Ayers v. Warren Corr. Inst. ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Ayers v. Warren Corr. Inst., 
    2011-Ohio-5959
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JAMES AYERS,                                              Case No. 2011-01020
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                                 Judge Joseph T. Clark
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    WARREN CORRECTIONAL
    INSTITUTION, et al.,
    Defendants.                                        DECISION
    {¶1} On July 21, 2011, defendant1 filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant
    to Civ.R. 56(B). On August 8, 2011, plaintiff filed a response. The motion is now before
    the court on a non-oral hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D).
    {¶2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
    {¶3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
    evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
    stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
    the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
    minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
    against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to
    have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also
    Gilbert v. Summit County, 
    104 Ohio St.3d 660
    , 
    2004-Ohio-7108
    , citing Temple v. Wean
    United, Inc. (1977), 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
    .
    1
    For purposes of this decision, “defendant” refers to both Warren Correctional Institution and Department
    of Rehabilitation and Correction. Accordingly, defendant’s September 20, 2011 motion is DENIED as
    moot.
    Case No. 2011-01020                          -2-                                  DECISION
    {¶4} At all times relevant, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of
    defendant pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.            Plaintiff alleges that in December 2010,
    Corrections Major D. Luneke authored a conduct report charging him with rules
    violations for stealing and then hiding a set of institutional keys. Plaintiff was cleared of
    the charges on appeal. Plaintiff asserts that the report authored by Luneke constitutes
    defamation, that Luneke’s actions amount to “harassment,” and that defendant was
    negligent in its supervision of Luneke.
    {¶5} In support of the motion, defendant filed the affidavit of Luneke, who states:
    {¶6} “1.   I am employed by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
    Correction (DRC) as a Corrections Major at Warren Correctional Institution (WCI). I
    was a Corrections Major during all the times mentioned herein.              I have personal
    knowledge of the matters herein referred to, and make this affidavit in support of
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
    {¶7} “2.   On December 2, 2010, I learned that a staff member lost a set of DRC
    keys in the building.
    {¶8} “3.   On December 3, 2010, I received information in a Kite submitted
    anonymously by another inmate that [plaintiff] had taken the keys and hid them behind
    the shower panel in the shower next to [his] cell. A true and accurate copy of the Kite is
    attached as Exhibit A. It is regular practice for inmates to write Kites * * *.
    {¶9} “4.   With the assistance of maintenance personnel, we removed the
    shower panel and found the keys hanging from a string behind the panel.
    {¶10} “* * *
    {¶11} “6. Because the author of the Kite correctly reported the location of the
    keys, I believed the confidential informant also correctly identified the person who took
    the keys.
    Case No. 2011-01020                        -3-                                DECISION
    {¶12} “7. On December 10, 2010, I wrote a Conduct Report concerning
    [plaintiff’s] actions on December 2-3, 2010. A true and accurate copy of the Conduct
    Report is attached as Exhibit B * * *.
    {¶13} “8. I wrote the conduct report in good faith.
    {¶14} “9. I honestly believed, at the time I wrote the Conduct Report, [plaintiff]
    had taken the keys and hid them in the shower. I did not believe my statements in the
    Conduct Report were false nor did I have any serious doubts as to their truth.
    {¶15} “10. My purpose of writing the Conduct Report was to report a possible
    violation of prison rules.”
    {¶16} “Defamation is defined as ‘the unprivileged publication of a false and
    defamatory matter about another * * * which tends to cause injury to a person’s
    reputation or exposes him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace * * *.’
    McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis deSales (1992), 
    80 Ohio App.3d 345
    , 353. As
    suggested by the definition, a publication of statements, even where they may be false
    and defamatory, does not rise to the level of actionable defamation unless the
    publication is also unprivileged. Thus, the threshold issue in such cases is whether the
    statements at issue were privileged or unprivileged publications.” Sullivan v. Ohio Dept.
    of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2003-02161, 
    2005-Ohio-2122
    , ¶8.
    {¶17} Privileged statements are those that are “made in good faith on any subject
    matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
    has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty on a
    privileged occasion and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the
    occasion and duty, right or interest. The essential elements thereof are good faith, an
    interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion,
    and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.” Hahn v. Kotten (1975),
    
    43 Ohio St.2d 237
    , 244, quoting 50 American Jurisprudence 2d 698, Libel and Slander,
    Section 195.
    Case No. 2011-01020                          -4-                                 DECISION
    {¶18} Furthermore, a qualified privilege can be defeated only by clear and
    convincing evidence of actual malice. Bartlett v. Daniel Drake Mem. Hosp. (1991), 
    75 Ohio App.3d 334
    , 340. “Actual malice” is “acting with knowledge that the statements
    are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.” Jacobs v. Frank
    (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d. 111, 116.
    {¶19} Based upon the undisputed affidavit testimony provided by defendant, the
    only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that Luneke acted without
    malice and that the statements he made in the conduct report he authored were made
    in good faith. Thus, defendant is protected from liability for defamation by a qualified
    privilege.
    {¶20} With respect to plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim, in order for plaintiff to
    prevail on such a claim he must prove: 1) the existence of an employment relationship;
    2) the employee’s incompetence; 3) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge
    of such incompetence; 4) the employee’s act or omission causing plaintiff’s injuries and
    5) the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining the employee as the proximate
    cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Evans v. Ohio State Univ. (1996), 
    112 Ohio App.3d 724
    ,
    739.
    {¶21} Based upon Luneke’s affidavit, and the fact that plaintiff has not provided
    the court with any evidence to the contrary, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn
    from the evidence is that Luneke was not “incompetent,” and, that defendant is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim.
    {¶22} The court construes plaintiff’s claim for “harassment” as a claim for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order to sustain such a claim, plaintiff must
    show that: “(1) defendant intended to cause emotional distress, or knew or should have
    known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress; (2) defendant’s
    conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)            defendant’s actions proximately caused
    plaintiff’s psychic injury; and (4) the mental anguish plaintiff suffered was serious.”
    Case No. 2011-01020                           -5-                                  DECISION
    Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (1991), 
    78 Ohio App.3d 73
    , 82, citing Pyle v. Pyle
    (1983), 
    11 Ohio App.3d 31
    , 34.
    {¶23} To constitute conduct sufficient to give rise to a claim of intentional infliction
    of emotional distress, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme
    in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
    atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Yeager v. Local Union 20,
    Teamsters (1983), 
    6 Ohio St.3d 369
    , 375, quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts
    (1965) 73, Section 46, Comment d.
    {¶24} “It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which
    is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even
    that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which
    would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. * * * Generally, the case
    is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
    arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ The
    liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
    oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. at 374-375.
    {¶25} Based upon the evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could find the alleged
    conduct either extreme or outrageous. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law as to plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    {¶26} Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that no questions of fact exist for
    trial and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.               Accordingly,
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted and judgment shall be
    rendered in favor of defendant.
    Case No. 2011-01020                        -6-                                    DECISION
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    JAMES AYERS,                                     Case No. 2011-01020
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                         Judge Joseph T. Clark
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    WARREN CORRECTIONAL
    INSTITUTION, et al.,
    Defendants.                                JUDGMENT ENTRY
    {¶27} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment.       For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently
    herewith, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is
    rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk
    shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
    _____________________________________
    JOSEPH T. CLARK
    Judge
    cc:
    Case No. 2011-01020                  -7-                              DECISION
    Jeanna R. Volp                        James Ayers, #625-838
    Jennifer A. Adair                     Ross Correctional Institution
    Assistant Attorneys General           P.O. Box 7010
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor       Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    Filed September 27, 2011
    To S.C. reporter November 18, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-01020

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 9/27/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014