Beckham v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Beckham v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 
    2011-Ohio-3880
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    DALE BECKHAM
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2009-09442
    Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    MAGISTRATE DECISION
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging that he was assaulted by an employee
    of defendant.       The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the case
    proceeded to trial on the issue of liability.
    {¶ 2} At all times relevant, plaintiff was in inmate in the custody and control of
    defendant at the London Correctional Institution (LoCI) pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.
    Plaintiff testified that he was eating in the LoCI dining room on either July 4 or 5, 2009,
    at approximately 4:20 p.m. when inmate Martin asked him for a packet of mayonnaise.
    Plaintiff stated that when he tossed the mayonnaise to Martin, Corrections Captain
    Wimberly “chewed him out” and told him he had two minutes to finish eating his
    sandwich. According to plaintiff, he soon thereafter stood up from the table and bused
    his food tray, but continued to eat his sandwich. Plaintiff testified that Wimberly gave
    him several orders to throw the sandwich in the trash, but that he quickly stuffed the
    remainder of the sandwich in his mouth. According to plaintiff, Wimberly became angry
    and struck him in the face with his shoulder several times. Plaintiff testified that he
    Case No. 2009-09442                        -2-                 MAGISTRATE DECISION
    spent 52 days in the “hole” as a result of the incident. Plaintiff asserts that Wimberly’s
    actions amount to an assault.
    {¶ 3} However, plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the LoCI dining room rules,
    which include: prohibitions on throwing food, taking food out of the dining room, and
    loitering; and a limitation on the amount of time inmates have to eat their food. Plaintiff
    also admitted that he disobeyed Wimberly’s orders to finish his sandwich, bus his tray,
    and leave the dining room.
    {¶ 4} Maurice Wimberly is a Corrections Captain posted as the first shift
    commander at LoCI. Wimberly testified that he had only a vague recollection of the
    incident with plaintiff.   According to Wimberly, after plaintiff threw the mayonnaise
    packet, he gave plaintiff a direct order to bus his tray and leave the dining room.
    However, when plaintiff refused, Wimberly had a corrections officer escort plaintiff out of
    the dining room to the administration area where Wimberly dealt with him “face to face”
    after the meal was finished. Wimberly stated that he did not write a report concerning
    the incident because it was minor and he did not believe a formal reprimand was
    necessary. Wimberly testified that he did not use force against plaintiff at any time
    during the incident.
    {¶ 5} Harold Sewell was an inmate in the LoCI dining hall on the day of the
    incident.   Sewell testified that he saw plaintiff throw the mayonnaise packet, that
    Wimberly warned plaintiff, and that when plaintiff bused his tray, Wimberly came up
    beside him and bumped him with his shoulder before having him escorted out of the
    dining area.
    {¶ 6} DeCarlo Blackwell was the institutional inspector for LoCI at the time of the
    incident. Blackwell testified that he began an investigation of the incident after plaintiff
    filed a complaint alleging that Wimberly used force against him. No report was filed by
    Wimberly regarding the incident.       According to Blackwell, plaintiff was placed in
    segregation during the investigation for his own safety, per defendant’s policy.
    Case No. 2009-09442                         -3-                 MAGISTRATE DECISION
    Blackwell stated that he interviewed both plaintiff and Wimberly, and reviewed security
    video footage during his investigation. Blackwell testified that plaintiff stated to him that
    he was not harmed during the encounter with Wimberly and that it was a matter of
    “principle.” Blackwell further testified that the security videos for July 4 and 5, 2009, do
    not show the alleged incident.
    {¶ 7} The Ohio Administrative Code sets forth the circumstances under which
    force may be lawfully utilized by prison officials and employees in controlling inmates.
    Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(C) provides, in relevant part:
    {¶ 8} “(2) Less-than-deadly force. There are six general circumstances in which
    a staff member may use force against an inmate or third person. A staff member may
    use less-than-deadly force against an inmate in the following circumstances:
    {¶ 9} “(a) Self-defense from physical attack or threat of physical harm;
    {¶ 10} “(b) Defense of another from physical attack or threat of physical attack;
    {¶ 11} “(c) When necessary to control or subdue an inmate who refuses to obey
    prison rules, regulations or orders;
    {¶ 12} “(d) When necessary to stop an inmate from destroying property or
    engaging in a riot or other disturbance;
    {¶ 13} “(e) Prevention of an escape or apprehension of an escapee; or
    {¶ 14} “(f) Controlling or subduing an inmate in order to stop or prevent self-
    inflicted harm.”
    {¶ 15} The court has recognized that “corrections officers have a privilege to use
    force upon inmates under certain conditions. * * * However, such force must be used in
    the performance of official duties and cannot exceed the amount of force which is
    reasonably necessary under the circumstances. * * * Obviously, ‘the use of force is a
    reality of prison life’ and the precise degree of force required to respond to a given
    situation requires an exercise of discretion by the corrections officer.” Mason v. Ohio
    Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.      (1990), 
    62 Ohio Misc.2d 96
    , 101-102.         (Internal citations
    omitted.)
    Case No. 2009-09442                         -4-                 MAGISTRATE DECISION
    {¶ 16} Based upon the foregoing testimony, the court finds that any “force”
    Wimberly used against plaintiff was both minimal and justified in light of plaintiff’s refusal
    to comply with Wimberly’s orders.
    {¶ 17} Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff claims he was improperly held in
    segregation during the investigation, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he
    language in R.C. 2743.02 that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its liability determined * * * in
    accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *’
    means that the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the
    exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy
    decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or
    discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984), 
    14 Ohio St.3d 68
    , 70; Von Hoene v. State (1985),
    
    20 Ohio App.3d 363
    , 364. Prison administrators are provided “wide-ranging deference
    in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
    to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v.
    Wolfish (1979), 
    441 U.S. 520
    , 547.
    {¶ 18} The court finds that the policy to hold plaintiff in the “hole” during the
    pendency of the investigation into the alleged incident was characterized by a high
    degree of official judgment or discretion and was based upon a need to maintain
    institutional security.   Defendant is therefore entitled to discretionary immunity from
    claims arising out of that decision.
    {¶ 19} Judgment is recommended in favor of defendant.
    {¶ 20} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14
    days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision
    during that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files
    objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first
    objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of
    any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
    Case No. 2009-09442                                  -5-                   MAGISTRATE DECISION
    finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely
    and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the
    filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
    _____________________________________
    MATTHEW C. RAMBO
    Magistrate
    cc:
    Kristin S. Boggs                                          Dale Beckham, #435-197
    Assistant Attorney General                                Allen Correctional Institution
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor                           2338 North West Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130                                 P.O. Box 4501
    Lima, Ohio 45801
    MR/cmd/Filed May 27, 2011/To S.C. reporter June 7, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2009-09442

Judges: Rambo

Filed Date: 5/27/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014