Wrinn v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol , 2011 Ohio 5963 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Wrinn v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 
    2011-Ohio-5963
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    EUGENE WRINN, JR.,
    Plaintiff,                                            Case No. 2006-05934
    v.                                                    Judge Joseph T. Clark
    OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL,
    Defendant.                                            DECISION
    {¶1} An evidentiary hearing was conducted in this matter to determine whether
    Daren Johnson and Kenneth Koverman are entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C.
    2743.02(F) and 9.86.1          The case arises out of a traffic accident that occurred on
    September 16, 2005, at approximately 1:45 a.m. Plaintiff was driving his pick-up truck
    with two passengers on northbound Interstate 75 (I-75) just north of State Route 309 in
    Allen County, when it spun on wet pavement and came to rest facing south in the left
    lane. The vehicle was then struck head-on by a semi truck traveling northbound. The
    semi truck came to rest in the right hand lane. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious by
    the collision; the passengers were coherent and able to climb out of the truck. Plaintiff
    has no memory of the accident or of the events that followed.
    {¶2} R.C. 2743.02(F) states, in part:
    {¶3} “A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36 of
    the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was manifestly
    outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official responsibilities,
    or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton
    or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court of claims, which has
    1
    Plaintiff’s May 20, 2011 motion for leave to exceed the 15 page limitation for his proposed findings of fact
    and conclusions of law is GRANTED.
    exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the officer or employee is
    entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised Code and whether the
    courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.”
    {¶4} R.C. 9.86 states, in part:
    {¶5} “[N]o officer or employee [of the state] shall be liable in any civil action that
    arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his
    duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of
    his employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with
    malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
    SERGEANT JOHNSON
    {¶6} Sergeant Daren Johnson testified that he has been employed with
    defendant for 18 years and has been assigned to the Lima Post since 2002. Johnson
    testified that at approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 16, 2005, he was on duty in his
    patrol car when he heard over his radio that an accident had occurred on I-75 just north
    of State Route 309. According to Johnson, dispatch directed the accident report to
    Trooper T.K. Manley, but since he was closer to the scene than Manley was, he notified
    dispatch that he would respond. Johnson related that when he arrived on the scene of
    the accident, he observed a pick-up truck facing southbound in the left northbound lane
    of I-75, and a semi truck facing northbound in the right lane. Johnson stated that he
    entered the area using the on-ramp from State Route 309, parked his patrol car in the
    left lane approximately 20 yards south of the pick-up truck, and activated his emergency
    lights. According to Johnson, vehicles were able to drive around the accident scene
    using the 309 ramp, and continued to do so until he ordered a road block several hours
    after his arrival on the scene. However, he stated that traffic was not able to travel in
    the northbound lanes of I-75 due to the positions of the semi truck and his patrol car.
    Johnson testified that he was the first law enforcement officer to arrive on the scene,
    which establishes him as the “officer in charge” until a more senior or higher ranking
    officer arrives.
    {¶7} Johnson testified that as he approached the pick-up truck, he noticed a
    group of people standing near the northbound/southbound lane barrier wall between
    himself and the pick-up. Johnson related that one of the individuals approached him
    and stated that he had been a passenger in the pick-up and that he wanted Johnson to
    “check on his buddy” who was still in the pick-up.                    Johnson stated that as he
    approached the pick-up he observed plaintiff slumped over and motionless, and that his
    initial thought was that the individual was dead. According to Johnson, however, as he
    approached, plaintiff “came to” and exited the pick-up.                  Johnson testified that he
    instructed plaintiff to remain in the pick-up so that he could check his injuries, but that
    plaintiff pushed past him and walked in a northerly direction. Johnson stated that he
    ordered plaintiff to remain in the truck, but that plaintiff did not respond, comply, or
    acknowledge his instructions. Johnson testified that he then grabbed plaintiff around
    the upper arms from behind and attempted to stop him, but that plaintiff “shook [him] off”
    and continued walking north for a few moments, and then turned south. Johnson stated
    that as plaintiff continued south, he grabbed him a second time and ended up face-to-
    face with plaintiff. According to Johnson, he again instructed plaintiff to stop and that
    plaintiff responded by grabbing him around the biceps so that the two men had their
    arms around each other. Johnson stated that he instructed plaintiff two more times to
    let him go with no response; and that the third time he instructed plaintiff to let him go or
    he would hit him. Johnson testified that plaintiff did not comply, that he repeated the
    threat, and that when plaintiff again did not comply, he struck plaintiff with his flashlight.2
    {¶8} According to Johnson, he swung the flashlight in an overhand motion and
    struck plaintiff in the left shoulder and neck area three times. Johnson stated that after
    the third strike, plaintiff fell to his knees and wrapped his arms around his waist in a type
    of “bear hug.” Johnson testified that soon thereafter one of the bystanders “pulled him
    free” and plaintiff simply turned and walked southward once again. Johnson states that
    he pursued plaintiff, approached him from behind, and attempted to stun him by holding
    a Taser against the back of plaintiff’s leg and activating it. Johnson related that plaintiff
    went down to one knee after he used the Taser, but that he was not incapacitated to the
    point that Johnson could get him under control.
