Lee v. Tumbleson ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION JEROME VINCENT LEE, JR., Plaintiff, v. Civil Action 2:21-cv-4706 Judge James L. Graham Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura SGT. TUMBLESON, et al., Defendants. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Jerome V. Lee Jr., a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against two employees of the Ross Correctional Institute (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that the prison officials wrongfully confiscated Plaintiff’s personal property in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments. (Compl., ECF No. 5). This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915A for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. I. BACKGROUND In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges one the Defendants took Plaintiff’s personal property from his jail cell while Plaintiff was placed in limited privilege housing. (Compl. 4, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff details the property he lost and his attempts to utilize the prison’s internal grievance procedure to obtain relief for the property losses he suffered. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to adjudicate his claims because Defendants have not resolved the grievance in question, and it has been three months since the incident. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges he has attempted to resolve his claim with prison employees, but no information has been provided in response. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). III. ANALYSIS Applying the foregoing, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he has not sufficiently alleged the inadequacy of the remedies available under Ohio law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Paratt, the Supreme Court held that the existence of adequate post-deprivation state remedies eliminates any due process claim arising from the negligent deprivation of a prisoner’s property. 451 U.S. at 539–44. The Hudson Court extended Parratt’s application to all § 1983 due process claims involving deprivation of property, regardless of whether the deprivation is negligent or intentional. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533–36. Cf. Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004) (“If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury.”). Following Parratt and Hudson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that in a § 1983 case “claiming the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065–66 (6th Cir. 1983). Where a plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1993) (dismissal of procedural due process claim upheld where the plaintiff had “not pled or shown that [the state] judicial remedies are inadequate . . . .”); Ruiz v. Fisher, No. 96-4212, 1998 WL 661139, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim of either intentional or negligent deprivation of property where he had not pled “that state remedies for redressing the wrong [were] inadequate”). In this instant case, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that the post-deprivation tort remedies available to him under Ohio law are inadequate to adjudicate his property-loss claims as required under Parratt and Vicory. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534–36) (“State tort remedies generally satisfy the postdeprivation process requirement of the Due Process Clauses.”). In effort to satisfy his burden, Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ administration of the prison’s inmate grievance procedure. (Compl. 7, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff states that prison staff “keep[s] extending the time claiming they need more time to give a proper answer, but it has been three months.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the handling of his administrative grievances, however, fails to state a claim or otherwise satisfy his burden because “there is no inherent constitutional right to an effective grievance procedure.” Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); and Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)). Beyond Plaintiff’s expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of his administrative grievances, his Complaint contains only “naked assertions,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, and provides insufficient factual content or context from which the Court could reasonably infer that Ohio’s post-deprivation tort remedies are inadequate to adjudicate his property-loss claims. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. IV. DISPOSITION For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE