Bowen v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. , 2011 Ohio 5549 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Bowen v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    2011-Ohio-5549
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JAMES R. BOWEN JR.,                                         Case No. 2011-04088-AD
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                                   Acting Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    Defendant.                                           MEMORANDUM DECISION
    {¶ 1} On March 5, 2011, at approximately 9:55 p.m., plaintiff’s son, Jay Bowen,
    was involved in an automobile accident while driving plaintiff’s, James Bowen, 2001
    Oldsmobile Intrigue on State Route 54 in South Vienna, Ohio. Plaintiff recalled that his
    son stated that, “an unknown vehicle passed him and he struck a large pothole on State
    Rt. 54. Jay said he then hit the bridge which damaged the car.” Plaintiff explained he
    traveled to the scene, spoke with Officer Sullivan of the South Vienna police
    department, and took pictures of the pothole. Plaintiff observed damage to the vehicle’s
    hood, front bumper, driver’s side fender, and the driver’s side tire and rim.
    {¶ 2} Plaintiff has implied defendant, Department of Transportation (DOT),
    should bear liability for the damage to his car inasmuch as plaintiff’s son lost control of
    the vehicle and careened into the wall only after driving into the pothole. Consequently,
    plaintiff filed this complaint seeking to recover $2,500.00, the estimated value of the car.
    The filing fee was paid.
    {¶ 3} Defendant denied having any knowledge of a pothole on State Route 54
    at milepost 5.67 in Clark County prior to plaintiff’s incident there. Defendant stated it
    “has no way of knowing or determining exactly how long the pothole existed in the
    roadway prior to [plaintiff’s son’s] incident.” Defendant suggested the pothole “existed in
    that location for only a relatively short amount of time before [plaintiff’s son’s] incident.”
    {¶ 4} In addition, defendant pointed out that the accident report lists this incident
    as a “hit/skip traffic accident.”     The officer’s report suggests that another driver
    attempted to pass plaintiff’s vehicle, clipped the fender, and caused plaintiff’s son to
    steer the car into a pothole which damaged the driver’s side tire. Defendant contended
    plaintiff failed to prove his property damage was caused by any negligent act or
    omission on the part of DOT personnel.
    {¶ 5} Plaintiff filed a response essentially reiterating the allegations in the
    complaint.    Plaintiff submitted a series of photographs depicting a large, round
    pavement defect on the traveled portion of the roadway and abutting the white edgeline.
    Plaintiff specifically denies that the damage to the car was caused by the actions of
    another motorist.
    {¶ 6} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe
    condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976),
    
    49 Ohio App. 2d 335
    , 3 O.O. 3d 413, 
    361 N.E. 2d 486
    . However, defendant is not an
    insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996),
    
