Pallone v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources , 2013 Ohio 3639 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Pallone v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 
    2013-Ohio-3639
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    ROMAN J. PALLONE
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-10505
    Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.
    Magistrate Anderson M. Renick
    DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence. The issues of liability and
    damages were bifurcated and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of liability.
    {¶ 2} In 2005, plaintiff began operating a business which was located on Buckeye
    Lake State Park and leased from a private landowner. He operated the property and
    building as a restaurant called “Smitty’s on the Lake” (Smitty’s). Smitty’s is surrounded
    by property owned by defendant, Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). On
    September 14, 2008, the remnants of Hurricane Ike traveled through Ohio. During the
    storm, a silver maple tree located on defendant’s property that was adjacent to Smitty’s,
    split in two, causing a branch with a seven-foot circumference to strike Smitty’s roof.
    Defendant removed the fallen tree on September 15, 2008. Plaintiff testified that as a
    result of the damage caused by the fallen tree, Smitty’s closed for six months, but
    plaintiff continued to lease Smitty’s through 2011.
    {¶ 3} Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in maintaining and inspecting
    the trees located adjacent to Smitty’s and that such negligence caused the tree to fall
    and damage the restaurant on September 14, 2008.
    Case No. 2010-10505                         -2-                                 DECISION
    {¶ 4} In order for plaintiff to prevail upon his claim of negligence, he must prove
    by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant owed him a duty, that defendant’s
    acts or omissions resulted in a breach of that duty, and that the breach proximately
    caused his injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 
    99 Ohio St.3d 79
    , 2003-Ohio-
    2573, ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 
    15 Ohio St.3d 75
    , 77 (1984).
    {¶ 5} “[W]here negligence revolves around the question of the existence of a
    hazard or defect, the legal principle prevails that notice, either actual or constructive, of
    such hazard or defect is a prerequisite to the duty of reasonable care.” Heckert v.
    Patrick, 
    15 Ohio St.3d 402
    , 405 (1984). Actual notice exists where, “from competent
    evidence, either direct or circumstantial, the trier of the facts is entitled to hold as a
    conclusion of fact and not as a presumption of law that the information was personally
    communicated to or received by the party * * *.” In re Estate of Fahle, 
    90 Ohio App. 195
    , 197 (1950). Constructive notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to
    give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice. 
    Id.
    {¶ 6} Plaintiff asserts that defendant had notice that the tree that damaged his
    restaurant was a potential hazard. On May 23, 2008, plaintiff notified Tim Waln, an
    ODNR employee at Buckeye Lake, that he was concerned about a tree located next to
    Smitty’s. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10.) On June 4, 2008, a contractor that had been hired by
    defendant removed the tree that plaintiff was concerned about. Plaintiff testified that
    between June 4, 2008 and September 14, 2008, he called Waln informing him that tree
    branches had fallen on Smitty’s and that there was another tree that should be
    removed. However, plaintiff testified that he did not remember when he made those
    calls and that he kept no record of such calls. Further, he admitted that he never made
    any written complaint to defendant about trees located near Smitty’s after June 4, 2008.
    {¶ 7} Plaintiff presented the testimony of Thomas Sydnor, Ph.D., a board-certified
    master arborist who has recently retired from The Ohio State University. According to
    Dr. Sydnor, in 2002 he was hired by DLZ Ohio, an environmental engineering group, to
    Case No. 2010-10505                         -3-                                DECISION
    inspect the trees located along the four-mile earthen dam at Buckeye Lake.               He
    explained that the state wanted to remove all the trees from the dam, but that private
    property owners who resided near the dam opposed the recommendation to remove the
    trees. Dr. Sydnor testified that he tagged and numbered all 318 trees located on the
    dam and he commented upon their condition. According to Dr. Sydnor, the focus of his
    inspection was to determine whether the integrity of the dam and its soil would be
    compromised during a “windfall.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.)
