State v. Wilson , 2024 Ohio 4728 ( 2024 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Wilson, 
    2024-Ohio-4728
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-23-1232
    Appellee                                  Trial Court No. CR0202202553
    v.
    Carmanetta Wilson                                 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: September 27, 2024
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
    *****
    SULEK, P.J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Carmanetta Wilson, appeals from the September 28, 2023
    judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of one count of
    obstructing justice and sentencing her to a term of 30 months in prison. Wilson
    challenges her sentence as not clearly and convincingly supported by the record. For the
    reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} On September 13, 2022, the Lucas County Grand Jury indicted Wilson on
    two counts of obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5), (C)(1), and (C)(4), a
    third-degree felony (counts 7 and 8). The indictment also charged two others, Dearryl
    Cornelious and Byron Cleveland, with aggravated murder in violation of R.C.
    2903.01(C) and (G) along with several other offenses.
    {¶ 3} The charges against all three defendants arose from an incident on February
    12, 2022 when Cleveland and Cornelious, who were riding in a Dodge Charger, shot at a
    second vehicle. The driver of the second vehicle, K.W., was shot several times, and one
    of the vehicle’s passengers, D.E., was killed. D.E. was the 10-year-old niece of K.W.
    Another child, X.E., who was D.E.’s brother and K.W.’s nephew, was also a passenger in
    the second vehicle but was not injured. Just before the shooting, K.W. picked up the
    children from the apartment complex where Wilson lived, and the Dodge Charger began
    following K.W.’s vehicle as they left the complex.
    {¶ 4} While investigating the crime, police discovered that Cornelious’s phone
    records showed several contacts, both before and after the shooting, with a phone number
    associated with Wilson. The police identified the phone number as Wilson’s because
    Wilson, on a prior, unrelated occasion—less than a month before the February 12th
    shooting—gave that number to the police, and she was recorded on a police body worn
    camera doing so. When police questioned Wilson after the February 12th shooting,
    however, she denied having contact with Cornelious on February 12, denied knowing the
    2.
    phone number associated with her, and claimed that she did not have a phone. She later
    admitted she had a phone, though she claimed she did not know her own phone number.
    Wilson never provided the police with any information about her contacts with
    Cornelious on February 12.
    {¶ 5} Wilson initially pleaded not guilty to the two counts against her, but she
    withdrew that plea and entered a plea of no contest to one count of obstructing justice in
    violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5), (C)(1), and (C)(4) on September 13, 2023. At the
    change of plea hearing, the state asserted that Wilson “communicated false statements to
    Toledo Police officers to hinder the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for
    the murder, specifically Dearryl Cornelius, who was charged with murder.” Following a
    Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court found Wilson guilty, ordered a presentence
    investigation, and scheduled a sentencing hearing for September 28, 2023.
    {¶ 6} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court first heard a statement from the
    grandmother of D.E. (who was also the mother of K.W.). During her statement, D.E.’s
    grandmother accused Wilson of being involved in the shooting.
    {¶ 7} Next, the trial court reviewed some of the facts underlying Wilson’s
    proximity to the shooting as follows:
    THE COURT: [Prosecutor], [Wilson’s attorney] gave some pretty
    significant detail with regard to the investigative process and what the
    detectives had discovered even prior to Ms. Wilson being contacted, but in
    your working on this case – and I believe it’s been alluded to multiple
    times, that the starting point of that event, the sequence of events, started
    from the apartment complex, or living complex that Miss Wilson lived at.
    [PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
    3.
    THE COURT: And that is where the male victim driver, who doesn’t
    appear to be attached in anyway to a gang activity, left from with two
    minor children.
    [PROSECUTOR]: Correct.
    THE COURT: And based on your work with your – with obviously your
    investigative tools that work for you, does it happen in a pretty quick
    sequence of events that the car leaves with the children and the car with the
    – the car that is connected to the shooting –
    [PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
    {¶ 8} Following this exchange, Wilson’s attorney protested, arguing that Wilson
    was convicted of obstructing justice, not complicity to murder, and therefore in
    sentencing Wilson, the court could not consider any statements about Wilson’s
    involvement in the shooting beyond that Wilson lied to the police about not having
    contact with Cornelious on the date of the shooting. In response, the court had the
    following exchange with Wilson’s attorney:
    THE COURT: She’s charged with obstructing. With obstructing comes
    knowledge. Knowledge comes from proximity. Proximity and statement
    of facts.
    So if you somehow want me to separate out an obstruction charge from a
    subsequent starting event to where it ends in a felony, that would be
    illogical.
    So you can make the argument and make the record, but I – you can’t
    unknow a sequence of events that surround what would be someone
    potentially obstructing for.
    [WILSON’S ATTORNEY]: Correct. Correct.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    4.
    [WILSON’S ATTORNEY]: We’re not objecting that she had knowledge.
    {¶ 9} Wilson’s attorney then requested the court sentence Wilson to community
    control, pointing to her lack of a prior record, asserting that her family would support her
    and her two young children, and attributing her actions to her environment. Wilson also
    spoke and expressed remorse for her actions.
    {¶ 10} In response, the court addressed Wilson as follows:
    Many times people are here on an obstructing in a criminal situation
    because they become involved after the fact. And the Court has to weigh a
    situation. So let’s say a young woman like you, you don’t know anything is
    happening on the front end, and people come to you, and the next thing you
    know you are tagged in by what happens next. And the Court can look at
    that maybe a different way.
    There is no way for me to separate out what you knew or didn’t know. You
    appear somehow connected at the front end. You appear stalwart in your
    decision to not assist in any way on this case.
    …
    And I know that the decision I’m going to make doesn’t bring a child back,
    and I don’t take it lightly. But somewhere it has to stop. Somewhere there
    has to be a point where someone is grown up enough in the room to know
    that you pick up the phone and you call the police and say, these people are
    leaving my house. I think they’re going to hurt somebody.
    If you have the strength to stop people before they do it, you do. But most
    people, if you had any knowledge of something happening or going to
    happen, you know what our reaction is? To stop it.
    I don’t know what to do to get through to young women to say, make better
    choices. Stay away. Put the bar higher. Do something. Because until the
    women stop accepting the activities of the men it’s all free reign out there.
    The court then, among other things, stated that it had “considered [Wilson’s] record, the
    oral statements… the victim impact statement that was presented in court, balanced the
    5.
    principles and purposes of sentencing under 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness and
    recidivism under 2929.12, and all the factors necessary and set forth in 2929.13B.”
    {¶ 11} Following that recitation, the trial court sentenced Wilson to a 30-month
    term in prison, ordering that none of the term was mandatory.
    II. Assignments of Error
    {¶ 12} In Wilson’s appeal, she asserts a single assignment of error for review:
    The record on appeal does not support the trial court’s imposition of a
    maximum prison sentence.
    III. Law and Analysis
    {¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “an appellate court may vacate or modify
    a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that
    the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the
    sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 
    2016-Ohio-1002
    , ¶ 1.
    However, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not permit an appellate court to conduct an
    independent review of a trial court’s sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its
    adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11.” State v. Reynolds,
    
