent State’s motion for summary judgment, the
statement of Manley’s account with the Bursar’s Office, demonstrates that the
amount became due on June 3, 2015. Indeed, as reflected on Exhibit C1 to Kent
State’s motion, Kent State sent Manley a bill dated June 10, 2015, for the $11,110
“amount due.” Nevertheless, as noted above, other than reflecting that Manley was
enrolled for the “Spring 2015” semester at Kent State, the record does not specify
the dates for the spring 2015 session. Accordingly, we cannot determine from the
record the date that is the later of 45 days after Manley’s account was due or 10 days
after the beginning of the next academic semester, quarter, or other session
following the session for which the payment was payable. Thus, there is a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether Kent State’s certification of Manley’s
student loan debt to the Ohio Attorney General on February 6, 2017, was timely. If
it was not timely certified pursuant to R.C. 131.02(A), Kent State is precluded from
pursuing its collection action against Manley.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Kent
State’s ability to prevail in its collection claim against Manley, the trial court erred
in granting Kent State’s motion for summary judgment. The fifth assignment of
error is sustained.
In her third assignment of error, Manley argues that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss because Kent State did not timely certify its
complaint to the Ohio Attorney General. In light of our determination that there is
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the certification was timely, this
assignment of error is overruled as moot.
E. Continuance of Final Pretrial
On September 25, 2020, Kent State filed a motion asking to
participate in the final pretrial, which was set for September 29, 2020, by phone.
The docket reflects that on September 30, 2020, the trial court, sua sponte, entered
an order continuing the final pretrial from September 29 to November 17, 2020. In
her sixth assignment of error, Manley contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in sua sponte continuing the final pretrial without good cause.
The docket reflects that as of September 29, 2020, there were several
motions pending before the trial court, including Kent State’s motion for summary
judgment and Manley’s motion to dismiss. There would have been no point in
holding a final pretrial before the trial court ruled on these dispositive motions.
“A trial court has the inherent power to control its own docket and the
progress of proceedings in its court.” Chou v. Chou, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80611,
2002-Ohio-5335, ¶ 38, citing State ex rel. Kura v. Sheward, 75 Ohio App.3d 244,
245, 598 N.E.2d 1340 (10th Dist.1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court
exercise its judgment “in an unwarranted way[] in regard to a matter over which it
has discretionary authority,” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-
3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35, or there is no sound reasoning process that would
support its decision. Klayman v. Luck, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97074 and 97075,
2012-Ohio-3354, ¶ 12.
In light of the pending dispositive motions, and the trial court’s
inherent authority to control its docket, the court’s sua sponte continuance of the
final pretrial was neither unwarranted nor unreasonable. The sixth assignment of
error is overruled.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR