TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept. , 308 Or. App. 177 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                               177
    Argued and submitted November 6, 2019, reversed and remanded with
    instructions to dismiss petitions December 30, 2020
    TPC, LLC,
    an Oregon limited liability company,
    Petitioner,
    and
    Taylor A. HYDE
    and John L. Hyde,
    as General Partners of the
    Hyde Family Limited Partnership,
    Petitioners-Respondents,
    v.
    OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
    and Danette Watson, in her official capacity
    as District #17 Watermaster,
    Respondents-Respondents,
    and
    KLAMATH TRIBES,
    Intervenor-Appellant.
    TPC, LLC,
    an Oregon limited liability company,
    Petitioner,
    and
    Taylor A. HYDE
    and John L. Hyde,
    as General Partners of the
    Hyde Family Limited Partnership,
    Petitioners-Respondents,
    v.
    OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
    and Danette Watson, in her official capacity
    as District #17 Watermaster,
    Respondents-Appellants,
    and
    KLAMATH TRIBES,
    Intervenor.
    178                             TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    Marion County Circuit Court
    16CV27427, 17CV26962; A167380
    482 P3d 121
    This case involves final orders issued in 2016 and 2017 by the Oregon Water
    Resources Department (OWRD) that curtailed petitioners’ use of their surface
    water rights in the Williamson River, which is located in the Klamath Basin, in
    favor of senior water rights held by the Klamath Tribes and the United States
    as trustee for the Klamath Tribes. The parties’ water rights in the Williamson
    River were established as determined claims in a 2013 OWRD final order that
    adjudicated water right claims in the Klamath Basin. Exceptions to that 2013
    order, including exceptions filed by the parties in this case, are currently on
    review in Klamath County Circuit Court under the process provided for in ORS
    chapter 539. Petitioners sought judicial review of the 2016 and 2017 curtailment
    orders in Marion County Circuit Court, arguing that a provision in a stipulation
    entered into by petitioners, the United States, the Klamath Tribes, and OWRD
    in the Klamath Basin adjudication—a provision that was not incorporated into
    the 2013 adjudication order—prohibited OWRD from issuing the 2016 and 2017
    curtailment orders. Marion County Circuit Court concluded that OWRD was
    subject to the provision in the stipulation, as urged by petitioners, and remanded
    the curtailment orders. Held: Marion County Circuit Court did not have subject
    matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim. Exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
    over the precise claim brought by petitioners was with Klamath County Circuit
    Court under the process in ORS chapter 539.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss petitions.
    Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
    Edmund Clay Goodman argued the cause for appellant
    Klamath Tribes. Also on the briefs was Hobbs Straus Dean
    & Walker LLP.
    Dominic M. Carollo argued the case for respondents John
    L. Hyde and Taylor A. Hyde. Also on the brief were Nathan
    Ratliff and Yockim Carollo LLP.
    Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondents Oregon Water Resources
    Department and Danette Watson. Also on the briefs were
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin
    Gutman, Solicitor General.
    Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, argued
    the cause for appellants Oregon Water Resources
    Department and Danette Watson. Also on the briefs were
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin
    Gutman, Solicitor General.
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                         179
    Dominic M. Carollo argued the case for respondents John
    L. Hyde and Taylor A. Hyde. Also on the brief were Nathan
    Ratliff and Yockim Carollo LLP.
    James A. Maysonett argued the cause on behalf of
    amicus curiae United States. Also on the brief were Billy
    J. Williams, Kelly Zusman, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, and Eric
    Grant.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
    James, Judge.
    ORTEGA, P. J.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss
    petitions.
    180                             TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    ORTEGA, P. J.
    This case involves final orders issued in 2016 and
    2017 by an Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD)
    watermaster1 which curtailed petitioners’2 use of their sur-
    face water right in the Williamson River, which is located in
    the Klamath Basin, in favor of senior water rights held by
    the Klamath Tribes and the United States as trustee for the
    Klamath Tribes. The parties’ water rights were established
    as determined claims in a 2013 OWRD final order that
    adjudicated water right claims in the Klamath Basin. That
    2013 adjudication order is currently on review in Klamath
    County Circuit Court. To settle contests to petitioners’ water
    right claim brought by the United States and the Klamath
    Tribes in that adjudication, petitioners, the United States,
    and the Klamath Tribes entered into a stipulation, which
    OWRD also signed (the Hyde Agreement). The OWRD adju-
    dicator incorporated part of the Hyde Agreement into the
    2013 adjudication order.
    In 2016 and 2017, the Klamath Tribes made a call
    for water to the district watermaster, which led to the orders
    at issue in this case that curtailed petitioners’ use of their
    water right. Petitioners sought judicial review of those cur-
    tailment orders in Marion County Circuit Court, arguing
    that a provision in the Hyde Agreement that the adjudicator
    did not incorporate into the 2013 adjudication order prohib-
    ited OWRD from issuing the curtailment orders. Petitioners
    did not join the Klamath Tribes or the United States in their
    petitions, and the Klamath Tribes intervened for the lim-
    ited purpose of seeking to dismiss the action for failure to
    join the Tribes. Marion County Circuit Court permitted the
    Tribes to intervene but denied the Tribes’ motion to dismiss
    and, on cross-motions for summary judgment by petitioners
    and OWRD, concluded that OWRD was subject to the pro-
    vision in the Hyde Agreement, as urged by petitioners, and
    remanded the curtailment orders.
    1
    OWRD and the watermaster, in her official capacity, are both named par-
    ties in this case. For ease of reference, we refer only to OWRD throughout this
    opinion.
    2
    The parties have stipulated to the dismissal of petitioner TPC, LLC, as a
    respondent on appeal, and it is no longer a party to this case. Our use of the term
    “petitioners” throughout this opinion refers only to the Hyde petitioners.
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                            181
    OWRD appeals from that judgment, arguing that it
    is not bound by the Hyde Agreement. The Klamath Tribes
    also appeal, arguing that Marion County Circuit Court
    erred in denying their motion to dismiss. Additionally, the
    United States filed an amicus brief on appeal, taking up
    the argument made by OWRD below that Marion County
    Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over peti-
    tioners’ claim, because, under ORS chapter 539, exclusive
    jurisdiction for the particular claim they asserted rests in
    Klamath County Circuit Court, where the Klamath Basin
    adjudication order is currently being litigated by the par-
    ties in this case. We conclude that Marion County Circuit
    Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over peti-
    tioners’ claim and, thus, reverse and remand with instruc-
    tions to Marion County Circuit Court to dismiss the
    petitions.
    The relevant background facts are undisputed. In
    2013, under the process set forth in ORS chapter 539, the
    director of OWRD, through an adjudicator, issued a final
    order that adjudicated about 730 surface water right claims
    in the Klamath River Basin (the KBA order). The Klamath
    River Basin adjudication (the KBA or the adjudication)
    included surface water right claims in the Williamson River
    and its tributaries, which feed into Upper Klamath Lake.3
    Petitioners’ determined claim, Claim 33, is “at and near the
    headwaters of the Williamson River” with a priority date in
    1864. The determined claims of the Klamath Tribes and the
    United States, as trustee for the Klamath Tribes, include
    Claims 625 through 629 and 631 through 640, which are
    for instream flows in the Williamson River and its tributar-
    ies, and Claim 623, which is for maintenance of minimum
    water levels in Klamath Marsh, into which the Williamson
    River flows. All of those claims have a priority date of “time
    3
    The KBA order describes the Williamson River:
    “The Williamson River rises in large springs along the toe of Booth
    Ridge in the northeasterly portion of the basin. It flows northward for some
    distance before turning west and entering Klamath Marsh. From Klamath
    Marsh it flows southerly into Upper Klamath Lake. Between Klamath Marsh
    and Upper Klamath Lake, the Williamson has two significant tributaries.
    The first, Spring Creek, which enters the Williamson above the town of
    Chiloquin, exhibits almost constant flow; the second, Sprague River, joins
    the Williamson just sought of Chiloquin.”
    182                            TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    immemorial.” 4 Thus, under the KBA order, the Klamath
    Tribes’ water rights have seniority over petitioners’ water
    right.5 Many parties to the adjudication filed exceptions to
    the KBA order, including petitioners, the United States,
    and the Klamath Tribes, which are discussed below. Those
    exceptions are currently on review in Klamath County
    Circuit Court.
    During the adjudication, the United States and the
    Klamath Tribes contested petitioners’ water right claim
    (Claim 33). In 2005, petitioners, the United States, the
    Klamath Tribes, and OWRD signed a stipulation to settle
    those contests to petitioners’ claim—the Hyde Agreement.
    The Hyde Agreement was a filed document in that contested
    case and is headed with the caption of the contested case,
    case number, claim number, contest numbers, and the plead-
    ing title, “Stipulation to Resolve Contests.” The opening line
    of the document states, “Claimants Dayton and Gerda Hyde
    (‘Claimants’), Contestant United States, and Contestant
    Klamath Tribes (‘Tribes’), collectively referred to as the
    ‘Parties,’ and the Oregon Water Resources Department
    (‘OWRD’), stipulate and agree as follows.” (Footnote omit-
    ted.) After setting forth stipulated facts in section A, the
    Hyde Agreement provides, in part, in section B:
    “1. (a) Claimants, Contestants and OWRD agree
    that Claim 33 should be approved by the Adjudicator as
    described below: [setting out a description of the water
    right]
    “(b) The exercise of the water right described herein
    is subject to maintaining a flow of at least one-half of the
    4
    The Klamath Tribes’ water rights to instream flow in the Williamson River
    watershed to support hunting and fishing were confirmed in its 1864 Treaty with
    the United States and “necessarily carry a priority date of time immemorial.”
    United States v. Adair, 723 F2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir 1983), cert den, 
    467 US 1252
    (1984).
    5
    Once the KBA order issued, OWRD had regulatory authority over the
    adjudicated claims, including authority to regulate junior water users in favor
    of senior water users, as required by Oregon law, which has adopted the prior
    appropriation system. See, e.g., ORS 540.045(1) (describing watermasters’ reg-
    ulation duties); ORS 539.130(4) (providing that OWRD’s determination orders
    are “in full force and effect”); ORS 539.170 (providing that, pending the circuit
    court judgment, division of water on the stream shall be made in accordance with
    OWRD’s determination orders).
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                               183
    total flow in the Williamson River upstream of the current
    north boundary of Claimants’ property * * *. * * *
    “(c) Claimants’ use of their water right upstream of
    the current north boundary of Claimants’ property * * *
    will not be curtailed in favor of any senior water right now
    held or later acquired by the United States or the Klamath
    Tribes. The United States and the Klamath Tribes agree
    that they will not place any call on the Williamson River
    that will result in the curtailment of Claimants’ use of
    water in excess of the principles set forth in paragraph
    B.1.(b), above. To ensure implementation of this provi-
    sion, the United States and the Klamath Tribes hereby
    request that the Adjudicator’s Findings of Fact and Order
    of Determination place a condition implementing the prin-
    ciples set forth in paragraph B.1.(b), above, thereby pre-
    venting exercise, upstream of the current north boundary
    of Claimants’ property, * * * of any rights adjudicated in
    favor of the United States on behalf of the Klamath Tribes
    in Claim No. 633. The United States and the Klamath
    Tribes also request that the same provision be placed on
    any rights adjudicated in favor of the Klamath Tribes with
    respect to the portion of the Klamath Tribes’ Claim No. 612
    that incorporates Claim 633 filed by the United States on
    behalf of the Klamath Tribes.
    “(d) Claimants and Contestants anticipate that it will
    be unnecessary to invoke the provisions of paragraph
    B.1.(b), above, due to the Conservation Easement discussed
    below and attached hereto as Exhibit 2. However, to the
    extent that one or more of the Parties determines that reg-
    ulation of the river is necessary, such regulation will be
    conducted subject to the availability of the watermaster to
    carry out this work. * * *
    “(e) Claimants agree to grant to the Tribes a Con-
    servation Easement on the property above the bound-
    ary described in paragraph B.1.(b). * * * Enforcement of
    any provision of the Conservation Easement will be done
    through proceedings of the Easement itself, and will not
    be cause for filing exceptions in the Circuit Court to the
    Adjudicator’s findings of fact and order of determination.