    {¶ 8} The silver maple that fell onto Smitty’s on September 14, 2008, was
    identified by Dr. Sydnor as tree number 178 and he noted in his 2002 report that the
    tree had decay in the crown, a “hanger,” and was in “fair” or “average” condition.
    (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.) Dr. Sydnor testified that his notes did not pertain to the focus of
    the study, which was the integrity of the earthen dam. Dr. Sydnor opined that the decay
    in tree number 178 was sufficient to cause concern, but he explained that most mature
    trees have some decay. While Dr. Sydnor identified other trees that posed a potential
    hazard to adjacent buildings, no such notation was made regarding tree number 178,
    and he did not recommend removing tree number 178.
    {¶ 9} Dr. Sydnor testified that his examination of a photograph of tree number
    178 showed that the silver maple had a codominate lead, meaning that the tree had two
    main stems of almost equal size. He explained that a tree with a codominate lead
    becomes more unstable as the stems grow such that less live wood connects the two
    stems. Dr. Sydnor testified that on September 14, 2008, the highest recorded wind
    speed at Heath airport, located 10 miles away from Buckeye Lake, was 34 miles per
    hour. He explained that a healthy tree is not expected to fall in winds under 50 miles
    per hour. Dr. Sydnor stated that tree number 178 fell because there was less “holding
    wood” in the tree due to the codominate lead.
    {¶ 10} Bob Cumbow, an employee of ODNR, testified on behalf of defendant.
    Cumbow testified that he has been employed by defendant for 31 years and that he
    currently works in ODNR’s Division of Parks and Recreation. Cumbow began working
    Case No. 2010-10505                        -4-                                 DECISION
    for ODNR as a seasonal laborer at Buckeye Lake State Park; he eventually became the
    Assistant Park Manager at Buckeye Lake; he has held several other jobs with ODNR;
    and, in 2005, he began working in ODNR’s central office as Natural Resources
    Administrator III.
    {¶ 11} Cumbow explained that the          earthen dam at Buckeye           Lake    is
    approximately four miles long. Cumbow testified that portions of the dam have been
    sold to private landowners who have built structures along the dam; however, ODNR
    continued to maintain the dam. According to Cumbow, from the time he was a seasonal
    laborer at Buckeye Lake, the trees on the dam have been a controversial issue between
    ODNR and the private landowners who live near the dam. Cumbow explained that
    ODNR engineers did not want trees to be growing on the dam, but that property owners
    wanted the trees to remain on the dam. Furthermore, the 2002 study completed by Dr.
    Sydnor was conducted to address the concern of maintaining trees on the dam.
    Cumbow testified that defendant’s division of engineering initiated the survey to
    determine the condition of the trees on the Buckeye Lake dam.
    {¶ 12} Cumbow explained that ODNR has three methods to inspect and maintain
    trees at Buckeye Lake: (1) law enforcement officers observe the dam each morning
    during the boating season and visually inspect the trees from a boat; (2) residents living
    along the dam contact the park office; and (3) Buckeye Lake’s maintenance staff
    perform their normal maintenance duties and make visual inspections of trees.
    {¶ 13} To the extent that plaintiff argues that defendant should be liable for its
    decision to allow trees to grow on the earthen dam, it is well established that “[t]he state
    cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or
    planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized
    by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Reynolds v. State,
    
    14 Ohio St.3d 68
    , 70 (1984).
    Case No. 2010-10505                        -5-                                DECISION
    {¶ 14} As evidenced by Cumbow’s testimony, several ODNR officials were
    involved in the decision-making process to maintain the integrity of the earthen dam.
    Further, Cumbow testified that ODNR balanced the potential risk that the trees posed
    against the desire of the property owners to keep the trees on the dam. Steve Manilla,
    ODNR’s Chief Engineer, wrote an e-mail on May 9, 2002, evidencing that defendant’s
    decision to allow the trees to remain on the dam involved engineering judgment.
    (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7.) The court finds that such decisions regarding the integrity of the
    dam involved a high degree of official judgment or discretion. Accordingly, defendant is
    entitled to discretionary immunity for such decisions.
    {¶ 15} Turning to plaintiff’s allegations that defendant was negligent in
    maintaining and inspecting tree number 178, as stated above, plaintiff wrote a letter to
    Tim Waln in May 2008 regarding a tree on ODNR property that concerned him and the
    tree was removed by a contractor hired by ODNR shortly thereafter. Plaintiff argues
    that ODNR did not properly notify its contractor as to which tree was to be removed.
    Although plaintiff argues that ODNR removed the wrong tree on June 4, 2008, plaintiff’s
    May 23, 2008 letter does not name the specific tree that concerned him, and there is no
    credible evidence that he informed ODNR that the wrong tree had been removed.
    Furthermore, plaintiff was unable to recall when he contacted ODNR or to whom he
    spoke. The court finds that plaintiff’s testimony that he contacted ODNR after June 4,
    2008 to inform defendant of his concern with tree number 178 is not credible.
    {¶ 16} Furthermore, while ODNR may have had notice of some decay in tree
    number 178 based on Dr. Sydnor’s 2002 report, plaintiff presented insufficient evidence
    to prove that defendant had actual or constructive notice of a hazardous condition in the
    tree. As Dr. Sydnor explained, most mature trees contain decay. Dr. Sydnor also
    testified that he did not know what ODNR did to maintain tree number 178. Dr. Sydnor
    acknowledged that he did not inspect the tree after it fell in 2008 and that he looked only
    at photographs provided by plaintiff.
    Case No. 2010-10505                          -6-                                  DECISION
    {¶ 17} Additionally, Cumbow testified as to the three methods used to inspect
    trees at Buckeye Lake. Cumbow further explained that inspections done from boats on
    the lake would be looking for “obvious” problems with trees, such as downed limbs.
    Cumbow testified that ODNR employees would be able to see a codominate lead on a
    tree but that decay located in the crown of the tree would not be visible from the boat.
    According to Cumbow, maintenance staff at Buckeye Lake was trained to look for rot,
    downed limbs, and a lack of foliage when inspecting trees. Furthermore, tree number
    178 was documented in 2002 as being in “average” condition and photographs of the
    tree show that on September 14, 2008, it maintained significant foliage, a characteristic
    of healthy trees. The court finds that there is insufficient evidence to show that ODNR
    had notice that tree number 178 was a hazardous condition prior to September 14,
    2008.
    {¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by
    a preponderance of the evidence that defendant breached any duty inasmuch as
    defendant did not have notice that tree number 178 was a hazard.
    {¶ 19} Moreover, defendant has asserted the defense of “Act of God.” “The term
    ‘Act of God’ in its legal significance, means any irresistible disaster, the result of natural
    causes, such as earthquakes, violent storms, lightning and unprecedented floods. It is
    such a disaster arising from such causes, and which could not have been reasonably
    anticipated, guarded against or resisted. It must be due directly and exclusively to such
    a natural cause without human intervention. It must proceed from the violence of nature
    of the force of the elements alone, and with which the agency of man had nothing to
    do.” Piqua v. Morris, 
    98 Ohio St. 42
    , 47-48 (1918).
    {¶ 20} Both at trial and in his post-trial brief, plaintiff acknowledged that an Act of
    God was involved in this incident, but he argues that defendant’s negligence directly
    contributed to his damage. “‘[I]f the negligence of the defendant concurs with the other
    cause of the injury, in point of time and place, or otherwise so directly contributed to the
    Case No. 2010-10505                        -7-                                   DECISION
    plaintiff’s damage that it is reasonably certain that the other cause alone would not have
    sufficed to produce it, the defendant is liable, notwithstanding he may not have
    anticipated or been bound to anticipate the interference of the superior force which,
    concurring with his own negligence, produced the damage.’” Bier v. New Philadelphia,
    
    11 Ohio St.3d 134
    , 136 (1984), quoting Piqua, supra, at 49.