    {¶9} Johnson testified that after he used the Taser, plaintiff again changed
    direction and began walking north. Johnson stated that he returned to his patrol car and
    2
    The flashlight was identified to the court as being constructed of black metal, approximately 14 inches in
    issued a “Signal 88” call on his radio. According to Johnson, the Signal 88 is broadcast
    to all patrol units operating on his radio frequency and to the post dispatch, and signifies
    an “officer in distress.” Johnson testified that after issuing the call, he again pursued
    plaintiff and caught up with him near the cab of the semi truck. Johnson stated that he
    once again grabbed plaintiff and attempted to subdue him with “elbow strikes,” “knee
    strikes,” and “forearm blows.” According to Johnson, at this point he was attempting to
    place plaintiff under arrest. However, Johnson admitted that he never informed plaintiff
    that he was under arrest.
    {¶10} Johnson testified that while he was attempting to subdue plaintiff at the
    front of the semi truck, Trooper T.K. Manely arrived on the scene.             According to
    Johnson, he and Manely were able to pin plaintiff to the ground, but that plaintiff
    continued to struggle. Johnson stated that soon after Manely arrived, several officers
    from various area law enforcement agencies also arrived on the scene.               Johnson
    testified that these officers joined in the effort to subdue plaintiff such that at one point
    there were six or seven officers “on top of” plaintiff. According to Johnson, several
    techniques were employed against plaintiff by the various officers, including knee
    strikes, hand strikes, elbow strikes, blows with flashlights, pepper spray, a Taser, and at
    least one officer applied pressure to plaintiff’s throat.
    {¶11} Johnson testified that eventually the officers were able to place handcuffs
    on plaintiff and that plaintiff was then placed on a “spine board” and Johnson requested
    that emergency medical personnel administer a drug to “knock [plaintiff] out.” Plaintiff
    was thereafter transported to an area hospital for medical treatment. Johnson testified
    that he has investigated over 800 automobile accidents in his career but that he had
    never encountered an accident victim who acted in such a way.
    {¶12} A video of the incident recorded from the “dash cam” of Johnson’s vehicle
    and two videos recorded from the “dash cam” of Lima police officers’ vehicles were
    admitted into evidence and largely corroborate Johnson’s version of events. (Plaintiff’s
    Exhibits 1, 2, and 27.)
    {¶13} Plaintiff asserts that Johnson acted in a wanton and reckless manner in
    four ways: 1) he failed to properly secure the accident scene upon his arrival; 2) he did
    length, and weighing approximately two pounds.
    not properly assess plaintiff’s injures; 3) he used improper and excessive force against
    plaintiff; and 4) it was inappropriate to issue “Signal 88.” Plaintiff argues that as a result
    of his actions Johnson is not entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(F) and
    9.86.
    {¶14} The issue whether an employee is entitled to immunity is a question of law.
    Nease v. Medical College Hosp., 
    64 Ohio St.3d 396
    , 
    1992-Ohio-97
    , citing Conley v.
    Shearer, 
    64 Ohio St.3d 284
    , 292, 
    1992-Ohio-133
    . The question whether an employee
    acted outside the scope of his employment, or with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in
    a wanton or reckless manner is one of fact. Tschantz v. Ferguson (1989), 
    49 Ohio App.3d 9
    .    Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the state employee should be
    stripped of immunity. Fisher v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr. (Aug. 25, 1998), Franklin
    App. No. 98AP-142.
    {¶15} “Malicious purpose encompasses exercising ‘malice,’ which can be defined
    as the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to harm
    another, usually seriously, through conduct that is unlawful or unjustified. Bad faith has
    been defined as the opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or
    constructive fraud or a design to mislead or deceive another. Bad faith is not prompted
    by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister
    motive. Finally, reckless conduct refers to an act done with knowledge or reason to
    know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the conduct creates
    an unnecessary risk of physical harm and that such risk is greater than that necessary
    to make the conduct negligent. The term ‘reckless’ is often used interchangeably with
    the word ‘wanton’ and has also been held to be a perverse disregard of a known risk.”
    Caruso v. State (2000), 
    136 Ohio App.3d 616
    , 620-621. (Internal citations omitted.)
    {¶16} In the continuum between negligence and intentional misconduct, “[w]anton
    misconduct is a degree greater than negligence.” Brockman v. Bell (1992), 
    78 Ohio App.3d 508
    , 515. “‘[M]ere negligence is not converted into wanton misconduct unless
    the evidence establishes a disposition to perversity on the part of the tortfeasor.’”
    Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 
    70 Ohio St.3d 351
    , 356, 
    1994-Ohio-368
    ,
    quoting Roszman v. Sammett (1971), 
    26 Ohio St.2d 94
    , 96-97. An employee’s wrongful
    conduct, even if it is unnecessary, unjustified, excessive or improper, does not
    automatically subject the employee to personal liability unless the conduct is so
    divergent that it severs the employer-employee relationship. Elliott v. Ohio Dept. of
    Rehab. & Corr. (1994), 
    92 Ohio App.3d 772
    , 775, citing Thomas v. Ohio Dept. of
    Rehab. & Corr. (1988), 
    48 Ohio App.3d 86
    , 89.
    {¶17} In support of his claim that Johnson is not entitled to civil immunity, plaintiff
    presented the expert testimony of Donald J. Van Meter, Ph.D.              Van Meter is the
    principal of Donald J. Van Meter and Associates, Inc., a firm that provides training and
    consulting services to law enforcement and public safety organizations.             Types of
    training provided by the firm include management, discipline, supervision, and use of
    force training. With respect to his experience and education, Van Meter was employed
    by defendant from 1963 through 1978, and he eventually reached the rank of lieutenant
    and served as a physical fitness and self-defense instructor. He is certified to train
    instructors at the Ohio Peace Officers Training Academy. Van Meter testified that he
    personally spends between 65 and 75 percent of his time training and the remainder of
    his time consulting. In terms of consulting, Van Meter testified that he prepares policy
    manuals for police departments, develops performance evaluation systems, and
    develops organizational structure plans for police departments. In preparation for his
    testimony, Van Meter examined the facts and circumstances surrounding this case,
    defendant’s policies and procedures, and reports generated by defendant as a result of
    this incident. Van Meter testified that after doing so, he formed an opinion as to the
    actions of both Johnson and Koverman.
    {¶18} With respect to Johnson securing the scene of the accident, Van Meter
    testified that, in his opinion, Johnson acted recklessly by not securing the scene in such
    a way as to prevent traffic from progressing through or around the scene. Van Meter
    opined that Johnson’s first order of business should have been to stop traffic completely
    and then to take all reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the scene and guard
    against additional injuries.   Van Meter opined that a reasonable officer would have
    known that failure to properly secure the scene would create an unnecessary risk of
    physical harm.
    {¶19} In assessing plaintiff’s injuries, Van Meter opined that Johnson showed a
    complete lack of concern that plaintiff had suffered a serious head injury as a result of
    the accident and treated him as if he were fully capable of understanding and following
    commands. Van Meter further opined that Johnson acted improperly when he grabbed
    and attempted to restrain plaintiff without thoroughly assessing his injuries, especially in
    light of the fact that plaintiff was clearly unresponsive to verbal commands. Van Meter
    testified that by grabbing plaintiff shortly after encountering him, he unnecessarily
    escalated the danger.
    {¶20} Van Meter further testified that Johnson acted recklessly when he struck
    plaintiff in the neck and head with his flashlight. According to Van Meter, striking an
    individual in the manner Johnson testified that he struck plaintiff carries a high risk of
    serious injury and even death.       Van Meter opined that Johnson therefore acted
    recklessly in striking plaintiff in such a manner and that nothing in his encounter with
    plaintiff supports Johnson’s decision to use such force.
    {¶21} Van Meter stated that Johnson continued to act recklessly in his pursuit of
    plaintiff as he wandered around the scene of the accident. Specifically, Van Meter
    testified that Johnson acted recklessly when he tried to subdue plaintiff by using his
    Taser in the “least effective” way and in his subsequent attempts to physically take
    plaintiff to the ground.