    ***
    “(f) Claimants also hold Water Right Certificates Nos.
    37002 and 8615. Claimants do not intend to exercise their
    water rights under these Certificates in a manner so as to
    184                      TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    cause depletion of water in the Williamson River in amounts
    greater than those identified in paragraph B.1.(b). To
    ensure that such a result does not occur, Claimants hereby
    file Affidavits of Diminution with OWRD, and request that
    Certificate Nos. 37002 and 8615 be diminished in accor-
    dance therewith. * * *
    “(g) Claimants also agree that they will not exercise
    any water rights that they may hereafter acquire or receive
    in such a manner so as to cause depletion of water in the
    Williamson River in amounts greater than those identi-
    fied in paragraph B.1.(b). To ensure that such a result does
    not occur, claimants hereby agree to make appropriate
    requests to OWRD to place conditions on such right(s) nec-
    essary to prevent such exercise.
    “2. The Parties agree that under the terms and provi-
    sions of this Stipulation, the Contests have been satisfacto-
    rily resolved, and such resolution ends the need for further
    proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge on the
    Contests.
    “3. Based on the Stipulation of the Parties that Claim
    33 and the Contests can be resolved without the need for
    further proceedings, OWRD adjudication staff hereby rec-
    ommends to the Adjudicator that Claim 33 be withdrawn
    from the Office of Administrative Hearings. OWRD adjudi-
    cation staff further recommends that Claim 33 be approved
    in the Findings of Fact and Order of Determination issued
    by the Adjudicator in accordance with the terms of Section
    B.1. above.
    “4. If the Finding[s] of Fact and Order of Determination
    issued by the Adjudicator for Claim 33 does not conform to
    the terms set forth in paragraph B.1., above, the Parties
    reserve any rights they may have to file exceptions to the
    Findings of Fact and Order of Determination as to Claim
    33 in the Circuit Court for Klamath County, and reserve
    any rights they may have to participate in any future pro-
    ceedings authorized by law concerning Claim 33.”
    In the determination order for Claim 33, the adju-
    dicator determined with respect to the Hyde Agreement as
    follows:
    “The [Hyde] Agreement executed between the Claimants,
    OWRD, the United States of America, and the Klamath
    Tribes is adopted and incorporated as if set forth fully
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                              185
    herein, with the exception of paragraphs B.1.(c), B.1.(d),
    B.1.(e), B.1.(f), and B.1.(g); these paragraphs are not perti-
    nent to the determination of a water right claim.”
    Thus, the KBA order established petitioners’ water right as
    described in the Hyde Agreement in B.1.(a) and with the
    limitation set out in B.1.(b), which was incorporated into the
    determined water right as a “further limitation.” However,
    none of the other paragraphs in section B.1. were incorpo-
    rated into any water right established under the KBA order.
    As noted above, petitioners, the United States,
    and the Klamath Tribes filed exceptions to the KBA order.
    Petitioners filed exceptions to the Tribes’ established claims
    in the Williamson River, taking exception to the omission
    of a limitation on the Tribes “to not exercise the rights held
    or acquired by [the Tribes] in a manner that will curtail
    [petitioners’] exercise of the rights held by them as described
    and limited in” the Hyde Agreement. As relevant here, the
    United States filed exceptions to petitioners’ established
    claim, excepting to parts of the determination as unsup-
    ported in the record, and the Tribes filed a request to also be
    heard on the United States’ exception. The exceptions to the
    KBA order are currently being litigated in Klamath County
    Circuit Court.
    In 2016 and 2017, the Klamath Tribes called on the
    OWRD watermaster for the district to enforce the Tribes’
    senior water rights in the upper Williamson River and
    Klamath Marsh, because instream flows and water levels
    in the marsh were below or projected to fall below the estab-
    lished levels for the Tribes’ claims. See ORS 540.045 (duties
    of watermasters). The watermaster then issued final orders
    in other than contested cases in 2016 and 2017 that ordered
    petitioners to cease all use of water from the Williamson
    River. Those are the orders at issue in the case. Petitioners
    sought review of those orders in Marion County Circuit
    Court under ORS 536.0756 and ORS 183.484, which governs
    6
    ORS 536.075 provides, in part:
    “(1) Any party affected by a final order other than contested case issued
    by the Water Resources Commission or Water Resources Department may
    appeal the order to the Circuit Court of Marion County or to the circuit court
    of the county in which all or part of the property affected by the order is
    186                             TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    judicial review of final orders in other than contested cases.
    Petitioners sought review on the basis that OWRD was
    barred by the Hyde Agreement from enforcing the Klamath
    Tribes’ call for water.7 We describe petitioners’ petitions in
    more detail below in our analysis.
    The Klamath Tribes filed a limited motion to inter-
    vene for the purpose of bringing a motion to dismiss for fail-
    ure to join the Tribes in the petitions as a necessary and
    indispensable party that cannot be joined due to its sover-
    eign immunity. Marion County Circuit Court granted that
    limited motion to intervene, but denied the Klamath Tribes’
    motions to dismiss, concluding that the Tribes are not an
    indispensable party.8 OWRD also brought a motion to dis-
    miss, arguing that Marion County Circuit Court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction, because exclusive jurisdiction
    rested in Klamath County Circuit Court, where the excep-
    tions to the KBA order were being heard. Marion County
    Circuit Court denied that motion.
    During the litigation of the Klamath Tribes’ motion
    to dismiss, petitioners for the first time asserted that the
    Hyde Agreement was an enforceable “rotation agreement”
    under ORS 540.150 and OAR 690-250-0080.9 As a result,
    situated. The review shall be conducted according to the provisions of ORS
    183.484, 183.486, 183.497 and 183.500. * * *
    “* * * * *
    “(7) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any proceeding
    under ORS 537.670 to 537.695 or ORS chapter 539.”
