Grenga v. Youngstown State Univ. , 2011 Ohio 877 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Grenga v. Youngstown State Univ., 
    2011-Ohio-877
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JOSEPH ROBERT GRENGA
    Plaintiff
    v.
    YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-10033
    Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.
    ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    {¶ 1} On November 8, 2010, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
    pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C).          On November 30, 2010, plaintiff filed a response.           On
    December 2, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for leave
    to file the same.        On December 8, 2010, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s
    motions. Inasmuch as this case has not been set for pretrial or trial, plaintiff’s motion for
    leave is DENIED as moot. Civ.R. 56(A). The case is now before the court for a non-
    oral hearing on the motions.
    {¶ 2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
    {¶ 3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
    evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
    stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
    the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
    Case No. 2010-10033                       -2-                                      ENTRY
    minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
    against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to
    have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also
    Gilbert v. Summit County, 
    104 Ohio St.3d 660
    , 
    2004-Ohio-7108
    , citing Temple v. Wean
    United, Inc. (1977), 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
    .
    {¶ 4} Plaintiff asserts that, on at least three occasions, employees of
    Youngstown State University (YSU) entered upon his property without permission. On
    October 13, 2010, the court dismissed plaintiff’s constitutional claims, criminal trespass
    claim, and claims accruing prior to August 18, 2008. Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s
    remaining claims of civil trespass and invasion of privacy are time-barred in that those
    claims are based upon transactions or occurrences that predate August 18, 2008.
    {¶ 5} In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of YSU
    Associate General Counsel Gregory Morgione, who has been employed by defendant
    since November 2005. Morgione’s affidavit states, in pertinent part, as follows:
    {¶ 6} “3.    James Mineo was employed by the University from October 12, 1970
    through June 28, 1996 and from November 1, 2002 through October 31, 2007. Mr.
    Mineo retired from the University on October 31, 2007.
    {¶ 7} “4.    In early 2007, I was aware that the city of Youngstown (the City)
    wanted to purchase Joseph Robert Grenga’s property located at 128 West Rayen
    Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio (the Property) for the purpose of constructing a public road
    through a portion of the University campus.
    {¶ 8} “5.    On or about March 8, 2007, Mr. Mineo and I accompanied
    representatives from the City during their inspection of the Property.       One of Mr.
    Grenga’s employees met us at the Property, unlocked the front entrance door to the
    Property and allowed us to inspect the Property. I did not enter the Property again
    during the remaining time that Mr. Grenga owned the Property, nor am I aware that any
    Case No. 2010-10033                         -3-                                 ENTRY
    other YSU employee entered the Property after March 8, 2007 on behalf of YSU during
    the remaining time that Mr. Grenga owned the Property.
    {¶ 9} “6.    On or about September 5, 2007, the city of Youngstown adopted
    Resolution No. RES-01 107 declaring the necessity and intention to appropriate the
    Property to make a public road.
    {¶ 10} “7.   On January 29, 2008, the city of Youngstown filed a petition to
    appropriate the Property in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    2008 CV 00388.”
    {¶ 11} Plaintiff has submitted his own affidavit wherein he “take[s] exception to
    the date” on which Morgione claims to have inspected plaintiff’s property. According to
    plaintiff, a January 14, 2009 letter from Dan Pribich, Deputy Law Director of the city of
    Youngstown, shows that defendant’s employees entered his building “on or about
    January, 2009.”     However, Pribich states in his letter that “the County Auditor’s
    appraiser and their authorized representatives” were scheduled to enter plaintiff’s
    property on January 19, 2009, for the purpose of appraising and documenting the
    property. The letter does not refer to defendant, and plaintiff has not presented any
    evidence from which the court could infer that employees of defendant participated in
    the January 19, 2009 appraisal.
    {¶ 12} The only employees of defendant whom plaintiff has identified as being
    among the persons who entered upon his property are Morgione and Mineo.
    Morgione’s affidavit states that one of plaintiff’s employees allowed representatives of
    defendant and the city of Youngstown to inspect the property. Additionally, Morgione’s
    representation that Mineo retired from his employment with defendant on October 31,
    2007, and that neither Morgione nor any other employee of defendant has visited
    plaintiff’s property since March 8, 2007, is not disputed.
    {¶ 13} The court finds that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
    undisputed evidence set forth above is that plaintiff’s claims for relief are based upon
    transactions or occurrences that predate August 18, 2008.       Plaintiff did not file his
    Case No. 2010-10033                          -4-                                    ENTRY
    complaint until August 18, 2010, more than two years later. Consequently, plaintiff’s
    claims are time-barred. See R.C. 2743.16.
    {¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as
    to any material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, plaintiff’s motion for summary
    judgment is DENIED, and judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. All other pending
    motions are DENIED as moot. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk
    shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
    _____________________________________
    CLARK B. WEAVER SR.
    Judge
    cc:
    Amy S. Brown                                    Joseph Robert Grenga
    Assistant Attorney General                      5498 Glenwood Avenue
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor                 Boardman, Ohio 44512-2551
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    AMR/cmd
    Filed January 18, 2011
    To S.C. reporter February 22, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-10033

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 877

Judges: Weaver

Filed Date: 1/18/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014