State v. Watson , 2024 Ohio 4992 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Watson, 2024-Ohio-4992.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 23CA25
:
v. :
: DECISION AND
QUINCY WATSON, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Chris Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Appellant.
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecutor, and Jayme Hartley Fountain,
Assistant Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Quincy Watson, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of the
Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of
aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of illegal conveyance of drugs of
abuse onto the grounds of a detention facility or institution, both third-degree
felony offenses. On appeal, Watson raises a single assignment of error contending
that the proportionality of his sentence was inconsistent with the principles set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors to be considered under R.C. 2929.12.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 2
However, because we find no merit to Watson’s sole assignment of error, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
{¶2} On May 4, 2023, Watson was indicted on nine felony counts as
follows:
Count One: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in
drugs with specification in violation of R.C.
2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(f), a
first-degree felony;
Count Two: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in
drugs with specification in violation of R.C.
2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(e), a
first-degree felony;
Count Three: Complicity to illegal conveyance of drugs of
abuse onto the grounds of a detention
facility or institution in violation of R.C.
2923.03 and 2921.36(A)(2), a third-degree
felony;
Count Four: Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in
violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), a first-
degree felony;
Count Five: Complicity to trafficking in marihuana in
violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(1)
and (C)(3)(c), a fourth-degree felony;
Count Six: Complicity to trafficking in marihuana in
violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(2)
and (C)(3)(c), a fourth-degree felony;
Count Seven: Complicity to illegal conveyance of drugs of
abuse onto the grounds of a detention
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 3
facility or institution in violation of R.C.
2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(f), a
third-degree felony;
Count Eight: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in
drugs with specification in violation of
2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(f), a
first-degree felony; and
Count Nine: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in
drugs with specification in violation of R.C.
2923.03 and 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(f), a
first-degree felony.1
Watson initially entered pleas of not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded
towards trial.
{¶3} Thereafter, Watson entered into plea negotiations with the State that
resulted in him entering guilty pleas to an amended Count Two of the indictment,
as well as Count Three of the indictment, in exchange for the dismissal of the
remaining counts of the indictment. More specifically, the trial court permitted
Count Two of the indictment to be amended to charge Watson with complicity to
aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and
2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(c), which is a third-degree felony rather than a first-
degree felony as originally charged. The trial court also permitted Count Two to
be amended to remove the major drug offender specification. Thus, Watson
1
The specifications included on counts one, two, eight, and nine were major drug offender specifications as defined
in R.C. 2929.01(W).
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 4
agreed to plead guilty to two third-degree felony offenses in exchange for the
dismissal of the remaining seven counts in the indictment. Watson’s plea form
notified him that the maximum prison term for each third-degree felony count was
36 months and the trial court orally advised him of the same during the change-of-
plea hearing that was held on August 2, 2023. The trial court ordered that a pre-
sentence investigation be prepared and set the matter for sentencing at a later date.
{¶4} Watson was sentenced on October 25, 2023. Prior to imposing
sentence, the trial court referenced its receipt and review of the pre-sentence
investigation report that had been prepared. The report detailed the scheme in
which Watson played a role whereby several inmates and nurses at the Pickaway
Correctional Institution conspired together, in conjunction with Watson and several
other people that were not incarcerated, to illegally convey drugs into the
correctional facility. The pre-sentence investigation report also detailed Watson’s
prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter and attendant prison sentence, as
well as a long list of infractions committed while he was in prison for that offense.2
The trial court heard sentencing arguments by both Watson and the State. Defense
counsel requested that Watson be sentenced to probation only, citing Watson’s
limited role in the illegal conveyance scheme. The State argued that Watson
2
It appears from the record that although Watson’s prior offense was committed when he was juvenile, he was
charged as an adult in 1993 and was sentenced to prison. While it is unclear exactly how long Watson was
imprisoned, the list of prison infractions ranges from 2007 through 2019.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 5
should be sentenced to concurrent 24-month prison terms on each count. The trial
court also permitted Watson to make a statement in mitigation of sentencing.
{¶5} The trial court ultimately sentenced Watson to 36-month prison terms
on each count, to be served consecutively. Prior to imposing sentence, the
following exchange took place between the court and Watson:
THE DEFENDANT: * * * I take full responsibility, you
know, on the part that I played, you
know, in this situation. Like I say,
since I’ve been out, I’ve been trying to
restore my life all the time I did from a
juvenile, and I wish to continue to
grow in his work and rebuild my life.
Like I said, I take full responsibility.
