Socha v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Socha v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 
    2011-Ohio-2619
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    MICHAEL P. SOCHA
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2009-06621
    Judge Joseph T. Clark
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    {¶ 1} This case is sua sponte assigned to Judge Joseph T. Clark to conduct all
    proceedings necessary for decision in this matter.
    {¶ 2} On October 12, 2010, the magistrate issued a decision recommending
    judgment for plaintiff.
    {¶ 3} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) states, in part: “A party may file written objections to a
    magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the
    court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R.
    53(D)(4)(e)(i).”     On November 29, 2010, with leave of court, defendant filed its
    objections and a transcript of the trial. On December 29, 2010, with leave of court,
    plaintiff filed a response.
    {¶ 4} At all times relevant, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of
    defendant at Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI) pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.                  On
    September 14, 2007, plaintiff sat on a backless bench in the Ohio Penal Industries
    building at TCI while waiting to get his legal mail. Corrections Captain Douglas Miller
    entered the building riding a bicycle. He rested the bicycle, with its kickstand in use,
    behind the bench where plaintiff was sitting. A few seconds after Miller entered the mail
    Case No. 2009-06621                         -2-                       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    room, inmate Scott Payne, sitting on a bench near plaintiff, exclaimed to plaintiff that the
    bicycle was falling.   Plaintiff quickly turned his head, and when he saw the bicycle
    falling, he pivoted and jumped to get out of the way. As he pivoted, he felt a tear in his
    groin. The magistrate found that defendant’s employee breached a duty of care and
    was negligent when he placed the bicycle immediately behind the bench where plaintiff
    sat.
    {¶ 5} In reviewing defendant’s objections, “the court must conduct an
    independent analysis of the underlying issues, undertaking the equivalent of a de novo
    determination and independently assessing the facts and conclusions contained in the
    magistrate’s decision.” Shihab & Assoc. Co., LPA v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    168 Ohio App.3d 405
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4456
    , ¶13.
    {¶ 6} In its first objection, defendant asserts that Miller did not breach a duty
    owed to plaintiff. Miller testified that he rode the bicycle into the mail room; parked it
    behind a bench where inmates sat; and secured the kickstand. Miller admitted that it is
    common knowledge that a kickstand may not hold thereby causing a bicycle to fall over.
    The magistrate determined that Miller breached his duty when he parked the bicycle
    behind plaintiff despite his admitted knowledge that a bicycle can fall over even if a
    kickstand is used.     Upon review of the transcript of the trial and the magistrate’s
    decision, the court finds that the magistrate did not err in concluding that Miller
    breached his duty to plaintiff. Defendant next asserts that Miller’s decision involved a
    high degree of official judgment and discretion. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held
    that “[t]he language in R.C. 2743.02 that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its liability determined * *
    * in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * *
    *’ means that the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the
    exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy
    decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or
    discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984), 
    14 Ohio St.3d 68
    , 70; Von Hoene v. State (1985),
    
    20 Ohio App.3d 363
    , 364. Prison administrators are provided “wide-ranging deference
    Case No. 2009-06621                            -3-                        JUDGMENT ENTRY
    in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
    to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v.
    Wolfish (1979), 
    441 U.S. 520
    , 547. The court finds that Miller’s decision to park the
    bicycle behind the bench where plaintiff was sitting is not characterized by a high
    degree of official judgment or discretion and that defendant is not entitled to
    discretionary immunity from suits arising out of such decisions. Therefore, upon review
    of the trial transcript, the court finds that the magistrate properly determined that Miller
    breached his duty of care when he parked his bicycle behind plaintiff. Defendant’s first
    objection shall be overruled.
    {¶ 7} In its second objection, defendant contends that plaintiff failed to prove
    that the falling bicycle was the proximate cause of his injury. Plaintiff testified that as he
    jumped to avoid the falling bicycle, he “yelled ow, and [he] felt something tear in [his]
    groin area.” (Transcript, Page 14, Lines 14-15.) Further, the magistrate found that
    plaintiff felt a “pop” in his groin as he pivoted to avoid the falling bicycle.
    {¶ 8} In Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 
    153 Ohio St. 31
    , 39, the court
    stated: “Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence
    and injury depends upon whether that intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by
    the one who was guilty of the negligence. If an injury is the natural and probable
    consequence of a negligent act and it is such as should have been foreseen in the light
    of all the attending circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result of the
    negligence. It is not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular
    injury. It is sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone.”
    {¶ 9} Upon review of the trial transcript, the court finds that it was reasonably
    foreseeable, under the circumstances, that plaintiff might injure himself in his effort to
    avoid the danger created by the falling bicycle. Accordingly, the magistrate properly
    determined that plaintiff proved that the falling bicycle was the proximate cause of his
    injury. Defendant’s second objection shall be overruled.
    {¶ 10} Upon review of the record, the magistrate’s decision and the objections,
    the court finds that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and
    Case No. 2009-06621                        -4-                     JUDGMENT ENTRY
    appropriately applied the law. Therefore, the objections are OVERRULED and the court
    adopts the magistrate’s decision and recommendation as its own, including findings of
    fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff.
    The case will be set for trial on the issue of damages.
    _____________________________________
    JOSEPH T. CLARK
    Judge
    cc:
    Emily M. Simmons                             Richard F. Swope
    Assistant Attorney General                   6480 East Main Street, Suite 102
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor              Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    LP/JSO/cmd
    Filed May 5, 2011
    To S.C. reporter May 26, 2011
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2009-06621

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 5/5/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014