    7
    Petitioners also alleged a claim for relief on the basis that OWRD’s enforce-
    ment of the Klamath Tribes’ call for water was futile under OAR 690-250-0020.
    Petitioners dropped that claim from both of their petitions.
    8
    Petitioners’ 2016 and 2017 petitions for judicial review of the curtailment
    orders raised nearly identical claims, and the Klamath Tribes brought identical
    motions to intervene and to dismiss in those proceedings. Marion County Circuit
    Court later consolidated the review of the 2016 and 2017 curtailment orders,
    resulting in a general judgment for both matters.
    9
    ORS 540.150 provides:
    “To bring about a more economical use of the available water supply,
    water users owning lands to which are attached water rights may rotate in
    the use of the supply to which they may be collectively entitled. Whenever two
    or more water users notify the watermaster that they desire to use the water
    by rotation, and present a written agreement as to the manner of rotation,
    the watermaster shall distribute the water in accordance with the written
    agreement.”
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                               187
    the Tribes provided notice to the OWRD watermaster that
    it was voluntarily terminating any such claimed rotation
    agreement, as allowed by OAR 690-250-0080(2). The United
    States also provided an acknowledgement of the Tribes’ ter-
    mination and provided its own notice of termination to the
    watermaster.
    Petitioners and OWRD then filed cross-motions
    for summary judgment. OWRD reasserted its argument
    that Marion County Circuit Court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim and, separately, argued
    that OWRD could not be compelled to enforce a provision
    in the Hyde Agreement. Petitioners argued that the Hyde
    Agreement was a written agreement for the distribution of
    water (a “rotation agreement”) under ORS 540.150 that the
    watermaster had to follow and that OWRD had agreed in
    writing to not enforce a call for water by the Tribes against
    petitioners. Marion County Circuit Court denied OWRD’s
    motion and granted petitioners’ motion. That court entered
    a general judgment that provided, in relevant part:
    “2. The Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to ORS
    183.484, to review the 2016 and 2017 Final Orders
    OAR 690-250-0080 provides:
    “(1) Appropriators may rotate use of the supply to which they may be
    collectively entitled. The nature of potential agreements are subject to the
    limitations in section (3) of this rule.
    “(2) An agreement shall identify the duration of the agreement which
    shall be no less than one irrigation season. The agreement shall not be ter-
    minated within an irrigation season, and the rotation agreement shall be
    signed by all participants and dated. A copy of the agreement shall be filed
    with the watermaster for the area. Unless the rotation agreement provides
    otherwise, any member of the agreement may notify the watermaster after
    the end of the irrigation season, and before the beginning of the next season’s
    use, that they are terminating the agreement.
    “(3) A watermaster shall distribute water only under those enforceable
    agreements that include the provisions of section (2) of this rule. A water-
    master shall not implement a rotation agreement that violates existing water
    statutes, court decrees, instream water rights, minimum flows, other rules
    of the Commission, or interferes with the rights of any appropriator not a
    member of such agreement. If distribution of water by the rotation agreement
    requires substantially more of the watermaster’s time than distribution
    among the relative priorities, then the watermaster may require payment by
    the appropriators for an assistant watermaster, as described in ORS 540.100.
    “(4) The agreement may contain language describing how a call from
    an appropriator or minimum flow senior to one or more appropriators in the
    rotation will be honored.”
    188                      TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    providing that Petitioners could not divert water from the
    Williamson River in 2016 and 2017.
    “3. OWRD is a party to the Hyde Agreement and is
    bound by its terms.
    “4. The Hyde Agreement qualifies as a rotation agree-
    ment pursuant to ORS 540.150 and OAR 690-250-0080.
    “5. As a contract signed by the agency, the Hyde
    Agreement is a final order as defined in ORS 183.310(6)(b).
    “6. The Hyde Agreement is enforceable by OWRD, both
    (1) as a rotation agreement pursuant to ORS 540.150 and
    OAR 690-250-0080 and, independently, (2) as a final order
    under ORS 183.310(6)(b) that is binding on OWRD.
    “* * * * *
    “8. The Final Orders are unlawful because they violate
    the terms of the Hyde Agreement.
    “* * * * *
    “13. The 2016 and 2017 Final Orders are hereby
    REMANDED to OWRD WITH INSTRUCTIONS that
    OWRD comply with the terms of the Hyde Agreement,
    such that, so long as the Hyde’s use of their water rights
    does not exceed one-half of the total flow in Williamson
    River upstream of the north boundary of Claimants’ prop-
    erty, OWRD will not enforce any water rights now held
    or later acquired by the United States or the Klamath
    Tribes, except as provided for under Section B.1.(d) of the
    Hyde Agreement, if enforcement of such water rights would
    result in curtailment of the Hyde’s use of their water right
    upstream of the current north boundary of their property,
    as described in the Hyde Agreement.”
    In addressing the appeal of that judgment, we begin
    with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. “Subject matter
    jurisdiction is the authority to deal with the general subject
    involved.” State v. Murga, 
    291 Or App 462
    , 466, 422 P3d 417
    (2018). “Subject matter jurisdiction exists when the consti-
    tution, the legislature, or the common law has directed a
    specific court to do something about a specific kind of dis-
    pute.” 
    Id.
     “Circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction
    over all actions, unless a statute or rule of law divests them
    of jurisdiction.” 
    Id.
     A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can
    be raised at any time. 
    Id. at 465
    . “If a court lacks subject
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                              189
    matter jurisdiction over a claim brought before it, it must dis-
    miss the proceeding.” Kleikamp v. Board of Commissioners
    of Yamhill County, 
    301 Or App 275
    , 282, 455 P3d 546 (2019).
    Here, the issue is whether Marion County Circuit
    Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because exclusive
    jurisdiction to decide the precise issue raised by the peti-
    tions for judicial review of the curtailment orders rested
    in Klamath County Circuit Court, where the KBA judicial
    review was already ongoing. To address that issue, we first
    provide an overview of the applicable statutory provisions.
