State v. Larrazabal ( 2020 )


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  •                                    831
    Argued and submitted October 19; in Case No. 18CR48123, convictions
    on Counts 5 and 6 reversed, remanded for resentencing, otherwise affirmed;
    in Case No. 18CR69378, affirmed December 9, 2020
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CHASE MICHAEL LARRAZABAL,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Washington County Circuit Court
    18CR48123, 18CR69378;
    A169561 (Control), A169562
    478 P3d 1023
    Eric Butterfield, Judge.
    Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
    cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
    Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
    Defense Services.
    E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
    for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
    Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
    Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
    Mooney, Judge.
    PER CURIAM
    In Case No. 18CR48123, convictions on Counts 5 and 6
    reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
    In Case No. 18CR69378, affirmed.
    832                                                   State v. Larrazabal
    PER CURIAM
    In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant
    challenges his convictions in Case No. 18CR48123 for second-
    degree assault, ORS 163.175 (Count 3), and two counts of
    third-degree assault, ORS 163.165 (2017), amended by Or
    Laws 2019, ch 213, § 119 (Counts 5 and 6).1 A detailed dis-
    cussion of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar,
    or the public. Suffice it to say that the convictions at issue
    on appeal arose from an incident in which defendant drove
    recklessly through Beaverton, with police pursuing him,
    weaving in and out of traffic, sometimes into the oncoming
    lane, running stop signs and red lights, exceeding the speed
    limit (at times by almost twice the limit), and, eventually,
    striking a pickup truck from behind, losing control, and
    then colliding with a second vehicle, seriously injuring its
    driver.
    On appeal, defendant first challenges the trial
    court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA)
    on Count 3; we reject that assignment without discussion.
    In his second and third assignments, defendant contends
    that the court erred in denying his MJOAs on Counts 5
    and 6. Those counts charged third-degree assault based on
    defendant “unlawfully and recklessly, under circumstances
    manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
    caus[ing] physical injury to [the victim] by means of a vehi-
    cle, a dangerous weapon.” See ORS 163.165(1)(c) (2017). The
    victim in Count 5 was L, the driver of the pickup; S, his pas-
    senger, was identified as the victim in Count 6.
    Defendant argues that the state failed to prove the
    “physical injury” element of the offenses, in particular, that
    L or S suffered “substantial pain.” See ORS 161.015(7) (defin-
    ing “physical injury” as “impairment of physical condition or
    substantial pain”). To be substantial, the pain subjectively
    experienced by the victim “must be ample or considerable,
    and not fleeting or inconsequential.” State v. Long, 
    286 Or App 334
    , 340, 399 P3d 1063 (2017) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). L testified at trial that he had some muscle
    1
    Defendant does not raise any issues with regard to his other convictions in
    that case or with respect to Case No. 18CR69378.
    Cite as 
    307 Or App 831
     (2020)                                           833
    soreness in his back that night and the next morning, but
    that it had gone away within 30 hours. S described “some
    tenderness” for a couple of days along the site of a recent
    biopsy on her outer thigh, but only “if it was pressed upon.”
    Defendant is correct that, under our case law, that evidence
    is insufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that either L or S suffered substantial
    pain.2 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
    275 Or App 468
    , 469-70,
    364 P3d 353 (2015), rev den, 
    358 Or 833
     (2016) (victim’s tes-
    timony that “she felt a ‘sting’ when defendant slapped her”
    was “insufficient to support a finding of substantial pain”);
    State v. Lewis, 
    266 Or App 523
    , 529-30, 337 P3d 199 (2014)
    (even if factfinder could infer that hair being pulled from
    victim’s head caused her some pain, no evidence that degree
    or duration was sufficient to constitute substantial pain).
    In Case No. 18CR48123, convictions on Counts
    5 and 6 reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise
    affirmed. In Case No. 18CR69378, affirmed.
    2
    Given that conclusion, we need not address defendant’s argument that the
    state also failed to prove the “extreme indifference” element of the offenses.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A169561

Filed Date: 12/9/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024