State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez ( 2021 )

614
Argued and submitted September 25, 2020; decision of Court of Appeals
reversed, judgment of circuit court affirmed March 4, 2021
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ALEX AGUIRRE-RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 16CR60858) (CA A165704) (SC S067446)
482 P3d 62
Defendant pleaded guilty to several charges that had resulted in damage
to the victim’s pickup truck, and the trial court ordered him to pay restitution
for the cost of repairing the truck. Defendant appealed the restitution award,
arguing that the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish that the
cost to repair the victim’s truck was reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed
with defendant and reversed. Held: The state presented sufficient evidence, when
considered collectively, to support the trial court’s determination that the cost to
repair the victim’s truck was reasonable.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also
on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General,
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Ashley L. Vaughn, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Rosalind M. Lee, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
______________
* On appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Rafael Caso, Judge. 301 Or
App 42, 455 P3d 997 (2019).
Cite as 367 Or 614 (2021) 615
NELSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
616 State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez
NELSON, J.
In this criminal case, defendant pleaded guilty to
several crimes that resulted in damage to the victim’s truck.
After the state presented evidence of a repair bill paid by
the victim’s insurer, the trial court ordered defendant to pay
restitution for the full amount of that bill, pursuant to ORS
137.106. Defendant appealed, arguing that the restitution
award was not supported by sufficient evidence to prove
that the amount charged had been reasonable. The Court
of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed. State v.
Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or App 42, 43, 455 P3d 997 (2019).
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the state pre-
sented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that the amount that the victim’s insurer paid for repairs
was reasonable. The trial court therefore did not err in
entering the restitution award.
The relevant facts are uncontested. While intoxi-
cated, defendant drove into the victim’s pickup truck, dam-
aging the truck and injuring two people who were in the
truck at the time of the collision. Defendant did not remain
on the scene to exchange insurance information. For that
conduct, defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of
one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, two
counts of fourth-degree assault, and one count of failing to
perform the duties of a driver to injured persons.
After defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced,
the state sought restitution for a total of $11,803.50, which
included $10,404.80 that the victim’s insurer had paid to
repair the victim’s truck. To support that latter amount,
the state submitted the following evidence: (1) the Kelley
Blue Book value of the truck, assuming excellent condi-
tion ($9,761.00); (2) photographs of the damage to the truck
after the collision; (3) a detailed repair estimate from the
autobody shop that performed the repairs ($10,904.80); and
(4) evidence that the insurer had paid that full amount, less
the victim’s $500 insurance deductible. The repair estimate
provided by the autobody shop prior to the insurance compa-
ny’s authorization to perform the repairs was detailed and
included (1) a list of parts necessary to complete the repairs
($6,915.50); (2) paint supplies to touch up the damage to the
Cite as 367 Or 614 (2021) 617
truck ($450.00); and (3) labor costs ($3,539.30). The hourly
labor rates were further broken down and ranged from
$52 per hour for “body” and “paint” labor, to $75 per hour for
“mechanical” labor. The estimate was prepared using (1) a
third-party publication, the Motor Crash Estimating Guide,
to evaluate the damage and cost of repairs; and (2) CCC
One Estimating, a software program that allowed the auto-
body repair shop to directly order repair parts from local
suppliers.
Before the trial court, defendant argued that the
state’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the
amount sought for the repairs was reasonable, as required
by the restitution statute, ORS 137.106. The trial court then
reviewed that evidence, noting that it had “observed the
vehicle and its condition, and its injuries, its damages. And
certainly, this is documentation for what you have included
in the amount of restitution.” Upon evaluating the evidence
presented, including the submitted Kelley Blue Book esti-
mated value, the trial court found that “[i]t was worth just
about what it cost them to fix it.”1 The trial court rejected
defendant’s argument that additional evidence was neces-
sary to establish that the cost of repairs was reasonable,
commenting that, “I don’t think we need an expert to find
that that makes it reasonable per se.” The trial court then
imposed the full amount of restitution sought by the state,
including the amount for the repairs paid by the victim’s
insurer.
