McNatt v. Dept. of Job & Family Servs. ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as McNatt v. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2019-Ohio-476.]
    VINCE MCNATT                                           Case No. 2018-01256PQ
    Requester                                       Special Master Jeffery W. Clark
    v.                                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
    JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES
    Respondent
    {¶1} Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, provides a remedy for production of
    records under R.C. 2743.75 if the court of claims determines that a public office has
    denied access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). The policy underlying the
    Act is that “open government serves the public interest and our democratic system.”
    State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 
    109 Ohio St. 3d 364
    , 2006-Ohio-1825, 
    848 N.E.2d 472
    , ¶ 20.
    Therefore, the Act is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is
    resolved in favor of disclosure of public records. State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 
    119 Ohio St. 3d 391
    , 2008-Ohio-4788, 
    894 N.E.2d 686
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶2} On July 31, 2018, requester Vince McNatt made a public records request for
    several categories of records and information related to a job position within respondent
    Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). (Complaint at 3-4.) Over the
    next three weeks the parties exchanged correspondence, McNatt made additional
    requests, and ODJFS provided most of the requested records. (Id. at 2-30.) On
    August 16, 2018, ODJFS denied the July 31 request as it pertained to “interview
    questions [and] responses * * * for all applicants.” (Id. at 11.)
    {¶3} On September 6, 2018, McNatt filed a complaint under R.C. 2743.75
    alleging denial of access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). The case was
    referred to mediation, and on November 9, 2018, ODJFS provided McNatt with the
    requested records. (Moss Aff. at ¶ 4.) On November 15, 2018, the court mediator
    Case No. 2018-01256PQ                     -2-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    entered a report that the parties had reached an agreement resolving the case, and
    recommended dismissal pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(E)(1), with court costs to be
    absorbed by the court.
    {¶4} However, on November 20, 2018, McNatt submitted a letter titled “motion for
    court review decision to include statutory damages.” On November 27, 2018, ODJFS
    filed a response to the motion. On November 28, 2018, the clerk of the court returned
    the case to the docket of the special master for resolution. On December 6, 2018,
    McNatt submitted an unlabeled memorandum in support of the motion for damages.
    Neither the motion for damages nor McNatt’s subsequent memorandum included a
    certificate of service or case caption. Civ.R. 5(B)(4) and Civ.R. 10(A). Thus, these
    pleadings may not be considered by the court. Civ.R. 5(B)(4).
    {¶5} On December 10, 2018, ODJFS filed a motion to dismiss (Response).
    Suggestion of Mootness
    {¶6} In an action to enforce R.C. 149.43(B), a public office may produce the
    requested records prior to the court’s decision and thereby render the claim for
    production moot. State ex rel. Striker v. Smith, 
    129 Ohio St. 3d 168
    , 2011-Ohio-2878,
    
    950 N.E.2d 952
    , ¶ 18-22. ODJFS asserts that the sole claim in the complaint, for
    production of “Interview Question & Answers,” has been satisfied by production of the
    responsive documents. (Response at 2-4; Moss Aff. at ¶ 4.) Based on the
    uncontradicted evidence in the case, I find that McNatt’s request for production of
    records is moot.
    Filing Fee, Costs, and Statutory Damages
    {¶7} ODJFS notes that McNatt seeks recovery of his filing fee, lost wages,
    parking fees, and mileage, as well as an award of statutory damages. (Response to
    Motion for Damages at 1-2.) Although McNatt’s improper submissions of November 20
    and December 6, 2018 may not be considered, these issues will be addressed for the
    sake of completeness.
    Case No. 2018-01256PQ                        -3-      REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    First, the recoveries available under R.C. 2743.75(F)(3) are conditional:
    If the court of claims determines that the public office or person responsible for
    the public records denied the aggrieved person access to the public records in
    violation of division (B) of section 149.43 of the Revised Code and if no appeal
    from the court’s final order is taken under division (G) of this section, both of the
    following apply:
    ***
    (b) The aggrieved person shall be entitled to recover from the public office or
    person responsible for the public records the amount of the filing fee of twenty-
    five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that are incurred by
    the aggrieved person, * * *.
