State v. Wood , 2024 Ohio 4925 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Wood, 2024-Ohio-4925.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29887
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 22-TRD-3833
:
ALICE WOOD : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on October 11, 2024
...........
ANDREW S. POLLIS & MELISSA A. GHRIST, Attorneys for Appellant
ASHLEY THOMAS, Attorney for Appellee
.............
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Alice Wood appeals from her conviction for reckless
operation of a vehicle. Specifically, she challenges the trial court’s order of restitution,
-2-
arguing that the amount of restitution ordered did not bear a reasonable relationship to
the actual loss suffered, because the State failed to present evidence regarding the
market value of the vehicle immediately before the collision. For the following reasons,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In January 2022, Brian Klein was driving Angela Skinner’s vehicle and was
hit in the front bumper by another driver. On May 8, 2022, Skinner was driving the same
vehicle with Klein as a passenger and, while stopped at a traffic light, Wood hit the rear
end of Skinner’s vehicle. After the collision, Wood got out of her car, spoke with Skinner
(who allegedly agreed that there was no damage to the rear bumper), and then left the
scene without notifying the police.
{¶ 3} Shortly thereafter, Skinner contacted the Dayton Police Department and
reported the incident. On July 8, 2022, Wood was charged with one count of failure to
stop after an accident on public roads in violation of R.C. 4549.02 and one count of failure
to maintain assured clear distance ahead in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). Wood later
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation of
R.C. 4511.20.
{¶ 4} On June 20, 2023, the trial court held a restitution hearing at which Skinner,
Klein, and Wood testified. At the hearing, it was undisputed that Skinner’s vehicle had
pre-existing damage on the front driver’s side from the January 2022 collision. Neither the
State nor Wood presented evidence regarding the market value of Skinner’s vehicle
immediately before or after the May 2022 collision, but Skinner testified that she had paid
-3-
$5,000 for the vehicle when she purchased it approximately four years earlier.
{¶ 5} The State offered into evidence an auto-repair estimate from Beau Townsend
Collision Center. The estimate included the cost of fixing the pre-existing damage from
the January 2022 accident and the damage from the collision involving Wood, totaling
$6,656.22. The total estimate to repair the vehicle exceeded the $5,000 that Skinner had
paid for the car. The State argued that the restitution cap was $5,000 and then requested
$5,000 to fix the vehicle.
{¶ 6} Although the portion of the estimate involving the front of the car was not
taken into account, the trial court considered certain aspects of the estimate related to the
vehicle’s rear end and ordered Wood to pay $1,865.76 in restitution to Skinner for damage
to the vehicle, which included the truck lid ($831.11), the right and left rear lamps ($251.65
each), and the rear bumper cover ($531.78). We note that the actual total to repair the
rear end damage according to the estimate was $1,866.19, not $1,865.76.
{¶ 7} Wood appeals.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} Wood sets forth the following sole assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING MS. WOOD TO PAY
RESTITUTION BECAUSE THE CITY FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
OF THE VALUE OF MS. SKINNER’S CAR BEFORE THE ACCIDENT
FROM WHICH TO DETERMINE WHETHER REPAIR COSTS WERE
EXCESSIVE.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.28 governs financial sanctions for misdemeanor offenses and
-4-
allows a court to impose sanctions on a criminal offender, including restitution by the
offender to the victim. R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) provides, in part:
The court shall determine the amount of restitution to be paid by the
offender. The victim, victim’s representative, victim’s attorney, if applicable,
the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s designee, and the offender may provide
information relevant to the determination of the amount of restitution. The
amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the
economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of the offense . . . If the court decides to or is required to impose
restitution, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on restitution if the
offender, victim, victim’s representative, victim’s attorney, if applicable, or
victim’s estate disputes the amount of restitution. The court shall determine
the amount of full restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.
{¶ 10} “R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) grants broad discretion to the trial court to ‘base the
amount of restitution it orders’ on new information presented at the restitution hearing,
which can be from the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates,
receipts, or ‘any other information.’ ” State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-125, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Olson, 2013-Ohio-4403, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). The amount of restitution “must
be limited to the actual economic loss caused by the illegal conduct for which the
defendant was convicted.” State v. Caldwell, 2023-Ohio-355, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting
State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 69 (1990). “The State bears the burden of establishing
the restitution amount.” State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-3318, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing Caldwell
-5-
at ¶ 16.