    As described, this case involves enforcement of the
    distribution of water on the Williamson River, which was
    done through the watermaster’s curtailment orders, which,
    in turn, were OWRD final orders in other than contested
    cases. ORS 536.075(1). For such final orders, ORS 536.075
    provides that a “party affected by a final order other than
    contested case” may appeal that order in Marion County
    Circuit Court, or in the court where the affected property
    is located, and that “[t]he review shall be conducted accord-
    ing to the provisions of ORS 183.484, 183.486, 183.497 and
    183.500.” ORS 536.075(1). ORS 536.075(5) provides that the
    filing of the petition for judicial review stays enforcement of
    the order, “unless the commission or the department deter-
    mines that substantial public harm will result if the order is
    stayed.” The review provided for in ORS 536.075 “shall not
    apply to any proceeding under ORS 537.670 to 537.695 or
    ORS chapter 539.” ORS 536.075(7).
    The KBA and judicial review of the KBA order are
    governed by ORS chapter 539, which provides the procedure
    for general stream adjudications, such as the KBA. See ORS
    539.005(1) (“The Legislative Assembly declares that it is
    the purpose of this chapter to set forth the procedures for
    carrying out a general stream adjudication in Oregon.”). As
    such, the determinations from the KBA cannot be reviewed
    under the review mechanism provided for in ORS 536.075.
    Instead, ORS chapter 539 sets out the exclusive judicial
    review mechanism for such an order. As part of the notice
    OWRD must provide to claimants or other parties of the
    right to inspect evidence for a general stream adjudica-
    tion, the OWRD “shall also state in the notice the county
    190                     TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    in which the determination will be heard by the circuit
    court; provided, that the cause shall be heard in the county
    in which the stream or some part thereof is situated.” ORS
    539.090. Then, after the OWRD issues an order of determi-
    nation of the water rights to the stream, such as the KBA
    order, OWRD is required to gather all the original evidence
    and file it with the order in the circuit court “wherein the
    determination is to be heard.” ORS 539.130(1). Upon that
    filing, that court is to issue an order for a hearing on the
    determination, notice of which OWRD is to provide to all
    claimants. ORS 539.130(2) - (3). Unlike for judicial review
    under ORS 536.075, for stream adjudications under ORS
    chapter 539, “[t]he determination of the [OWRD] shall be
    in full force and effect from the date of entry in the records
    of [OWRD], unless [stayed by a bond under] ORS 539.180.”
    ORS 539.130(4).
    ORS 539.150 governs the court proceedings to
    review OWRD’s determination. It provides in relevant part
    that “the proceedings shall be like those in an action not
    triable by right to a jury” and, “[a]t any time prior to the
    hearing provided for in ORS 539.130, any party or parties
    jointly interested may file exceptions in writing to the find-
    ings and order of determination, or any part thereof, which
    exceptions shall state with reasonable certainty the grounds
    and shall specify the particular paragraphs or parts of the
    findings and order excepted to.” ORS 539.150(1). “After final
    hearing the court shall enter a judgment affirming or modi-
    fying the order of the director as the court considers proper,
    * * * [and] [a]n appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals
    from the judgment in the same manner and with the same
    effect as in other cases in equity.” ORS 539.150(4).
    ORS chapter 539 further provides that, “[w]hile
    the hearing of the order of the Water Resources Director
    is pending in the circuit court, and until a certified copy of
    the judgment, order or decree of the court is transmitted to
    the director, the division of water from the stream involved
    in the appeal shall be made in accordance with the order of
    the director.” ORS 539.170. Thus, under ORS chapter 539,
    unlike under ORS 536.075, the KBA order and the deter-
    minations made in that order are not automatically stayed
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                                 191
    pending judicial review and are required to be enforced by
    the OWRD until the circuit court judgment issues. See also
    ORS 539.130(4) (“The determination of the [OWRD] shall be
    in full force and effect from the date of entry in the records
    of [OWRD], unless [stayed by a bond under] ORS 539.180.”).
    Here, petitioners filed petitions for judicial review
    in Marion County Circuit Court for review of the curtail-
    ment orders, which were final orders in other than contested
    cases. As such, jurisdiction to review those orders typically
    lies with Marion County Circuit Court under ORS 536.075,
    which is what that court held in this case. That, however,
    does not resolve the jurisdictional issue here presented,
    which is whether the subject matter of the petitions herein
    was nonetheless within the scope of the exclusive jurisdic-
    tion of Klamath County Circuit Court, as provided in ORS
    chapter 539, because petitioners’ claims were bound up with
    the KBA, a proceeding under ORS chapter 539.10
    We first recognize that that question presents an
    issue of subject matter jurisdiction that is different from
    how we would typically discuss subject matter jurisdiction
    in the circuit courts, which are courts of general jurisdic-
    tion. That is so, because the statutes create exclusive juris-
    diction by way of a special proceeding in a particular circuit
    court, instead of by way of a forum that is distinct from the
    circuit courts. Under ORS chapter 539, once a stream adju-
    dication is initiated, the special judicial review mechanism
    10
    We note that subject matter jurisdiction is the appropriate lens with which
    to view this case and not venue. “Jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to act
    whereas ‘venue concerns the particular location where it is appropriate for the
    court to exercise that authority.’ ” Dept. of Human Services v. R. M. S., 
    280 Or App 807
    , 810, 383 P3d 417 (2016) (quoting Kohring v. Ballard, 
    355 Or 297
    , 312, 325 P3d
    717 (2014)). ORS chapter 539 contains both jurisdictional and venue aspects—
    that is, it both creates an exclusive judicial process in a particular circuit court
    for the stream adjudication and provides which circuit court is the appropriate
    location for that judicial process to occur. See generally ORS chapter 539 (provid-
    ing exclusive process for stream adjudications); see also ORS 536.075(7) (remov-
    ing stream adjudications from circuit court judicial review under ORS 536.075);
    ORS 539.090 (providing that the proper location for the circuit court determina-
    tion in a stream adjudication is the county in which the stream is located). This
    case, however, is not about whether petitioners chose the proper location for their
    claim—an issue of venue. It is about whether Marion County Circuit Court could
    hear that claim at all—an issue of subject matter jurisdiction—because that
    claim fell within the exclusive stream adjudication process for which jurisdiction
    had been established in Klamath County Circuit Court under ORS chapter 539.
