Axelrod v. Dept. of Commerce ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Axelrod v. Dept. of Commerce, 2019-Ohio-1821.]
    DAVID F. AXELROD, et al.                             Case No. 2018-01458PQ
    Requesters                                    Special Master Jeffery W. Clark
    v.                                            REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
    DIVISION OF SECURITIES
    Respondent
    {¶1} On November 26, 2018, requesters David Axelrod and Trina Goethals filed
    a complaint pursuant to R.C. 2743.75 alleging that respondent Ohio Department of
    Commerce, Division of Securities (DOC) denied access to public records in violation of
    R.C. 149.43(B). On November 30, 2018, requesters filed an amended complaint. On
    February 22, 2019, the court was notified that the parties had resolved four of the public
    records requests in mediation, but failed to resolve Requests Nos. 2 and 6. On March 6,
    2019, DOC filed its response. On March 19, 2019, requesters filed a reply.
    Axelrod sent DOC a public records request on July 12, 2018 that included:
    2. Copies of all Division examination files and documents relating to Dock
    D. Treece, Treece Investment Advisory Corp. and/or Treece Financial
    Services, from January 1, 2008 through the present.
    6. Copies of all communications between or among Division staff,
    attorneys and other employees, including paper correspondence, text
    messages, email, audio recordings and other electronic communications
    (whether on state-issued or personal devices), with any broker-dealer,
    investment advisor or other third party, who offered to sell or stated that it
    would sell, at no cost, advisor class shares to clients of other investment
    advisors.
    (Response Exh. 1.) On July 16, 2018, DOC responded that its investigatory and trial
    preparation records were prohibited from release under R.C. 1707.12, but that it would
    review any publicly available documents. (Response Exh. 2.) On October 29, 2018,
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                      -2-         REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    DOC produced some records, but advised that the requests were otherwise denied as
    overly broad. DOC also denied the remaining records as subject to R.C. 1707.12(C), or
    to the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. (Response Exh. 3 Followell
    Aff., Exh. A.) On November 14, 2018, DOC sent a letter clarifying its reasons for denial.
    (Id. Exh C.) Both response letters invited requesters to contact the DOC if they wished
    to discuss or amend the requests. (Followell Aff. at ¶ 13, Exhs. A, C.)
    Burdens of Proof Under the Public Records Act (PRA)
    The burden is on requester to prove a violation of R.C. 149.43(B). In mandamus,
    [a]lthough the PRA is accorded liberal construction in favor of access to
    public records, “the relator must still establish entitlement to the requested
    extraordinary relief by clear and convincing evidence.”
    (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 
    151 Ohio St. 3d 425
    , 2016-Ohio-
    8394, 
    89 N.E.3d 598
    , ¶ 15. Claims pursuant to R.C. 2743.75 must likewise be
    established by clear and convincing evidence. Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, 
    97 N.E.3d 1153
    , ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.).
    {¶2} If a public office asserts an exception to the PRA the burden of proving the
    exception rests on the public office. “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records
    Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the
    custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. A custodian does
    not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within
    the exception.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 
    118 Ohio St. 3d 81
    ,
    2008-Ohio-1770, 
    886 N.E.2d 206
    , paragraph two of the syllabus. Any doubt should be
    resolved in favor of disclosure. State ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ., 
    70 Ohio St. 3d 168
    , 169, 
    637 N.E.2d 911
    (1994).
    Ambiguous or Overly Broad Requests
    {¶3} A   request   that   is   ambiguous    or    overly   broad    may   be   denied.
    R.C. 149.43(B)(2). It is “the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or
    copy records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.” State ex rel.
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                      -3-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 
    133 Ohio St. 3d 122
    , 2012-Ohio-4228,
    
    976 N.E.2d 861
    , ¶ 21. See generally Gupta v. Cleveland, Ct. of Cl. No 2017-00840PQ,
    2018-Ohio-3475.
    {¶4} Attorneys, accustomed to writing discovery instruments, are susceptible to
    writing public records requests as though they were interrogatories or requests for
    production of documents. While a person may request public records for use in civil
    litigation, Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 
    104 Ohio St. 3d 660
    , 2004-Ohio-7108, 
    821 N.E.2d 564
    ,
    the standards for a proper public records request are distinctly different from the
    standards for civil discovery. For example, a discovery-style demand to conduct an
    officewide search for records containing information “regarding or related to” an agency
    program, organization, or person is improper as a public records request. State ex rel.
    Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. 
    71 Ohio St. 3d 245
    , 245-246, 
    643 N.E.2d 126
    (1994), cited
    with approval in State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, 
    149 Ohio St. 3d 612
    , 2016-
    Ohio-8447, 
    76 N.E.3d 1171
    , ¶ 10; State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. 70 Ohio
    St.3d 1437, 
    638 N.E.2d 1041
    (1994). The Public Records Act does not
    compel a governmental unit to do research or to identify records
    containing selected information. That is, relator has not established that a
    governmental unit has the clear legal duty to seek out and retrieve those
    records which would contain the information of interest to the requester.
    Cf. State ex rel. Cartmell v. Dorrian (1984), 
    11 Ohio St. 3d 177
    , 179, 
    464 N.E.2d 556
    .
    State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63737, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2591,
    *3-4 (April 28, 1993), aff’d, 
    68 Ohio St. 3d 117
    , 
    623 N.E.2d 1202
    (1993).
    {¶5} Judicial determination of whether an office has properly denied a request as
    ambiguous or overly broad is based on the facts and circumstances in each case,
    Zidonis at ¶ 26. In this case I find that Request No. 6, and Request No. 2 to the extent
    that it requests “all * * * documents relating to” three corporations, are ambiguous and
    overly broad requests that do not reasonably identify records sought by the requester.
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                                 -4-       REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    Request No. 6
    {¶6} First, Request No. 6 is not limited to any date range. See Zidonis at ¶ 21 (all
    complaint and litigation files for six years is overly broad); State ex rel. Dehler v. Spatny,
    
    127 Ohio St. 3d 312
    , 2010-Ohio-5711, 
    939 N.E.2d 831
    , ¶ 1-3 (all prison orders and
    receipts for clothing/shoes for seven years is overly broad). Second, the request is not
    limited to a file type, department, record retention series, a single topic,1 or any other
    means of determining the boundaries of the request. Third, the request demands “all
    communications between or among Division staff, attorneys and other employees,”
    which would include all employees carbon- or blind-copied, not just senders and primary
    recipients. Fourth, instead of naming specific third parties, the request demands
    communications “with any broker-dealer, investment advisor or other third party, who
    offered to sell or stated that it would sell, at no cost, advisor class shares to clients of
    other investment advisors relationship to various organizations.” A request is ambiguous
    or overly broad when it identifies correspondents only as belonging to titles, groups or
    categories, for which research by the office is required to recognize such membership.
    State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 04AP-492,
    04AP-504, 2005-Ohio-3377, ¶ 9, overturned on other grounds; Gannett GP Media, Inc.
    v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Ct. of Cl. No. 2017-00051-PQ, 2017-Ohio-4247, ¶ 11.
    Fifth, the request is overly broad in requesting a search through the office’s entire email
    system and paper files for any correspondence. A public office is not obliged to “seek
    out and retrieve those records which would contain the information of interest to the
    requester.” Fant v. 
    Tober, supra
    . See State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 
    92 Ohio St. 3d 312
    ,
    314, 
    750 N.E.2d 156
    (2001) (all records “containing any reference whatsoever to
    [requester]”); State ex rel. O’Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous.
    1 The last clause, referring to any “third party, who offered to sell * * *, at no cost, advisor class shares to
    clients of other investment advisors,” requires research rather than identifying a category by which the
    DOC’s records are organized and maintained.
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                       -5-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    Auth., 
    190 Ohio App. 3d 218
    , 2010-Ohio-3416, ¶ 7-11 (8th Dist.) (all records containing
    information about injury claims), rev’d in part on other grounds; State ex rel. Morgan v.
    Strickland, 
    121 Ohio St. 3d 600
    , 2009-Ohio-1901, 
    906 N.E.2d 1105
    , ¶ 14-15 (“[a]ny and
    all email communications * * * which reference * * * the ‘evidence-based model’ or
    education funding in general”) (first ellipsis sic); State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State
    Univ., 
    71 Ohio St. 3d 245
    , 246, 
    643 N.E.2d 126
    (1994) (information “regarding or related
    to” any pro-animal-rights action group or individual); State ex rel. Youngstown Publ’g
    Co. v. Youngstown, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05MA66, 2006-Ohio-7272, ¶ 28-32 (“asking
    for all records concerning when and where negotiations took place and between whom
    is not a request for a specific document.”) A request for records “regarding” an office
    operation is improperly ambiguous and overly broad, and requires a search rather than
    reasonably identifying the records sought. Gannett GP Media at ¶ 12.
