Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J ( 2024 )

No. 762 October 30, 2024 695
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Krista L. Wilson, Claimant.
Krista L. WILSON,
Petitioner,
v.
SAINT HELENS SCHOOL DISTRICT 29J,
Respondent.
Workers’ Compensation Board
1906100; A177389
Argued and submitted July 12, 2023.
Philip M. Lebenbaum argued the cause for petitioner.
Also on the briefs was Hollander Lebenbaum Gannicott &
Patrick.
Brian M. Solodky argued the cause for and filed the brief
for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Affirmed.
696 Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J
POWERS, J.
Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’
Compensation Board affirming employer’s denial of her
claim for left wrist conditions. In a single assignment of
error, she argues that the board’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence or reason. We have reviewed the record
and conclude that, although there was more than one way to
view the evidence, the board’s order was supported by sub-
stantial evidence and reason. Accordingly, we affirm.
In this case, which involves a typical “battle of the
experts” where doctors disagree as to whether a work inci-
dent was a material cause of the claimant’s injuries, we
briefly summarize the material facts in a manner consistent
with the unchallenged factual findings of the board. See
SAIF v. Maldonado, 294 Or App 252, 253, 430 P3d 580 (2018)
(so stating). In October 2017, claimant was working for the
St. Helens School District as a special education parapro-
fessional that focused on children with significant academic
deficits. During an incident between students in claimant’s
classroom, claimant ended up against a door, pulling on the
door to close it while a student grabbed claimant’s left wrist
and turned and twisted it to attempt to get claimant’s arm
off the door. Following the incident, claimant sought medi-
cal care, and employer accepted an injury claim for cervical
strain and left trapezius strain. In December 2017, claim-
ant reported to her primary care practitioner that her wrist
had been hurting since she originally went to urgent care in
October 2017 and that her wrist was feeling more painful
again with lifting and from using her arm more. Claimant
mentioned her wrist pain to providers several more times.
In June 2018, claimant told her providers that her wrist was
the main issue, and subsequent examinations indicated that
claimant had an ulnar positive variant, which is a congeni-
tal abnormality. In December 2019, Dr. Mirarchi performed
wrist surgery, and he noted several findings, including a tri-
angular fibrocartilage complex (TFCC) tear and cartilage
loss resulting from ulnar/carpal compaction syndrome.
Mirarchi opined that the cartilage loss and TFCC
tear had been caused by claimant’s work injury, because
those injuries typically occur when there is compression on
Cite as 335 Or App 695 (2024) 697
the wrist or a twisting type of injury. Mirarchi acknowl-
edged that there was a significant delay between the work
incident and claimant’s complaints of left wrist symptoms,
and he reasoned that claimant may have been “distracted”
by the pain from her other injuries and that her TFCC tear
probably advanced over time, which made it more painful.
Conversely, Dr. Vu, who had examined claimant in November
2018, prior to the surgery, and reviewed Mirarchi’s report
following the surgery, opined that claimant’s left wrist con-
ditions were more likely caused by her ulnar positive vari-
ant causing the cartilage loss and TFCC tear gradually
over time rather than by an acute injury. Vu explained that
it was not plausible that claimant was “distracted” by her
other injuries because of the significant pain that she would
have experienced due to an acute TFCC tear. Thus, Vu con-
cluded that the wrist conditions were unrelated to the work
incident. Employer ultimately denied claimant’s claim for
her left wrist conditions.
Claimant appealed to the board, which adopted the
administrative law judge’s factual findings and issued an
order affirming the denial of claimant’s claim for her left
wrist conditions. The board concluded that Mirarchi’s opin-
ion that the work injury was the major contributing cause of
claimant’s left wrist conditions was “conclusory and not well
explained and, thus, unpersuasive.” Moreover, the board
explained that Mirarchi’s opinion did not adequately rebut
Vu’s opinion regarding the cause of the tear and the delay
in the onset of left wrist symptoms. The board, therefore,
concluded that the record lacked a persuasive medical opin-
ion establishing the compensability of claimant’s left wrist
conditions.
On review, claimant argues that the board’s conclu-
sion that Mirarchi’s opinion was “conclusory and not well
explained” is not supported by substantial evidence or rea-
son. Specifically, claimant asserts that the conclusion ignores
Mirarchi’s detailed explanation of the well-accepted mecha-
nism of TFCC tears and that those mechanisms occurred in
this case. Moreover, claimant contends that the board’s defer-
ence to Vu’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence
or reason, because Vu provided unexplained, contradictory
698 Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J
histories regarding the onset of symptoms and because she
never discussed whether the mechanisms of the work injury
could have caused the TFCC tear. Employer remonstrates
that the board’s findings and conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence and reason.
We review the board’s order for errors of law and
substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(7), (8); Armstrong v.
Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 205, 752 P2d 312 (1988).
Substantial evidence exists to support a factual finding
“when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a rea-
sonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).
Moreover, a board order must be supported by “substantial
reason.” Taylor v. SAIF, 295 Or App 199, 203, 433 P3d 419
(2018), rev den, 365 Or 194 (2019). If a board order articu-
lates the reasoning that leads from the facts found to the
conclusions drawn, then it is supported by substantial rea-
son. Id.On review, claimant argues that our decision in
Sullivan v. SAIF, 319 Or App 14, 510 P3d 255, rev den, 370
Or 212 (2022), created a “rigorous” standard for reviewing
a board’s order when there is competing medical evidence,
viz., a “battle of the experts.” We disagree that Sullivan
altered the well-established standard of review. In Sullivan,
we determined that the board’s determinations, including
its rejection of the treating physician’s opinion, were not
supported by substantial evidence or reason. Id. at 23-24.
Importantly, however, we do not understand Sullivan to
have changed or altered the standard of review in cases
where there are competing expert opinions. Rather, in our
view, Sullivan represents a case where, in applying our stan-
dard of review, we concluded that the board’s order lacked
substantial evidence and reason in the particular circum-
stances presented by the case. Thus, we apply the oft-cited
standard of review to the undisputed facts in this case.
In applying our standard of review, we conclude
in this case that the board’s order is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and reason. Both Mirarchi and Vu pro-
vided detailed medical reports and opinions regarding the
cause of the TFCC tear and cartilage loss. In particular, Vu
reviewed claimant’s medical history, examined claimant,
Cite as 335 Or App 695 (2024) 699
and opined that the wrist conditions were caused gradu-
ally over time rather than by an acute injury. Moreover, the
board explained that it found Mirarchi’s opinion unpersua-
sive, because Mirarchi acknowledged the delay in the onset
and reporting of symptoms but failed to rebut Vu’s opinion
that an acute tear would have caused significant pain such
that claimant would not have been “distracted” by her other
pain. Thus, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to
support the board’s findings and that the board articulated
its reasoning as to why it was persuaded by Vu’s rather than
Mirarchi’s opinion. We disagree with claimant’s contention
that the board was required to credit Mirarchi’s opinion; the
record did not compel that conclusion as a matter of law.
Although the board could have viewed the evidence in more
than one way, the board’s findings and conclusions are sup-
ported by substantial evidence and reason.
Affirmed.