Craver v. Haefner ( 2024 )

[Cite as Craver v. Haefner, 2024-Ohio-2242.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Richard C. Craver, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 23AP-448
v. : (C.P.C. No. 19JU-1343)
Katherine M. Haefner, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellee. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on June 11, 2024
On brief: Richard C. Craver, pro se. Argued: Richard C.
Craver.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
PER CURIAM
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Richard C. Craver, appeals the judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, which
adopted a magistrate’s decision and modified Craver’s child support obligation. For the
following reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} On January 4, 2019, the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency
(“CSEA”) issued an original administrative order for child support and medical support
regarding N.H., the minor daughter of Craver and defendant-appellee, Katherine M.
Haefner. Craver objected to the administrative order by filing in the juvenile court an action
for the payment of support and provision for the child’s health care under R.C. 2151.231.1
1 R.C. 2151.231(A) states, in pertinent part, “The parent * * * of a child * * * may bring an action in a juvenile
court or other court with jurisdiction under section 2101.022 or 2301.03 of the Revised Code under this section
No. 23AP-448 2
Craver requested the court “to reduce, or eliminate if possible” the “extremely high monthly
payment.” (Feb. 4, 2019 Compl. to Set Support (Obj. to CSEA Adm. Order) at 1.)
{¶ 3} A juvenile court magistrate conducted a hearing on Craver’s complaint on
April 2, 2019, and issued a decision recommending that the court grant Craver’s complaint
to set support and vacate the CSEA’s administrative order. The juvenile court adopted the
magistrate’s decision. The court ordered Craver to pay child support of $471.36 per month,
plus processing charge, effective December 12, 2018, and anytime thereafter that private
health insurance is in effect. Alternatively, effective December 12, 2018, and anytime
thereafter that private health insurance is not in effect, the court ordered Craver to pay child
support of $428.05 per month, plus processing charge, and cash medical support of $121.33
per month, plus processing charge.
{¶ 4} In September 2022, the CSEA conducted an administrative review pursuant
to R.C. 3119.60 through 3119.71 and recommended that Craver’s support obligation be
modified and increased, effective September 1, 2022. Craver requested an administrative
adjustment hearing, after which the CSEA issued an administrative modification hearing
decision. The CSEA found that Craver’s income for child support purposes was $81,386.37.
Based on that income, the CSEA calculated Craver’s child support obligation according to
the Child Support Guidelines’ Worksheet, in accordance with R.C. 3119.022 and 3119.023;
it recommended modification of Craver’s child support obligation to $1,184.10 per month,
plus processing charge, and of Craver’s cash medical support obligation to $22.44 per
month, plus processing charge.
{¶ 5} Craver requested a court hearing regarding the CSEA’s modification decision
pursuant to R.C. 3119.63, claiming the CSEA had erroneously calculated his income by
including in the calculation “perceived overtime.” Following a hearing before a juvenile
court magistrate on July 12, 2023, at which both Craver and Haefner were present and
represented by counsel, the magistrate issued a decision sustaining Craver’s objection to
CSEA’s recommendation. The magistrate recommended that the juvenile court modify
Craver’s support obligations to require him to pay child support of $978.16 per month, plus
requesting the court to issue an order requiring a parent of the child to pay an amount for the support of the
child without regard to the marital status of the child’s parents.”
No. 23AP-448 3
processing charge, and cash medical support of $20.18 per month, plus processing charge.
The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision as the court’s judgment.
{¶ 6} Craver, acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Craver’s appellate brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)
{¶ 7} App.R. 16(A) sets forth requirements that must be included in an appellant’s
appellate brief:
The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and
in the order indicated, all of the following:
(1) A table of contents, with page references.
(2) A table of cases alphabetically arranged, statutes, and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where
cited.
(3) A statement of the assignments of error presented for
review, with reference to the place in the record where each
error is reflected.
(4) A statement of the issues presented for review, with
references to the assignments of error to which each issue
relates.
(5) A statement of the case briefly describing the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and the disposition in the court
below.
(6) A statement of facts relevant to the assignments of error
presented for review, with appropriate references to the record
in accordance with division (D) of this rule.
(7) An argument containing the contentions of the appellant
with respect to each assignment of error presented for review
and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.
(8) A conclusion briefly stating the precise relief sought.
{¶ 8} Craver’s appellate brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A). Most notably,
Craver’s brief does not include “[a] statement of the assignments of error presented for
review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected,” as required
No. 23AP-448 4
by App.R. 16(A)(3). As Craver has not identified any assignments of error, his statement of
issues does not refer to the assignments of error, as required by App.R. 16(A)(4). Likewise,
his statement of facts and legal arguments cannot be tethered to nonexistent assignments
of error. As we have explained, “[a]ssignments of error are vitally important because
appellate courts determine each appeal ‘on its merits on the assignments of error set forth
in the briefs.’ ” J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Cloyes, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-107, 2021-
Ohio-3316, ¶ 10, quoting App.R. 12(A)(1)(b). “[I]n the absence of assignments of error, this
court has nothing to review.” Id., citing Ward v. Ward, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-381, 2021-
Ohio-2571, ¶ 6. “A party’s failure to comply with App.R. 16 is tantamount to not filing a
brief in the first instance.” Columbus v. Payne, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-766, 2023-Ohio-2461,
¶ 5. Although Craver is proceeding pro se in this appeal, pro se litigants are held to the same
standards as litigants who are represented by counsel. Cloyes at ¶ 9.