THE COURT: Well, you received a substantial break
in this case, Mr. Watson. As indicated
by your attorney, when the State, for
whatever reason, elected to reduce this
from nine charges to two.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: So that’s the consideration. You got
that from them, not me. When I look
at what was going on down here, you
know, when you send people to prison
you anticipate they’re going to do their
time and not continue to be active in
crimes. And then you get in there and
start this stuff. Not in my county.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 6
THE COURT: You know, I didn’t put those prisons in
Pickaway County, but I have to deal
with them. This just goes too far.
{¶6} The court then went on to impose the sentences, stating as follows:
The court has considered the record and the presentence
report as prepared as well as the principles and purposes of
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness
and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and finds the
appropriate sentence in this case is thirty-six months on each of
these, and that they be consecutive.
{¶7} The court further made the necessary consecutive-sentencing findings,
including that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from
future crime and to punish the offender, that consecutive sentences were not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the danger he
posed to the public, and that the offender’s history of criminal conduct
demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from
future crime. A sentencing entry was filed on October 27, 2023, and it is from that
order that Watson filed his appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for our
review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF THE SENTENCE WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET
FORTH [SIC] O.R.C. §2929.11 AND FACTORS TO BE
CONSIDRED [SIC] IN O.R.C.§2929.12.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 7
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Watson contends that the
proportionality of his sentence was inconsistent with the principles set forth in R.C.
2929.11, as well as the factors to be considered in R.C. 2929.12. He argues that
rather than considering “his sincere remorse for his actions” and his “minimal
involvement in the operation,” the trial court “regarded the negotiated plea itself as
a mitigating element, leading to the imposition of maximum and consecutive
sentences.” Watson contends that “the trial court’s utilization of these factors as
grounds from mitigation was inappropriate.” Watson also argues that the “stark
disparity” between the State’s recommended sentence of 24 months “is so
significant that it elicits a sense of injustice.” Watson further argues that the
sentences imposed in this case “raise significant concerns regarding its alignment
with the principles outlined in relevant statutes and prior legal precedents.”
Watson further essentially urges this Court to examine whether the sentences
imposed upon him were consistent “with sentences for similar offenses by similar
offenders.” In addition, Watson claims that “there is no indication the trial court
accounted for the impact of the factors specified in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(F).”
{¶9} The State contends, on the other hand, that Watson’s sentences were
not contrary to law because the trial court clearly considered the R.C. 2929.11 and
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 8
2929.12 factors, the sentences were within the statutory range, and the court made
the required consecutive sentence findings. The State argues that the trial court
considered Watson’s previous manslaughter conviction as a juvenile, the
underlying facts of the case as set forth in the pre-sentence investigation, the
principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, as well as the
seriousness and recidivism factors contained in R.C. 2929.12. The State also
points out that the required findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences
were made, that the trial court was not required to “give a full recitation of every
factor,” and that the record supports the maximum and consecutive sentences in
this case.
Standard of Review
{¶10} R.C. 2953.08 governs appeals based on felony sentencing guidelines.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states:
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C)
of this section shall review the record, including the findings
underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing
court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may
vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court
for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate
court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly
and convincingly finds either of the following:
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 9
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶11} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of
such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and
which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to
the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120
N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Legal Analysis
{¶12} As set forth above, Watson contends that the sentence imposed by the
trial court was inconsistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing
as set forth under R.C. 2929.11 and also that the trial court failed to “account” for
the factors specified in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(F). While he does not argue that the trial
court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, he does appear to contend that the
overall length of the sentence as a whole is disproportionate to the sentences
imposed on other similarly situated offenders.
{¶12} R.C. 2929.11 states:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be
guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The
overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 10
from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the
offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary
burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those
purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others
from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making
restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably
calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate
with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's
conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders.
***
{¶13} R.C. 2929.12(A) states:
Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the
Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter
upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the
most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles
of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.
In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors
set forth in [divisions (B) through (F)] of this section * * * and,
in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to
achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.
R.C. 2929.12(B) through (F) sets out factors for the court to consider relating to the
seriousness of the offender's conduct, the likelihood of the offender's recidivism,
and, if applicable, the offender's service in the armed forces of the United States.
{¶14} “ ‘Because both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require the trial court
to consider the factors outlined in those two statutory provisions, * * * a trial
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 11
court's failure to consider the factors would render the sentence * * * “contrary to
law.” ’ ” State v. Nolan, 4th Dist. Adams No. 23CA1169, 2024-Ohio-1245, ¶ 43,
quoting State v. Poole, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1151, 2022-Ohio-2391, ¶ 17.
However, “ ‘neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any
specific factual findings on the record.’ ” Nolan at ¶ 43, quoting State v. Jones,
163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20.