    {¶7} I find that Request No. 6 is ambiguous and overly broad, does not
    reasonably identify the records sought, and is thus unenforceable under the Public
    Records Act.
    Request No. 2
    {¶8} Request No. 2 seeks, in part, “all * * * documents relating to” three
    corporations during a ten-year period. This part of the request is not limited to a
    reasonably short time period, an examination file, a department, a record retention
    series, a single topic, or any other means of determining the boundaries of the request.
    The request is ambiguous and overly broad in requiring a search through “all
    documents” of the office, of any nature, during a ten-year period. I find that this portion
    of Request No. 2 is improperly ambiguous and overly broad, does not reasonably
    identify the records sought, and is therefore unenforceable under the Public Records
    Act.
    Embedded Request
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                        -6-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    {¶9} A proper request embedded within an otherwise ambiguous or overly broad
    request may be enforceable. In State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 
    119 Ohio St. 3d 391
    ,
    2008-Ohio-4788, 
    894 N.E.2d 686
    , ¶ 1, 17-24, a request for six months-worth of a state
    representative’s email was found overly broad, but an embedded request – “including,
    but not limited to [a particular bill]” – was sufficiently narrow to be a proper request. See
    also Strothers v. Keenon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103313, 2016-Ohio-405, 
    59 N.E.3d 556
    , ¶ 24-30 (clarified request “ordered released in the spirit of R.C. 149.43, which
    requires the Public Records Act to be liberally construed in favor of disclosure.”).
    {¶10} Request No. 2 contains a severable request for “all Division examination
    files * * * relating to Dock D. Treece, Treece Investment Advisory Corp. and/or Treece
    Financial Services, from January 1, 2008 through the present.” The request is made to
    an agency that conducts examinations of regulated entities. R.C. 1707.23. The DOC
    must of necessity organize examination files by the names of the entities subject to an
    examination. This portion of the request is thus reasonably limited by subject matter and
    by the entities concerned. While the time period of ten years was found overly broad
    above for a search of “all documents,” Axelrod notes that the responsive records that
    have been provided by the DOC demonstrate the agency’s ability, in this instance, to
    identify three responsive examinations during that time period. (Reply at 3.) I find that
    this embedded request was not impermissibly ambiguous or overly broad. See
    Kesterton v. Kent State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5110 at ¶ 23-27.
    Suggestion of Mootness
    {¶11} The DOC undertook efforts to satisfy the requests, providing Axelrod with
    some responsive records. (Followell Aff. at ¶ 15-16.) In an action to enforce
    R.C. 149.43(B), a public office may produce requested records prior to the court’s
    decision and thereby render the claim for production moot. State ex rel. Striker v. Smith,
    
    129 Ohio St. 3d 168
    , 2011-Ohio-2878, 
    950 N.E.2d 952
    , ¶ 18-22. I recommend that the
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                               -7-       REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    court find the claim is moot to the extent that the DOC has provided particular
    responsive records.
    Exceptions Asserted
    {¶12} The Public Records Act requires a public office to disclose records upon
    request unless an exception applies. State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 
    123 Ohio St. 3d 410
    , 2009-Ohio-4762, 
    916 N.E.2d 1049
    , ¶ 15-16. An exception is a state or
    federal law prohibiting or excusing disclosure of items that otherwise meet the
    definitions of a “record” of a “public office,” including those listed in R.C. 149.43(A)(1).2
    The parties do not dispute that the DOC is a public office, or that the documents
    requested in this matter are records of the DOC.
    {¶13} With respect to the surviving portion of Request No. 2, the DOC asserts
    exceptions from disclosure pursuant to: 1) R.C. 1707.12(C) exempting a) information
    obtained by the division through any investigation, b) confidential law enforcement
    investigatory records, and c) trial preparation records; 2) R.C. 1707.12(B) prohibiting
    targets of Division investigations from accessing investigatory information obtained by
    the Division; 3) common-law attorney-client work product; and 4) attorney work product.