    112 Ohio App. 3d 189
    , 
    678 N.E. 2d 273
    ; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 
    67 Ohio App. 3d 723
    , 
    588 N.E. 2d 864
    .
    {¶ 7} Evidence in the instant action tends to show plaintiff’s damage was
    caused by an act of an unidentified third party, not DOT. Defendant has denied liability
    based on the particular premise it had no duty to control the conduct of a third person
    except in cases where a special relationship exists between defendant and either
    plaintiff or the person whose conduct needs to be controlled. Federal Steel & Wire Corp.
    v. Ruhlin Const. Co. (1989), 
    45 Ohio St. 3d 171
    , 
    543 N.E. 2d 769
    . However, defendant
    may still bear liability if it can be established some act or omission on the part of DOT
    was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. This court, as trier of fact, determines
    questions of proximate causation. Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984), 
    14 Ohio St. 3d 51
    , 14
    OBR 446, 
    471 N.E. 2d 477
    .
    {¶ 8} “‘If any injury is the natural and probable consequence of a negligent act
    and it is such as should have been foreseen in the light of all the attending
    circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result of the negligence.           It is not
    necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular injury.             It is
    sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone. Neff Lumber Co. v. First
    National Bank of St. Clairsville, Admr. (1930), 
    122 Ohio St. 302
    , 309, 
    171 N.E., 327
    .’”
    Cascone v. Herb Kay Co. (1983), 
    6 Ohio St. 3d 155
    , 160, 
    451 N.E. 2d 815
    , quoting
    Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 
    153 Ohio St. 31
    , 
    41 O.O. 117
    , 
    90 N.E. 2d 859
    .
    {¶ 9} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, he must prove, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that
    duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries.         Armstrong v. Best Buy
    Company, Inc. 
    99 Ohio St. 3d 79
    , 81, 
    2003-Ohio-2573
    , ¶ 8 citing Menifee v. Ohio
    Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio Misc. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 
    472 N.E. 2d 707
    .
    Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered
    a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v.
    Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom
    the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for
    sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice
    among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such
    burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 
    145 Ohio St. 198
    , 
    30 O.O. 415
    , 
    61 N.E. 2d 198
    , approved and followed.
    {¶ 10} In order to prove a breach of duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff must
    prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or constructive
    notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the accident. McClellan
    v. ODOT (1986), 
    34 Ohio App. 3d 247
    , 
    517 N.E. 2d 1388
    . Defendant is only liable for
    roadway conditions of which it has notice, but fails to reasonably correct. Bussard v.
    Dept. of Transp. (1986), 
    31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1
    , 31 OBR 64, 
    507 N.E. 2d 1179
    . The trier of
    fact is precluded from making an inference of defendant’s constructive notice, unless
    evidence is presented in respect to the time the defective condition developed. Spires
    v. Ohio Highway Department (1988), 
    61 Ohio Misc. 2d 262
    , 
    577 N.E. 2d 458
    . There is
    no evidence that defendant had actual notice of the pothole on State Route 54 prior to
    the evening of March 5, 2011.
    {¶ 11} Therefore, to find liability, plaintiff must prove that ODOT had constructive
    notice of the defect. In order for there to be constructive notice, plaintiff must show that
    sufficient time has elapsed after the dangerous condition appears, so that under the
    circumstances defendant should have acquired knowledge of its existence. Guiher v.
    Dept. of Transportation (1978), 78-0126-AD . Size of the defect is insufficient to show
    notice or duration of existence. O’Neil v. Department of Transportation (1988), 
    61 Ohio Misc. 2d 287
    , 
    587 N.E. 2d 891
    . “A finding of constructive notice is a determination the
    court must make on the facts of each case not simply by applying a pre-set time
    standard for the discovery of certain road hazards.” Bussard, at 4. “Obviously, the
    requisite length of time sufficient to constitute constructive notice varies with each
    specific situation.” Danko v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (Feb. 4, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-
    1183. No evidence has shown that ODOT had constructive notice of the pothole.
    {¶ 12} Generally, in order to recover in a suit involving damage proximately
    caused by roadway conditions including potholes, plaintiff must prove that either: 1)
    defendant had actual or constructive notice of the potholes and failed to respond in a
    reasonable time or responded in a negligent manner, or 2) that defendant, in a general
    sense, maintains its highways negligently.   Denis   v. Department of Transportation
    (1976), 75-0287-AD.     Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to infer that
    defendant, in a general sense, maintains its highways negligently or that defendant’s
    acts caused the defective conditions. Herlihy v. Ohio Department of Transportation
    (1999), 99-07011-AD.
    {¶ 13} Plaintiff has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    defendant failed to discharge a duty owed to plaintiff, or that plaintiff’s injury was
    proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Plaintiff failed to show the damage-
    causing pothole at the time of the damage incident was connected to any conduct under
    the control of defendant or any negligence on the part of defendant.         Taylor v.
    Transportation Dept. (1998), 97-10898-AD; Weininger v. Department of Transportation
    (1999), 99-10909-AD; Witherell v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (2000), 2000-04758-AD.
    Therefore, defendant is not liable for any damage plaintiff may have suffered from the
    pothole.
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JAMES R. BOWEN JR.,                                    Case No. 2011-04088-AD
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                              Acting Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    Defendant.                                      ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
    DETERMINATION
    Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth
    in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor
    of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.
    ________________________________
    DANIEL R. BORCHERT
    Acting Clerk
    Entry cc:
    James R. Bowen, Jr.                             Jerry Wray, Director
    14 Wildwood Drive                               Department of Transportation
    South Charleston, Ohio 45368                    1980 West Broad Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43223
    6/28
    Filed 7/19/11
    Sent to S.C. reporter 10/27/11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-04088-AD

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 5549

Judges: Borchert

Filed Date: 7/19/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014