State v. Miles ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Miles, 2024-Ohio-1982.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113129
v. :
MATTHEW MILES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 23, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-658755-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Kevin Filiatraut, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
FG+G Firm and Marcus Sidoti, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant, Matthew Miles (“Miles” or “appellant”), appeals his
sentence and the imposition of court costs. Upon review, we affirm.
On April 19, 2021, Miles was charged under a six-count indictment.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Miles entered a guilty plea to Count 3, as amended,
for involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C.
2903.04(A), with a three-year firearm specification; Count 5, as amended, for
felonious assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2);
and Count 6 for having weapons while under disability, a felony of the third degree
in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The three remaining counts were nolled.
At the plea hearing, when the plea agreement was placed on the
record, a jointly recommended sentence was made to the court as follows:
The State and the defense agree to recommend jointly a sentence of ten
years on the amended Count 3, which after the application of Reagan
Tokes will be 10 to 15 years. That’s in addition — you would then add
also the three-year firearm specification on that count making that 13
to 18 years.
The State and defense agree to also recommend on Count 5 a
sentence of seven years to run consecutive and then a sentence on
Count 6 to run concurrent, leaving the total sentence in this case agreed
recommended being 20 to 25 years. That’s the agreed recommended
sentence between the parties to the Court.
The assistant prosecutor stated on the record that “there are members
of the victim’s family that do not agree with this plea * * *.” The assistant prosecutor
further noted for the record that this was “just a joint recommendation,” and not an
agreed sentence. Defense counsel confirmed the plea agreement. The trial court
advised Miles of the maximum sentence that could be imposed for each offense and
informed Miles of the total aggregate term of 29.5 years that could be imposed. The
trial court also informed Miles that “there’s no promises of a particular sentence”
and that the court could impose “any sentence within the ranges” that were
discussed. Miles expressed his understanding.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it had
reviewed “the entire case file; the presentence investigation report; [R.C.] 2929.11
for the principles and purposes of sentencing; [R.C.] 2929.12 for the seriousness and
recidivism factors; and [R.C.] 2929.13 and other Revised Code Sections for felony
sentencing of the first, second, and third degree.” The trial court heard from the
assistant prosecutor, who again put the jointly recommended sentence on the
record, acknowledged that the court was free to impose anything within the
statutory ranges, and represented that members of the victim’s family were present,
many of whom did not agree with the plea offer. The assistant prosecutor set forth
the facts of the case, which included the death of the victim who suffered multiple
gunshot wounds, and he noted appellant’s “terrible record, which includes the
homicide of another individual back in 2005, for which he was prosecuted and
served 10 years for manslaughter.” The trial court heard from defense counsel, who
presented mitigating factors, asked the court to impose the recommended sentence,
and requested a waiver of costs due to appellant’s indigency. The trial court
indicated that Miles was aware at the time of his plea that “[t]he Court retains its
sentencing discretion within the statutory ranges[,]” and defense counsel
acknowledged that Miles was so advised. The trial court also heard from Miles, who
accepted responsibility and apologized to the victim’s family.
The trial court stated that what occurred in this case was “beyond
comprehension” and that it was “going to deviate from the recommended sentence
because I don’t believe that in light of the prior history of Mr. Miles that it’s
appropriate.” The trial court sentenced Miles on each count, ordered “[a]ll the
counts are to run consecutive to each other,” and made the requisite statutory
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), stating as follows: “All the counts are to run
consecutive to each other. The Court finds that it’s necessary to protect the public
and * * * punish the offender, and it’s not disproportionate to the conduct, and the
offender’s criminal history shows that consecutive sentences are necessary to
protect the public.” The trial court included consecutive-sentence findings in the
judgment entry. The total aggregate prison term imposed was 24 to 29.5 years. The
trial court also ordered Miles to pay court costs, with the option of community work
service if appellant is unable to pay costs.
Miles timely filed this appeal. He raises two assignments of error for
our review.
Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims his sentence is
clearly and convincingly not supported by the record and is contrary to law.
Although appellant advocates for a de novo review, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has determined that “[t]he standard to be applied is the standard set
forth in [R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)].” State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1083,
¶ 13. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), this court may increase, reduce, otherwise modify,
or vacate a sentence only after it has reviewed the entire trial-court record and
“clearly and convincingly finds” that “the record does not support the sentencing
court’s findings” under certain statutes or that “the sentence is otherwise contrary
to law.” Id.; Jones at ¶ 13. “The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an
appellate court to defer to a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings * * *.” State
v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
The record herein shows that Miles entered a guilty plea to three
offenses, including an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter as well as
charges for felonious assault and having weapons while under disability. Pursuant
to the plea agreement, three other counts were nolled. Although there was a jointly
recommended sentence of 20 to 25 years, the trial court, on accepting the plea
agreement, retained the discretion to impose a sentence that was less severe or more
severe than the jointly recommended sentence. See State v. Watson, 171 Ohio St.3d
1513, 2023-Ohio-4034, 220 N.E.3d 845, ¶ 3, citing State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio
St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 28. The record reflects that appellant
understood this and was advised that the potential aggregate sentencing range that
could be imposed reached 29.5 years.
As this court has previously observed,
In cases involving serious crimes where guilt is found or
admitted, consecutive sentencing is often in play. Defendants may
wish to limit their potential exposure. Conversely, the state seeks to
ensure the sentence will satisfy the victim or the prosecutor’s sense of
justice for the community as a whole. Sentences can vary widely. A
mutual agreement on sentencing can be beneficial to both sides.
Nevertheless, even where an agreement on sentencing can be
reached between the parties, trial judges are sometimes reluctant to be
bound by a specific number on a specific sentence agreed to by the
parties at the time of the plea. Judges may have concerns about what a
presentence investigation report may reveal or what may later be said
during a sentencing hearing that may sway the judge’s decision. Judges
often prefer to retain sentencing discretion, and curbing or limiting
their discretion is not something easily accomplished.
State v. Grant, 2018-Ohio-1759, 111 N.E.3d 791, ¶ 16-17 (8th Dist.).
In this case, there were members of the victim’s family that did not
agree with the plea agreement. The underlying facts reflect the serious nature of the
offenses, which includes the death of an individual who had eight or nine gunshot
wounds throughout his body. The presentence-investigation report shows Miles
had a lengthy criminal history that includes a prior manslaughter conviction.
Mitigating factors were presented. After reviewing the entire record, we do not
clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. The first assignment of
error is overruled.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court
erred by imposing costs because the record shows he is indigent and the court had
discretion to waive costs.
R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) requires the sentencing court “[i]n all criminal
cases” to “include in the sentence the costs of prosecution * * * and render a
judgment against the defendant for such costs.” The statute requires a trial court to
impose costs against all criminal defendants, even those who are indigent. State v.
Taylor, 161 Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 6, citing State v.
White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, ¶ 8; State v. Dean,
146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 231. Nevertheless, pursuant
to R.C. 2947.23(C), the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to waive the costs
of prosecution and may do so at the time of sentencing or any time thereafter.
Taylor at ¶ 6. “‘[W]aiver of costs is permitted — but not required — if the defendant
is indigent.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting White at ¶ 14. There is no requirement that a court
consider a defendant’s ability to pay. Id. at ¶ 9, 16.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it ordered Miles to pay
court costs in this matter. Furthermore, upon imposing court costs, the trial court
indicated that appellant could satisfy the costs through community work service.
Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR