State v. G. B. ( 2024 )

No. 692 October 2, 2024 289
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of G. B.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
G. B.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
22CC05513; A179656
Rebecca A. Lease, Judge.
Submitted October 23, 2023.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Reversed.
290 State v. G. B.
POWERS, J.
In this civil commitment proceeding, appellant
appeals from a judgment committing him to the Mental
Health Division of the Oregon Health Authority for a period
not to exceed 180 days and an order prohibiting him from
purchasing and possessing a firearm on the basis that he
is a person with a mental disorder and is a danger to him-
self and is unable to provide his basic personal needs. See
ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C); ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A), (B). Appellant
argues in a single assignment of error that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continu-
ance for three reasons: (1) there was insufficient time to pre-
pare for the hearing; (2) when the trial court ruled on the
motion, there was no longer an articulated reason for the
state’s objection; and (3) the court did not provide a reason
for the denial. As explained below, given the totality of the
circumstances before the trial court when it ruled, we con-
clude that the court made a choice outside the permissible
range of discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a
second continuance. Accordingly, we reverse.
ORS 426.095(2)(c) provides that a trial court may,
if there is good cause, postpone a civil commitment hear-
ing for not more than five judicial days to allow more time
to prepare for a hearing. A decision on whether to grant a
postponement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
C. C., 190 Or App 568, 569, 79 P3d 373 (2003). Generally,
a trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a choice
outside the permissible range of choices. See, e.g., Espinoza
v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 359 Or 63, 117, 376 P3d 960
(2016) (explaining that a discretionary decision is legally
impermissible if it is “based on predicate legal conclusions
that are erroneous or predicate factual determinations that
lack sufficient evidentiary support”).
The relevant facts are undisputed and mainly pro-
cedural in nature. Appellant sought and received a one-day
continuance when the civil commitment hearing initially
began around 4:00 p.m. the day before making a motion for
a second continuance. The following morning, which was
a Tuesday, the trial court asked appellant and appellant’s
counsel whether they had an opportunity to consult with
Cite as 335 Or App 289 (2024) 291
each other since the hearing the day before. Appellant told
the court that he needed more time to consult with counsel,
and the trial court granted a brief recess to allow more time
for appellant and his counsel to confer.
When the hearing reconvened about 15 minutes
later, appellant’s counsel made the motion that is the sub-
ject of this appeal: “[Appellant] requests a further continu-
ance. * * * He needs more time to prepare. It’s unclear to me
the medical reasons for which he was transferred from [the
hospital] have been resolved yet. So, [appellant] asks for a
continuance to next Monday if possible.” The state opposed
the motion explaining that the witnesses showed up the
day before and were present for the hearing, but that the
state did not know “how probable it is again to ask them a
third time to please be here.” The state also asked for clar-
ification on the reason for the continuance—whether it was
based on medical reasons or because appellant needed time
to contact witnesses. Appellant clarified that a continuance
was sought for both reasons and further explained that he
needed more time to develop the theory of the case, to pre-
pare defenses, and to talk to possible witnesses. Ultimately,
the trial court deferred ruling on the motion and proceeded
to take evidence from the state’s witnesses and have appel-
lant examined on the record.
During his examination, appellant testified that the
prior witnesses were incorrect. Appellant explained, “I have
records that the schizophrenia and bipolar were on the for-
mer resident there. I have actual factual proof of this in
writing, that that was the other person’s diagnosis, schizo-
phrenia and bipolar. I have PTSD only.” Later, when the
trial court asked if there was anything else it should know,
appellant told the court, “I told you about the medication
and the diagnosis does belong to another client[.] * * * I have
actual proof of that in writing. I do have it, ma’am.”
After completing its questioning of appellant, the
trial court asked if appellant had any witnesses to call.
When appellant told the court that there were no witnesses,
the trial court immediately denied the motion for a continu-
ance without explanation:
292 State v. G. B.
“THE COURT: And [appellant’s counsel], are there
any other witnesses for [appellant]?
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: I am going to rule on the motion to set
over the hearing. That motion is denied. We will go ahead
and take a recess in just a few minutes.”
On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s decision
to deny the motion for a second continuance because there
was insufficient time to prepare for the hearing, there was
no longer a valid objection when the trial court ruled on
the motion, and the trial court failed to provide a reason
for the denial. As explained below, the trial court’s denial
was outside the range of permissible discretion given the
circumstances.
As noted above, the state’s objection to the continu-
ance was only that the hearing had already been postponed
once and it was unclear if the witnesses would show up for a
third time. The court deferred its ruling on the motion and
took evidence from the state’s witnesses. After the state fin-
ished presenting evidence, the court denied the ruling with-
out explanation. We agree with appellant’s argument that
the state’s only objection to the continuance became moot
when the court took evidence from the state’s witnesses.
To the extent that the state argues that appellant’s
reasons for the continuance were too vague, we reject that
argument. As described above, appellant’s initial hearing
was at approximately 4:00 p.m. on a Monday. After the
trial court granted the one-day postponement, there were
less than 20 hours to prepare and investigate appellant’s
medical issues related to his recent transfer. In asking for
the second continuance, appellant explained that he had
not had an opportunity to consult with his counsel between
the hearings. Appellant’s counsel further explained that
appellant wanted an additional continuance because they
needed more time to develop the theory of the case, prepare
defenses, and talk to possible witnesses. Moreover, appel-
lant asserted twice that he believed that testimony from
the state’s witnesses regarding his diagnoses were incor-
rect and that he had documents proving his claim. Thus,
Cite as 335 Or App 289 (2024) 293
we agree with appellant’s arguments that there were valid
reasons for the postponement and that the reasons were not
vague.
The case is similar to C. C., in which we reversed a
civil commitment after accepting the state’s concession and
concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied a motion to postpone a hearing where the appellant’s
attorney offered a valid reason for a postponement, the state
did not oppose it, and the court denied it for no apparent
reason. 190 Or App at 569. In this case, before denying the
motion, the trial court knew that appellant’s request was
based on an insufficient opportunity to contact potential
witnesses and, at the time it denied the request, the court
had appellant’s testimony that questioned the accuracy of
his medical diagnoses. Further, the state’s only articulated
reason for objecting to the motion was moot when the court
made its ruling. Thus, any predicate factual determinations
that could have supported the denial of the motion lacked
sufficient evidentiary support. In short, given the totality of
the circumstances before the trial court when it ruled, we
conclude that the court made a choice outside the permis-
sible range of discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
for a second continuance. Accordingly, we reverse. See State
v. W. A. B., 298 Or App 838, 839 n 1, 445 P3d 952 (2019)
(explaining that, in the context of civil commitment pro-
ceedings, we routinely reverse outright—instead of reverse
and remand—even in the case of procedural errors).
Reversed.