In re T.W. , 2024 Ohio 4697 ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re T.W., 2024-Ohio-4697.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In The Matter of: :
No. 23AP-143
[T.W., : (C.P.C. No. 22JU-861)
: (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Appellant].
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 26, 2024
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Michael A. Walsh, for appellee.
On brief: Mitchell A. Williams, Public Defender, and
Robert D. Essex, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
EDELSTEIN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, T.W., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, adjudicating him a
delinquent minor for committing the offense of rape. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 27, 2022, plaintiff-appellee, the State of Ohio, filed a complaint
alleging that T.W. was delinquent for committing one count of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2). The complaint alleged that, on November 12, 2021, T.W. engaged in vaginal
intercourse with N.C. by purposely compelling her to submit by force. T.W. denied the
charge and the court referred the case to a magistrate pursuant to Juv.R. 40.
{¶ 3} On April 28, 2022, a 5-day trial before the magistrate commenced. The
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that, on November 12, 2021, 13-year-old N.C. and
No. 23AP-143 2
17-year-old T.W. arranged to meet at the Tuttle Mall in Columbus, Ohio. N.C. explained
that she had known T.W. for about 1 year and that they were “sort of” dating when they
went to the mall that day. (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 46.) N.C. arrived at the mall with her friend,
C.H., and T.W. arrived at the mall with his friend, K.J.L. K.J.L. described the group’s
meeting at the mall as a “two set,” or a type of double date. (May 6, 2022 Tr. at 64.)
{¶ 4} The four minors walked around the mall together, purchased food, and
looked at clothes. N.C. noted that she and T.W. were “flirting with each other and hugging
and kissing and things like that” while walking around the mall. (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 46.)
C.H. purchased two shirts at the store Forever 21 but could not try the shirts on because the
fitting rooms at Forever 21 were closed. As such, the group walked to the fitting rooms at
JCPenney.
{¶ 5} N.C. and C.H. entered adjacent fitting rooms at JCPenney and C.H. threw a
shirt over the fitting room wall for N.C. N.C. stated that, when she bent down to pick the
shirt up, T.W. entered her fitting room and locked the door behind him. N.C. stated that
T.W. then pulled her pants down and when she “bent down to grab [her] pants back he took
his arm, * * * and bent [her] back over” like he was “press[ing] down on [her] back for [her]
to stay bent over.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 49-50.) N.C. stated that T.W. then pulled down
his pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. N.C. told T.W. “no” and “stop” and T.W.
told her to “shut up.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 52.) N.C. stated that T.W. ejaculated on the
floor, she pulled her pants up, and he walked out of the fitting room. After the incident,
N.C. was “crying and [C.H.] was hugging [her],” and N.C. “whispered in [C.H.’s] ear like he
just raped me, he just raped me.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 54.)
{¶ 6} The four minors then walked out of the mall because N.C.’s parents were on
their way to pick up N.C. and C.H. N.C. stated that T.W. “tr[ied] to hug [her] and kiss [her]”
as they were walking out, but she was being “distant” and “holding on to [C.H.].” (Apr. 28,
2022 Tr. at 55.) C.H. stated that T.W. seemed “angry and mad” as they were walking out of
the mall and told her “not to touch [N.C.].” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 35.) The girls left the mall
when N.C.’s parents arrived.
{¶ 7} During the evening of November 12, 2021, N.C. received a message on
Instagram from a person claiming to be T.W.’s “baby mother.” (Nov. 22, 2022 Tr. at 81.)
N.C. replied to the Instagram message, and then texted T.W. and told him they were done.
No. 23AP-143 3
N.C. blocked T.W.’s phone number and Instagram account. At 3:00 a.m. the following
morning, N.C. told her mother that T.W. had raped her at the mall.
{¶ 8} N.C.’s mother scheduled a medical appointment with N.C.’s primary care
physician. N.C.’s mother informed the doctor that N.C. needed pregnancy and STD tests
because of the incident at the mall. N.C. stated that she did not want to report the incident
to police, but her doctor’s office reported “it to the police because they had no choice.”
