State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections , 2024 Ohio 5304 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-5304.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio ex rel. City of Maumee, Court of Appeals No. L-24-1238
et al.,
Trial Court No. CI0202402608
Appellants
v.
Lucas County Board of Elections DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: October 30, 2024
*****
Jeffrey M. Stopar, Esq., and Alan J. Lehenbauer, Esq.,
for appellants, City of Maumee and James MacDonald.
Julia R. Bates, Kevin A. Pituch, Esq., John A. Borell, Esq., and
Evy M. Jarrett, for appellee, Lucas County Board of Elections.
*****
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellants, City of Maumee and its mayor, James McDonald (collectively,
“the City”), appeal the October 8, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas denying their complaint seeking a writ of prohibition against appellee, Lucas
County Board of Elections (“the Board”). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
II. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} The facts necessary for our resolution of this appeal are undisputed. The
City passed Ordinance No. 002-2023 on March 20, 2023. A resident of the City, Colleen
LaChapelle, filed a certification with the City’s clerk on March 31, 2023, indicating that
she and “other concerned citizens” intended to circulate and file a referendum petition
against the ordinance for an upcoming general election. The City initially declined to
forward the certification to the Board, alleging that the petition was deficient under R.C.
731.32. LaChapelle sought, and was granted, a writ of mandamus from the Ohio
Supreme Court ordering the City to transmit the referendum petition to the Board. State
ex rel. LaChapelle v. Harkey, 2023-Ohio-2723. The petition was then forwarded to the
Board for its review and placement on the ballot.
{¶ 3} The City filed objections to the referendum petition on August 24, 2023.1
Those objections alleged that LaChapelle’s referendum petition was not properly certified
and that LaChapelle failed to include a complete, certified copy of the ordinance to the
petition. The Board scheduled a hearing for the resolution of their objections on April 4,
2024. On that date, the Board heard oral arguments from the parties on the City’s
1
The city filed two additional objections on August 8 and 29, 2024. Those objections
were subsequently withdrawn and are not part of this appeal.
2.
objections. The Board overruled the objections and advised the parties of its opinion that
same day.
{¶ 4} On May 31, 2024, the City filed a verified petition in the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas seeking a writ of prohibition to preclude the Board from
including the referendum on the November 5, 2024 general election ballot. The City’s
petition restated the overruled objections regarding the alleged certification deficiencies
in LaChappelle’s original filing. It alleged that R.C. 731.32 required strict compliance
for a referendum to be placed on the ballot and that those deficiencies rendered the
referendum issue on which the petition was advanced to the ballot invalid. The City filed
an amended petition on June 3, 2024, to include the exhibits to its complaint that were
initially rejected by the clerk of courts.
{¶ 5} Prior to the Board filing its answer, the parties attended a pretrial hearing
on June 7, 2024.2 At that pretrial, the parties agreed to a case management schedule for
resolution of the City’s complaint. Specifically, the parties agreed to submit their
respective motions for summary judgment on or before June 28, 2024, with responses to
be filed on or before July 15, 2024.
{¶ 6} The Board filed its answer to the petition, generally denying the City’s
allegations, and its motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2024. The City filed its
2
The record does not reflect an order scheduling the pretrial but shows that all parties
were in attendance.
3.
motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2024. Both parties then filed their respective
oppositions on July 15, 2024.
{¶ 7} The trial court entered judgment granting the Board’s motion for summary
judgment, and denying the City’s motion for summary judgment, on October 8, 2024.
The trial court determined that the City was not entitled to a writ of prohibition, finding
no defect in LaChappelle’s petition.
III. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} The City timely appealed and asserts the following error for our review:
1. The trial court erred in overruling the motion for summary judgment of
[appellants] City of Maumee and James McDonald and in granting the motion for
summary judgment of [appellee] Lucas County Board of Elections.
IV. Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} Prior to reaching the merits of the City’s assigned error, we have identified
two preliminary issues that we must address. First, we note that in its amended petition
filed with the trial court, the City only sought an order prohibiting the Board from placing
the referendum on the November 5, 2024 general election ballot. Now, in this appeal, the
City not only asks this court to reverse the trial court’s judgment and prohibit the Board
from placing the referendum on the ballot, it now asks this court, for the first time in
these proceedings, to enter an order “prohibiting the votes on this issue from being
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tabulated[.]”3 It identifies no authority that would permit this court to consider its request
for an unalleged claim for relief for the first time on appeal or to show that this court has
the legal authority to order the Board not to tabulate votes cast by its citizens. For this
reason, we reject the City’s request for an order and to prohibit the Board from tabulating
votes on the underlying referendum. Such a request could only be granted, if at all, in a
separate petition seeking that extraordinary relief.
{¶ 10} Second, we must address the Board’s argument that the City’s claim
seeking an order prohibiting the Board from placing the referendum on the ballot is
barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically, the Board argues that the City’s delay in
filing its prohibition action for nearly two months after the Board overruled its objections
was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice to the Board. The City, in response, argues
that the Board waived its laches argument. It is undisputed that the Board did not allege
laches as an affirmative defense with the trial court and raises it for the first time in this
appeal. We begin our analysis, then, with whether the Board waived its laches argument
before addressing the merits of that argument.