    192                     TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    that is required by that adjudication process is noticed to
    occur in a particular, identified circuit court. ORS 539.090.
    And, once that particular court is identified, subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction for that stream adjudication can only be in
    that identified court, ORS 539.130, because, at the same
    time, the legislature has divested all of the circuit courts
    of the general judicial review mechanism for agency orders,
    ORS 536.075(7), with respect to any proceeding under ORS
    chapter 539. Thus, to state it more simply, under ORS
    chapter 539, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for a
    stream adjudication is vested in a particular circuit court
    once the stream adjudication process under that chapter is
    initiated.
    In this case, the parties appear to generally agree
    that Klamath County Circuit Court has exclusive subject
    matter jurisdiction to review the KBA order. We also con-
    clude that that is the correct view under the controlling stat-
    utes, as explained above. The more critical issue, and the
    one on which the parties do not agree, is whether the subject
    matter of this case, which was initiated in Marion County
    Circuit Court as a judicial review of an agency order in an
    other than contested case, nonetheless falls within Klamath
    County Circuit Court’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
    in the KBA. Our case law in the land use context provides
    useful guidance for answering that question.
    There are two parallel review mechanisms in the
    land use context that can present a subject matter juris-
    diction issue akin to the one presented here. Under ORS
    197.825, jurisdiction over land use matters is divided
    between the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) and the
    circuit courts. LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction to review
    “any land use decision or limited land use decision of a local
    government.” ORS 197.825(1). The circuit courts retain
    jurisdiction of enforcement actions to enforce LUBA’s orders
    and for “declaratory, injunctive or mandatory relief,” to
    enforce a comprehensive plan or land use regulation. ORS
    197.825(3). “In effect, ORS 197.825 draws a ‘jurisdictional
    line’ between ‘the land use decision and review process and
    the enforcement process.’ ” Flight Shop, Inc. v. Leading Edge
    Aviation, Inc., 
    277 Or App 638
    , 643-44, 373 P3d 177 (2016)
    (quoting Clackamas County v. Marson, 
    128 Or App 18
    , 22,
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                            193
    
    874 P2d 110
    , rev den, 
    319 Or 572
     (1994)). Although not a per-
    fect analogy, that line is similar to the line we must draw in
    this case—between the exclusive review process for stream
    adjudications under ORS chapter 539 and review of orders
    in other than contested cases under ORS 536.075, such as
    the curtailment orders in this case.
    In determining where to draw that line in the land
    use context, we have held that a circuit court lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction to decide an enforcement action when the
    substance of the claim brought involves issues that are sub-
    ject to an ongoing land use decisional process, or could have
    been brought in a prior land use decisional process. In Flight
    Shop, Inc., the defendant had sought and obtained county
    approval for a refueling station. The plaintiff appealed that
    approval to LUBA, which remanded for further proceedings.
    While those proceedings were ongoing, the plaintiff sought
    enforcement of the land use regulations against the defen-
    dant in circuit court seeking injunctive relief and statutory
    fines on the basis that the defendant did not have required
    approval for the refueling station, and, separately, to force
    removal of a canopy built over the fuel tanks, which was
    not made part of the site plan. 
    277 Or App at 646, 648
    . The
    circuit court determined that it lacked subject matter juris-
    diction over the enforcement action, and we agreed.
    We explained that the dispute over the approval
    of the refueling station was pending before the county
    and could again be appealed to LUBA. As such, it was a
    land use decision matter for the county or LUBA, but not
    the circuit court. 
    Id. at 646
    . We noted that the plaintiff’s
    requested remedies of an injunction to prevent defendant
    from operating its fueling station and an order to remove
    the fuel tanks “underscore the impropriety of circuit court
    intervention,” because whether or not such remedies would
    be proper would have required predicting the outcome of
    the land use decisional process. 
    Id. at 646-47
    . Similarly, we
    concluded that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
    consider the canopy, because it was built after the defendant
    obtained a building permit for it—a land use decision that
    the plaintiff could have challenged when it was issued on the
    basis that it was not made part of the defendant’s site plan.
    
    Id. at 648
    .
    194                      TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    Similarly, in Rogue Advocates v. Board of Comm. of
    Jackson County, 
    277 Or App 651
    , 661, 372 P3d 587 (2016),
    rev dismissed, 
    362 Or 269
     (2017), we concluded that the cir-
    cuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim
    in a land use enforcement action that sought injunctive
    relief to halt “illegal” operations. In that case, “[a]t the time
    that plaintiff filed their enforcement action, the land use
    decisional process had yet to determine * * * which activi-
    ties were unlawful alterations of a lawful nonconforming
    use and which of the structures were unlawful for want
    of a floodplain development permit.” 
    Id.
     The plaintiff thus
    sought to interject the circuit court into determining what
    was an “illegal” operation, which was part of the ongoing
    land use decisional process.
    Returning to this case, to determine whether
    Marion County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction
    to review petitioners’ claim, we begin with the allegations
    and requested relief in the petitions as viewed through the
    lens of Oregon’s water law. Under Oregon’s prior appropria-
    tion system, regulating water rights depends on the priority
    date of respective water rights. When there is a shortage
    of water, the senior water right holder is entitled to receive
    their entire share of water before the next most senior water
    right holder can receive their share, and so on. See Benz v.