    {¶22} Van Meter was also critical of Johnson’s decision to issue the Signal 88.
    According to Van Meter, the Signal 88 is essentially an “officer in distress” call and that
    it is primarily used when an officer has been injured or is in serious danger. Van Meter
    opined that the situation at issue did not warrant the Signal 88 and that it would have
    been more appropriate to simply call for “backup.”         Van Meter further opined that
    Johnson was reckless in issuing such a call inasmuch as the officers who responded to
    it mistakenly assumed that plaintiff posed a serious danger to Johnson and to
    themselves.
    {¶23} In sum, Van Meter testified that, in his opinion, Johnson wantonly failed to
    exercise any care whatsoever in that: he failed to properly secure the accident scene
    upon his arrival; he failed to consider the severity and nature of plaintiff’s injuries when
    he first interacted with him and never sought help from bystanders or other first
    responders; and that he unnecessarily escalated the encounter by grabbing and holding
    on to plaintiff, and eventually striking him with his flashlight and employing his Taser
    improperly.
    {¶24} Major Kevin Teaford has been employed by defendant since 1988 and
    currently serves       as   the   commander of    defendant’s    critical information    and
    communications center.        In preparation for his testimony, Teaford reviewed case
    investigation forms, witness statements, the crash investigation report, reports
    generated as a result of administrative investigations of Johnson, and the “response to
    resistance review” investigation report regarding the incident. Teaford testified that the
    response to resistance review begins with an officer of higher rank than the officer
    involved in the case collecting evidence, taking photographs of the scene, and
    interviewing witnesses. When that officer completes the investigation, it is reviewed by
    the post commander, who determines if the actions of the officer involved were
    reasonable, if any rules were violated, and whether training issues need to be
    addressed with the officer involved in the incident. Thereafter, the district commander
    reviews the incident and performs a similar review. The investigation is then submitted
    to the administrative investigations unit for a third review. According to Teaford, if it is
    then determined that something out of the oridinary occurred, the incident is reviewed
    by a committee comprised of several members of defendant’s command staff, who
    conduct a similar review. If it is determined that the officer acted improperly, a further
    investigation would be carried out by either that officer’s supervisor or the administrative
    investigations unit.
    {¶25} Teaford testified that he reviewed all of the above documents and reports
    in forming an opinion as to Johnson’s actions during the incident. Teaford testified that,
    in his opinion, Johnson acted within the guidelines and policies of defendant and did not
    violate any rules or regulations in his dealings with plaintiff. He further opined that
    Johnson acted reasonably at all times on September 16, 2005.
    {¶26} Teaford testified that the responsibilities of the first officer arriving at the
    scene of an accident are to: assess the scene; secure the scene; attend to any injured
    person; protect the scene from further damage; and finally to collect evidence and take
    photographs of the scene. Teaford stated that he did not feel that Johnson violated any
    policy in his handling of the accident scene at issue, other than failing to activate the
    microphone for his “dash-cam” when he exited his vehicle.
    {¶27} With respect to Johnson’s use of his flashlight to strike plaintiff, Teaford
    testified that the use of a flashlight in such a manner as described by Johnson is
    categorized by defendant as “less than lethal” force. Teaford stated that in his opinion,
    Johnson did not violate any rule or regulation when he used his flashlight to strike
    plaintiff and that such a use was not unreasonable.
    {¶28} Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that
    Johnson did not act in a wanton or reckless manner at any time during the incident on
    September 16, 2005. The court concludes that Johnson’s actions do not rise to the
    level of wanton or reckless behavior and that such actions did not create an
    unnecessary risk of harm to plaintiff.    Accordingly, the court finds that Johnson is
    entitled to civil immunity for his actions on September 16, 2005.
    LIEUTENANT KOVERMAN
    {¶29} Lieutenant Kenneth Koverman testified that he began his training with
    defendant in 1978 and served as the commander of the Lima post from 2001 until his
    retirement in 2006. Koverman was Johnson’s direct superior. Plaintiff asserts that
    Koverman wantonly and recklessly disregarded Johnson’s history of and propensity for
    violence and failed to adequately discipline and supervise Johnson.
