Mower (Glenn) v. State ( 2014 )

 credit for time served in the instant case, we disagree. NRS 176.055(1)
does not apply because Mower's confinement was not "pursuant to a
judgment of conviction for another offense."
There is no indication in the record before us that federal
authorities placed a hold on Mower after his arrest leading to the instant
conviction. Further, the State does not challenge the following assertion
made by Mower on appeal:
From the date of arrest through the date of
sentencing, the federal government did not issue
any writs to obtain custody of appellant.
Additionally, there has not been any
correspondence or any information indicating that
the federal government is seeking custody of
appellant; except for . . . a written statement made
by the Presentence Investigation [report] writer
that the federal government would seek parole
revocation after the Nevada case is completed.
It appears that Mower was taken into custody and confined solely due to
the instant offense and is entitled to credit for the time served prior to his
sentencing. See State v. Dist. Ct. (Jackson), 121 Nev. 413, 416, 116 P.3d
834, 836 (2005) ("[D]espite its discretionary language, the purpose of NRS
176.055 is to 'ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendant's
ultimate sentence." (quoting Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev. 1285, 1287,
926 P.2d 781, 783 (1996))). Therefore, this matter must be remanded to
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the district court for the awarding of 141 days' credit for time served and
the amending of Mower's judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we
ORDER this matter REMANDED to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this order. 1 2
J.
Hardesty
J.
Douglas
J.
1 The fast track statement submitted by Mower does not comply with
the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure because the procedural history
and statement of facts do not contain any citations to the record. See
NRAP 3C(e)(1)(C) and NRAP 28(e)(1). Counsel for Mower is cautioned
that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future
may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
2 This
order constitutes our final disposition of this appeal. Any
subsequent appeal shall be docketed as a new matter.
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cc. Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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