State v. Briggs ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Briggs, 2023-Ohio-4674.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 22AP-484
(C.P.C. No. 17CR-6236)
v. :
No. 22AP-485
Antoine T. Briggs, : (C.P.C. No. 17CR-1732)
Defendant-Appellant. : No. 22AP-486
(C.P.C. No. 17CR-3824)
:
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on December 21, 2023
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Darren
Burgess, for appellee. Argued: Paula M. Sawyers.
On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D.
Essex, for appellant. Argued: Robert D. Essex.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Antoine T. Briggs, appeals the judgments of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following his second combined resentencing in
these three criminal cases. This court has reversed his sentence in these cases on two prior
occasions: first, because the sentencing judge improperly removed the defendant from his
sentencing hearing without warning before imposing sentence, State v. Briggs, 10th Dist.
No. 18AP-679, 2020-Ohio-4652 (hereinafter “Briggs I”), and second, because the trial
court committed plain error by concluding that the defendant’s three unrelated cases were
part of an ongoing course of conduct requiring maximum and consecutive sentences. State
v. Briggs, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-144, 2022-Ohio-1950 (hereinafter “Briggs II”). All three
Nos. 22AP-484, 22AP-485, & 22AP-486 2
times, the trial court has imposed the same three maximum sentences to be run
consecutively, for an aggregate term of 15 years incarceration.
{¶ 2} We have previously recounted the facts underlying these appeals:
At a plea hearing held on July 2, 2018, appellant entered guilty
pleas to aggravated vehicular homicide in Franklin C.P. No.
17CR-1732 (“17CR-1732”), possession of cocaine in Franklin
C.P. No. 17CR-3824 (“17CR-3824”), and burglary in Franklin
C.P. No. 17CR-6236 (“17CR-6236”). The prosecutor recited the
following pertinent facts in each case as follows.
In 17CR-1732, on February 19, 2017, appellant exited I-70
eastbound onto the Alum Creek ramp, failed to negotiate a
curve, drove through a grassy area, and struck a vehicle
traveling onto I-70 eastbound from the Alum Creek ramp. The
victim sustained fatal injuries in the accident. At the time of the
accident, appellant’s blood-alcohol level was .209 and his
driver’s license had been suspended. In 17CR-3824, on
September 15, 2016, Columbus police officers responding to a
location on Barnett Road were advised that appellant was on
the premises and that there was a possible warrant for his
arrest. During a search incident to arrest, the officers
discovered in appellant’s pants pocket a folded one-dollar bill
containing .179 grams of crack cocaine. In 17CR-6236, on
June 23, 2016, a homeowner on Millbridge Drive reported to
the Columbus police that several items had been stolen from
her home. During a subsequent police investigation,
fingerprints matching those of appellant were found inside the
home.
Briggs II, ¶ 2-3. As indicated above, we have twice reversed Briggs’ sentence. On July 7,
2022, the trial court held a third sentencing hearing. At that hearing, the state argued that
consecutive sentence terms were permissible pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and State v.
Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, as well as this court’s remand, compare with
Briggs II at ¶ 29, and requested the court impose maximum and consecutive sentences.
(July 7, 2022 Tr. at 10-11.) Briggs’ counsel presented arguments in mitigation, id. at 6-8,
and the trial court engaged in a detailed analysis of the R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and
recidivism factors, id. at 14-24, found that each of the offenses were the “worst form of the
offense,” id. at 26, that Briggs had a long criminal history and that “based on Mr. Briggs’
history, [that] it is likely that he will commit crimes in the future,” id., that Briggs had shown
no genuine remorse, id. at 21-22, and that it could not and would not consider his
Nos. 22AP-484, 22AP-485, & 22AP-486 3
participation in programming and substance abuse cessation in prison because “that is
required under [the judicial release statute] and not the sentencing guidelines which are
the subject of the Tenth Appellate District’s decision,” id. at 21. The court imposed
maximum sentences for each offense, and went on to order that each of those sentences be
served consecutively:
Pursuant to State versus Bonnell, cited at 140 Ohio St. 3d 209,
also 2014-Ohio-3177, at Paragraph 22 of that decision. In
reference to Revised Code 2929.14 subsection (C) (4), the Court
will find that consecutive sentences, “consecutive service,” that
is the language of the Bonnell decision at Paragraph 22.
Consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from
future crime or to punish the offender. Consecutive sentences
are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public. And
the Court will also find that subsection (C) at Paragraph 22 of
the Bonnell decision is appropriate. The offender’s history of
criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender. The Court has listed in its sentencing the record of
criminal convictions that exists since the age of 18. So the Court
will find consistent with the requirements of Bonnell that the
- - that Mr. Briggs’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates
that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
from future crime by the offender.
Id. at 27. Briggs objected to the court’s failure to consider “both his remorse now as well as
his acknowledgement of his substance abuse problem at this time when we are conducting
a new sentencing hearing.” Id. at 31. The court noted the objections and stated that it
believed Briggs’ remorse was “convenient remorse. I don’t believe it’s genuine remorse.”
Id. This timely appeal followed, and Briggs now argues that the trial court erred “by
imposing maximum sentences upon the appellant where the record clearly and
convincingly showed that such sentences were not justified and were contrary to law.”
{¶ 3} Generally, appellate courts will not reverse a sentencing court’s decision
unless the evidence is clear and convincing that either the record does not support the
sentence or the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” See, e.g., Briggs II at ¶ 9-11, citing
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and State v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-910, 2016-Ohio-4638, ¶ 7.
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces “a firm belief or conviction as to
the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph
three of the syllabus. And in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, the
Nos. 22AP-484, 22AP-485, & 22AP-486 4
Supreme Court of Ohio placed a limiting construction on the statutory phrase “otherwise
contrary to law” in R.C. 2953.08 and concluded that so long as the trial court engaged in
the proper formal analysis, the actual conclusions that flow from that analysis are due more
deference and are not subject to reevaluation by the appellate court. Specifically, the court
held that “[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently
weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id.
at ¶ 42. Jones stands for the proposition that if a sentencing court examines how the factors
set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 relate to the defendant and the case and the court’s
analysis bears some reasonable relation to the record and proceeds to make findings under
R.C. 2929.14 that permit the imposition of maximum and/or consecutive sentences, unless
those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record, the sentence
should be affirmed.
{¶ 4} Here, while the trial court’s analysis under R.C. 2929.12(B) is not particularly
strong, the court observed that Briggs was on probation to her court on a different case at
the time he committed these offenses, (Tr. at 19), that at least one of the victims suffered
serious physical harm, id. at 15, that another victim suffered serious psychological harm,
id., that Briggs’ actions were not less serious than the actions that normally constituted the
offenses, id. at 16-19, and that Briggs’ lengthy criminal history, substance abuse problems,
and lack of genuine remorse made him more likely to commit offenses in the future. Id. at
19-24.
{¶ 5} In sum, the trial court appropriately reviewed the statutory factors and made
R.C. 2929.14 findings that were sufficient to impose maximum sentences. And upon a
thorough review of the sentencing hearing judgment entry and transcript, we cannot say
that the trial court’s maximum sentences are clearly and convincingly unsupported in the
record. Accordingly, Briggs’ sole assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled. The
judgments of the Franklin County Court Common Pleas are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
JAMISON and LELAND, JJ., concur.