Garrett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 2010 Ohio 851 ( 2010 )


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  • [Cite as Garrett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 
    2010-Ohio-851
    .]
    Court of Claims of Ohio
    The Ohio Judicial Center
    65 South Front Street, Third Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
    www.cco.state.oh.us
    RODERICK GARRETT
    Plaintiff
    v.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
    Defendant
    Case No. 2009-04858
    Judge Joseph T. Clark
    Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo
    MAGISTRATE DECISION
    {¶ 1} On January 19, 2010, an evidentiary hearing was conducted in this matter
    to determine whether Henry Berlin is entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C.
    2743.02(F) and 9.86.
    {¶ 2} R.C. 2743.02(F) states, in part:
    {¶ 3} “A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36
    of the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was
    manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official
    responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad
    faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court
    of claims, which has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the
    officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised
    Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.”
    {¶ 4} R.C. 9.86 states, in part:
    Case No. 2009-04858                         -2-                 MAGISTRATE DECISION
    {¶ 5} “[N]o officer or employee [of the state] shall be liable in any civil action that
    arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his
    duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of
    his employment or official responsibilities or unless the officer or employee acted with
    malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
    {¶ 6} R.C. 109.36 provides, in part:
    {¶ 7} “(A) (1) ‘Officer or employee’ means any of the following:
    {¶ 8} “* * *
    {¶ 9} “(b) A person that, at the time a cause of action against the person,
    partnership, or corporation arises, is rendering medical, nursing, dental, podiatric,
    optometric, physical therapeutic, psychiatric, or psychological services pursuant to a
    personal services contract or purchased service contract with a department, agency, or
    institution of the state.”
    {¶ 10} At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Berlin was, at all times relevant,
    an employee of Wise Medical Staffing, a corporation under contract with defendant to
    provide nursing services to the Corrections Medical Center (CMC), and that Berlin thus
    met the definition of “employee” as set forth in R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(b). The court agrees
    and finds that Berlin was therefore an “employee” for the purposes of R.C. 2743.02(F)
    and 9.86.
    {¶ 11} At all times relevant, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of
    defendant pursuant to R.C. 5120.16. Plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2008, he was
    at CMC awaiting transport to The Ohio State University Medical Center for surgery on
    his left knee when Berlin sexually assaulted him. Plaintiff contends that Berlin was
    acting within the course and scope of his employment when the assault took place and
    that Berlin is therefore entitled to civil immunity. Defendant argues that Berlin was
    acting manifestly outside the course and scope of his employment and is therefore not
    entitled to civil immunity.
    Case No. 2009-04858                          -3-                  MAGISTRATE DECISION
    {¶ 12} Plaintiff testified that he had been transported to CMC from the Ross
    Correctional Institution (RCI) prior to October 7, 2008, and that his surgery was
    scheduled for October 8, 2008. Plaintiff stated that he was placed in a room at CMC
    with four beds and that there were two other inmates in the room with him. According to
    plaintiff, on the day in question, Berlin entered the room alone while the other inmates
    were asleep and told plaintiff that he was there to “check his vitals.” Plaintiff testified
    that nurses usually came to the room in groups of two or three and there was always a
    corrections officer with them who stood near the door. According to plaintiff, the events
    then unfolded as follows: Berlin lifted plaintiff’s shirt up and used a stethoscope to listen
    to his heart and lungs; Berlin then lifted the waistband of plaintiff’s, pants stuck the
    stethoscope down the front, and rubbed plaintiff’s penis with his left hand; Berlin then
    moved to plaintiff’s right leg and rolled up the leg of plaintiff’s pants to examine plaintiff’s
    right knee; plaintiff informed Berlin that his surgery was going to be on his left knee, not
    his right and Berlin replied that he needed to examine both; Berlin then stuck his left
    hand up the leg of plaintiff’s pants and rubbed plaintiff’s testicles twice; Berlin then
    moved to plaintiff’s left side and repeated the knee examination and then stuck his right
    hand up plaintiff’s pant leg and again rubbed plaintiff’s testicles twice; Berlin then
    rubbed plaintiff’s penis with his right hand and walked away making notes; Berlin then
    stood at the door and briefly stared at plaintiff before leaving the area.
    {¶ 13} Plaintiff stated that during the alleged incident he said nothing to Berlin
    other than to voice his concerns over which knee Berlin examined. Plaintiff further
