Wittensoldner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Wittensoldner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    2013-Ohio-4863
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    ROBERT WITTENSOLDNER, et al.
    Plaintiffs
    v.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2011-05823
    Judge Patrick M. McGrath
    Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck
    ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    {¶ 1} On March 18, 2013, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
    pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B).             On April 12, 2013, plaintiffs filed a memorandum in
    opposition. The motion is now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to
    L.C.C.R. 4(D).
    {¶ 2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
    {¶ 3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
    evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
    stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
    the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
    minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
    against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to
    have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also
    Case No. 2011-05823                         -2-                                     ENTRY
    Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 
    104 Ohio St.3d 660
    , 
    2004-Ohio-7108
    , citing Temple v. Wean
    United, Inc., 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
     (1977).
    {¶ 4} Plaintiff, Robert Wittensoldner (hereinafter “plaintiff”), brings this action for
    negligence. On October 7, 2010, Darrell Brosius, an employee of defendant, was at the
    intersection of U.S. Route 62 and State Route 165 in Mahoning County performing work
    in preparation for the scheduled replacement later that day of the “signal span wire,”
    being the steel cable from which all the overhead traffic lights for the intersection were
    hung. While Brosius performed this work, plaintiff, a township police officer, directed
    traffic at the intersection. There is no dispute that the signal span wire and attached
    traffic lights suddenly fell and that one of the traffic lights glanced off a moving vehicle
    and struck plaintiff in the head, causing him to sustain injury.
    {¶ 5} “[I]n order to establish actionable negligence, one seeking recovery must
    show the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting proximately
    therefrom.” Strother v. Hutchinson, 
    67 Ohio St.2d 282
    , 285 (1981). “Pursuant to R.C.
    5501.11, [defendant] has the responsibility to construct and maintain highways in a safe
    and reasonable manner.       However, the state is not an insurer of the safety of its
    highways.”    Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    67 Ohio App.3d 723
    , 729-730 (10th
    Dist.1990).
    {¶ 6} In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an
    affidavit from Brosius, as well as plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories.        Plaintiffs
    submitted transcripts of depositions of Brosius and another employee of defendant,
    Martin Baker.
    {¶ 7} Baker, who is employed as a “signal electrician 1,” testified in his deposition
    that on or about the afternoon of September 3, 2010, he received a dispatch stating that
    defendant had been informed that the traffic lights were hanging low at the intersection
    of U.S. Route 62 and State Route 165. Baker stated that he and another employee of
    defendant drove to the intersection in a bucket truck to assess the problem. Baker
    Case No. 2011-05823                          -3-                                     ENTRY
    testified that he determined that a power line belonging to a utility company had been in
    contact with the signal span wire and burnt it such that it came apart, meaning that the
    traffic lights were suspended only by the electric service line that supplied them with
    power, which was wrapped around the signal span wire; he explained that the electric
    service line is not designed to bear the weight of the traffic lights. Baker stated that his
    repair entailed using a “come along,” or hand-cranked winch, to pull the two sections of
    broken signal span wire back together, and then splicing a three or four foot piece of
    new wire on either side of where the burn occurred, attaching the new wire to the old
    with a “three-bolt clamp” on each side.
    {¶ 8} Brosius, who is employed as a “signal electrician 2,” testified in his
    deposition that Baker’s repair was considered to be a temporary solution, and that he
    was part of a crew that was scheduled to replace the entire signal span wire at the
    intersection on the night of October 7, 2010. Brosius explained that he came to the
    intersection that afternoon to inspect the site and perform some preparatory work on his
    own, and he related that when he arrived, Baker’s repair appeared to have held up and
    the traffic lights were hanging at the proper height. Brosius testified that electric service
    lines are normally wrapped around the signal span wire, and that in order to enable the
    replacement of the signal span wire later that night, he got in the bucket of his truck and
    unwrapped the electric service line. Brosius stated that a few minutes later, as he was
    preparing to leave, the traffic lights suddenly dropped about ten feet lower. According to
    Brosius, one of the three-bolt clamps that Baker used in his splice repair had come off
    such that the weight of the traffic lights was born only by the electric service line.
    {¶ 9} Brosius testified that he then secured two “cable grip” tools to the original
    signal span wire (not the smaller piece of wire Baker had used as a splice), one on each
    side of the burnt area. He then used a hand-cranked winch attached to the cable grips
    to pull the two sides together again. Brosius stated that after he came down from the
    bucket of the truck and measured the traffic lights to be 14 feet above the ground,
    plaintiff, who had recently arrived at the scene, began to direct traffic. Brosius stated
    Case No. 2011-05823                          -4-                                   ENTRY
    that he got back in the bucket intending to pull the signal span wire tighter in order to
    raise the traffic lights to the standard 16-foot height. According to Brosius, however, he
    heard the sound of the traffic lights falling, looked over, and saw that plaintiff was
    injured.
    {¶ 10} Brosius testified that he proceeded to check on plaintiff, pull all the traffic
    lights out of the intersection, erect temporary stop signs, and call for assistance from co-
    workers. Brosius explained that he was not able to determine at that time what had
    caused the accident, but that while performing work on another intersection a week or
    two later, he observed one of the two cable grips malfunction such that it slipped from
    the wire to which he had it fastened. Brosius, who explained that these were the same
    two cable grips that were in use when plaintiff was injured, testified that the next
    morning, he tested the tools by attempting to pull together two pieces of wire that he
    had attached to trucks parked outside his department’s shop. According to Brosius, the
    cable grip that had malfunctioned the day before slipped once again, while the other
    held firm to the wire as it should. Brosius stated that as a result of these observations,
    he then inferred that the accident in which plaintiff was injured was due to a malfunction
    of the cable grip, resulting in the wire slipping free from the tool. Brosius testified that
    he notified his supervisor of the tool’s malfunctioning, and that it was then taken out of
    service; the tool, which bears the name of Klein Tools, Incorporated, was produced at
    his deposition. Brosius further testified that he had regularly used the tool with no prior
    problems, that in more than 15 years at his job he has not otherwise had a cable grip
    fail to hold a wire firmly in place, and that he had no prior knowledge of any problems
    with these tools. The affidavit of Brosius that defendant submitted provides testimony
    similar to the foregoing.
    {¶ 11} Defendant thus argues that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the failure of
    the cable grip tool, through no fault of defendant, and that defendant did not have actual
    or constructive notice that the tool would fail.
    Case No. 2011-05823                        -5-                                    ENTRY
    {¶ 12} Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable and that
    “the negligence of [defendant] is therefore inferred as a matter of law.” The doctrine of
    res ipsa loquitur “permits an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant to be
    drawn from the factual circumstances surrounding the injury to the plaintiff. * * * ‘To
    warrant application of the rule a plaintiff must adduce evidence in support of two
    conclusions: (1) That the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury,
    or at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury, under the exclusive
    management and control of the defendant; and (2) that the injury occurred under such
    circumstances that in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if
    ordinary care had been observed.’” Hickey v. Otis Elevator Co., 
    163 Ohio App.3d 765
    ,
    