{¶ 11} “[W]e generally review a trial court’s order of restitution under an abuse of
discretion standard; an abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Wilson, 2015-Ohio-3167, ¶ 11, citing
State v. Naylor, 2011-Ohio-960, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.); State v. Johnson, 2012-Ohio-1230, ¶ 11
(2d Dist.). A trial court abuses its discretion “when it orders restitution that does not bear
a reasonable relationship to the actual financial loss suffered” and “if the award of
restitution is not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the
court can discern the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” Williams
at ¶ 14, citing Johnson at ¶ 11; Olson at ¶ 33.
{¶ 12} In her assignment of error, Wood contends that the State’s burden in
establishing the restitution amount included producing evidence sufficient to prove the
market value of Skinner’s vehicle immediately before the May 2022 accident with Wood.
She asserts that, because the State failed to produce such evidence, the trial court erred
in ordering Wood to pay restitution at all.
{¶ 13} Wood relies on Falter v. City of Toledo, 169 Ohio St. 238 (1959), in support
of her argument. In Falter, the plaintiffs, Falter and Allstate Insurance Company, sought
to recover damages resulting from a collision between Falter’s automobile and a truck
owned by the City of Toledo and driven by a city employee. Id. The plaintiffs’ complaint
included an allegation that “the reasonable cost of the labor and material necessary to
repair said automobile was the sum of one hundred seventyeight [sic] and 74/100 dollars
($178.74) which amount also represents the depreciation in the reasonable value of said
-6-
automobile as a result of said collision.” Id. at 239. The defendants sought to strike this
allegation, arguing that the plaintiffs should not have pleaded the cost of repairs but,
rather, should have alleged only the difference in the reasonable market value of the
motor vehicle both immediately before and after the actionable collision. Id.
{¶ 14} Falter concluded that the owner of a damaged motor vehicle may recover
the difference between its market value immediately before and immediately after the
collision. Id. at 240. The court also held, however, that it was not prejudicial error for the
owner of such a vehicle to allege, prove, and recover the reasonable cost of repairs
provided that such recovery did not exceed the difference between the market value of
the vehicle immediately before and after the collision. Id. In support of its conclusion,
Falter quoted the following from Gass v. Agate Ice Cream, 264 N.Y. 141, 143-44 (1934):
The damages sustained by an automobile in a collision may be established
by showing the reasonable cost of the repairs necessary to restore it to its
former condition, although the general rule is that the measure of damages
to personal property is the difference between its market value immediately
before and immediately after the injury. This rule is subject to the limitation
. . . that the cost of repairs must be less than the diminution in market value
due to the injury . . . The plaintiff should not benefit by the loss . . . Where
the automobile is totally destroyed, the measure of damages is its
reasonable market value immediately before destruction. There can be no
recovery beyond such value for mere repairs.
Id.-7-
{¶ 15} Wood also cites State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-3318 (1st Dist.). In Moore, the
victim was required to purchase a new vehicle after a collision, and the trial court awarded
a restitution amount that was based on the cost of the replacement vehicle. In reversing
the trial court’s award, Moore recognized that, while the damage to a vehicle may be
determined by estimates setting forth the cost of repair, when the cost to repair
the vehicle exceeds its value (as when the vehicle is a “total loss”), “then the owner’s
damages are limited to the value of the vehicle immediately prior to the accident.” Moore
at ¶ 12, quoting Caldwell at ¶ 22.
{¶ 16} The issue in this case concerns whether the trial court erred in ordering
restitution without considering the market value of Skinner’s vehicle immediately before
and after the accident with Wood. Wood points out that Skinner purchased the vehicle
four years prior for $5,000 and that the vehicle had already been damaged from the
January 2022 accident before the incident with Wood, suggesting (1) that the total repair
estimate of $6,656.22 far exceeded the market value of the vehicle immediately before
and after the May 2022 accident and (2) that the trial court’s order for restitution in the
amount of $1,865.76 for rear end repairs also likely exceeded the vehicle’s market value
before and after the latter accident. According to Wood, the record is devoid of any
market-value evidence from which to determine whether the cost of repairs necessitated
by the May 2022 collision exceeded the difference between the market value of the
vehicle immediately before and after the accident. Thus, in relying on the reasoning in
Falter and Moore, Wood contends that, without evidence of market value at the relevant
times, the estimate of the repair costs was not an appropriate way to establish economic
-8-
loss.