    stated that he did not tell anyone at CMC about what happened for fear of reprisals from
    Berlin or other nurses, and for fear that his surgery would be postponed. According to
    plaintiff, he had never seen Berlin prior to this incident and did not see him thereafter.
    When plaintiff returned to RCI he voiced his concerns over the incident and submitted a
    statement to Corrections Captain Price on October 13, 2008. (Defendant’s Exhibit A.)
    Plaintiff also gave a statement to the Ohio State Highway Patrol on February 9, 2009.
    (Defendant’s Exhibit B.) These narrative accounts are nearly identical to the testimony
    Case No. 2009-04858                          -4-               MAGISTRATE DECISION
    plaintiff presented at the hearing.     No evidence or testimony was presented at the
    hearing to dispute plaintiff’s account of the incident.
    {¶ 14} The issue of whether an employee is entitled to immunity is a question of
    law. Nease v. Medical College Hosp., 
    64 Ohio St.3d 396
    , 
    1992-Ohio-97
    , citing Conley
    v. Shearer, 
    64 Ohio St.3d 284
    , 292, 
    1992-Ohio-133
    .            The question whether the
    employee acted outside the scope of his employment, or with malicious purpose, in bad
    faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner is one of fact. Tschantz v. Ferguson (1989), 
    49 Ohio App.3d 9
    . Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the state employee should be
    stripped of immunity. Fisher v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr. (Aug. 25, 1998), Franklin
    App. No. 98AP-142.
    {¶ 15} “Malicious purpose encompasses exercising ‘malice,’ which can be
    defined as the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to
    harm another, usually seriously, through conduct that is unlawful or unjustified. Bad
    faith has been defined as the opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving
    actual or constructive fraud or a design to mislead or deceive another. Bad faith is not
    prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or
    sinister motive.   Finally, reckless conduct refers to an act done with knowledge or
    reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the conduct
    creates an unnecessary risk of physical harm and that such risk is greater than that
    necessary to make the conduct negligent.              The term ‘reckless’ is often used
    interchangeably with the word ‘wanton’ and has also been held to be a perverse
    disregard of a known risk.” Caruso v. State (2000), 
    136 Ohio App.3d 616
    , 620-621.
    (Internal citations omitted.)
    {¶ 16} This court has previously held that actions that amount to sexual
    harassment are outside the scope of employment because they further only the
    interests of the alleged offender and not the employer. In Jones v. Ohio Veteran’s
    Home (Oct. 1, 2004), Ct. of Cl. No. 2002-03775, the court found that an employee who
    Case No. 2009-04858                        -5-                MAGISTRATE DECISION
    inappropriately touched a female colleague was not entitled to civil immunity. In Smith
    v. Dept. of Youth Services (June 4, 2002), Ct. of Cl. No. 2000-05860, the court found
    that a corrections officer who permitted an incarcerated minor to touch her breasts and
    buttocks over her clothes was not entitled to civil immunity. See also Browning v. Ohio
    State Highway Patrol, Franklin App. No. 02AP-814, 
    2008-Ohio-1108
    .
    {¶ 17} Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that although Berlin was
    ostensibly performing his duties as a nurse when he entered plaintiff’s room at CMC, he
    acted only to satisfy his own interests. Accordingly, it is recommended that the court
    issue an order that Henry Berlin is not entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86
    and 2743.02(F) and that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over any civil
    actions that may be filed against him based upon the allegations in this case.
    A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days of
    the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that
    14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections,
    any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections
    are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual
    finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or
    conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically
    objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the
    decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
    _____________________________________
    MATTHEW C. RAMBO
    Magistrate
    cc:
    Case No. 2009-04858               -6-              MAGISTRATE DECISION
    Eric A. Walker                     Richard F. Swope
    Assistant Attorney General         6504 East Main Street
    150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor    Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068-2268
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
    Henry Berlin                       Thomas M. Spetnagel
    7074 Chenoweth Fork Road           Paige J. McMahon
    Piketon, Ohio 45661                42 East Fifth Street
    Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
    MR/cmd
    Filed February 3, 2010
    To S.C. reporter March 3, 2010
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2009-04858

Citation Numbers: 2010 Ohio 851

Judges: Rambo

Filed Date: 2/3/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014