    2005-Ohio-4279
    , ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), quoting Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co.,
    
    23 Ohio St.2d 65
    , 66-67 (1970). The doctrine, however, “‘does not apply where there is
    direct evidence as to the cause, or where the facts are such that an inference that the
    accident was due to a cause other than defendant’s negligence could be drawn as
    reasonably as that it was due to his negligence.’” Jennings Buick, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 
    63 Ohio St.2d 167
    , 172 (1980), quoting Loomis v. Toledo Rys. & Light Co., 
    107 Ohio St. 161
    , 169-170 (1923).
    {¶ 13} The only evidence tending to establish the cause of the accident in this
    case with any certainty is the testimony of Brosius. He stated that although Baker’s
    repair failed after the electric service line was unwrapped, no one was harmed at that
    time and he was able to reconnect and raise the signal span wire using the cable grips
    and winch, standard tools of the trade, but that the malfunctioning of one of the cable
    grips resulted in the wire slipping free and falling downward with the attached traffic
    lights. While plaintiff contends that Brosius’ testimony as to the accident being caused
    by a malfunctioning tool is inadmissible, the court concludes that it is admissible opinion
    testimony by a lay witness inasmuch as it is rationally based on his personal
    observations and perceptions and is helpful to a clear understanding of a fact in issue.
    See Evid.R. 701. Brosius’ undisputed testimony constitutes evidence tending to show
    Case No. 2011-05823                          -6-                                   ENTRY
    that the cause of the accident was something other than negligence on the part of
    defendant; that is, if the accident was the result of a manufacturing or design defect in
    the tool, then plaintiff’s injury would have occurred even if defendant had satisfied its
    duty of care. As such, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
    {¶ 14} Furthermore, whereas defendant has presented evidence tending to show
    that the accident resulted from a cause other than its negligence, plaintiff has not
    presented evidence of acts or omissions on the part of defendant from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant caused the accident.             With
    respect to the tool identified by Brosius as having malfunctioned, there is no evidence
    that the tool had ever failed before, that any defect in the tool was previously manifest,
    that the tool was unsuited for this type of work, that the tool could not have failed without
    some form of negligence on the part of defendant, or, how defendant could have
    prevented or predicted that the tool would malfunction.         In short, plaintiff has not
    provided proof of facts to show that a genuine issue exists for trial.         Accordingly,
    reasonable minds can only conclude that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law on plaintiff’s claim of negligence.
    {¶ 15} Given that plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim of negligence, the derivative
    claim for loss of consortium asserted by plaintiff, Tara Wittensoldner, must also fail.
    Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 
    63 Ohio St.3d 84
    , 93 (1992).
    {¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that there are no genuine
    issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is
    rendered in favor of defendant. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. All
    previously scheduled events are VACATED.             Court costs are assessed against
    plaintiffs. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of
    entry upon the journal.
    Case No. 2011-05823                  -7-                                ENTRY
    _____________________________________
    PATRICK M. MCGRATH
    Judge
    cc:
    Martin F. White                       Stephanie D. Pestello-Sharf
    156 Park Avenue, N.E.                 Velda K. Hofacker
    P.O. Box 1150                         Assistant Attorneys General
    Warren, Ohio 44482-1150               150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    001
    Filed May 28, 2013
    To S.C. Reporter October 31, 2013
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-05823

Judges: McGrath

Filed Date: 5/28/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016