State v. Hodge , 2024 Ohio 207 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Hodge, 2024-Ohio-207.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : Case Nos. 23CA22
23CA23
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DANITELEEN P. HODGE, :
Defendant-Appellant. : REALEASED 1/10/2024
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Autumn D. Adams, Toledo, Ohio, for appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecutor, Steven K. Nord, Lawrence County
Assistant Prosecutor, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Daniteleen P. Hodge appeals the imposition of a prison term following a
resentencing hearing conducted upon remand as ordered in State v. Hodge, 4th Dist.
Lawrence Nos. 19CA20, 19CA21, 2022-Ohio-2748. Hodge argues that the trial court’s
sentence is not consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing because the
trial court imposed a prison term. She contends a prison term was not warranted because
she has not incurred any new criminal charges from the time she was initially convicted
until the time her case was remanded for resentencing and therefore she was not likely
to reoffend. However, we find that Hodge’s challenge to the trial court’s prison sentence
is barred by res judicata. In her first appeal, she challenged certain aspects of her
sentence. We granted, in part, several of her assignments of error. Our remand for
resentencing was limited to (1) recalculating her jail-time credit days and (2) identifying
the correct failure to appear count she was convicted of and which failure to appear count
Lawrence App. Nos. 23CA22, 23CA23 2
had been dismissed. If Hodge believed her prison term could be challenged under the
felony sentencing statute, she could have raised it in her initial appeal. And, in fact, in her
first appeal she challenged the constitutionality of her prison term. Her argument here is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We overrule her sole assignment of error and affirm
the trial court judgment.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The facts and procedural history are set forth in detail in State v. Hodge, 4th
Dist. Lawrence Nos. 19CA20, 19CA21, 2022-Ohio-2748, ¶ 8 – 23. Important for this
appeal are our findings on her sentencing and our limited remand for resentencing.
{¶3} Hodge pleaded guilty to identity fraud, falsification, grand theft of a motor
vehicle, and failure to appear. She was charged with a second failure to appear count,
which was dismissed by the state. The trial court sentenced her to an 11-month prison
term for identity fraud, a 6-month jail term for falsification, a 17-month prison term for
grand theft, and a 17-month prison term for failure to appear. The trial court ordered all
sentences to be served concurrently for a total 17-month prison term. Hodge at ¶ 1.
{¶4} Hodge raised four assignments of error all related to her sentencing. She
argued that her identity fraud and falsification convictions should have merged as allied
offenses of similar import and we rejected that. Hodge at ¶ 2-3, 24-35. She argued that
the trial court failed to properly apply her jail-time credit to all of her concurrent sentences.
We rejected that in part, but remanded the matter in order to have the actual number of
days of jail-time credit accurately calculated. Hodge at ¶ 4, 36-43. She argued that she
was incorrectly sentenced on both failure to appear counts, even though one of the counts
was dismissed by the state. She requested a nunc pro tunc order to correct that error.
However, we remanded for a rehearing on that error because in the sentencing hearing
Lawrence App. Nos. 23CA22, 23CA23 3
transcript, although the trial court clearly only sentenced her on one count of failure to
appear, the judge did not identify if that was count one or count two. Therefore we did not
believe the error could be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry and we remanded it for
resentencing for the trial court to identify on which failure to appear count Hodge had
been convicted and which had been dismissed. Hodge at ¶ 5, 44-48.
{¶5} Upon remand, the trial court scheduled a resentencing hearing for
September 2022, but Hodge failed to appear. The resentencing hearing eventually took
place in May 2023. The trial court properly limited the scope of the resentencing hearing
to the narrow matters to be addressed on remand. It corrected the actual days of jail-time
credit from 30 to 42 days and corrected the sentencing on the failure to appear to identify
that Hodge was convicted on count two- failure to appear and that count one-failure to
appear had been dismissed by the state.
{¶6} Hodge filed this appeal from the resentencing judgment entries.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶7} Hodge presents one assignment of error:
I. The imposition of a prison sentence is not consistent with the
principles and purposes of sentencing as Appellant incurred no new criminal
charges in the 4 years this case took to resolve, showing clearly that
Appellant’s conduct was not likely to occur again.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶8} Hodge argues that the trial court’s imposition of a prison sentence was
inconsistent with the recidivism factor in R.C. 2929.12(E)(4) because her behavior
showed that her offenses were committed under circumstances not likely to recur.
However, she also concedes that nothing in the statutory framework for felony sentencing
review permits an appellate court to independently weigh the record and substitute its
Lawrence App. Nos. 23CA22, 23CA23 4
judgment for that of the trial court concerning whether the sentence best complies with
the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12 or the purposes and principles set
out in R.C. 2929.11. State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d
649; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). We do not reach the merits of Hodge’s assignment of error
because it is barred by res judicata.
{¶9} The scope of Hodge’s resentencing hearing was limited to a recalculation
of her jail-time credit days and a correction to identify the proper failure to appear count
for which she was convicted. Therefore only those limited matters were affected by the
appeal and were reviewed at the resentencing hearing. The sentences not affected by
the appealed errors were not vacated – that includes her prison terms – and were not
subject to review by the trial court. State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669,
951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 15. Hodge cannot take advantage of the resentencing to challenge
other portions of her original sentence. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-
1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, paragraph three of the syllabus.
When a defendant fails to appeal the sentence for a certain offense, he
cannot take advantage of an error in the sentence for an entirely separate
offense to gain a second opportunity to appeal upon resentencing. To hold
otherwise would essentially abrogate the doctrine of res judicata for
multicount sentences and precludes finality in sentencing. Accordingly, a
defendant who fails on direct appeal to challenge the sentence imposed on
him for an offense is barred by res judicata from appealing that sentence
following a remand for resentencing on other offenses.
State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 19.
{¶10} In her first appeal Hodge could have challenged and did, in fact, appeal the
imposition of a prison term on all of the counts for which she was convicted. Because the
only matters that the trial court could properly review on remand were the jail-time credit
calculation and identification of the proper count associated with the failure to appear
conviction, only those two matters are subject to appeal following the resentencing. For
Lawrence App. Nos. 23CA22, 23CA23 5
example, if she believed that the trial court had still improperly calculated the number of
jail-time credit days, she could have appealed that purported error.
{¶11} Trial courts have no authority to extend the scope of remand limited by a
mandate of an appellate court. Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984),
citing Briggs v. Pennsylvania RR. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403(1948). Therefore the trial court could not have altered any of the prison terms to which it
had originally sentenced her as that would have been beyond the scope of the remand
authority. Hodge’s attempt to challenge her prison term now is barred by res judicata.
State v. Walters, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1032, 2017-Ohio-5722, ¶ 13.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶12} We overrule Hodge’s sole assignment of error as barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
Lawrence App. Nos. 23CA22, 23CA23 6
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
LAWRENCE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.