    {¶ 21} Plaintiff cites Vondrell v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ct. of Cl. No.
    2007-O3358-AD, 
    2007-Ohio-7232
    , in support of his assertion that defendant’s
    negligence contributed to his damage. However, the circumstances at issue in Vondrell
    are not analogous to this situation inasmuch as the tree in Vondrell was dead for nearly
    five years before it caused damage and that defendant knew or should have known that
    the tree was dead and constituted a hazardous condition.          Id. at ¶ 11.    Here, the
    evidence shows that defendant did not have notice that tree number 178 was a
    hazardous condition.
    {¶ 22} While plaintiff described the remnants of Hurricane Ike as “any other
    storm,” Cumbow, who lived only two miles from Buckeye Lake, recalled that the storm
    produced unusually high winds and that several trees on his property fell during the
    storm. The evidence shows that wind speeds during the storm ranged from 34 miles
    per hour at Heath airport to nearly 75 miles per hour in Columbus, Ohio. Further, Dr.
    Sydnor testified that he recalled high winds around Ohio during the storm.             The
    evidence showed that the September 14, 2008 storm was so unusual and powerful that
    the damage to the codominate limbs was attributable to the storm alone, rather than any
    negligence by defendant. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s claim is barred as
    an Act of God.
    {¶ 23} Finally, to the extent that plaintiff claims that defendant is liable for
    improperly inspecting and evaluating the trees at Buckeye Lake, defendant is immune
    under the public duty doctrine.
    {¶ 24} R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) states, “Except as provided in division (A)(3)(b) of
    this section, the state is immune from liability in any civil action or proceeding involving
    Case No. 2010-10505                         -8-                                 DECISION
    the performance or nonperformance of a public duty, including the performance or
    nonperformance of a public duty that is owed by the state in relation to any action of an
    individual who is committed to the custody of the state.”
    {¶ 25} R.C. 2743.01(E)(1) states: “‘Public duty’ includes, but is not limited to, any
    statutory, regulatory, or assumed duty concerning any action or omission of the state
    involving any of the following:
    {¶ 26} “(a) Permitting, certifying, licensing, inspecting, investigating, supervising,
    regulating, auditing, monitoring, law enforcement, or emergency response activity * * *.”
    {¶ 27} In order for a special relationship to exist between the state and an injured
    party, pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(b), all of the following must exist:
    {¶ 28} “(i) An assumption by the state, by means of promises or actions, of an
    affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was allegedly injured;
    {¶ 29} “(ii) Knowledge on the part of the state’s agents that inaction of the state
    could lead to harm;
    {¶ 30} “(iii) Some form of direct contact between the state’s agents and the
    injured party;
    {¶ 31} “(iv) The injured party’s justifiable reliance on the state’s affirmative
    undertaking.”
    {¶ 32} Plaintiff failed to prove that a special relationship existed between him and
    defendant. Indeed, Cumbow testified that defendant’s duties with regard to both the
    tree management and tree inspection were duties performed on behalf of the general
    public. Although defendant’s employees both communicated with plaintiff concerning
    various land use issues and responded to plaintiff’s concerns regarding trees that were
    adjacent to his property, the court finds that none of these interactions established a
    special relationship between plaintiff and defendant.
    Case No. 2010-10505                          -9-                                DECISION
    {¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove
    his claim for negligence. Accordingly, it is recommended that judgment be rendered in
    favor of defendant.
    {¶ 34} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14
    days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision
    during that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files
    objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first
    objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of
    any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
    finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely
    and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the
    filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
    _____________________________________
    ANDERSON M. RENICK
    Magistrate
    cc:
    James P. Dinsmore                              Roman J. Pallone
    Assistant Attorney General                     1284 Primrose Place
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor                Columbus, Ohio 43212
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    007
    Filed January 30, 2013
    To S.C. Reporter August 22, 2013
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-10505

Citation Numbers: 2013 Ohio 3639

Judges: Renick

Filed Date: 1/30/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014