State v. C. C. N. ( 2024 )

224 August 7, 2024 No. 542
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of C. C. N.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
C. C. N.,
Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
22CC06735; A180065
Ann M. Lininger, Judge.
Submitted December 21, 2023.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc. filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Mooney, Judge, and
Hadlock, Senior Judge.
MOONEY, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 334 Or App 224 (2024) 225
226 State v. C. C. N.
MOONEY, J.
In this civil commitment proceeding, appellant
challenges the trial court’s judgment committing him to the
custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to
exceed 180 days based on the court’s determination that he
is a person with mental illness and that, as a result, he is
dangerous to others. Appellant raises three assignments
of error. First, appellant argues that the trial court lacked
probable cause to hold a commitment hearing because it
issued a citation for that hearing before the investigation
required by ORS 426.070(3)(c) was complete, and therefore
should have granted his motion to dismiss. Second, appel-
lant challenges the admission of evidence relating to crim-
inal assaults committed by appellant in 2013 and 2020.
Third, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insuf-
ficient to prove that appellant was a danger to others. We
affirm.
Probable Cause. We review for legal error whether
the trial court complied with the pre-commitment statutes
and whether any non-compliance with the statutes violated
appellant’s due process rights. See State v. K. G., 330 Or App
493, 497, 544 P3d 403 (2024) (reviewing the trial court’s
interpretation of the commitment statutes for legal error);
see also State v. Johansen, 125 Or App 365, 367, 866 P2d 470(1993), rev den, 319 Or 572 (1994) (reviewing a due process
challenge to commitment procedures for errors of law).
Appellant argues that the trial court lacked prob-
able cause to hold the commitment hearing because the
citation issued before the investigator completed the inves-
tigation required by ORS 426.070(3)(c), and, moreover, the
investigator ultimately recommended against a commit-
ment hearing. On that basis, appellant argues that the trial
court should have granted his motion to dismiss. Assuming
without deciding that the trial court violated ORS 426.070(5)
(a) by prematurely issuing the citation, we nevertheless con-
clude that any procedural failure was harmless because it
did not result in appellant’s commitment.
A trial court must initiate an investigation by a
community mental health program upon receiving notice
Cite as 334 Or App 224 (2024) 227
that an individual is alleged to be mentally ill and in need
of treatment. ORS 426.070(3)(c); ORS 426.074. “If the court,
following the investigation, concludes that there is probable
cause to believe that the person investigated is a person with
mental illness, it shall, through the issuance of a citation
* * * cause the person to be brought before it * * * for a hear-
ing * * *.” ORS 426.070(5)(a). The statutory civil commitment
scheme “provides procedural safeguards which satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Dietrich v. Brooks,
27 Or App 821, 828, 558 P2d 357 (1976), rev den, 277 Or 99(1977). While those procedures “aim to ensure due process, it
is not necessarily true that the failure to satisfy those pro-
cedures denies due process[.]” State v. S. R.-N., 318 Or App
154, 161, 506 P3d 492 (2022) (emphasis in original). Thus, to
determine whether there was “a constitutionally significant
deprivation of due process” here, we must assess “the risk
that a procedural failure resulted in the commitment.” Id.In this case, although the trial court may have
prematurely issued a citation before the investigation was
complete, the notice of mental illness describing appel-
lant’s violent behavior, continued delusions, and medica-
tion noncompliance provided the trial court with probable
cause to hold a commitment hearing. Specifically, the notice
described a violent incident in which appellant stabbed a
stranger, who sustained life-threatening injuries, and
which resulted in criminal charges against appellant, as
well as the results of a subsequent aid-and-assist evalua-
tion that concluded that appellant would never be able to aid
and assist in his own defense. The notice further described
appellant’s lack of insight into his mental health, his frus-
tration with taking medication, and a physical altercation
between appellant and another patient at the Oregon State
Hospital. We conclude that that notice provided the trial
court with a substantial objective basis to believe that, more
likely than not, appellant was suffering from a mental ill-
ness. See State v. Smith, 71 Or App 205, 211, 692 P2d 120(1984) (explaining that, in the context of civil commitment
proceedings, probable cause is “a substantial objective basis
for believing that more likely than not a person is mentally
ill”). Even though the investigator ultimately recommended
against a commitment hearing, that recommendation was
228 State v. C. C. N.
not binding on the trial court. See ORS 426.070(4) (“Upon
completion, a recommendation based upon the investigation
report under ORS 426.074 shall be promptly submitted to
the court.” (Emphasis added.)). Therefore, any procedural
failure on the part of the trial court did not prejudice appel-
lant in that the issuance of the citation before the investiga-
tor reported their recommendation did not result in appel-
lant’s commitment. The trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to dismiss on that basis.