(May 2, 2022 Tr. at 11.)
{¶ 9} On December 16, 2021, Laura Romans, a forensic interviewer at the
Nationwide Children’s Hospital child advocacy center (“CAC”), interviewed N.C. regarding
the incident with T.W. N.C. also spoke with Detective Jeffrey Huhn of the Columbus Police
Department after the CAC interview. Following his investigation, Detective Huhn obtained
a warrant for T.W.’s arrest.
{¶ 10} On February 20, 2022, Officer Samuel Moore executed the warrant for T.W.’s
arrest. Officer Moore’s body-worn camera documented his interaction with T.W. and the
state played the body-worn camera video footage at trial. The footage documented T.W.
stating he knew “what the rape charge [was] for. It’s cause this little 13-year-old lied about
her age and she told [him] that she was 16 or 17.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 24.) T.W. told
Officer Moore that he “end[ed] up going to the mall” with the 13-year-old and “end[ed] up
fucking her in the fitting room.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 24.) T.W. also stated he knew he
“didn’t rape that little girl,” noting the girl was “[t]alking about she wanted to be [his] baby
mom the whole trip.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 29-30.)
{¶ 11} T.W. made a Crim.R. 29 motion for dismissal at the conclusion of the state’s
evidence and again at the conclusion of all the evidence. The magistrate denied both
motions. At the conclusion of the trial, the magistrate determined the state had established
T.W.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On May 31, 2022, the magistrate issued a decision
adjudicating T.W. delinquent for having committed the offense of rape. T.W. filed
objections to the magistrate’s delinquency adjudication, alleging the adjudication was
against the manifest weight of the evidence and the state impermissibly bolstered N.C.’s
testimony.
{¶ 12} On September 12, 2022, the magistrate held a dispositional hearing. The
magistrate ordered T.W. to complete programming at a residential treatment facility, to
No. 23AP-143 4
comply with all requirements of his Juvenile Community Enrichment Services, and to
register as a Tier II sex offender. On October 2, 2022, the magistrate issued a judgment
entry reflecting the disposition announced at the September 12, 2022 hearing. T.W. filed
objections to the magistrate’s disposition, asserting the magistrate erred by placing him at
the residential treatment facility and by ordering him to register as a Tier II sex offender.
{¶ 13} On October 12, 2022, T.W. filed a motion requesting that the court hear
additional evidence in the case. The trial court granted T.W.’s motion and held a hearing
for that purpose on November 22, 2022.
{¶ 14} On February 1, 2023, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry
overruling T.W.’s objections to the magistrate’s adjudication and overruling in part and
granting in part T.W.’s objections to the magistrate’s disposition. The court overruled
T.W.’s objection asserting the magistrate’s adjudication was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. The court noted that, while there were discrepancies concerning the
“tangential actions of N.C. and the group of minors at the Tuttle Mall,” none of the
“discrepancies concern[ed] the elements around the act of rape itself.” (Decision at 6.) The
trial court sustained T.W.’s objection to the magistrate’s dispositional order requiring him
to register as a Tier II sex offender. The court overruled T.W.’s remaining objections.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 15} T.W. appeals, assigning the following errors for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred when it entered judgment against the
appellant which such judgment was against the manifest
weight of the evidence in violation of his right to due process
of law.
[II.] The trial court erred when it entered judgment against
the appellant when the evidence was insufficient to sustain an
adjudication in violation of his right to due process of law.
III. Analysis
{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, T.W. asserts that his delinquency
adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence. T.W.’s second assignment of
error asserts that his delinquency adjudication was based on insufficient evidence. Our
review of the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence in a
juvenile delinquency adjudication is the same as for adult criminal defendants. In re C.S.,
No. 23AP-143 5
10th Dist. No. 11AP-667, 2012-Ohio-2988, ¶ 23, citing In re D.R., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-492,
2006-Ohio-5205. The legal concepts of sufficiency and weight of the evidence are both
quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal standard that tests whether the evidence
introduced at trial is legally adequate to support a verdict. Id. at 386. Whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. Id. In determining whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, “ ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937, ¶ 34, quoting State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. A verdict will not be
disturbed on sufficiency of the evidence unless, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, it is apparent that reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion reached by the trier of fact. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001).
