- PEARSON, J. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION NENAD JANKOVIC, ) ) CASE NO. 5:22CV1619 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON ) CHIEF JUSTICE MAUREEN O’CONNOR, ) et al., ) ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND Defendants. ) ORDER I. Background On September 12, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Nenad Jankovic filed this civil rights action against Defendants Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, Judicial Assignment Analyst Diane Hayes, and Ohio Assistant Ohio General Ann Yackshow. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See ECF No. 2. The Complaint does not set forth cogent factual allegations or legal claims. In one paragraph, it states: Maureen O’Connor signiture [sic] illegal Certificet [sic] of Assignment for visiting judge for illegal time and destroy evidence for what, I think, inside self- interest murder. Diana Hayes said it is legal document tried to coverd [sic] destroyed evidence and swear on falce documente [sic]. Ann Yackshaw quash my subpoena that I can not provide in Court that is judge illegal and that is all illegal document and that Supreme Court destroyed some evidence. ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 4. (5:22CV1619) The relief sought is incomprehensible. Plaintiff asks the Court “[t]o find out why they wanted illegal court, did was in destroyed evidence elected judge thak [sic] about self-interest murder and is my life safe.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 5. For the reasons set forth, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECE No. 2) is granted, and the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed. II. Standard of Review When a plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, a court is required to construe the complaint indulgently and hold it to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hahn y. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 715 (6th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the lenient treatment accorded pro se plaintiffs has limits. See e.g., Pilgrim vy. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Even pro se plaintiffs must satisfy basic pleading requirements, and the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings "does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf." Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (holding that the dismissal standards (5:22CV1619) articulated in Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) govern dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The complaint’s "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And the complaint must set forth allegations sufficient to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson y. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Il. Analysis On review, the Court finds the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which Plaintiff may be granted relief. The statements in the pleading are incomprehensible, conclusory, and fail to meet basic pleading requirements. Even accorded the deference to which a pro se pleading is entitled, the Complaint is insufficient to state any plausible non-frivolous federal claim against any Defendant. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief). Furthermore, judges, judicial officers, and prosecutors — the only defendants named — are immune from suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the performance of their judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions. See Wappler v. Carniak, 24 F. □□□□□□ 294 (6th Cir. 2001); Jreland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435 (6" Cir. 1997); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Complaint is also subject to dismissal to the extent it purports to allege federal civil rights claims under § 1983 arising out of the named Defendants’ (5:22CV1619) performance of judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions as to which they are immune from suit. IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Complaint is dismissed pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. IT IS SO ORDERED. January 31, 2023 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson Date Benita Y. Pearson United States District Judge 4
Document Info
Docket Number: 5:22-cv-01619
Filed Date: 1/31/2023
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/27/2024