Relevancy of Evidence Pertaining to Previous
Assaults. In his second assignment, appellant contends that
the trial court erred by admitting testimony, over appel-
lant’s relevancy objections, pertaining to a 2013 incident in
which appellant assaulted his father and a 2020 incident
in which appellant stabbed a stranger on a bike path. As
appellant acknowledges, under the rules of evidence, rele-
vance is a low threshold: evidence that has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence” is relevant. OEC 401.
We conclude that the evidence pertaining to the
2013 and 2020 assaults was relevant. Both incidents rep-
resent overt acts of violence, and because appellant had
been hospitalized since the 2020 stabbing, that incident in
particular provided the most recent example of appellant’s
tendency to commit violence while unmedicated and in a
delusional state. That evidence logically bears on appel-
lant’s probability to commit violence in the future. See State
v. J. T. C., 284 Or App 38, 40, 392 P3d 754, rev den, 361 Or
645 (2017) (explaining that when a person with a mental
disorder has carried out “an overt violent act in the past
against another person,” that evidence generally constitutes
clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to
others if it “form[s] a foundation for predicting future dan-
gerousness” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the
trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s objections to
the admission of testimony relating to those assaults.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Finally, appellant con-
tends that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that
he was a danger to others because the evidence pertaining
Cite as 334 Or App 224 (2024) 229
to the 2013 and 2020 incidents fails to show a current threat
of serious and highly probable physical harm. We have
reviewed the record and conclude the trial court did not err.
“Whether evidence is legally sufficient to support a
civil commitment is a question of law.” State v. R. L. W., 267
Or App 725, 728, 341 P3d 845 (2014). We are bound by the
trial court’s findings, so long as they are supported by evi-
dence in the record. Id. “[W]e view the evidence, as supple-
mented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences,
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition
and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally
sufficient to permit that outcome.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“To prove that a person is dangerous to others, the
state must establish by clear and convincing evidence a fac-
tual foundation to predict appellant’s future dangerousness
based on his condition at the time of the hearing in the con-
text of his history.” State v. H. M., 307 Or App 246, 250,
475 P3d 133 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]
f a mentally ill person has threatened others and has also
carried out an overt violent act in the past against another
person, those facts generally constitute clear and convincing
evidence that the person is a danger to others.” State v. D.
L. W., 244 Or App 401, 405, 260 P3d 691 (2011). However,
the state cannot carry its burden to establish future dan-
gerousness “based solely on past history without more.” H.
M., 307 Or App at 251. The state must also present “cur-
rent evidence to link [the] appellant’s past behavior to a cur-
rent serious and highly probable threat of harm.” Id. at 252
(emphasis in original).
Here, the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the trial court’s conclusion that appellant is a danger to oth-
ers due to his mental illness. Appellant’s previous assaults
demonstrate the serious violence appellant is capable of
while unmedicated and in a delusional state. Although the
2020 incident occurred approximately two years before the
commitment hearing, the state presented sufficient evi-
dence to link appellant’s past violent behavior to a current
serious and highly probable threat of harm. The trial court
found, and the record supports, that appellant’s delusions
230 State v. C. C. N.
persisted despite treatment and intervention in the Oregon
State Hospital, that appellant demonstrated poor insight
into his mental health and planned to stop taking medica-
tion if he was not required to, and that appellant engaged
in multiple physical altercations with other patients while
hospitalized. The trial court, therefore, did not err in con-
cluding that appellant, because of a mental disorder, is dan-
gerous to others.
Affirmed.