Defendant appealed, challenging the $10,404.80
restitution award for the repair costs paid by the victim’s
insurer. At issue on appeal, and again before this court, was
whether the evidence that the victim’s insurer had paid the
bill was sufficient to establish that the cost of repairs was
reasonable. The Court of Appeals noted, correctly, that the
1
We do not understand the trial court’s statement that the cost to repair the
victim’s truck was similar to the Kelley Blue Book value of the truck to reflect a
ruling that the repair bill was reasonable as a matter of law based solely on the
Blue Book value. Instead, we understand the trial court to have made a factual
finding, based on all of the evidence submitted, that the requested repair cost
was reasonable. As the trial court noted, defendant did not argue that the truck’s
value was less than the cost of repairs, and, accordingly, we do not address the
question of whether repairs costs are reasonable when they exceed the estimated
value of the item.
618 State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez
state bore the burden of presenting affirmative evidence
to prove that the cost of repairs was reasonable. Aguirre-
Rodriguez, 301 Or App at 45. Pointing to its decision in State
v. J. M. E., 299 Or App 483, 487, 451 P3d 1018 (2019), that
court then explained that, to establish reasonableness, the
state’s evidence must demonstrate how the paid charges cor-
respond to the relevant market. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or
App at 45. The court then concluded that the state’s evidence
did not “provide any meaningful basis for assessing how
those costs correspond to the relevant market” and, accord-
ingly, reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 46-47.
We allowed the state’s petition for review, and,
because we conclude that the evidence that the state pre-
sented, when considered collectively, was sufficient to sup-
port the trial court’s determination that the repair cost was
reasonable, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
We begin with a general overview of the require-
ments of the restitution statute, ORS 137.106. Under Oregon
law, restitution is to be awarded when a defendant has been
convicted of a crime that results in economic damages to
the victim and the state has presented evidence of those
damages. ORS 137.106(1)(a). If proof of economic damages is
established, then the trial court is required to enter a judg-
ment imposing restitution for the amount of those damages.
Id. According to the statutory definition of “economic dam-
ages,” that amount must be based on the reasonable costs
of repair or replacement of the damaged property. See ORS
137.103(2)(a) (“economic damages” in restitution statutes car-
ries same meaning as set out in ORS 31.710, with an excep-
tion that does not apply here); ORS 31.710(2)(a) (defining
“[e]conomic damages” as including “reasonable costs incurred
for repair or for replacement of damaged property”).
As a procedural matter, the restitution statute places
the burden of establishing the amount of economic damages
on the state. See ORS 137.106(1)(a) (“When a person is con-
victed of a crime * * * that has resulted in economic dam-
ages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to
the court * * * evidence of the nature and amount of the dam-
ages.”). The defendant may rebut the evidence presented by
Cite as 367 Or 614 (2021) 619
the state and, if desired, present evidence about why the pro-
posed restitution amount should not be imposed—including
evidence that the amount of the economic damages is not
reasonable. See State v. Hart, 329 Or 140, 147, 985 P2d 1260(1999) (noting that the defendant has an opportunity to
object to the state’s proposed restitution amount). The court
then evaluates the circumstances of the case, determines
the amount of economic damages, and enters a judgment
that reflects that decision. See ORS 137.106 (outlining the
procedure for determining the nature and amount of eco-
nomic damages to be awarded in a restitution proceeding).
On review, neither party disputes that defendant’s
criminal conduct resulted in economic damages to the vic-
tim’s truck; rather, the issue is whether the state’s evidence
was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the
costs of repair were reasonable. We address that question—
which we have not previously addressed in the context of the
restitution statutes—below. First, however, we consider the
other contexts in which this court has previously discussed
whether evidence of a paid bill, standing alone, reflects the
reasonable costs of the product or service.
In Farris v. McCracken, 253 Or 273, 453 P2d 932(1969), a case dealing with enforcement of a mechanic’s lien
filed after nonpayment of a disputed contractor’s bill, this
court considered whether evidence of the contractor’s paid
bill was sufficient to establish that the costs paid by the
contractor were not excessive. In that case, the plaintiff—
the lien claimant—presented evidence consisting almost
entirely of his own alleged costs without providing any
explanation of the basis of the charged amount. Farris, 253
Or at 274-75. After examining the claim on de novo review,
this court concluded that, “[t]o say that the contractor paid
a given amount for an item of labor or material, without
explanation, does not, of itself, prove that the amount paid
was justified.” Id. at 276.