A. The Board did not waive its laches argument.
{¶ 11} It has long been held that “[i]n nonelection cases, laches is an affirmative
defense which must be raised or else it is waived.” State ex rel. Ohio Dept. of Mental
3
The trial court entered its judgment on October 8, 2024. The City filed its notice of
appeal on October 10, 2024. It is undisputed that absentee and early voting began on
October 8, 2024. The City’s new request appears to be in response to the fact that by the
time this appeal was filed, ballots may have already been cast.
5.
Health v. Nadel, 2003-Ohio-1632, ¶ 15; See also State ex rel. Fishman v. Lucas Cty. Bd.
of Elections, 2007-Ohio-5583, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose,
2024-Ohio-4953, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). Conversely, the doctrine of laches generally is
not waived in election cases despite not being alleged in an initial pleading. Id., See also
State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 494 (1998). This
distinction between election and non-election cases is necessary because in election
cases, the relator must show that they acted with “extreme diligence and promptness” in
seeking their requested relief. LaRose at ¶ 22, See also State ex rel. Pinkston v.
Delaware County Board of Elections, 2023-Ohio-1060, ¶ 15. Parties seeking relief in
non-election cases are not burdened by this same exercise of diligence and promptness.
See Nadel at ¶ 15. As this is an election case, the general rule that the City’s argument
that the Board waived its laches defense is without merit.
{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the limits to this election/non-
election case distinction regarding a parties’ laches argument. In State ex rel. Hildreth v.
LaRose, 2023-Ohio-3667, the relator sought a writ of mandamus compelling the
respondent board of elections to remove a ballot initiative from the November, 2023
general election ballot through an original, expedited election case. Id. at ¶ 1. The
respondent argued that relator’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. Id. at ¶ 9.
The court summarily denied respondent’s laches defense because it was not raised as an
affirmative defense in its answer to the relator’s petition pursuant to Civ.R. 8(C). Id.
Therefore, despite the exception of election cases from the general doctrine of waiver of
6.
an unalleged laches defense, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the board in Hidlreth had
indeed waived its argument by failing to raise it in their responsive pleading. The City
relies on Hildreth in support of its argument that the Board waived its laches argument.
{¶ 13} Close examination of Hildreth shows that it is distinguishable from the
present action and does not support the City’s argument. Hildreth was an original action
filed in the Ohio Supreme Court as an expedited election case pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.
12.08. Id. at ¶ 1.4 We find that the court’s application of the waiver doctrine to the
respondent’s laches defense in Hildreth was limited to expedited election cases. At least
one subsequent opinion, albeit a concurring opinion, reaches this same conclusion. See
State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain County Bd. Of Elections, 2024-Ohio-4990, ¶ 58, fn. 4, citing
Hildreth (Bruner, J., concurring) (“we unanimously held that a board of elections in an
expedited election case waived a laches defense when it did not plead laches as an
affirmative defense in its answer.”) (emphasis added). Logically, if the waiver doctrine
was applied beyond expedited cases to include all election cases, it would eliminate the
long-held distinction between election and non-election cases for when waiver of a laches
argument applies. That issue was not before the court and we see no basis to extend the
holding in Hildreth beyond the facts of that expedited case. As a result, we find Hildreth
unpersuasive as authority in support of the City’s waiver argument.
4
We note that the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure governing this court does not
contain a rule establishing expedited election cases.
7.
{¶ 14} In light of the foregoing authority, we find that a party alleging the defense
of laches for the first time on appeal in a non-expedited election case does not waive that
defense when it was not raised before the trial court. Since the case before us is a non-
expedited election case, we find that the Board did not waive its laches argument when it
failed to raise it before the trial court.
B. The City’s case is barred by the doctrine of laches.
{¶ 15} Turning to the merits of the Board’s laches argument, we find that the City
failed to exercise “extreme diligence and promptness” to seek its requested relief before
the Board suffered prejudice as a result of its delay. See LaRose, 2024-Ohio-4953 at ¶
22. As a result, the City’s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches.
{¶ 16} “Laches will bar an action when there is (1) an unreasonable delay or lapse
of time in asserting a right, (2) the absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) actual or
constructive knowledge of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the opposing party.
Id. at 22. “With respect to the fourth factor, the prejudice must be material.” Id., citing
State ex rel. Pennington v. Bivens, 2021-Ohio-3134, ¶ 26. All four factors are present
here.
{¶ 17} As to the first element, we find that the City unreasonably delayed asserting
its request for relief in this case. The City filed its initial objections to the petition
underlying the referendum issue on August 24, 2023. The Board overruled the City’s
objection on April 4, 2024. The City then waited nearly two months before filing its
original petition seeking a writ of prohibition on May 31, 2024. The Ohio Supreme
8.
Court has determined that parties’ delays of 24 days—and less in some instances—in
seeking rights in election cases is unreasonable. Id. at ¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Syx v.
Stow City Council, 2020-Ohio-4393, ¶ 11 (22-day delay); State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2002-Ohio-5922, ¶ 11 (17-day delay); State ex rel. Landis v.
Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2000-Ohio-295, ¶ 8-9 (22-day delay); State ex rel. Polo v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 1995-Ohio-269, ¶ 13 (17-day delay). The City’s delay
of 57 days before seeking its writ of prohibition, coupled with its obligation to act with
“extreme diligence and promptness” can only be considered unreasonable.
{¶ 18} As to the second element, the City offers no excuse for its delay. Instead,
the City argues only that the Board was unreasonable in scheduling resolution of its
objections in April, 2024. The Board alleged that the City agreed to this delay—a fact
that would additionally support a finding that the City was unreasonable in pursuing the
writ. The city neither disputes or accepts the Board’s factual allegation. The record does
not allow this court to resolve this factual dispute. We note, however, that if the City
believed the Board was withholding a right to which it was entitled—that is, a timely
decision on its objections—it could have sought a writ of mandamus or initiated some
other proceeding to compel the Board to act on its objections.5 Moreover, even if the
Board had unilaterally delayed its resolution of the City’s objections from August, 2023
5
We note this potential action as a means by which the City could have shown that it was
acting with the extreme diligence and promptness required of it to pursue its claim.
Whether the City would have been entitled to such a writ is beyond the scope of this
appeal.
9.
to April, 2024 to the City’s prejudice, it does not explain why the City waited nearly two
months before filings its petition for the writ of prohibition after the objections had been
resolved. The City failed to offer any reason for its unreasonable delay in pursuing its
remedy after the Board resolved its objection. For that reason, we find that the second
element of the Board’s laches defense is satisfied.
{¶ 19} Under the third element, it cannot be disputed that all parties in this action
had actual knowledge of the wrong the Board allegedly committed during the City’s
delay in seeking its claimed remedy. The City initiated these proceedings with its filing
of objections to LaChappelle’s petition. It was involved in the Board hearing on those
objections and was promptly advised of its decision on April 4, 2024. Any alleged wrong
would have been known to the City at that time. As a result, we find that the third
element of the Board’s laches defense has been established.
{¶ 20} Finally, we find that the Board has shown material prejudice as a result of
the City’s delay in pursuing its writ of prohibition—the fourth element necessary to
support a laches defense. “Cases in which laches is dispositive generally involve
prejudice to the respondents in their statutory obligation to absentee voters to have
absentee ballots printed and ready for use.” State ex rel. Pennington v. Bivens, 2021-
Ohio-3134, ¶ 28, citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 14. Recently,
the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that prejudice in election cases occurs when those
cases involve “requested changes to absentee ballots if a relator’s delay in filing leads to
the impossibility of relief before ballots are printed and mailed.” LaRose at ¶ 27. The
10.
court also recognized that “[a]s a general matter, courts should refrain from ordering
changes to the rules governing elections during or close to the start of an election.” Id. at
¶ 28, citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). This is based on the “common-
sense principal that judges—novices in election administration should not meddle in
elections at the last minute * * * because when they do, they are likely to do more harm
than good.” Id.{¶ 21} Here, it is undisputed that absentee and early voting has already begun.
Indeed, the City concedes this fact with its request that this court order the Board not to
tabulate any votes cast on the referendum issue if it were to succeed in showing that the
petition was invalid—a request we denied as a preliminary matter. The prejudice
suffered by the Board, through its inability to correct the ballots prior to the
commencement of absentee and early voting should the City succeed, is borne solely
from the City’s failure to exercise extreme diligence and promptness in pursuing its
claim. Clearly, then, the City’s delay in pursuing its claim has resulted in prejudice to the
Board, satisfying the fourth element of the Board’s laches defense.
{¶ 22} Having satisfied all four elements of that defense, we find that the Board’s
argument that the City’s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches is well-founded. For
these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the Board’s motion for
summary judgment and denying the City’s motion for summary judgment. We note that
our conclusion is not based on reasons relied on by the trial court. We are not precluded,
however, from affirming the trial court’s decision for other reasons as long as the other
11.
bases relied on does not result in prejudice to the appealing party. See State ex rel.
Sommers v. Perkins Local Schools Board of Education, 2017-Ohio-7991 (6th Dist.) (“this
court will not reverse a trial court decision that achieves the right result for
the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial.”). The trial court’s judgment
reached the correct conclusion and the City suffers no prejudice from this court affirming
that judgment for different reasons. Therefore, we find the City’s assignment of error not
well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 23} The city was obligated to pursue its relief with “extreme diligence and
promptness” in this election case. LaRose at ¶ 22. This is “not simply a technical nicety”
but a “consistent requirement.” Id. at ¶ 32. The City failed to meet this obligation,
without excuse, and the Board would suffer prejudice if we allowed this action to
proceed. For that reason, the City’s claim is barred under the doctrine of laches and we
find its single assignment of error not well-taken. We affirm the October 8, 2024
judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 24} Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24.
12.
State of Ohio Ex. Rel., City of Maumee, et al. v.
Lucas County Bd. of Elections
Appeals Case No.: L-24-1238
Trial Court Case No.: CI0202402608
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
13.