    {¶14} Although the DOC states that “R.C. 1707.12 is the sole provision governing
    information collected by the Division” and that R.C. 149.43 is “inapposite” and “[does]
    not apply” to DOC records (Response at 8-9), I find that R.C. 1707.12 can be analyzed
    like any other exception. See State ex rel. Dublin Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of
    Securities, 
    68 Ohio St. 3d 426
    , 430-431, 
    627 N.E.2d 993
    (1994) (“R.C. 1707.12 appears
    to be an exception to the general public records provision”). Despite the wording used in
    the cited cases, R.C. 1707.12 operates as a statute exempting records from disclosure
    under the “catch-all” exception in the Public Records Act:
    “Public record” does not mean any of the following:
    ***
    2   The terms “exception” and “exemption” are used interchangeably in case law, and in this report.
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                       -8-       REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    (v) Records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.
    R.C. 149.43(A)(1), (A)(1)(v). Further, the parties implicitly agree that R.C. 149.43 does
    apply here. Axelrod brought the action pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(1). DOC has not
    moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of this court over a mandamus action to enforce
    R.C. Chapter 1707 apart from R.C. 149.43. See Dancy v. Molitoris, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 09AP-749, 2010-Ohio-1382, ¶ 5 (“The Court of Claims * * * has no authority to allow
    writs of mandamus.”). I recommend that the court find this action is properly brought
    and may be determined under R.C. 149.43(C) and R.C. 2743.75, including the
    application of R.C. 1707.12 as a statutory exception to public records disclosure.
    R.C. 1707.12(B) provides, in pertinent part:
    (B) Information obtained by the division * * * through any investigation
    shall be retained by the division and shall not be available to inspection by
    persons other than those having a direct economic interest in the
    information or the transaction under investigation, or by law enforcement
    agencies, state agencies, federal agencies, and other entities as set forth
    by rules adopted by the division.
    Requesters seek documents contained in examination files from 2013, 2015, and 2017.
    (Reply at 3.) “The Parties were able to agree, or the Petitioners withdrew,” requests for
    complaints concerning Treece entities, and for the deficiency letters that resulted from
    the examinations. (Reply at 1; Exh. 1.) The remaining documents in the examination
    files thus consist of information gathered during the investigation.
    {¶15} In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Joyce, 
    97 Ohio St. 3d 192
    , 2002-Ohio-
    5807, 
    777 N.E.2d 253
    , the phrase “information obtained by the division through any
    investigation” was held to mean any information obtained “during the entire period of” an
    investigation. 
    Id. at ¶
    15-16. As in Joyce, the evidence in this case is uncontroverted
    that the contents of requested examination files were obtained through the investigatory
    enforcement power of the DOC. (Followell Aff. at ¶ 4-6.) Requester’s clients, the real
    parties in interest for these requests (Am. Complaint at ¶ 1), are not among “those
    Case No. 2018-01458PQ                       -9-     REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
    having a direct economic interest in the information * * * under investigation.” Dublin
    Securities at 432. The text of R.C. 1707.12(B) sets no time limit on the prohibition
    against disclosure of such information. I find that the exemption in R.C. 1707.12(B)
    encompasses the entire examination files, and justified the DOC’s denial of the
    embedded request in Request No. 2.
    {¶16} Since the findings of overbreadth, and the operation of R.C. 1707.12(B),
    are together sufficient to dispose of all claims before the court, I find it unnecessary to
    address the other exceptions asserted by the DOC.
    Conclusion
    {¶17} Upon consideration of the pleadings and attachments, I recommend the
    court grant respondent’s motion to dismiss requester’s claim for production of records in
    response to Requests Nos. 2 and 6 to the extent that those requests are ambiguous
    and overly broad. I further recommend that the court deny requester’s claim for
    production of records from examination files gathered during investigation, pursuant to
    R.C. 1707.12(B).
    {¶18} Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party may file a written objection
    with the clerk of the Court of Claims of Ohio within seven (7) business days after
    receiving this report and recommendation. Any objection shall be specific and state with
    particularity all grounds for the objection. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the
    court’s adoption of any factual findings or legal conclusions in this report and
    recommendation unless a timely objection was filed thereto. R.C. 2743.75(G)(1).
    JEFFERY W. CLARK
    Special Master
    Filed April 2, 2019
    Sent to S.C. Reporter 5/10/19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-01458PQ

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 4/2/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/10/2019