Franklin v. Dept. of Transp. , 2011 Ohio 1113 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Franklin v. Dept. of Transp., 
    2011-Ohio-1113
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    CAROLYN FRANKLIN
    Plaintiff
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-08811-AD
    Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff, Carolyn Franklin, filed this action against defendant, Department
    of Transportation (ODOT), contending her car was damaged as a proximate cause of
    negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a bridge spanning Northfield Road
    (State Route 8) in Cuyahoga County. In her complaint, plaintiff provided a description of
    her damage incident noting: “I was driving Southbound on Northfield Road when a
    piece of the bridge fell on the hood of my car it was a concrete piece of rock.”
    According to plaintiff, the falling debris damaged both the hood and windshield of her
    car. Plaintiff related, “I was able to get it (the damage-causing debris) because it stay
    on the windshield” of her vehicle. Plaintiff did not provide any demonstrative evidence
    depicting the damage-causing debris. Plaintiff recalled her described incident occurred
    on June 4, 2010 at approximately 8:45 p.m. Plaintiff requested damages in the amount
    of $937.54, the stated cost of repairing her automobile. No repair estimates were filed
    with the complaint. The filing fee was paid.
    {¶ 2} Defendant conducted an investigation and determined the described
    damage incident occurred “between mileposts 5.18 to 5.00 on SR 8 in Cuyahoga
    County. Defendant contended, “ODOT denied receiving any prior calls or complaints
    regarding debris falling from any bridge spanning State Route 8.”            Furthermore,
    defendant related, “there is no evidence the debris actually came from the bridge.”
    Plaintiff, in her complaint, wrote “a piece of the bridge fell on the hood of my car.”
    Conversely, defendant contended “the evidence suggests the damage (to plaintiff’s car)
    was not caused by debris from the bridge.” Defendant asserted, “[p]laintiff does not
    identify the debris that fell onto her hood when she passed under the bridges on SR 8
    before I-480.” In her complaint, plaintiff noted, “a concrete piece of rock” from the
    bridge structure fell and struck the hood of her vehicle.       Defendant explained two
    bridges spanning State Route 8 at milepost 5.08 and 5.06 were inspected on March 3,
    2009; some fifteen months prior to the incident forming the basis of this claim.
    Defendant advised the submitted inspection reports “mention a very small percentage of
    declamations.” The submitted inspection reports in fact mention “minor declamations”
    on the bridges as well as “cracks,” “spalls,” and “debris” on both bridges. Defendant
    denied the falling piece of concrete that damaged plaintiff’s car emanated from any
    bridge spanning State Route 8.
    {¶ 3} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, she must prove, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed her a duty, that it breached that
    duty, and that the breach proximately caused her injuries.        Armstrong v. Best Buy
    Company, Inc., 
    99 Ohio St. 3d 79
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2573
    ,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding
    Products, Inc. (1984), 
    15 Ohio St. 3d 75
    , 77, 15 OBR 179, 
    472 N.E. 2d 707
    . Plaintiff
    has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered a loss
    and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio
    State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the
    burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for
    sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice
    among different possibilities as to an issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.”
    Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 
    145 Ohio St. 198
    , 
    30 O.O. 415
    , 
    61 N.E. 2d 198
    , approved and followed.             The court, as trier of fact,
    determines questions of proximate causation. Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984), 
    14 Ohio St. 3d 51
    , 14 OBR 446, 
    471 N.E. 2d 477
    .
    {¶ 4} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe
    condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976),
    
    49 Ohio App. 2d 335
    , 3 O.O. 3d 413, 
    361 N.E. 2d 486
    . However, defendant is not an
    insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996),
    
    112 Ohio App. 3d 189
    , 
    678 N.E. 2d 273
    ; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 
    67 Ohio App. 3d 723
    , 
    588 N.E. 2d 864
    .
    {¶ 5} In order to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff
    must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or
    constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the
    accident.   McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 
    34 Ohio App. 3d 247
    , 
    517 N.E. 2d 1388
    .
    Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice, but fails to
    reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 
    31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1
    , 31 OBR
    64, 
    507 N.E. 2d 1179
    .     The trier of fact is precluded from making an inference of
    defendant’s constructive notice, unless evidence is presented in respect to the time the
    defective condition developed. Spires v. Ohio Highway Department (1988), 
    61 Ohio Misc. 2d 262
    , 
    577 N.E. 2d 458
    . However, proof of notice of a dangerous condition is
    not necessary when defendant’s own personnel passively or actively caused such
    condition. See Bello v. City of Cleveland (1922), 
    106 Ohio St. 94
    , 
    138 N.E. 526
    , at
    paragraph one of the syllabus; Sexton v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1996), 94-
    13861.
    {¶ 6} Ordinarily, in a claim involving roadway defects, plaintiff must prove that
    either: 1) defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defective condition and
    failed to respond in a reasonable time or responded in a negligent manner, or 2) that
    defendant, in a general sense, maintains its highways negligently. Denis v. Department
    of Transportation (1976), 75-0287-AD.     The evidence points to the conclusion that
    plaintiff’s damage was proximately caused by negligent bridge maintenance.
    {¶ 7} This court has previously held ODOT liable for property damage resulting
    from falling debris. Elsey v. Dept. of Transportation (1989), 89-05775-AD; Alfson .v.
    Ohio Dept. of Transp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2010-03274-AD, 
    2010-Ohio-5220
    . Plaintiff has
    proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she sustained property damage as a
    result of defendant’s negligence regarding bridge maintenance.       Brickner v. ODOT
    (1999), 99-10828-AD; Rini v. ODOT (1997), 97-05649-AD; McTear v. Dept. of Transp.,
    Dist. 12, Ct. of Cl. No. 2008-09139-AD, 
    2008-Ohio-7118
    .
    {¶ 8} The credibility of witnesses and the weight attributable to their testimony
    are primarily matters for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 
    10 Ohio St. 2d 230
    ,
    39 O.O. 2d 366, 
    227 N.E. 2d 212
    , paragraph one of the syllabus. The court is free to
    believe or disbelieve, all or any part of each witness’s testimony. State v. Antill (1964),
    
    176 Ohio St. 61
    , 26 O.O. 2d 366, 
    197 N.E. 2d 548
    . In the instant action, the trier of fact
    finds that the statements of plaintiff concerning the origin of the damage-causing debris
    are persuasive. Alfson. Consequently, defendant is liable to plaintiff for the damage
    claimed, $937.54, plus the $25.00 filing fee which may be reimbursed as compensable
    costs pursuant to R.C. 2335.19. See Bailey v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
    Correction (1990), 
    62 Ohio Misc. 2d 19
    , 
    587 N.E. 2d 990
    .
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    CAROLYN FRANKLIN
    Plaintiff
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2010-08811-AD
    Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert
    ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
    DETERMINATION
    Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth
    in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor
    of plaintiff in the amount of $962.54, which includes the filing fee. Court costs are
    assessed against defendant.
    DANIEL R. BORCHERT
    Deputy Clerk
    Entry cc:
    Carolyn Franklin                       Jolene M. Molitoris, Director
    4509 Longleaf                          Department of Transportation
    Warrensville Hts., Ohio 44128          1980 West Broad Street
    Columbus, Ohio 43223
    RDK/laa
    12/15
    Filed 1/7/11
    Sent to S.C. reporter 3/4/11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-08811-AD

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 1113

Judges: Borchert

Filed Date: 1/7/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016