{¶ 18} “[T]he criminal manifest weight of the evidence standard addresses the
evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Cassell, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1093, 2010-Ohio-
1881, ¶ 38, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25. Thus,
although there may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment, a court may nevertheless
conclude that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387.
When presented with a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court
may not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins at 387. An appellate court should
reserve reversal of a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence for only
the most “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”
Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 19} In addressing a manifest weight of the evidence argument, we are able to
consider the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-105, 2010-
No. 23AP-143 6
Ohio-4953, ¶ 6. However, in conducting our review, we are guided by the presumption that
the jury, or the trial court in a bench trial, “ ‘is best able to view the witnesses and observe
their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.’ ” Id., quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio
St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Accordingly, we afford great deference to the trier of fact’s
determination of witness credibility. State v. Redman, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-654, 2011-
Ohio-1894, ¶ 26, citing State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840, ¶ 55.
See State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus (credibility
determinations are primarily for the trier of fact). The fact finder is free to believe “all, part,
or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” Cattledge at ¶ 6, citing Hill v.
Briggs, 111 Ohio App.3d 405, 412 (10th Dist.1996). “If evidence is susceptible to more than
one construction, reviewing courts must give it the interpretation that is consistent with the
verdict and judgment.” Id., citing White v. Euclid Square Mall, 107 Ohio App.3d 536, 539
(8th Dist.1995).
{¶ 20} The trial court found T.W. delinquent for committing the offense of rape in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) provides that “[n]o person shall
engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other
person to submit by force or threat of force.” Sexual conduct includes vaginal intercourse
between a male and female. R.C. 2907.01(A). To prove the force element of a sexual offense,
the state must establish force beyond that force inherent in the crime itself. State v. Griffith,
10th Dist. No. 05AP-1042, 2006-Ohio-6983, ¶ 17, citing State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323(1998). See State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus
(stating that the “force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape depends upon
the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other”). A person acts
with purpose “when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result.” R.C.
2901.22(A).
{¶ 21} N.C. testified that T.W. entered her fitting room at JCPenney without her
permission, pulled her pants down, and used his hand to press down on her back to bend
her over. N.C. stated that she “told [T.W.] to move,” but that he was using “force” and “like
applied more pressure with his hand to bend [her] over.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 51.) N.C.
stated that after T.W. bent her over, he placed his penis inside her vagina. According to her
No. 23AP-143 7
trial testimony, N.C. told T.W. “no, no, no,” but he told her to shut up and placed his hand
over her mouth so that her voice was “mumbled.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 51-53.) N.C. stated
that she did not consent to having sex with T.W. Therefore, N.C.’s testimony established
the elements of the offense of rape. See State v. D.E.M., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-589, 2016-
Ohio-5638, ¶ 111, quoting State v. Fortson, 8th Dist. No. 92337, 2010-Ohio-2337, ¶ 47
(stating that “[u]nder Ohio law, ‘a rape victim’s testimony alone, if believed, is enough
evidence for a conviction’ ”).
{¶ 22} T.W. acknowledges that, because he admitted to having sex with N.C., the
sole issue in the case “was whether [he] compelled N.C. to submit by force.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 18.) T.W. asserts that “substantial inconsistencies in N.C.’s story” rendered her
testimony unworthy of belief. (Appellant’s Brief at 18-19.) However, “an accused is not
entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was
presented.” State v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1118, 2011-Ohio-5131, ¶ 29. “The trier of
fact is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’
manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses’ testimony is credible.” Id.,citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-35, 2002-Ohio-4503, ¶ 58. Accord State v.
