Schwartzberg v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. , 2011 Ohio 1120 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Schwartzberg v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    2011-Ohio-1120
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    MARK SCHWARTZBERG
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-10122-AD
    Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff, Mark Schwartzberg, filed this action against defendant,
    Department of Transportation (ODOT), contending his vehicle was damaged as a
    proximate cause of negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a hazardous
    condition on Interstate 490 in Cuyahoga County.                    Specifically, plaintiff related his
    property damage occurred “[w]hile driving eastbound on I 490 ramp leading to I-77
    southbound (Cleveland).” Plaintiff further related, “I drove (over) some sort of large
    concrete block which was in the middle of the road.” Plaintiff suggested the damage
    causing concrete block “may have fallen off a truck as it appeared to (be) used for
    sewer projects.” Plaintiff claimed the “concrete blocks” damaged the right front rim and
    body on his vehicle.          Plaintiff recalled the described damage incident occurred on
    August 18, 2010 at approximately 9:50 p.m.                     In his complaint, plaintiff requested
    damages in the amount of $2,500.00, the statutory maximum under R.C. 2743.10. The
    filing fee was paid.
    {¶ 2} Defendant denied liability based on the contention that no ODOT
    personnel had any knowledge of the damage-causing debris condition prior to plaintiff’s
    incident. Defendant located the debris “at milepost 1.88 on I-490 in Cuyahoga County”
    and advised ODOT did not receive any calls or complaints for debris at that location
    despite the fact the particular “section of roadway has an average daily traffic count
    between 25,960 and 27,160 vehicles.” Defendant suggested, “that the debris existed in
    that location for only a relatively short amount of time before plaintiff’s incident.”
    Defendant asserted plaintiff did not offer any evidence to establish the length of time the
    concrete debris existed on the roadway prior to 9:50 p.m. on August 18, 2010.
    Defendant further asserted plaintiff failed to establish the damage-causing debris
    condition was attributable to any conduct on the part of ODOT.           Defendant noted
    plaintiff suggested the concrete block his vehicle struck had fallen from a trunk operated
    by an unidentified third party.   Defendant argued ODOT is generally not liable for
    damage caused by the acts of a third party motorist not affiliated with ODOT.
    {¶ 3} Defendant pointed out that defendant’s “Cuyahoga County Manager
    conducts roadway inspections on all state roadways within the county on a routine
    basis, at least one to two times a month.” Apparently, no debris was discovered at
    milepost 1.88 on Interstate 490 the last time that specific section of roadway was
    inspected prior to August 18, 2010.      Defendant reviewed a six-month maintenance
    jurisdiction history of the area in question and found thirty-five Road Cruiser Patrols
    were performed, the last being on August 16, 2010. Also, defendant’s records show
    that nine litter pick-ups were performed in the area with the last occurring on August 5,
    2010 and according to defendant, any debris found would have been picked up.
    Defendant contended plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show his damage claimed
    was proximately caused by negligent maintenance on the part of ODOT.
    {¶ 4} Plaintiff filed a response noted, “I did run over some type of cement block
    related to a sewer project.” Plaintiff revised his damage claim to $250.00, reflecting his
    insurance coverage deductible for vehicle repair costs.
    {¶ 5} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, he must prove, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that
    duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries.        Armstrong v. Best Buy
    Company, Inc., 
    99 Ohio St. 3d 79
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2573
    ,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding
    Products, Inc. (1984), 
    15 Ohio St. 3d 75
    , 77, 15 OBR 179, 
    472 N.E. 2d 707
    . Plaintiff
    has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a loss
    and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio
    State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the
    burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for
    sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice
    among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such
    burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 
    145 Ohio St. 198
    , 
    30 O.O. 415
    , 
    61 N.E. 2d 198
    , approved and followed.
    {¶ 6} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe
    condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976),
    
    49 Ohio App. 2d 335
    , 3 O.O. 3d 413, 
    361 N.E. 2d 486
    . However, defendant is not an
    insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996),
    
    112 Ohio App. 3d 189
    , 
    678 N.E. 2d 273
    ; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 
    67 Ohio App. 3d 723
    , 
    588 N.E. 2d 864
    .
    {¶ 7} In order to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff
    must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or
    constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the
    accident.   McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 
    34 Ohio App. 3d 247
    , 
    517 N.E. 2d 1388
    .
    Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice but fails to
    reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 
    31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1
    , 31 OBR
    64, 
    507 N.E. 2d 1179
    .
    {¶ 8} Defendant professed liability cannot be established when requisite notice
    of the damage-causing conditions cannot be proven. Generally, defendant is only liable
    for roadway conditions of which it has notice, but fails to correct. Bussard. However,
    proof of notice of a dangerous condition is not necessary when defendant’s own agents
    actively caused such condition. See Bello v. City of Cleveland (1922), 
    106 Ohio St. 94
    ,
    