{¶ 17} At the outset, we note that, when the cost to repair the vehicle exceeds its
market value, the recoverable damage is the vehicle’s market value immediately prior to
the accident. Caldwell, 2023-Ohio-355, at ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Falter, 169 Ohio St. 238.
Alternatively, when the vehicle’s damage does not exceed its market value, the owner of
the damaged vehicle may recover either the difference between its market value
immediately before and immediately after the collision or the reasonable cost of repairs,
provided that the cost of repairs does not exceed the difference between the market value
of the vehicle immediately before and after the collision. Falter at 240. There is no
evidence in this case that the damage to Skinner’s vehicle from the collision with Wood
exceeded its market value and, thus, based on the foregoing, the calculation of Skinner’s
restitution was based on the latter calculation.
{¶ 18} We recognize that there was no evidence presented at the restitution
hearing regarding the market value of Skinner’s vehicle immediately before and after the
subject collision and that the only evidence offered regarding the market value of
Skinner’s vehicle was the $5,000 purchase price of the vehicle four years prior. We also
recognize that the State bore the burden of establishing the restitution amount. Wood,
however, suggests that it was not only the State’s burden to produce evidence of the
reasonable cost of repairs but also to produce the market value evidence of Skinner’s
vehicle immediately before and after the May 2022 accident, and that, by failing to
produce such evidence, the trial court erred in ordering Wood to pay restitution at all. It is
in this respect that we disagree with Wood and find State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-3786 (1st
-9-
Dist.) to be instructive on the matter.
{¶ 19} In Gordon, the victim testified at the restitution hearing that Gordon, the
offender, keyed deep scratches into her car’s exterior. Id. at ¶ 3. The victim took her car
to three body shops and offered repair estimates in the amounts of $5,350, $5,448, and
$6,894 at the hearing. Id. In response, Gordon submitted a Kelley Blue Book website
printout that indicated a $3,290 trade-in value for the same model of car, with a trade-in-
value range of $2,593 to $3,986. Id. Without considering Gordon’s estimated trade-in-
values, the trial court averaged the victim’s three repair estimates and ordered restitution
in the amount of $5,897. Id. In ordering restitution, the trial court noted that the victim had
obtained estimates from three body shops and stated that there was no reason for the
court to doubt the credibility of the estimates. Id. at ¶ 7. Although Gordon presented
evidence of the Kelley Blue Book trade-in value for a similar car model, which was less
than the repair cost, the trial court observed that Gordon had presented no evidence of
the Blue Book private sale value or any other retail value. Id. Because there was no
evidence to indicate that the retail value of the car was less than the repair estimates,
Gordon held that the trial court had not abused its discretion “in finding the economic loss
to the victim was the cost of repair and in ordering Gordon to pay $5,897 in restitution,
based on the evidence before it.” Id. See also State v. Hoy, 2021-Ohio-4098, ¶ 41 (5th
Dist.) (“We note, although given the opportunity, Appellant did not present any evidence
at the hearing which established the fair market value of [the victim’s] car either before or
after he damaged it. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
using the estimate of the cost of repairing the vehicle to ascertain economic loss.”).
-10-
{¶ 20} In this case, the State was required to prove that Skinner had suffered an
economic loss as a direct and proximate result of Wood’s conduct and to establish the
amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. To that end, Skinner obtained
an estimate from a body shop indicating the cost of repairing the vehicle, and the State
presented that estimate as evidence of the restitution amount, which satisfied its burden.
{¶ 21} Like the offender in Gordon, if Wood sought to demonstrate that the cost of
repairs, as set forth the State, exceeded the market value of the vehicle, Wood had the
burden to demonstrate such, but she presented no evidence indicating that the market
value of the car immediately before and after the accident was less than the rear end
repair estimates totaling $1,865.76. “A court does not abuse its discretion in ordering
restitution in the amount of a cost-to-repair estimate if there is no evidence showing that
the value of the vehicle is less than the repair cost.” Caldwell at ¶ 24, citing Gordon. Here,
as in Gordon, there was no evidence to indicate that the market value of the vehicle was
less than the repair estimates. Because there was no evidence to indicate that rear end
repair costs exceeded the difference between the market value of Skinner’s vehicle
immediately before and after the collision, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the economic loss to Skinner was the cost of the rear end repairs
and in ordering Wood to pay restitution in that amount based on the evidence before it.
See Gordon at ¶ 7. Therefore, Wood’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 22} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
.............
-11-
EPLEY, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.