{¶ 9} Noncompliance with the appellate rules constitutes good cause for dismissal
of an appeal. Payne at ¶ 5, citing Loc.R. 10(E). See also Kemba Fin. Credit Union v.
Covington, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-487, 2021-Ohio-2120, ¶ 8 (“Appellate courts have
discretion to dismiss appeals that fail to set forth assignments of error”), citing
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Asamoah, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-212, 2012-Ohio-4422, ¶ 5.
Nevertheless, this court also has the discretion to review the merits of the appealed
judgment, even in the absence of assignments of error, in the interest of serving justice. Hill
v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-454, 2019-Ohio-3459, ¶ 7, citing Asamoah at ¶ 5, and Tonti v.
Tonti, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-732, 2007-Ohio-2658, ¶ 2.
{¶ 10} Craver’s noncompliance with App.R. 16(A), and particularly his failure to set
out any assignment of error in his appellate brief, warrants dismissal of this appeal, but
even if we were to overlook that failure, Craver could not prevail on appeal.
B. Child support is not a matter of contract
{¶ 11} Craver’s main arguments in his appellate brief stem primarily from his
mistaken belief that his obligation to pay child support is a contractual one. He argues, “the
child support order is a contract that [he] signed only under duress and that he was coerced
into signing due to intimidation and fear of arrest.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6.) He contends,
had he known all the facts, he “never would have signed the contract,” and “no obligation
would have been created.” Id. And he states, “if no contract exists, there is no obligor,
No. 23AP-448 5
obligee, or obligation that binds someone to an agreement.” Id. Craver’s lawful obligation
to support his child, however, does not depend on the existence of a contract.
{¶ 12} “[A] parent’s legal obligation to pay child support is not a matter of contract.”
Story v. Story, 8th Dist. No. 109850, 2021-Ohio-2439, ¶ 19. Rather, “ ‘[a]n obligation to
pay child support arises by operation of law.’ ” Id., quoting Cramer v. Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d
131, 135 (1994). Thus, the fact that Craver “absolutely does not wish to participate in child
support proceedings” does not affect his legal obligation to support his child. (Appellant’s
Brief at 6.)
{¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized two sources of parental
obligations under Ohio law. In re Adoption of B.I., 157 Ohio St.3d 29, 2019-Ohio-2450,
¶ 27. It explained, “[t]he General Assembly created a binary system in which a parent has
a general obligation of support toward a child when the parent’s responsibilities are not the
subject of a court order and a specific obligation of support when a court has determined
the parent’s obligation by decree.” Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 14} A parent’s general obligation to support his or her children is set out in R.C.
3103.03(A), which states, in part, “[t]he biological or adoptive parent of a minor child must
support the parent’s minor children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s labor.”
Thus, by statute, “ ‘all parents, whether married or not, have a duty to support their minor
children.’ ” B.I. at ¶ 21, quoting In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor, 59 Ohio St.3d 201,
202 (1991). R.C. 3103.03 subsumes the pre-existing common law obligation for parents to
support their children. Nokes v. Nokes, 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 5 (1976).
{¶ 15} A specific child support obligation imposed by judicial decree supersedes
the general statutory obligation of support under R.C. 3103.03. Id. at ¶ 27. Thus, in B.I.,
“once the parties invoked the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to establish parentage,
calculate child support pursuant to the guidelines, and issue an order of child support
pursuant to the guidelines, the court’s decree thereafter superseded the general obligation
of support set forth in R.C. 3103.03(A).” Id. at ¶ 30. Similarly here, the juvenile court
calculated and issued an order of support pursuant to the child-support guidelines and
pursuant to statute, and Craver’s objections based on principles of contract law are
misplaced.
No. 23AP-448 6
C. Craver’s remaining arguments are meritless
{¶ 16} In his appellate brief, Craver also cites federal criminal statutes dealing with
“peonage,” 18 U.S.C. 1581, and “forced labor,” 18 U.S.C. 1589, but Craver’s otherwise
unsupported, conclusory suggestion that he “has been forced to work much more than what
would be necessary under normal means to pay off” his child support obligation is
insufficient to establish any error in the juvenile court’s judgment, let alone that the
judgment is in violation of federal law. (Appellant’s Brief at 7.) Furthermore, Craver’s
vague claim that his court ordered child support violates his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution fares no better. Craver does not
identify any specific due process violation he contends occurred, and he does not support
his due process argument with any citation to legal authority or any cogent argument.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 17} Because Craver has failed to file a brief that complies with App.R. 16 and
because Craver has otherwise failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s judgment,
we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
BEATTY BLUNT, BOGGS, and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.