Mann, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1131, 2011-Ohio-5286, ¶ 37, quoting State v. Nivens, 10th Dist.
No. 95APA09-1236, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2245 (May 28, 1996) (noting that the “ ‘jury
may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly’ ”); State v.
Favor, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-215, 2008-Ohio-5371, ¶ 10. We will address each of the
inconsistencies T.W. identifies in his brief.
{¶ 23} T.W. initially notes that, while N.C. testified at trial she met T.W. in person
for the first time at the mall on November 12, 2021, N.C. told Ms. Romans and Detective
Huhn that she previously met T.W. at the mall in October 2021. After defense counsel
played the recordings of N.C.’s prior statements at trial, N.C. stated that she did remember
meeting T.W. at the mall in October 2021. N.C. stated she was “very confused because [she]
did not know the exact date” of their prior meeting. (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 70.) Thus, when
confronted with her prior statements, N.C. admitted that she had previously met T.W. at
the mall. Compare In re Z.B., 9th Dist. No. 09CA0039-M, 2010-Ohio-1345, ¶ 20 (finding
the defendant’s rape conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence, in part, because
the victim testified at trial that she “hardly knew Z.B. on the date of the incident,” but
No. 23AP-143 8
previously told a police officer that Z.B. was “a long time friend,” and when confronted with
her prior statement at trial, the victim “denied that she made that statement”).
{¶ 24} T.W. further notes that, while N.C. testified at trial she was in a relationship
with T.W. on November 12, 2021, and was hugging and kissing him that day, N.C. told Ms.
Romans during the CAC interview that T.W. was not her boyfriend and she rejected his
attempts to kiss her at the mall. Defense counsel played clips from the CAC interview
during N.C.’s cross-examination, which documented N.C. telling Ms. Romans when T.W.
tried to kiss her she told him “[b]ack up. And you’re just my friend and I have a boyfriend
and you’re trippin’,” and, “I do not wanna (sic) kiss you. I don’t like you like that. I told you
you were my friend and I told you I had a boyfriend.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 21, 25.) When
confronted with her prior statements to Ms. Romans, N.C. confirmed she made these
statements to T.W., but stated she made them “[a]s a joke.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 21-22, 26.)
{¶ 25} T.W. notes that, at trial, N.C. denied having a boyfriend other than T.W. in
November 2021. Defense counsel impeached N.C.’s testimony with statements she made
to Ms. Romans during the CAC interview indicating she had a boyfriend named Miami who
lived in Miami, Florida, they had been in a relationship for two years, and they met on an
app called Monkey. When confronted with her prior statements at trial, N.C. denied having
another boyfriend when she went to the mall with T.W. on November 12, 2021. N.C. also
confusingly stated she did have a boyfriend “at that time, but while [she] was dating [T.W.
she] didn’t have him.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 71.) Notably, K.J.L. described N.C. as T.W.’s
“bop,” meaning that she was his girlfriend when she was around him but was not his
girlfriend when she was not around him. (May 6, 2022 Tr. 83-84.)
{¶ 26} T.W. next addresses a portion of N.C.’s trial testimony when she stated that,
while C.H. was inside Forever 21, N.C. and T.W. stood together in front of the store and
T.W. “kept on trying to touch [her] private part and [she] kept on dropping down to the
floor” and using his “belt to help [her] back up.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 82.) N.C. testified
that each time T.W. tried to touch her private part she “would continue to drop back down.”
(Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 82.) T.W. asserts this “assault allegation [was] simply not worthy of
belief,” because N.C. initially told Ms. Romans during the CAC interview that she and C.H.
went into Forever 21 together and subsequently told Ms. Romans that all four minors went
into Forever 21 together. (Appellant’s Brief at 21; Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 86-87; State’s Ex. 3,
No. 23AP-143 9
CAC interview, at 31:00, 54:25.) However, N.C. also told Ms. Romans that, while C.H. was
inside Forever 21, she and T.W. remained outside the store and T.W. attempted to touch
her private part. And, during the interview, N.C. demonstrated for Ms. Romans how T.W.
briefly touched her breast and genital area on the outside of her clothes. (State’s Ex. 3, CAC
Interview at 56:00-57:00.) Accordingly, regardless of who went into Forever 21 and when,
N.C. consistently stated that T.W. attempted to touch her private part while they were
standing outside Forever 21.