    Water Resources Commission, 
    94 Or App 73
    , 81, 
    764 P2d 594
    (1988) (“[U]nder the law of prior appropriations, see, e.g., ORS
    537.120, a senior appropriator who applies water to a benefi-
    cial use and thereafter continues to do so holds a water right
    that is superior to any water right obtained by a subsequent
    junior appropriator.”). This system of water regulation is
    enforced though OWRD’s watermasters, who, among other
    duties, must “[r]egulate the distribution of water among the
    various users of water from any natural surface or ground
    water supply in accordance with the users’ existing water
    rights of record in the Water Resources Department.” ORS
    540.045(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also ORS 540.045(4) (“As
    used in this section, ‘existing water rights of record’ includes
    all completed permits, certificates, licenses and ground
    water registration statements filed under ORS 537.605 and
    related court decrees.”); ORS 539.170 (“While the hearing
    of the order of the Water Resources Director is pending in
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                  195
    the circuit court, and until a certified copy of the judgment,
    order or decree of the court is transmitted to the director,
    the division of water from the stream involved in the appeal
    shall be made in accordance with the order of the director.”).
    In accordance with that duty, the OWRD, through the dis-
    trict watermaster, issued the curtailment orders in this
    case.
    In their second amended petition challenging the
    2016 order, petitioners asserted a single claim for relief
    based on the Hyde Agreement, which was attached as an
    exhibit. That claim for relief alleged, in relevant part:
    “20. The [Hyde Agreement], Exhibit B, prohibits the
    exercise of the water rights that [OWRD], through issuance
    of the Final Orders, are enforcing.
    “21. [OWRD] ha[s] made no investigation of the cur-
    rent flow of the Williamson River on Petitioners’ land, or
    the flow of the Williamson River at the point where it exits
    Hyde Partnership’s land. [OWRD] ha[s] failed to make any
    determination of whether under the terms of the [Hyde
    Agreement] the Klamath Tribes and United States have a
    right to make a call for enforcement of the Order. [OWRD]
    ha[s] failed to make any determination that [OWRD] ha[s]
    the authority under the terms of Oregon law and the [Hyde
    Agreement] to enforce the water rights of the Klamath
    Tribes and United States in a manner that prevents [peti-
    tioners] from diverting and putting to beneficial use one
    half of the total flow of the Williamson River.
    “22. Pursuant to ORS 540.150, OAR 690-240-0080,
    [governing “rotation agreements”] and the common law,
    [OWRD is] required to distribute water in accordance
    with written agreements between water users * * * [and]
    [p]ursuant to those authorities, [OWRD is] prohibited from
    enforcing the Klamath Tribes’ and United States’ provi-
    sional water rights in a manner inconsistent with the
    [Hyde Agreement].
    “23. [OWRD’s] actions in issuing the Final Orders and
    alleged enforcement of the water rights of the Klamath
    Tribes and United States in the Upper Williamson River
    violate the [Hyde Agreement] between the parties and
    OWRD, was outside the range of discretion delegated to the
    agency by law; and/or inconsistent with an agency rule, an
    officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice;
    196                      TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    and/or otherwise in violation of a statutory provision; and/
    or not supported by substantial evidence.”
    In their amended petition challenging the 2017
    order, petitioners also asserted a single claim for relief
    based on the Hyde Agreement, which was attached as an
    exhibit. That petition alleged the identical allegations
    found in paragraphs 20 and 21 set out above. Additionally,
    the petition alleged that OWRD’s “actions in issuing the
    Final Orders and alleged enforcement of the water rights
    of the Klamath Tribes and United States in the Upper
    Williamson River violate the [Hyde Agreement] between
    the parties and OWRD, and is not supported by substantial
    evidence.”
    Petitioners sought substantively the same relief in
    both petitions, which was described in the 2016 petition as
    follows:
    “A. A declaration that the Final Orders and the enforce-
    ment of the Final Orders violated the terms of the [Hyde
    Agreement], was outside the range of discretion delegated
    to the agency by law; and/or inconsistent with an agency
    rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency
    practice; and/or otherwise in violation of a statutory provi-
    sion; and/or not supported by substantial evidence;
    “B. A judgment reversing, setting aside, and/or vacat-
    ing the Final Orders;
    “C. An injunction prohibiting [OWRD] from enforcing
    any call for water to fulfill the United States’ provisional
    water rights, when the effect of the enforcement of those
    water rights violates, or would violate, the terms of the
    [Hyde Agreement].
    “D. An award of Petitioners’ reasonable attorney fees
    and costs pursuant to ORS 183.497;
    “E. And such other relief the Court deems just and
    equitable.”
    Petitioners additionally sought in their 2017 petition “[a]n
    injunction prohibiting [OWRD] from enforcing a call for
    water to fulfill the United States’ water right for minimum
    elevation levels for the Klamath Marsh.”
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                              197
    The core claim in the petitions is that OWRD could
    not enforce the United States’ and Klamath Tribes’ water
    rights according to the terms of those rights in the KBA
    order, but rather was required to enforce them, if at all, as
    set out in paragraph B.1.(c) (the no-call provision) of the Hyde
    Agreement. The relief petitioners sought further lays bare
    that core claim, because petitioner sought declarations and
    injunctions prohibiting OWRD from enforcing the United
    States’ and Klamath Tribes’ water rights in any manner
    other than according to the terms of the Hyde Agreement.
    That claim, and its requested relief, however, is
    irreconcilably bound up with the KBA, because it required
    Marion County Circuit Court to decide whether the Hyde
    Agreement placed a limitation on the Klamath Tribes’
    KBA-determined water right claims. The KBA adjudicator
    had already rejected that notion, concluding that the no-call
    provision in the Hyde Agreement was “not pertinent to the
    determination of a water right claim.” That decision is cur-
    rently on review before Klamath County Circuit Court in its
    review of the KBA order.