    138 N.E. 526
    , at paragraph one of the syllabus; Sexton v. Ohio Department of
    Transportation (1996), 94-13861. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to prove
    that his property damage was caused by a defective condition created by ODOT or that
    defendant knew about the particular debris condition prior to 9:50 p.m. on August 18,
    2010.
    {¶ 9} Ordinarily, to recover in any suit involving injury proximately caused by
    roadway conditions including debris, plaintiff must prove that either: 1) defendant had
    actual or constructive notice of the debris condition and failed to respond in a
    reasonable time or responded in a negligent manner, or 2) that defendant, in a general
    sense, maintains its highways negligently.     Denis v. Department of Transportation
    (1976), 75-0287-AD. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to prove that ODOT had
    actual notice of the damage-causing condition. Therefore, in order to recover plaintiff
    must offer proof of defendant’s constructive notice of the condition as evidence to
    establish negligent maintenance.
    {¶ 10} “[C]onstructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give
    notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice or knowledge.” In re Estate of
    Fahle (1950), 
    90 Ohio App. 195
    , 197-198, 
    48 O.O. 231
    , 
    105 N.E. 2d 429
    . “A finding of
    constructive notice is a determination the court must make on the facts of each case not
    simply by applying a pre-set time standard for the discovery of certain road hazards.”
    Bussard, at 4.     “Obviously, the requisite length of time sufficient to constitute
    constructive notice varies with each specific situation.” Danko v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
    (Feb. 4, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-1183.        In order for there to be a finding of
    constructive notice, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    sufficient time has elapsed after the dangerous condition appears, so that under the
    circumstances defendant should have acquired knowledge of its existence. Guiher v.
    Dept. of Transportation (1978), 78-0126-AD; Gelarden v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Dist. 4,
    Ct. of Cl. No. 2007-02521-AD, 
    2007-Ohio-3047
    .
    {¶ 11} Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to indicate the length of time that
    the concrete debris was present on the roadway prior to the incident forming the basis
    of this claim. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant had actual notice of the condition.
    Also, the trier of fact is precluded from making an inference of defendant’s constructive
    notice, unless evidence is presented in respect to the time that the concrete debris
    appeared on the roadway. Spires v. Ohio Highway Department (1988), 
    61 Ohio Misc. 2d 262
    , 
    577 N.E. 2d 458
    . There is no indication that defendant had constructive notice
    of the concrete debris on the roadway.
    {¶ 12} Evidence in the instant action is undisputed to show that plaintiff’s damage
    was caused by an act of an unidentified third party. Defendant has denied liability
    based on the particular premise that it had no duty to control the conduct of a third
    person except in cases where a special relationship exists between defendant and
    either plaintiff or the person whose conducts needs to be controlled. See Federal Steel
    & Wire Corp. v. Ruhlin Const. Co. (1989), 
    45 Ohio St. 3d 171
    , 
    543 N.E. 2d 769
    .
    However, defendant may still bear liability if it can be established if some act or
    omission on the part of ODOT was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. This court,
    as trier of fact, determines questions of proximate causation. Shinaver v. Szymanski
    (1984), 
    14 Ohio St. 3d 51
    , 14 OBR 446, 
    471 N.E. 2d 477
    .
    {¶ 13} “If an injury is the natural and probable consequence of a negligent act
    and it is such as should have been foreseen in the light of all the attending
    circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result of the negligence.       It is not
    necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular injury.         It is
    sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone.” Cascone v. Herb Kay
    Co. (1983), 
    6 Ohio St. 3d 155
    , 160, 6 OBR 209, 
    451 N.E. 2d 815
    , quoting Neff Lumber
    Co. v. First National Bank of St. Clairsville, Admr. (1930), 
    122 Ohio St. 302
    , 309, 
    171 N.E. 327
    .
    {¶ 14} Evidence in the instant claim tends to show the concrete block condition
    was caused by an unidentified third party and not negligent maintenance on the part of
    ODOT. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to infer defendant, in a general sense,
    maintains its highways negligently or that defendant’s acts caused the defective
    condition or conditions. Herlihy v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1999), 99-07011-
    AD.
    {¶ 15} Plaintiff has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    defendant failed to discharge a duty owed to plaintiff, or that plaintiff’s injury was
    proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Plaintiff failed to show that the damage-
    causing object at the time of the damage incident was connected to any conduct under
    the control of defendant or any negligence on the part of defendant proximately caused
    the damage. Herman v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (2006), 2006-05730-AD; Husak v. Ohio
    Dept. of Transp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2008-03963-AD, 
    2008-Ohio-5179
    .
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    MARK SCHWARTZBERG
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-10122-AD
    Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION
    Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth
    in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor
    of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.
    ________________________________
    DANIEL R. BORCHERT
    Deputy Clerk
    Entry cc:
    Mark Schwartzberg                                 Jolene M. Molitoris, Director
    5228 Anthony Street                               Department of Transportation
    Maple Hts., Ohio 44137                            1980 West Broad Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43223
    RDK/laa
    11/24
    Filed 1/11/11
    Sent to S.C. reporter 3/4/11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-10122-AD

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 1120

Judges: Borchert

Filed Date: 1/11/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014