{¶ 27} T.W. notes that while N.C. also told Ms. Romans he tried to grab her private
part when they were on the elevator at the mall, “N.C. did not testify in court as to any
assault occurring on the elevator.” (Appellant’s Brief at 22; State’s Ex. 3, CAC Interview at
31:50.) However, defense counsel only asked N.C. if the four minors rode on an elevator at
the mall, and N.C. responded stating, “I don’t remember. We might’ve, yes.” (Apr. 28, 2022
Tr. at 83.) Defense counsel never specifically asked N.C. if T.W. tried to touch her private
part while riding on the elevator. (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 83-85.)
{¶ 28} T.W. further notes that N.C., C.H., and K.J.L. all testified to different versions
of what occurred in the JCPenney fitting rooms. N.C. testified that during the sexual assault
in the fitting room she “hear[d] someone playing with the door and saying let me in, let me
in.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 52.) N.C. “assum[ed] that was [C.H.]” and stated she was “100%
sure” it was C.H. “because [she] could hear her voice saying let me in, let me in.” (Apr. 28,
2022 Tr. at 52.) During her interview with Detective Huhn, N.C. also stated that C.H. was
“banging on” the fitting room door and saying “let me in, let me in” during the incident.
(Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 97.)
{¶ 29} At trial, C.H. denied ever standing outside the fitting room door and saying
“let me in.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 42.) C.H. confirmed that she and N.C. went into adjacent
fitting rooms at JCPenney and that she threw a shirt over the fitting room wall for N.C.
However, C.H. stated that she then tried on her shirt, came out of the fitting room, showed
the shirt to N.C., went back into her fitting room, changed her shirt, and then exited the
fitting room area. C.H. stated that T.W. and K.J.L. were standing in the fitting room hallway
when she left the fitting room area. C.H. looked at shirts in JCPenney for approximately
two minutes, then came back to the fitting room area and “that was when [she] saw [T.W.]
exiting [N.C.’s] room.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 30.) C.H. stated that after T.W. exited N.C.’s
No. 23AP-143 10
fitting room, she knocked on the fitting room door “and tried to open it and [N.C.] said,
‘Hold on,’ and she sounded upset. And then when she came out, she was crying, and that’s
when she told [C.H.] what happened.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 31.) N.C. told C.H. “ ‘He raped
me.’ ” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 32.)
{¶ 30} K.J.L. testified that T.W. and N.C. went inside a fitting room together while
he and C.H. stood in the fitting room hallway. K.J.L. stated that after about five to eight
minutes, T.W. and N.C. came out of the fitting room together. K.J.L. stated neither he nor
C.H. left the fitting room area during this time. K.J.L. also stated that, while they were in
the hallway, he was climbing on door hinges and “[s]winging back and forth” on the fitting
room doors “like a monkey.” (May 6, 2022 Tr. 84-85.) K.J.L. confirmed his climbing and
swinging on the fitting room doors made a “loud * * * noise.” (May 6, 2022 Tr. 85.) K.J.L.
also testified that T.W. and N.C. left the fitting room together, “still hugging and holding
hands.” (May 6, 2022 Tr. at 70.)
{¶ 31} T.W. asserts that N.C.’s version of events was meaningfully different from
C.H.’s version, because N.C. testified that C.H. attempted to enter the fitting room during
the incident and said “let me in,” while C.H. testified that she was not present in the fitting
room area during the incident and she never said “let me in.” The trial court noted that it
“[did] not expect young minors to accurately identify[] voices, [and] positions of people
outside a dressing room” during a sexual assault, especially since K.J.L. was “climbing on
doors hinges, making noise, and jostling doors” during the incident. (Decision at 6.)
