State v. Gentle , 299 Or. App. 508 ( 2019 )


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  •                                    508
    Submitted May 31, 2019, on respondent’s amended motion to dismiss filed
    August 20; appeal dismissed September 18, 2019
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ROBERT R. GENTLE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Lake County Circuit Court
    17CR84978; A166969
    450 P3d 507
    Robert F. Nichols, Jr, Judge.
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
    Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender,
    Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
    Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
    and Shorr, Judge.
    PER CURIAM
    Appeal dismissed.
    Cite as 
    299 Or App 508
     (2019)                                                  509
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals a judgment in which the court
    imposed a sentence of probation. He assigns error to six spe-
    cial conditions of probation, contending that the sentencing
    court erred by imposing the conditions because they were
    not announced in defendant’s presence before they appeared
    in the judgment. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
    While this appeal was pending, defendant’s 18-month
    probation term expired. We asked the parties to notify this
    court of their positions on whether the appeal should be dis-
    missed as moot. Defendant responded that four of his six
    assignments of error “are probably moot” due to the expira-
    tion of his term of probation, but that his first two assign-
    ments of error had not become moot because the challenged
    judgment provisions could have collateral effects. The state
    contends that the appeal is moot, and it moves to dismiss
    the appeal under ORAP 8.45.
    Defendant’s first two assignments of error challenge
    the following provisions of the judgment, which are identi-
    fied as special conditions of probation:
    “Defendant shall:
    “* * * * *
    “Defendant stipulates [sic] to pay restitution to all
    victims.
    “Stipulate to destruction or forfeiture of any seized
    property.”
    Defendant argues that, “[b]ecause the judgment states
    that defendant stipulates to restitution and to destruction
    or forfeiture of any seized property, it will adversely affect
    defendant should the victim file a civil tort claim against
    him or [should] defendant file a civil claim for return of the
    seized property.”1 He contends that “the presumption would
    1
    The phrasing of the first provision could resemble a factual finding—a
    construction which defendant’s argument seems to require—but we construe it,
    consistently with its inclusion in a list expressly identified as special conditions
    of probation, as a probation condition. Our construction matches the way that
    defendant identified this term in his first assignment of error in his opening
    brief. He referred to it as a probation condition requiring him to “ ‘stipulate[ ] to
    pay restitution to all victims.’ ” (Alteration in defendant’s brief.)
    510                                            State v. Gentle
    be that defendant did, in fact, stipulate in open court to pay
    restitution and to forfeit his rights to any seized property,”
    and that, therefore, his first two assignments of error are
    not moot. The state argues that the judgment provisions at
    issue are all probation conditions that have no prospective
    application now that the probation term has expired.
    We agree with the state. The judgment that defen-
    dant appeals did not impose any restitution, and defen-
    dant does not contend that any restitution proceeding has
    occurred in which he was required by the conditions of his
    probation to stipulate to the restitution. Similarly, defendant
    does not contend that any of his property has been seized,
    nor that he was required, during the term of his probation,
    to stipulate to the destruction of that property, or to forfeit
    any property. As conditions of a now-expired term of pro-
    bation, the terms have no further, prospective effect. State
    v. Miller, 
    262 Or App 537
    , 541 n 1, 325 P3d 787 (2014). We
    therefore grant the state’s motion to dismiss.
    Appeal dismissed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A166969

Citation Numbers: 299 Or. App. 508

Filed Date: 9/18/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024