Reid v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. ( 2011 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Reid v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 
    2011-Ohio-1859
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    MAURICE REID
    Plaintiff
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-12265-AD
    Judge Alan C. Travis
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    DECISION
    {¶ 1} On February 28, 2011, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
    amended complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6), and pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1)
    because it does not comply with the court’s January 18, 2011 order. On March 16,
    2011, plaintiff filed a response.
    {¶ 2} “The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is
    whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the complaint.”
    State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1989), 
    42 Ohio St.3d 77
    , 80. In construing a motion to
    dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court must presume that all factual allegations
    of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
    party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 
    40 Ohio St.3d 190
    . Then, before the court
    may dismiss the complaint, it must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set
    of facts entitling him to recovery.            O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union
    (1975), 
    42 Ohio St.2d 242
    .
    {¶ 3} Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and control of defendant at the
    Mansfield Correctional Institution (ManCI) pursuant to R.C. 5120.16. In his amended
    complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant retaliated against him by forcing him to
    frequently change cells; that “$135 of his property” was stolen while it was in
    defendant’s possession; that Corrections Lieutenant Page authored a false conduct
    report against him; and that Corrections Lieutenant Menard has told other inmates that
    he is an “old ass snitch, wanna-be attorney.”
    {¶ 4} Defendant argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
    plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, that it is entitled to discretionary immunity for decisions to
    move plaintiff between cells, that plaintiff cannot recover for the loss of contraband, and
    that plaintiff did not comply with the court’s January 18, 2011 order to specify the
    alleged defamatory statements, when they were made, and to whom they were
    published.
    {¶ 5} With respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim, such a claim is treated as
    arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983. State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 91,
    
    1994-Ohio-37
    . It is well-settled that such claims are not actionable in the Court of
    Claims.      See Thompson v. Southern State Community College (June 15, 1989),
    Franklin App. No. 89AP-114; Burkey v. Southern Ohio Corr. Facility (1988), 
    38 Ohio App.3d 170
    .
    {¶ 6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he language in R.C. 2743.02
    that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its liability determined * * * in accordance with the same rules
    of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *’ means that the state cannot be
    sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning
    function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the
    exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984),
    
    14 Ohio St.3d 68
    , 70; Von Hoene v. State (1985), 
    20 Ohio App.3d 363
    , 364. Prison
    administrators are provided “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
    policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
    discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish (1979), 
    441 U.S. 520
    ,
    547.
    {¶ 7} Defendant’s decisions with respect to plaintiff’s cell assignment are
    characterized by a high degree of official judgment or discretion.                Accordingly,
    defendant is entitled to discretionary immunity from suits arising out of such decisions
    as a matter of law.
    {¶ 8} Plaintiff’s claim of harassment sounds in intentional infliction of emotional
    distress.   In order to sustain such a claim, plaintiff must show that: “(1) defendant
    intended to cause emotional distress, or knew or should have known that actions taken
    would result in serious emotional distress; (2) defendant’s conduct was extreme and
    outrageous; (3) defendant’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s psychic injury; and (4)
    the mental anguish plaintiff suffered was serious.” Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp.
    (1991), 
    78 Ohio App.3d 73
    , 82, citing Pyle v. Pyle (1983), 
    11 Ohio App.3d 31
    , 34.
    {¶ 9} To constitute conduct sufficient to give rise to a claim of intentional
    infliction of emotional distress, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so
    extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
    as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Yeager v. Local Union 20,
    Teamsters (1983), 
    6 Ohio St.3d 369
    , 375, quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts
    (1965) 73, Section 46, Comment d.
    {¶ 10} “It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which
    is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even
    that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which
    would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. * * * Generally, the case
    is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
    arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ The
    liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
    oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. at 374-375.
    {¶ 11} Upon review, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegation that Menard referred
    to him as an “old ass snitch, wanna-be attorney” cannot be reasonably construed as
    extreme and outrageous for purposes of recovering on a claim for intentional infliction of
    emotional distress.
    {¶ 12} With respect to plaintiff’s property claim, while it is true that plaintiff cannot
    pursue a claim for property that he has no right to possess, plaintiff states in his
    complaint that he had “$135.00 of his property stolen.” It is unclear whether plaintiff is
    referring to $135 in cash, which is considered contraband, or other personal property
    worth $135.
    {¶ 13} Regarding plaintiff’s allegation that Page authored a false conduct report
    against him, the court finds that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to be in
    compliance with the court’s January 18, 2011 order. Specifically, plaintiff did not identify
    either the date on which the report was authored or to whom it was directed and he did
    not specify when it was published.
    {¶ 14} Based upon the foregoing, defendant’s motion shall be granted to the
    extent that plaintiff’s retaliation claim, harassment claim, and claim based upon
    defendant’s decision with respect to his cell assignments shall be dismissed. Plaintiff’s
    defamation claim shall be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for
    failure to follow the court’s orders.
    {¶ 15} Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is based upon the loss of “$135 of his
    property.” R.C. 2743.10 provides, in part, that “[c]ivil actions against the state for two
    thousand five hundred dollars or less shall be determined administratively by the clerk
    of the court of claims * * *.”      Inasmuch as plaintiff’s claim is for $135, it shall be
    transferred to the administrative docket where it shall be processed pursuant to R.C.
    2743.10(A).
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    MAURICE REID
    Plaintiff
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-12265-AD
    Judge Alan C. Travis
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    ENTRY OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND TRANSFERRING CASE TO
    ADMINISTRATIVE DOCKET
    For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, defendant’s
    motion to dismiss is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff’s retaliation claim, harassment
    claim, and claim based upon defendant’s decision with respect to his cell assignments
    are DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s defamation claim is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant
    to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for failure to follow the court’s order.
    Inasmuch as plaintiff’s remaining property claim is for $135, it is hereby
    TRANSFERRED to the administrative docket where it shall be processed pursuant to
    R.C. 2743.10(A).
    _____________________________________
    ALAN C. TRAVIS
    Judge
    cc:
    Amy S. Brown                                             Maurice Reid, #538-099
    Assistant Attorney General                               P.O. Box 788
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor                          1150 North Main Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130                                Mansfield, Ohio 44901
    MR/cmd
    Filed March 31, 2011/To S.C. reporter April 12, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-12265-AD

Judges: Travis

Filed Date: 3/31/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014