Moreover, C.H. testified that, after T.W. exited the fitting room, she tried “to get into
[N.C.’s] fitting room and knock[ed] on the door” and “wiggle[d] the handle to open the
door.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 50.) Thus, C.H. testified to knocking on the fitting room door
and wiggling the door handle, albeit after, rather than during, the incident.
{¶ 32} T.W. further notes that N.C. testified T.W. wrapped his hand around her
mouth during the incident, but she told Detective Huhn T.W. “tried to choke [her]” during
the rape “[b]ut he couldn’t because he couldn’t like bend down enough.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr.
at 97.) T.W. asserts that N.C.’s trial testimony lacked credibility because, if T.W. was
“unable to reach her neck, then he would also be unable to reach her mouth.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 25.)
No. 23AP-143 11
{¶ 33} T.W. also notes that N.C. stated, both at trial and during the CAC interview,
that C.H. punched T.W. in the neck when he opened the fitting room door and T.W.
responded stating, “bro, why would you do that I just got a tattoo right there.” (Apr. 28,
2022 Tr. at 103; State’s Ex. 3, CAC Interview at 34:45.) However, C.H. testified that she
never punched T.W. in the neck, and K.J.L. testified that he did not see C.H. punch T.W. in
the neck.
{¶ 34} T.W. finally asserts that N.C.’s testimony lacked credibility because she told
differing versions of how T.W. expressed to her that he was raped as a child. On direct
examination, N.C. testified that, following the incident in the fitting room, T.W. went “back
into the fitting room and typed * * * a sentence in his notes [app] of his phone” stating he
“had herpes ‘cause he was raped when he was a kid.” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 53-54.) On
cross-examination, defense counsel played portions of the CAC interview when N.C. told
Ms. Romans that T.W. verbally told her while they were standing outside the mall that he
was raped as a child. Defense counsel also played a portion of N.C.’s interview with
Detective Huhn when she stated that after T.W. “ejaculated on the floor and then [she] was
like * * * bro, why would you do that and he’s like oh, I got raped when I was a kid.” (Apr. 28,
2022 Tr. at 94.) N.C. did present inconsistent versions of how and where T.W. told her he
was raped as a child. We nonetheless note that she consistently described T.W. justifying
his conduct as a consequence of being raped as a child.
{¶ 35} N.C.’s testimony contained several inconsistencies for the trier of fact to
resolve. Her trial testimony differed from her prior statements regarding whether she had
previously met T.W. in person, whether she willingly kissed him at the mall, whether she
had another boyfriend at the time of their meeting, and whether T.W. was able to place his
hand over her mouth during the sexual encounter. N.C.’s testimony differed from C.H.’s
testimony regarding where C.H. was during the sexual assault and when she attempted to
enter N.C.’s fitting room. N.C.’s testimony differed from both C.H.’s testimony and K.J.L.’s
testimony regarding whether C.H. hit T.W. in the neck following the incident. And, N.C.
told several different versions of how T.W. shared with her that he was raped as a child.
{¶ 36} Notably, however, Ms. Romans testified that it was “common” for juveniles
disclosing abuse to “jumble” facts. (May 6, 2022 Tr. 31-32.) Compare State v. J.E.C., 10th
Dist. No. 12AP-584, 2013-Ohio-1909, ¶ 43 (finding the defendant’s convictions were not
No. 23AP-143 12
against the manifest weight of the evidence even though “the jury heard evidence of [the
victim’s] equivocation about the sex abuse,” because the state presented evidence
demonstrating that “children sometimes equivocate on their disclosure” of sexual abuse).
N.C. was 13 years old at the time of the incident and 14 years old when she testified at trial.
Detective Huhn agreed there were differences between N.C.’s and C.H.’s version of events
but stated he did not feel the differences “were significant” and that the differences
concerned “things that most teenagers wouldn’t pay a lot of attention to.” (May 3, 2022 Tr.
47.) The trier of fact could have agreed with Detective Huhn’s assessment after considering
all of the evidence.
