State v. Murphy ( 2020 )


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  •                                    844
    Argued and submitted September 29; convictions on Counts 2, 3, and 5 through
    10 reversed and remanded, otherwise affirmed December 9, 2020
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    TYRONE NEIL MURPHY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Washington County Circuit Court
    18CR29852; A170011
    478 P3d 1018
    Theodore E. Sims, Judge.
    Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
    cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
    Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
    Defense Services.
    Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
    Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General.
    Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
    Mooney, Judge.
    PER CURIAM
    Convictions on Counts 2, 3, and 5 through 10 reversed
    and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
    Cite as 
    307 Or App 844
     (2020)                            845
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy,
    ORS 163.405, second-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.425,
    and first-degree rape, ORS 163.375. The state had charged
    defendant with five counts of first-degree sodomy (Counts 1
    through 3, 7, and 8), four counts of second-degree sexual
    abuse (Counts 4 through 6 and 11), and two counts of first-
    degree rape (Counts 9 and 10). The state dismissed Counts
    1 and 4 before trial, the jury found defendant not guilty on
    Count 11, and it found defendant guilty of the remaining
    counts (Counts 2, 3, and 5 through 10). On appeal, defendant
    assigns error to seven of the trial court’s rulings. We reject
    without written discussion his second, third, and fourth
    assignments of error and write only to address the remain-
    ing assignments of error, which involve only two issues: the
    denial of defendant’s motion to sever and the jury’s return of
    a nonunanimous verdict.
    First, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial
    court erred in denying his motion to sever. It is not neces-
    sary to recount the facts presented at the hearing on the
    motion to sever. In short, defendant argued that he was
    prejudiced by joinder because some portions of the alleged
    victims’ testimony would not be cross-admissible in sepa-
    rate trials under OEC 403, and because joinder would inter-
    fere with his right to testify regarding some charges, but
    not others. With regard to prejudice, defendant concedes
    that the evidence was “sufficiently simple and distinct”
    to avoid the dangers of prejudice resulting from the join-
    der of charges. Because the evidence was admissible for
    the nonpropensity purpose of trying joined charges, State
    v. Miller, 
    327 Or 622
    , 631-34, 
    969 P2d 1006
     (1998), and
    because the evidence was “sufficiently simple and distinct
    to mitigate the dangers created by joinder,” State v. Buyes,
    
    280 Or App 564
    , 570, 382 P3d 562 (2016), defendant was
    not deprived of the protections afforded by the evidence
    code, State v. Gensler, 
    266 Or App 1
    , 9, 337 P3d 890 (2014),
    rev den, 
    356 Or 689
     (2015). Additionally, defendant was
    acquitted of the sole charge for which he sought to testify.
    So, even if we assumed that the court erred by not severing
    the charges because it would compromise his right against
    846                                                       State v. Murphy
    self-incrimination,1 the resulting acquittal on that charge
    provides no basis for a reversal.
    Second, we conclude that the trial court’s accep-
    tance of a nonunanimous jury verdict requires reversal and
    remand for a new trial. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 
    590 US ___
    , 
    140 S Ct 1390
    , 
    206 L Ed 2d 583
     (2020) (concluding that
    nonunanimous jury verdicts violate the Sixth Amendment
    to the United States Constitution); State v. Ulery, 
    366 Or 500
    , 504, 464 P3d 1123 (2020) (concluding that a trial
    court’s acceptance of a nonunanimous verdict constitutes
    plain error and that appellate courts should exercise their
    discretion to correct that plain error). The state concedes,
    and we agree, that the court’s acceptance of nonunanimous
    verdicts on each of the convictions constitutes plain error.
    For the reasons set forth in Ulery, we exercise our discretion
    to correct the error.
    Convictions on Counts 2, 3, and 5 through 10
    reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
    1
    We do not decide, one way or the other, whether the trial court so erred on
    that basis.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A170011

Filed Date: 12/9/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024