In re C.C. , 2024 Ohio 5012 ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5012.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: C.C. : APPEAL NO. C-240365
TRIAL NO. F21-535Z
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 18, 2024
Alana Van Gundy, for Appellant Mother,
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patsy Bradbury,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and
Family Services,
Pro Kids and Elizabeth Hutson, for the child’s Guardian Ad Litum.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant mother appeals the decision of the Hamilton County Juvenile
Court granting permanent custody of her child, C.C., to the Hamilton County
Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”). This court sua sponte
unconsolidates this appeal, the case numbered C-240365, from the appeal in the case
numbered C-240373.
{¶2} In her sole assignment of error, she argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s judgment and that the judgment was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not reach the merits of her
assignment of error, because we cannot determine from the judgment entry whether
the juvenile court applied the correct standard of review and if it independently
reviewed the magistrate’s decision.
{¶3} The record shows that on May 24, 2021, HCJFS filed a motion for
temporary custody of the child. Subsequently, the child was found to be dependent
and placed in foster care. On February 10, 2023, HCJFS filed a motion to convert
temporary custody of the child to permanent custody. We note that the applicable
statute, R.C. 2151.414, was amended effective April 3, 2023. The amendment made
only minor changes. Courts should apply the version of the statute in effect at the time
the motion for permanent custody was filed. In re P., S., M. Children, 2024-Ohio-
2794, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). Consequently, we apply the version of the statute in effect on
February 10, 2023.
{¶4} At the hearing on HCJFS’s motion, the magistrate found that the child
had been in the temporary custody of HCJFS for 12 or more months of a 22-month
period, that the child could not be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents, and that granting
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
permanent custody to HCJFS was in the child’s best interest. See former R.C.
2151.414(B) and (D). Mother objected to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶5} In ruling on the objections, the juvenile court discussed the manifest-
weight-of-the-evidence argument raised by mother and cited the appropriate standard
in what appears to be boiler-plate language. It then stated,
The Magistrate performed a detailed review and analysis of the
pertinent statutory factors in this matter. An abuse of discretion exists
when a Magistrate’s decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable,” meaning it is made “without consideration of or
regard for all the facts, [or] circumstances.” (Citation omitted). Here
the magistrate considered all of the relevant statutory factors under
O.R.C. 2151.414(E) and 2151.414(D). Further, [mother] frames her
assignment of error as a manifest weight and sufficiency challenge. She
argues the evidence and the record contradicts the ultimate conclusion
of the Magistrate. However [she] fails to substantiate these arguments
with any evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the Magistrate’s
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented.
{¶6} Finally, in what also appears to be boiler-plate language, the entry
states, “In light of the Magistrate’s thorough analysis, their [sic] consideration of the
appropriate statutory factors, the Court cannot find that the decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence or find any abuse of discretion in the Magistrate’s
determination.”
{¶7} This case is almost identical to In re E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421 (1st Dist.), in
which we set forth our standard of review for a trial court reviewing a magistrate’s
decision. We stated,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Appellate courts generally review juvenile courts’ parental-termination
determinations under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence or a manifest-
weight-of-the-evidence standard of review. In re Z.C., 173 Ohio St.3d
359, 2023-Ohio-4703, 230 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 11. But when an appeal of a
parental-termination decision presents questions of law, our review is
de novo. In re L.E.S., 2024-Ohio-165, 233 N.E.3d 1259, ¶ 14 (1st
Dist.). Whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard is
a legal question that we review de novo. See State v. Williams, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-190380, 2020-Ohio-5245, ¶ 5 (“We review de novo
whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard.”).
Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶8} We also discussed the trial court’s duties when deciding on objections
to a magistrate’s report under Juv.R. 40. We stated that in ruling on an objection, a
court must “undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain
that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately
applied the law.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). The juvenile court must review
the facts and determine the issues de novo, and it may not defer to the magistrate. Id.
{¶9} We further stated that this court presumes that the juvenile court
complied with Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) “when the record demonstrates that the juvenile
court independently reviewed the evidence, acknowledged the applicable statutes, and
reached its conclusion based on clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing In
re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 40. But a juvenile court errs in reviewing a magistrate’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. Juvenile courts should not presume a magistrate’s
decision’s validity. Id. at ¶ 20, citing Jones v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-131, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.).
{¶10} In In re E.J., the juvenile court initially used boiler-plate language that
stated the correct requirement for independent review. But following its recitation of
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that requirement, the juvenile court framed the mother’s objection to the weighing of
the best-interest factors as a manifest-weight argument and reviewed the magistrate’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. The court again cited the manifest-weight
standard, and then incorrectly stated that in making a custody determination, the
magistrate must consider the factors set out in R.C. 3109.04(F), rather than R.C.
2151.414(D), the correct statute. The court again described the mother’s argument as
a manifest-weight challenge and applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. In re E.J.,
2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 23 (1st Dist.).
{¶11} Finally, we said that we could not determine whether the juvenile court
independently reviewed the magistrate’s decision when it overruled the mother’s
objections. “While the juvenile court started and ended its decision with a boiler-plate
recitation of the correct standard, its substantive discussion of the mother’s objections
exclusively referenced an appellate standard of review. The court additionally cited
the wrong statute in its entry.” Id. at ¶ 25. Consequently, we reversed the juvenile
court’s judgment and remanded the cause for the juvenile court to conduct an
independent review of the magistrate’s decision. Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶12} The language used in the judgment entry in the present case is nearly
identical to the language used in In re E.J., with the only difference being that the
juvenile court did not cite to the wrong statute. The boiler-plate language states that
the court conducted an independent review, but in the body of the decision, the court
used a manifest-weight and abuse-of-discretion standard. Thus, we cannot determine
whether the juvenile court conducted an independent review and, without that
independent review, we cannot effectively perform our role as a reviewing court. See
id. at ¶ 35.
{¶13} Consequently, we reverse the juvenile court’s decision and remand the
cause for the juvenile court to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
decision and apply the proper standard of review. Our reversal renders mother’s
assignment of error moot, and we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c); In re
E.J., 2024-Ohio-2421, at ¶ 35 (1st Dist.).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BOCK, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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