    2023-Ohio-2624
    , ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Bryant, 
    2022-Ohio-1878
    , ¶ 21.
    Accordingly, challenges to sentences based on issues governed by R.C. 2929.11 and
    2929.12 are not reviewable and are “subject to summary resolution as a matter of law.”
    State v. Bowles, 
    2021-Ohio-4401
    , ¶ 9 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Toles, 
    2021-Ohio-353
    .
    6.
    {¶ 14} In support of her assignment of error challenging the trial court’s
    imposition of what she mischaracterizes as a maximum sentence,1 Wilson makes three
    arguments. First, Wilson contends that the trial court impermissibly imposed a sentence
    based on uncharged conduct—that Wilson was somehow involved in the shooting—and
    not solely based on the obstructing offense for which Wilson was convicted. Next,
    Wilson argues that the sentence should be vacated because the court imposed a lengthier
    sentence to make an example of Wilson, which Wilson claims is not consistent with the
    purposes and principles of felony sentencing. Finally, Wilson alleges that the court did
    not consider mitigating factors, such as Wilson’s limited prior record, her completion of
    house arrest with no violations, and the less serious nature of her conduct in comparison
    to the conduct of her co-defendants, in imposing her sentence.
    {¶ 15} None of these arguments present issues subject to appellate review because
    they are all governed by R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 and Wilson’s sentence was within the
    statutory range for a third-degree felony. State v. Montez, 
    2022-Ohio-640
    , ¶ 13-14 (6th
    Dist.). First, even if the trial court considered allegations of conduct for which she was
    not convicted as Wilson alleges, a trial court may consider uncharged conduct as part of
    its analysis under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See State v. Moore, 
    2021-Ohio-3995
    , ¶ 22
    1
    Wilson was convicted of violating R.C. 2921.32(A)(5), (C)(1), and (C)(4), a third-
    degree felony. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) provides that, for a third-degree felony, the trial
    court shall impose a “definite term of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-
    six months,” unless the offense is one of the offenses listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a).
    R.C. 2921.32(A)(5), (C)(1), and (C)(4) is not contained in that list. Accordingly, the
    maximum sentence the trial court could have imposed in this case was 36 months, and
    Wilson’s 30-month prison term was not the maximum sentence.
    7.
    (6th Dist.); State v. Craft, 
    2020-Ohio-4494
    , ¶ 10-11 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Lanning,
    
    2020-Ohio-2863
    , ¶ 17 (6th Dist.). Next, R.C. 2929.11(A) expressly requires a sentencing
    court to consider “deterring the offender and others from future crime” in imposing a
    sentence. Finally, the court’s consideration of mitigating factors falls squarely under the
    provisions of R.C. 2929.12. State v. Mathis, 
    2023-Ohio-4006
    , ¶ 9 (6th Dist.).
    {¶ 16} Because Wilson has failed to raise an issue subject to this court’s review,
    Wilson’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
    IV. Conclusion
    {¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, Wilson’s appeal of the September 28, 2023
    judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is dismissed. Wilson is ordered
    to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                             ____________________________
    JUDGE
    Gene A. Zmuda, J.
    ____________________________
    Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                     JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    ____________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    8.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-23-1232

Citation Numbers: 2024 Ohio 4728

Judges: Sulek

Filed Date: 9/27/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2024