{¶15} Watson does not argue that the trial court failed to reference R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 prior to imposing sentence. However, he appears to argue
that the trial court failed to take into account the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12(B)-
(F) and thus, he essentially argues that the record does not support the imposition
of such a lengthy sentence, especially considering the State recommended a shorter
sentence. He also argues that the sentences he received were disproportionate to
sentences imposed on other similarly situated offenders.
{¶16} First, we must be mindful that “ ‘R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit
an appellate court to conduct an independent review of a trial court's sentencing
findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing
under R.C. 2929.11.’ ” Nolan at ¶ 44, quoting State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250,
2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 21, in turn citing Jones at ¶ 41-42. For
example, this Court reasoned in Nolan as follows:
“R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to modify
or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 12
supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at
¶ 22, citing Jones at ¶ 31, 39. If we were to infer a sentence was
contrary to law and vacate it merely because we did not believe
the sentencing factors supported it, we would in effect be
vacating a sentence based on our view that it is not supported by
the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
Nolan at ¶ 44.
{¶17} Further, this Court held in State v. Daniels that “a trial court’s
statement in its sentencing entry that it considered the applicable statutory factors
is sufficient to fulfill the court’s obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
State v. Daniels, 4th Dist. Adams No. 22CA1157, 2023-Ohio-2043, ¶ 10, citing
State v. Young, 4th Dist. Ross No. 22CA10, 2022-Ohio-4223, ¶ 6.
{¶18} Here, the trial court stated, both at the sentencing hearing and in the
sentencing entry that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and had balanced the seriousness and recidivism
factors under R.C. 2929.12. Thus, the trial court not only considered R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12 as required but, as set forth above, it also made the requisite findings
for the imposition of consecutive sentences, which Watson has not challenged on
appeal. Additionally, and in light of the foregoing, we reject Watson’s argument
that the trial court’s decision to impose a sentence longer than that recommended
by the State was based upon its erroneous reliance on considerations extraneous to
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, namely the fact that several higher level felonies were
dismissed as part of Watson’s plea deal. Accordingly, after considering the totality
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 13
of the record, we cannot conclude that the sentences imposed by the trial court
were clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶19} Second, we also reject Watson’s argument that the sentences imposed
by the trial court were inconsistent and disproportionate to sentences imposed on
similar offenders for similar crimes. This court recently considered a similar
argument in State v. Goff, 2023-Ohio-4823, 232 N.E.3d 870 (4th Dist.). As
observed in Goff, “R.C. 2929.11(B) states that a felony sentence should be
‘consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders.’ ” In Goff, we observed that consistency-in-sentencing determinations
are fact-intensive inquiries that do not lend themselves to being initially reviewed
at the appellate level. See Goff at ¶ 47, citing State v. Taylor, 2017-Ohio-4395, 93
N.E.3d 1 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Adams, 2016-Ohio-7772, 84 N.E.3d 155, ¶ 46
(4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Montanez-Roldon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
103509, 2016-Ohio-3062, ¶ 14. We further observed in Goff as follows:
“ ‘ “[A]ny review must begin with the defendant
producing a record for the trial court's consideration before the
final sentence is imposed. As courts have long concluded, a
defendant must raise [the consistency-in-sentencing] issue
before the trial court and present some evidence, however
minimal, in order to provide a starting point for analysis and to
preserve the issue for appeal.” ’ ”
(Citations omitted.) Goff at ¶ 47, quoting Taylor at ¶ 29, quoting Adams at ¶ 46, in
turn quoting Montanez-Roldon at ¶ 14.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 14
{¶20} In Goff, trial counsel presented sentencing recommendations to the
trial court in advance of sentencing. Here, no sentencing memorandums were
provided to the trial court for consideration, nor were any consistency-in-
sentencing arguments raised at the trial court level. Thus, Watson has failed to
preserve this argument for appellate review.
{¶21} Finally, we note that here, a joint sentencing recommendation was not
part of Watson’s plea agreement and thus, there was no joint sentencing
recommendation provided to the trial court. Watson argued for probation, while
the State appears to have argued for concurrent 24-month prison terms on each
count. However, even if there had been a joint sentencing recommendation, “a
‘trial court is not bound by a [sentencing] recommendation.’ ” State v. Howard,
2017-Ohio-9392, 103 N.E.3d 108, ¶ 58 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Bailey, 5th
Dist. Knox No. 05-CA-13, 2005-Ohio-5329, ¶ 15. Thus, we cannot say that the
trial court erred by imposing a sentence exceeding that sought by the State.
{¶22} Accordingly, having found no merit in any of the arguments raised
under Watson’s sole assignment of error, it is overruled and the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. No. 23CA25 15
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Wilkin, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
_____________________________
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.