{¶ 37} Furthermore, while there were inconsistencies in N.C.’s testimony, there
were also notable consistencies in the evidence. N.C. testified that immediately after the
incident she was “crying” and told C.H. that T.W. had “just raped [me].” (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr.
at 54.) C.H. similarly testified that when N.C. opened the fitting room door she “was crying”
and told C.H., “ ‘He raped me.’ ” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 31-32.) Although C.H. was N.C.’s friend
at the time of the incident, C.H. stated at trial that they were “no longer friends” and she
was only testifying because she was subpoenaed. (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 36.) Additionally,
from N.C.’s initial immediate disclosure to C.H., to her statements to Ms. Romans and
Detective Huhn, to her testimony at trial, N.C. never equivocated in her accusation that
T.W. engaged in non-consensual, forced sexual intercourse with her in the fitting room.
N.C. explained at trial that, while she did not remember certain aspects of their day at the
mall, her memory of what occurred in the JCPenney fitting room with T.W. was “[v]ery
clear.” (May 2, 2022 Tr. at 15.)
{¶ 38} As such, we do not find any of the noted inconsistencies in N.C.’s various
statements rendered her testimony regarding the sexual assault unbelievable. See State v.
Smith, 7th Dist. No. 14 MA 0159, 2016-Ohio-3418, ¶ 54 (noting that “A.S. was consistent
with regard to her core allegations” and the “inconsistencies [in her testimony] cited by
Smith [did] not render A.S. completely incredible”). Compare State v. Short, 10th Dist. No.
22AP-543, 2024-Ohio-92, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Weber, 124 Ohio App.3d 451, 466 (10th
Dist.1997) (finding a verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence because the
“ ‘evidence presented by the state in th[e] case [was] marked by uncertainties and a lack of
sufficient probative evidence on crucial factual issues’ ”). Furthermore, while T.W. alleges
No. 23AP-143 13
that N.C. could have fabricated the rape allegation to hide a consensual sexual encounter
from her parents or boyfriend, the trier of fact heard N.C.’s testimony indicating that she
may have had another boyfriend at the time and that she initially asked her mother “not to
tell” her father about the sexual assault. (Apr. 28, 2022 Tr. at 118.) Accordingly, it was
within the province of the trier of fact to determine whether N.C. fabricated the rape
allegation for either reason.
{¶ 39} As noted, the trier of fact was in the best position to observe N.C.’s manner
and demeanor as she testified and to determine whether her testimony was credible.
Rankin, 2011-Ohio-5131 at ¶ 29. “ ‘[W]here a factual issue depends solely upon a
determination of which witnesses to believe, that is the credibility of witnesses, a reviewing
court will not, except upon extremely extraordinary circumstances, reverse a factual finding
* * * as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” In re L.J., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
495, 2012-Ohio-1414, ¶ 21, quoting In re Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1136, 2005-Ohio-
4389, ¶ 26. Reviewing the entire record and affording appropriate deference to the trier of
fact’s determination of credibility, we do not find the trier of fact clearly lost its way and
created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding N.C.’s testimony regarding the rape
credible. Therefore, T.W.’s delinquency adjudication for rape was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Based on the foregoing, we overrule T.W.’s first assignment of error.
{¶ 40} T.W.’s second assignment of error asserts his delinquency adjudication was
not supported by sufficient evidence. However, pursuant to our above analysis, we have
already found the adjudication supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
“Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, manifest weight
may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that a conviction is
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of
sufficiency.” State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11, citing State
v. Braxton, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15. Accord Columbus v.
Gunthorp, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-313, 2022-Ohio-138, ¶ 18. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
at 388, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). Thus, our conclusion that T.W.’s
delinquency adjudication is supported by the weight of the evidence demonstrates the
adjudication is supported by sufficient evidence as well. As such, we overrule T.W.’s second
assignment of error.
No. 23AP-143 14
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 41} Having overruled T.W.’s first and second assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and JAMISON, JJ., concur.
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