    {¶30} Koverman testified that in his capacity as Johnson’s supervisor it had been
    necessary to discipline him on occasion.      One such occasion involved an incident
    between Johnson and Sergeant Cosgrove. According to Koverman, both Johnson and
    Cosgrove were disciplined for being involved in a verbal confrontation in front of
    subordinates on January 24, 2004. Koverman stated that he investigated the incident
    and concluded that Johnson’s actions during the confrontation were unprofessional,
    unnecessary, and created a hostile work environment. Koverman further testified that
    immediately after the confrontation with Cosgrove, Johnson left the post in his patrol
    vehicle.   According to Koverman, while away from the post, Johnson arrested an
    individual on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. After the arrest,
    the individual filed a “citizen complaint” concerning his treatment by Johnson.
    Koverman investigated the allegations of the complaint and testified that as a result, he
    determined that Johnson used improper force and inappropriate language during the
    encounter. According to Koverman, as a result of these two incidents, Johnson was
    issued a three-day suspension with two days held in abeyance for two years pending
    good behavior. (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 19, 21.)
    {¶31} Koverman further testified that Johnson was issued a written reprimand as
    a result of a May 28, 2004 incident where Johnson provoked an individual into
    threatening him and then stunned the man with his Taser.              Koverman stated that
    Johnson was also directed to take classes on how to deal with difficult people.
    (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 20.)   Koverman also stated that in August 2005, he received an
    anonymous letter regarding Johnson’s job performance.                (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23.)
    According to Koverman, he forwarded the letter up the chain of command and an
    investigation was conducted. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 30.)
    {¶32} With regard to the incident with plaintiff, Koverman testified that on
    September 16, 2005, he was at home in bed when he received a call about the
    accident. According to Koverman, he arrived on the scene at approximately 2:45 a.m.,
    after plaintiff had been transported to the hospital, spoke with the sergeant in charge of
    the scene, and then went to the hospital.                Koverman prepared a “response to
    resistance” report regarding the incident because Johnson used his Taser and force
    when dealing with plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 31.)
    {¶33} Van Meter also testified on plaintiff’s behalf with regard to Koverman’s
    management and supervision of Johnson.              Van Meter opined that a reasonable
    supervisor with the knowledge of Johnson’s disciplinary problems as outlined above
    should know that such problems were going to result in harm to others if not corrected.
    Van Meter testified that Johnson was an employee with problems and that discipline
    had little or no effect on his behavior. Specifically, Van Meter stated that Johnson’s
    actions showed a lack of respect for Koverman and that Koverman failed to create an
    atmosphere at the post that would deter Johnson’s aggressive behavior.
    {¶34} Van Meter further opined that the proper supervisory action to take would
    have been to put Johnson under “direct supervision” and have him make regular reports
    as to his actions and how they promoted defendant’s mission. According to Van Meter,
    Koverman improperly deferred his disciplinary duties up the chain of command instead
    of being directly involved. Van Meter testified that Johnson’s disciplinary history should
    have signaled to Koverman that Johnson had violent tendencies and that those
    tendencies were going to result in harm if he were not more closely supervised. Van
    Meter concluded that by not managing Johnson’s propensity for abusing his authority as
    a trooper, Koverman recklessly created an unreasonable risk to members of the public.
    According to Van Meter, Koverman should have known that Johnson was going to take
    his aggression out on someone who challenged his authority.
    {¶35} Based upon the testimony and evidence provided, the court finds that
    plaintiff has failed to establish that Koverman acted in a wanton or reckless manner in
    his supervision and discipline of Johnson. The court is unpersuaded by Van Meter’s
    opinion that Koverman’s supervision of Johnson rose to the level of reckless or wanton
    conduct. Accordingly, the court finds that Koverman is entitled to civil immunity for his
    supervision of Johnson.
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    EUGENE WRINN, JR.,
    Plaintiff,                               Case No. 2006-05934
    v.                                       Judge Joseph T. Clark
    OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL,
    Defendant .                              JUDGMENT ENTRY
    {¶36} The court held an evidentiary hearing to determine civil immunity pursuant
    to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F). Upon hearing all the evidence and for the reasons set
    forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, the court finds that Daren Johnson and
    Kenneth Koverman are entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) and
    that the courts of common pleas do not have jurisdiction over any civil actions that may
    be filed against them based upon the allegations in this case.
    _____________________________________
    JOSEPH T. CLARK
    Judge
    cc:
    Cary R. Cooper                              Eric A. Walker
    Jacqueline M. Boney                         James P. Dinsmore
    Sarah K. Skow                               Assistant Attorneys General
    900 Adams Street                            150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor
    Toledo, Ohio 43604                          Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    Filed October 17, 2011
    To S.C. reporter November 18, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2006-05934

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 5963

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 10/17/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016