In this case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
“[t]he fact that a charge is billed, standing alone, says noth-
ing about whether that charge is reasonable” absent “some
sense of the relevant market.” Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or
App at 44. That court relied on Farris, which, in its view,
620 State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez
“made this [same] point.” Id. As explained in greater detail
below, however, this case does not present the same facts as
in Farris, because, here, the state presented evidence beyond
just the paid repair bill that provided an explanation for
the basis of the charges made to restore the victim’s truck.
Although the proposition in Farris—that evidence of pay-
ment of a charge, on its own and devoid of explanation, does
not establish that the amount charged was reasonable—
remains the law, it is inapposite in this case where the state
presented more than just an insurer-paid bill.
We turn to the appropriate standard of review. As we
understand the position of both parties, the issue of whether
the cost of the repairs to the victim’s truck was reasonable is
a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. The state contends
that evidence of a paid bill is sufficient to support a finding
that the amount paid is a reasonable amount for the ser-
vices provided. Defendant counters that a paid repair bill—
standing alone—is never sufficient to establish the reason-
ableness of repair costs for restitution purposes. We review
questions of the sufficiency of the evidence by examining the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as the party
that prevailed in the trial court. See Anderson v. Sturm, 209
Or 190, 191, 303 P2d 509 (1956) (stating that “[w]hen the
sufficiency of the evidence is thus challenged, the evidence
offered must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiff” as the party that had prevailed below). The state bore
the burden of proving each of the facts necessary to support
the restitution award. See ORS 137.106 (placing the burden
of presenting “evidence of the nature and amount of the
damages” in a restitution award on the state). Because the
state prevailed, the issue on review is whether a rational
factfinder, accepting all reasonable inferences, could have
found the facts necessary to support the award. Anderson,
209 Or at 192.
Before addressing the primary dispute between the
parties—whether the state’s evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the trial court’s determination that the cost to repair the
victim’s truck was reasonable—we reiterate the key compo-
nents of the restitution statute, ORS 137.106. As explained
briefly above, a restitution award is statutorily required
when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant has
Cite as 367 Or 614 (2021) 621
been convicted of criminal activity; (2) economic damages
have occurred; and (3) a causal relationship exists between
the defendant’s criminal activity and the economic dam-
ages. State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 181, 637 P2d 602 (1981);
see also State v. Ramos, 358 Or 581, 588, 368 P3d 446 (2016)
(“The statute requires only that the damages be ‘objectively
verifiable monetary losses’ that ‘result from’ a defendant’s
criminal activity.”). ORS 137.106(1)(a) specifically provides,
in part:
“When a person is convicted of a crime * * * that has
resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall
investigate and present to the court, at the time of sentenc-
ing or within 90 days after entry of the judgment, evidence
of the nature and amount of the damages. * * * If the court
finds from the evidence presented that a victim suffered
economic damages, * * * the court shall enter a judgment
or supplemental judgment requiring that the defendant
pay the victim restitution in a specific amount that equals
the full amount of the victim’s economic damages as deter-
mined by the court. * * *”
As noted, pursuant to ORS 137.103(2)(a), “economic dam-
ages” in that statute “[h]as the meaning given that term in
ORS 31.710,” with an exception that does not apply here. ORS
31.710(2)(a), in turn, defines “economic damages” as “objec-
tively verifiable monetary losses,” including, but not limited
to, “reasonable costs incurred for repair or for replacement of
damaged property.” (Emphasis added.)
When considering whether the state presented
sufficient evidence to establish that the cost of repairs was
reasonable, we must consider the legal principles that con-
cern the recovery of economic damages in civil cases. See
State v. Islam, 359 Or 796, 800, 377 P3d 533 (2016) (stating
that “restitution under ORS 137.106 is informed by princi-
ples enunciated in civil cases concerning recoverable eco-
nomic damages”). In such cases, Oregon has long followed
the principle that market value can be an appropriate mea-
sure for the reasonable cost of replacement or repairs. See
Swank v. Elwert, 55 Or 487, 499, 105 P 901 (1910) (citing
case law and treatises supporting the position that the mar-
ket value represents a reasonable amount of damages); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts section 911 comment d
622 State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez
(1979) (stating that “the market that determines the mea-
sure of recovery by a person whose goods have been taken,
destroyed or detained is that to which he would have to
resort to in order to replace the subject matter”). In this
case, we agree with both parties that the market rate for
services is the appropriate measure of the reasonable costs
for those services.
Here, the parties dispute the evidence necessary
to establish the market value of repair services. The state
argues that evidence of a bill paid by a market participant
permits a reasonable inference that the total amount paid
was at, or even below, market rate and, therefore, reason-
able. In the state’s view, that is true particularly so in a
case where the payor is a sophisticated party with knowl-
edge of the relevant market, such as an insurance com-
pany. Specifically, the state argues that an insurer is in the
business of investigating claims to ensure that necessary
repairs are competitively priced, citing State Farm Ins. v.
Farmer Ins. Exch., 238 Or 285, 290, 387 P2d 825 (1963)
(noting that insurers lack economic incentive to expend
efforts that would result in the unnecessary payment of
losses). According to the state, when an insurer is the entity
that pays a bill, it is especially reasonable for a factfinder to
infer that the costs were reasonable because of the insurer’s
particular knowledge of the relevant market and internal
incentives to minimize payments.
Defendant does not dispute that the reasonable
value of the repairs to the victim’s truck can be properly
calculated by determining the market value of the repairs.
Instead, he argues that evidence of payment of a repair bill
by an insurance company, on its own, cannot support an
inference that the cost of repairs was reasonable. In defen-
dant’s view, a factfinder cannot infer that a bill paid by an
insurer reflects a reasonable repair cost without making
unsupported assumptions—as he frames it, “speculating”—
about either the contents of the insurance policy between the
insurer and the policyholder, or the insurer’s internal busi-
ness practices. Defendant contends that the mere fact that
an insurance company paid a repair bill provides no basis
for assessing how those costs correspond with the relevant
Cite as 367 Or 614 (2021) 623
market because the payment of the bill says nothing about
why the bill was paid.
Defendant is correct that an inference cannot be
supported by mere speculation, but, rather, must be reason-
able, based on the record. See State v. Jesse, 360 Or 584,
597, 385 P3d 1063 (2016) (stating that facts in issue can be
established through reasonable inferences, but not through
speculation). A reasonable inference is one that a factfinder
could infer from the facts adduced; it is not an inference that
a factfinder is required to draw. State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or
724, 733, 452 P3d 948 (2019). Where the evidence gives rise
to multiple reasonable inferences, the choice between those
inferences—so long as those inferences are reasonable—
is a matter for the factfinder. Id. at 732. On review, this
court has an obligation to distinguish between inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented
at trial and those that are based on mere speculation. Id.Accordingly, the parties ask that we determine whether an
insurer-paid repair bill is evidence from which a factfinder
always could draw a reasonable inference that the cost for
repairs accurately reflect market value.
In the end, though, it is not necessary for us to
decide in this case exactly when, or even if, evidence of a
paid repair bill—standing alone—can support an inference
that the costs for repair were reasonable for the purposes
of the restitution statute. The repair bill here, paid by the
victim’s insurer, did not stand on its own. Instead, the state
presented documentary evidence to accompany the evidence
that the victim’s insurer had paid the bill: the Kelley Blue
Book value, a detailed repair estimate that was produced
using third-party materials and sourced parts from local
suppliers, and photographs of the damage to the victim’s
truck after the collision. We discuss that evidence next.
The detailed repair estimate and the photographs of
the damage to the truck after the collision were sufficient to
permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the repair costs
were a reflection of the relevant market rate and, thus, rea-
sonable. More specifically, the repair estimate was prepared
using industry-standard materials designed to source prices
directly from the local market and to estimate labor rates
624 State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez
and the price of replacement parts. That estimate, therefore,
provided the factfinder with some knowledge of the market
rate. Additionally, the photographs documenting the dam-
age sustained in the collision help confirm the severity of
the damage and the necessity of certain repairs. Considered
together, the repair estimate, prepared using local market
rates, and the photographs of the damage to the victim’s
truck, demonstrate a sufficient nexus to permit the trial
court to conclude that the cost of repairs was reasonable.
In light of our determination that the state’s cumu-
lative evidence was sufficient to support an inference that
the costs of repairs to the victim’s truck were reasonable
under ORS 137.106, we conclude that the trial court did not
err when it imposed the full restitution award that the state
requested.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.