Stratton v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Stratton v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    2011-Ohio-5727
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JEREMIAH DOUGLAS STRATTON,                                     :   Case No. 2011-04576-AD
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                                     :   Acting Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    Defendant.                                             :   MEMORANDUM DECISION
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff, Jeremiah Stratton, filed this action against defendant, Department
    of Transportation (ODOT), contending that his 1998 Honda Civic was damaged as a
    proximate result of negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a road reflector on I-
    270 in Franklin County. In his complaint, plaintiff provided a narrative description of his
    damage incident noting that he was driving his car on December 2, 2009, at
    approximately 7:15 a.m. when “a bus kicked up a road reflector lodging it in the driver’s
    side front end against radiator while fracturing multiple places.” Plaintiff implied that the
    damage to the automobile was proximately caused by negligence on the part of ODOT
    in failing to maintain the roadway free of hazardous debris conditions. Plaintiff filed this
    complaint seeking to recover $894.27, which represents the cost of automotive repairs
    and reimbursement of the filing fee. The $25.00 filing fee was paid.
    {¶ 2} Defendant denied liability based on the contention that no ODOT
    personnel had any knowledge of the damage-causing debris condition prior to plaintiff’s
    incident. Defendant located the debris near milepost 42.80 on I-270 in Franklin County.
    Defendant asserted plaintiff failed to establish the length of time the debris existed on
    the roadway prior to his property-damage event. Defendant suggested, “that the debris
    existed in that location for only a relatively short amount of time before plaintiff’s
    incident.” Defendant contended plaintiff failed to establish the damage-causing debris
    condition was attributable to any conduct on the part of ODOT. Plaintiff did not file a
    response.
    {¶ 3} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, he must prove, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that
    duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries.      Armstrong v. Best Buy
    Company, Inc., 
    99 Ohio St. 3d 79
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2573
    ,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding
    Products, Inc. (1984), 
    15 Ohio St. 3d 75
    , 77, 15 OBR 179, 
    472 N.E. 2d 707
    . Plaintiff
    has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a loss
    and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio
    State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the
    burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for
    sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice
    among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such
    burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 
    145 Ohio St. 198
    , 
    30 O.O. 415
    , 
    61 N.E. 2d 198
    , approved and followed.
    {¶ 4} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe
    condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976),
    
    49 Ohio App. 2d 335
    , 3 O.O. 3d 413, 
    361 N.E. 2d 486
    . However, defendant is not an
    insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996),
    
    112 Ohio App. 3d 189
    , 
    678 N.E. 2d 273
    ; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 
    67 Ohio App. 3d 723
    , 
    588 N.E. 2d 864
    .
    {¶ 5} In order to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff
    must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or
    constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the
    accident.   McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 
    34 Ohio App. 3d 247
    , 
    517 N.E. 2d 1388
    .
    Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice, but fails to
    reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 
    31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1
    , 31 OBR
    64, 
    507 N.E. 2d 1179
    .     However, proof of notice of a dangerous condition is not
    necessary when defendant actively caused such condition.         See Bello v. City of
    Cleveland (1922), 
    106 Ohio St. 94
    , 
    138 N.E. 526
    , at paragraph one of the syllabus;
    Sexton v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1996), 94-13861.
    {¶ 6} Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to prove that ODOT had actual
    notice of the loose reflector. Therefore, in order to recover plaintiff must offer proof of
    defendant’s constructive notice of the condition or evidence to establish negligent
    maintenance.
    {¶ 7} “[C]onstructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give
    notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice or knowledge.” In re Estate of
    Fahle (1950), 
    90 Ohio App. 195
    , 197-198, 
    47 O.O. 231
    , 
    105 N.E. 2d 429
    . “A finding of
    constructive notice is a determination the court must make on the facts of each case not
    simply by applying a pre-set time standard for the discovery of certain road hazards.”
    Bussard, at 4.      “Obviously, the requisite length of time sufficient to constitute
    constructive notice varies with each specific situation.” Danko v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
    (Feb. 4, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-1183.          In order for there to be a finding of
    constructive notice, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    sufficient time has elapsed after the dangerous condition appears, so that under the
    circumstances defendant should have acquired knowledge of its existence. Guiher v.
    Dept. of Transportation (1978), 78-0126-AD; Gelarden v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 4,
    Ct. of Cl. No. 2007-02521-AD, 
    2007-Ohio-3047
    .
    {¶ 8} Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to indicate the length of time that
    the road reflector was present on the roadway prior to the incident forming the basis of
    this claim.   Additionally, the trier of fact is precluded from making an inference of
    defendant’s constructive notice, unless evidence is presented in respect to the time that
    the condition appeared on the roadway. Spires v. Ohio Highway Department (1988), 
    61 Ohio Misc. 2d 262
    , 
    577 N.E. 2d 458
    .          There is no indication that defendant had
    constructive notice of the dislodged reflector.
    {¶ 9} Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to infer that defendant, in a
    general sense, maintains its highways negligently or that defendant’s acts caused the
    defective condition. Herlihy v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1999), 99-07011-AD.
    In addition, plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that defendant
    maintained a hazardous condition on the roadway which was the substantial or sole
    cause of his property damage. or that defendant knew about the particular reflector
    condition prior to December 2, 2009. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to prove that
    a negligent act or omission on the part of defendant caused the damage to his vehicle.
    Prstojevic v. Dept. of Transp., Dist. 3, Ct. of Cl. No. 2009-08519-AD, 
    2010-Ohio-2186
    .
    {¶ 10} In his complaint, plaintiff acknowledged the debris plaintiff’s car struck was
    displaced by a third party, another motorist. Defendant has also denied liability based
    on the particular premise it had no duty to control the conduct of a third person except in
    cases where a special relationship exists between defendant and either plaintiff or the
    person whose conduct needs to be controlled. Federal Steel & Wire Corp. v. Ruhlin
    Const. Co. (1989), 
    45 Ohio St. 3d 171
    , 
    543 N.E. 2d 769
    , Jordan v. Ohio Dept. of
    Transp., Dist. 8, Ct. of Cl. No. 2010-01336-AD, 
    2010-Ohio-4583
    .
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JEREMIAH DOUGLAS STRATTON,                           :   Case No. 2011-04576-AD
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                             :   Acting Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    Defendant.                                     :
    ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION
    Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth
    in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor
    of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.
    ________________________________
    DANIEL R. BORCHERT
    Acting Clerk
    Entry cc:
    Jeremiah Douglas Stratton                       Jerry Wray, Director
    Department of Transportation
    1980 West Broad Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43223
    7/1
    Filed 7/21/11
    Sent to S.C. reporter 11/4/11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-04576-AD

Judges: Borchert

Filed Date: 7/21/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014