    (Emphasis added.) This statutory language does not authorize recovery for an
    unsuccessful claim. See Holmes v. Crawford Mach., Inc., 
    134 Ohio St. 3d 303
    , 2012-
    Ohio-5380, 
    982 N.E.2d 643
    , ¶ 22. Nor does it authorize recovery where the court makes
    no determination at all. State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 
    138 Ohio St. 3d 367
    , 2014-
    Ohio-538, 
    7 N.E.3d 1136
    , ¶ 31-35.
    {¶8} There is no claim of violation pending for determination. ODJFS mooted the
    claim for production during mediation, precluding the need for determination. McNatt
    failed to assert any other claim in the complaint, including any claim regarding
    timeliness. An unasserted claim fails to satisfy the requirement of notice pleading to
    provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to
    relief.” Civ.R. 8(A). Where there is no discernable claim in the complaint, the violation of
    Civ.R. 8(A) is a valid ground for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See Sultaana v.
    Horseshoe Casino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102501, 2015-Ohio-4083, ¶ 10-14; Karras
    v. Rogers, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-221, 2008-Ohio-5760, ¶ 10-11. I find that any
    later assertion of untimely production is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
    {¶9} Next, even had McNatt stated a claim regarding timeliness, and assuming
    arguendo that the court found a violation, and assuming further that statutory damages
    are an available remedy in an action brought under R.C. 2743.75, McNatt did not make
    his request in writing “by hand delivery or certified mail,” a condition precedent to an
    Case No. 2018-01256PQ                       -4-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    award of statutory damages under the version of R.C. 149.43(C)(2) in effect at the time
    the request was made. State ex rel. Hogan Lovells U.S., L.L.P. v. Dept. of Rehab. &
    Corr., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5133, ¶ 35. He is thus ineligible for statutory
    damages.
    {¶10} Finally, McNatt misapprehends the meaning of “any other costs associated
    with the action that were incurred.” R.C. 2743.75(F)(3)(b). In Ohio law,
    Even with the word “all” placed before “costs” in R.C. 3515.09, the key word in
    the statute is “costs.” Benda v. Fana (1967), 
    10 Ohio St. 2d 259
    , 263, 39 O.O.2d
    410, 413, 
    227 N.E.2d 197
    , 201 (“costs” and “all costs” synonymous). “Costs are
    generally defined as the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors, and
    others are entitled for their services in an action and which the statutes authorize
    to be taxed and included in the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) 
    Id. at paragraph
           one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Commrs. of Franklin Cty., v. Guilbert (1907), 
    77 Ohio St. 333
    , 338, 
    83 N.E. 80
    , 81. In other words, a particular litigation expense
    will not qualify as part of “costs” unless it is “fixed and taxable according to
    statute.” 
    Benda, supra
    , 10 Ohio St.2d at 263, 39 O.O.2d at 
    413, 227 N.E.2d at 201
    . “‘[C]osts’ are not synonymous with [litigation] expenses unless expressly
    made so by statute.” 
    Id. In re
    Election of November 6, 
    62 Ohio St. 3d 1
    , 4, 
    577 N.E.2d 343
    (1991). But see
    Schuller v. United States Steel Corp., 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 157
    , 2004-Ohio-4753, 
    814 N.E.2d 857
    , ¶ 6-10 (under a legislative mandate that workers’ compensation statutes be
    liberally construed, the phrase “cost of any legal proceedings” is interpreted broadly). In
    any case, because McNatt is ineligible for recovery of his filing fee or costs for the
    reasons noted earlier, the court need not evaluate which, if any, of his listed expenses
    were “costs” “associated with the action” and “incurred” within the meaning of the
    statute.
    Conclusion
    {¶11} Upon consideration of the pleadings and attachments, I recommend that
    the court 1) find that the claim for production of records is moot, and 2) dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted any other purported violation. I
    Case No. 2018-01256PQ                       -5-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    recommend that the case be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(E)(1),
    and that court costs be absorbed by the court.
    {¶12} Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party may file a written objection
    with the clerk of the Court of Claims of Ohio within seven (7) business days after
    receiving this report and recommendation. Any objection shall be specific and state with
    particularity all grounds for the objection. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the
    court’s adoption of any factual findings or legal conclusions in this report and
    recommendation unless a timely objection was filed thereto. R.C. 2743.75(G)(1).
    JEFFERY W. CLARK
    Special Master
    Filed January 8, 2019
    Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/12/19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-01256PQ

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 1/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/12/2019