Mohler v. Bur. of Sentence Computation ( 2011 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Mohler v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 
    2011-Ohio-7015
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    ERIC S. MOHLER
    Plaintiff
    v.
    BUREAU OF SENTENCE COMPUTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2011-11262
    Judge Alan C. Travis
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    {¶1} On October 24, 2011, defendant filed a “motion to dismiss or for summary
    judgment.” On October 27, 2011, the court issued an entry stating that the motion is
    construed as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). On November
    4, 2011, plaintiff filed a response. The motion is now before the court for a non-oral
    hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D).
    {¶2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
    {¶3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
    evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
    stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
    the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
    minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
    against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to
    have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also
    Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 
    104 Ohio St.3d 660
    , 
    2004-Ohio-7108
    , citing Temple v. Wean
    United, Inc. (1977), 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
    .
    {¶4} Plaintiff is currently an inmate in the custody and control of the Department
    of Rehabilitation and Correction at the Noble Correctional Institution pursuant to R.C.
    5120.16. Plaintiff asserts that defendant erred in calculating his release date for a prior
    prison term that he served for a sexual offense. According to plaintiff, due to the error,
    he was forced to register as a sexually-oriented offender upon his release pursuant to
    the newly enacted “Megan’s Law.” Plaintiff asserts that defendant violated his civil
    rights, including those guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the
    United States Constitution.
    {¶5} Defendant argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims
    predicated upon constitutionally guaranteed rights. Defendant further argues that to the
    extent that plaintiff has asserted claims for false imprisonment or defamation, such
    claims are untimely.
    {¶6} With respect to plaintiff’s claims that his civil and constitutionally guaranteed
    rights were violated, it is well-settled that the court of claims lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist. (1989), 
    491 U.S. 701
    ; Burkey v. S. Ohio Correctional Facility (1988), 
    38 Ohio App.3d 170
    ; White v.
    Chillicothe Correctional Institution (Dec. 29, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1230.
    {¶7} Plaintiff’s assertion that defendant improperly calculated his release date
    states a claim for false imprisonment.
    {¶8} R.C. 2743.16(A) provides in relevant part:
    {¶9} “[C]ivil actions against the state permitted by sections 2743.01 to 2743.20 of
    the Revised Code shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of accrual
    of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits
    between private parties.” (Emphasis added.)
    {¶10} R.C. 2305.11(A) provides, in relevant part:
    {¶11} “(A) An action for * * * false imprisonment * * * shall be commenced within
    one year after the cause of action accrued * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
    {¶12} “False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally
    ‘without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable
    time * * *.’” Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1991), 
    60 Ohio St.3d 107
    , 109,
    quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger (1977), 
    50 Ohio St.2d 69
    , 71.
    {¶13} Plaintiff filed his original complaint on September 21, 2011, and attached a
    December 22, 2009 judgment entry from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas
    dismissing an indictment filed against him for failure to register as a sexually-oriented
    offender. Plaintiff asserts that the indictment was dismissed because he never should
    have been required to initially register as a sex offender in 1998. Plaintiff argues that
    his claim accrued on December 22, 2009, when the judgment entry was issued.
    {¶14} However, an action for false imprisonment accrues upon release from
    confinement. Robinson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Franklin App. No. 10AP-550,
    
    2011-Ohio-713
    . Plaintiff filed an affidavit from his mother, Marjorie Allen, who states
    that she drove plaintiff to his attorney’s office on the Monday after his release in April
    1998 to discuss with her whether he had to register as a sexually-oriented offender.
    Inasmuch as the undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff was released in April
    1998, his claim for false imprisonment accrued at that time, and is now time-barred.
    {¶15} Furthermore, construing plaintiff’s allegations as a claim for defamation,
    such claim is also time-barred.
    {¶16} R.C. 2305.11 provides, in pertinent part:
    {¶17} “(A) An action for libel [or] slander * * * shall be commenced within one
    year after the cause of action accrued * * *.”
    {¶18} An action for defamation upon an improper order to register as a sexually-
    oriented offender accrues when the registration requirement is first imposed. Pankey v.
    Ohio Adult Parole Auth., Franklin App. No. 11AP-36, 
    2011-Ohio-4209
    , ¶8, 11. The
    affidavit establishes that plaintiff was first required to register in April 1998. Accordingly,
    any defamation claim that may exist against defendant is untimely.
    {¶19} Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and
    judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
    Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice
    of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
    _____________________________________
    ALAN C. TRAVIS
    Judge
    cc:
    Christopher P. Conomy                        Eric S. Mohler, #625-937
    Assistant Attorney General                   Noble Correctional Institution
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor              15708 McConnelsville Road
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130                    Caldwell, Ohio 43724
    Filed December 16, 2011
    To S.C. reporter March 5, 2012
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-11262

Judges: Travis

Filed Date: 12/16/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014