Black v. Metro ( 2024 )

No. 756 October 23, 2024 633
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Darrin BLACK,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
METRO,
a political subdivision of the State of Oregon,
Respondent-Respondent.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
22CV44138; A181559
Michael C. Wetzel, Judge.
Argued and submitted July 2, 2024.
Darrin Black argued and filed the briefs pro se.
Roger A. Alfred argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
634 Black v. Metro
HELLMAN, J.
Plaintiff appeals a general judgment of dismissal
entered after the trial court concluded that his claims for
declaratory relief were barred by claim preclusion.1 Plaintiff
raises one assignment of error and makes several argu-
ments in support of that assignment. We affirm.
“We review the trial court’s conclusions with respect
to preclusion for errors of law. The doctrines of claim preclu-
sion, issue preclusion, and law of the case have the shared
purposes of preventing harassment by successive proceed-
ings, preventing inconsistent adjudications, and promoting
economy of resources in the adjudicative process.” OEA v.
Oregon Taxpayers United, 253 Or App 288, 299-300, 291 P3d
202 (2012) (citations omitted).
This case is before us for a second time. Plaintiff
and defendant, a metropolitan service district, began lit-
igating this case more than 15 years ago. Bleeg v. Metro,
229 Or App 210, 213, 211 P3d 302 (2009), rev den 349 Or
56 (2010), cert den, 563 US 1033 (2011). Because defendant’s
regulations affected plaintiff’s property, plaintiff and other
affected property owners “filed written demands for just
compensation with [defendant].” Id. at 213-14. “After [defen-
dant] denied those claims for just compensation, plaintiffs
filed actions in circuit court pursuant to ORS 197.352(6).”
Id. at 214. Former ORS 197.352 (2005), amended by Or
Laws 2007, ch 424, § 4, renumbered as ORS 195.305 (2007),
amended by Or Laws 2013, ch 279, § 1, was the codification
of Ballot Measure 37 (2004). Id. at 213 n 1. Ballot Measure
37 “provided, generally, that public entities that enacted or
enforced land use regulations that adversely affected the
fair market value of a claimant’s property either had to pay
just compensation or waive the offending regulations.” Id.
“[T]he trial court entered a general judgment that
awarded plaintiffs just compensation in the amount of
$14,818,158.” Id. at 214. Measure 49 (2007) took effect the
next day. Id. That measure “extinguish[ed] and replace[d] the
1
In his 2022 and 2023 filings, appellant identified himself as “Plaintiff/
Petitioner” and respondent as “Defendant/Respondent.” For purposes of this
nonprecedential memorandum opinion, we address appellant as “plaintiff” and
respondent as “defendant.”
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 633 (2024) 635
benefits and procedures that Measure 37 [had] granted to
landowners.” Id. at 213 n 1 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The following day, “the trial court entered corrected gen-
eral judgments that added a money award to the judgment
for each plaintiff.” Id. at 214. Defendant appealed. Id.
We concluded that the cases were not justiciable,
vacated the judgments, and remanded for entry of judg-
ments dismissing the claims. Id. at 217-18. We explained:
“[T]he dispute involving plaintiffs’ Measure 37 claims for
just compensation was ongoing as of the time that Measure
49 became effective—indeed that ongoing dispute about
plaintiffs’ Measure 37 claims for just compensation is the
subject of this appeal. Thus, Measure 49 supersedes those
Measure 37 claims and deprives the trial court’s judgments
in this case of continuing viability.”
Id. at 217.
In 2022, plaintiff filed a petition seeking “declar-
atory judgment and relief, and reinstatement, ratifica-
tion and confirmation of the money judgment previously
entered by the court.” Plaintiff asserted four claims. First,
plaintiff alleged that “the trial court should * * * reaffirm
the basis and merits of the court’s findings and judgments
previously issued by the trial court in spite of the Court of
Appeals’ mandate that the trial court issue a judgment dis-
missing [plaintiff’s] claims” because we had “never reached
a determination of the issues raised on appeal by [defen-
dant].” Second, plaintiff alleged that our decision to vacate
the judgments “without reviewing the merits of [plaintiff’s]
claim and the assignments of errors presented on appeal”
violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions.
Third, plaintiff alleged that we violated his constitutional
rights when we determined that Measure 49 extinguished
his Measure 37 claims. According to plaintiff, his Measure
37 claim “merged into the trial court’s judgments” so defen-
dant’s appeal “did not involve a pending Measure 37 claim.”
Finally, plaintiff alleged that “the trial court’s general judg-
ment and corrected money award issued in this case was
justiciable and not rendered moot.”
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and argued,
among other things, that claim preclusion barred plaintiff’s
636 Black v. Metro
claims. Relying on Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 340
Or 613, 136 P3d 1 (2006), the trial court concluded that the
doctrine of claim preclusion applied, granted defendant’s
motion, and entered a general judgment of dismissal with
prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.
Because they are dispositive, we begin with plain-
tiff’s arguments that his claims are not barred by claim pre-
clusion and that the trial court erred in relying on Lincoln
Loan. “To bring a declaratory judgment action, a plaintiff
must allege that its ‘rights, status or other legal relations are
affected’ by, inter alia, a constitutional provision or statute.”
Id. at 619 (quoting ORS 28.020). As relevant here, “[u]nder
the doctrine of claim preclusion, no party to that action
* * * may subsequently litigate a claim that is encompassed
within that adjudication.” OEA, 253 Or App at 300. A “[c]laim
includes all rights or remedies between the parties with
respect to all or any part of a transaction, or series of con-
nected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[c]laim preclusion does
not require that an issue of law or fact be actually litigated
nor that the determination of an issue be essential to the
final or end result of the proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted and emphasis added).
We conclude that the trial court did not err. The
only claims that plaintiff asserts arise from our decision
that vacated the 2007 judgments. Cf. Lincoln Loan, 340
Or at 619. (“[T]he only claim that plaintiff asserts in its
complaint in this action arises from the Court of Appeals’
reversal of the 1995 judgment and the subsequent entry of
a final judgment in defendant’s favor.”). Further, plaintiff
“seeks to restore the effect” of the 2007 judgments by raising
constitutional challenges that he could have raised before
us or the Supreme Court in the prior case. Id. Therefore,
the trial court did not err when it concluded that, like in
Lincoln Loan, claim preclusion barred plaintiff’s claims. See
id. at 620 (concluding that claim preclusion applied when
the plaintiff raised claims that “could have been raised and
litigated in the prior case.”).
Affirmed.