    That petitioners were asking Marion County Circuit
    Court to interject itself into the water right determination
    process under ORS chapter 539 is made more apparent by
    the statutes that OWRD is required to follow pending the
    KBA order judicial review process. OWRD, and its water
    masters, are required by statute to regulate the distribu-
    tion of water according to the water rights on record and
    the OWRD’s stream determination orders. ORS 540.045(1);
    ORS 539.170. Outside of a rotation agreement, as provided
    in ORS 540.150, the statutes do not allow OWRD to regu-
    late the distribution of water according to anything that is
    not part of the water rights on record (as defined by ORS
    540.045(4)) and stream determination orders, of which the
    no-call provision in the Hyde Agreement was not. Thus,
    petitioners were calling on Marion County Circuit Court to
    make water right determinations with respect to the United
    States’ and Klamath Tribes’ water rights claims made in
    the KBA, which it could not do, because the jurisdiction to
    do so rests solely with Klamath County Circuit Court under
    ORS chapter 539.
    198                            TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    Further, even if petitioners’ allegation in its 2016
    petition that the Hyde Agreement is a rotation agreement11
    is separately parsed out from their single claim, that allega-
    tion does not lead to a different result, because the allegation
    contains no facts that would bring the claim within Marion
    County Circuit Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, having
    only made an assertion of law—that the Hyde Agreement
    is an enforceable rotation agreement. The alleged facts to
    support that claim can only be found within the four cor-
    ners of the Hyde Agreement, which was attached to the peti-
    tion. The text of the Hyde Agreement is plainly not separa-
    ble from the KBA, whether it is characterized as a rotation
    agreement or something else.
    To begin with, the Hyde Agreement was a filed
    document in the contested case for petitioners’ Claim 33
    in the KBA, having the case caption—which was entitled
    “Stipulation to Resolve Contests”—as the heading for the
    agreement. The heart of the document, section B, set forth
    the agreement. As discussed in the fact section, section B.1.(a)
    set forth the agreement that Claim 33 should be approved
    by the adjudicator as described in the Hyde Agreement, and
    section B.1.(b) set forth the agreed limitations on petition-
    ers’ exercise of their water right. Those two provisions were
    incorporated into the KBA order as to petitioners’ deter-
    mined water right claim, which is currently subject to pend-
    ing exceptions before Klamath County Circuit Court.
    Section B.1.(c), also called the no-call provision and
    the basis of petitioners’ claim in this case, provided that it
    was to be implemented by requesting that the adjudicator
    adopt a limitation on the exercise of the United States’ and
    Klamath Tribes’ Claim 633:
    “(c) Claimants’ use of their water right upstream of
    the current north boundary of Claimants’ property * * *
    11
    Again, ORS 540.150 provides:
    “To bring about a more economical use of the available water supply,
    water users owning lands to which are attached water rights may rotate in
    the use of the supply to which they may be collectively entitled. Whenever two
    or more water users notify the watermaster that they desire to use the water
    by rotation, and present a written agreement as to the manner of rotation,
    the watermaster shall distribute the water in accordance with the written
    agreement.”
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 177
     (2020)                                199
    will not be curtailed in favor of any senior water right now
    held or later acquired by the United States or the Klamath
    Tribes. The United States and the Klamath Tribes agree
    that they will not place any call on the Williamson River
    that will result in the curtailment of Claimants’ use of
    water in excess of the principles set forth in paragraph
    B.1.(b), above. To ensure implementation of this provision,
    the United States and the Klamath Tribes hereby request
    that the Adjudicator’s Findings of Fact and Order of
    Determination place a condition implementing the princi-
    ples set forth in paragraph B.1.(b), above, thereby prevent-
    ing exercise, upstream of the current north boundary of
    Claimants’ property * * * of any rights adjudicated in favor
    of the United States on behalf of the Klamath Tribes in
    Claim No. 633. The United States and the Klamath Tribes
    also request that the same provision be placed on any rights
    adjudicated in favor of the Klamath Tribes with respect
    to the portion of the Klamath Tribes’ Claim No. 612 that
    incorporates Claim 633 filed by the United States on behalf
    of the Klamath Tribes.”
    (Emphases added.) The adjudicator did not incorporate
    any limiting provision on the United States’ and Klamath
    Tribes’ determined claims as requested, and that failure
    is also currently subject to pending exceptions in Klamath
    County Circuit Court.
    Under the Hyde Agreement, the provisions B.1.(a),
    B.1.(b), and B.1.(c), were all dependent upon the adjudicator’s
    adoption of those provisions, as provided in section B.4.:
    “4. If the Findings of Fact and Order of Determination
    issued by the Adjudicator for Claim 33 does not conform to
    the terms set forth in paragraph B.1., above, the Parties
    reserve any right they may have to file exceptions to the
    Findings of Fact and Order of Determination as to Claim
    33 in the Circuit Court for Klamath County, and reserve
    any rights they may have to participate in any future pro-
    ceedings authorized by law concerning Claim 33.”
    Section B.4. was adopted by the adjudicator into the KBA
    order.
    Petitioners cannot now attempt to get around the
    determinations in the KBA order and the ORS chapter 539
    review process, and obtain an automatic stay of OWRD’s
    200                      TPC, LLC v. Water Resources Dept.
    statutory obligation under ORS 539.170 to distribute water
    according to the determined claims pending that review
    process, by seeking to separately enforce in a different
    forum the provisions in the Hyde Agreement that the KBA
    order omitted. It is akin to what the plaintiffs in Flight
    Shop, Inc. sought to do when they asked the circuit court
    to enforce land use regulations against the defendant while
    the land use decisional process about the disputed land use
    on the defendant’s property was still ongoing. 277 Or App at
    646, 648. The circuit court in that case lacked subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction to do so, and so did Marion County Circuit
    Court in this case. Whether the no-call provision of the Hyde
    Agreement is a required limitation on the United States’
    and the Klamath Tribes’ water rights claims, as part of the
    stipulation to settle contests, is currently part of the ongoing
    KBA litigation, and it is subject to Klamath County Circuit
    Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under ORS chapter 539. By
    seeking to have Marion County Circuit Court instead treat
    the Hyde Agreement as separately enforceable under ORS
    540.150 or otherwise, petitioners sought to have Marion
    County Circuit Court interject itself into that ongoing lit-
    igation and decide for itself whether the Hyde Agreement
    limited the United States’ and Klamath Tribes’ determined
    claims.
    The remedies sought by petitioners further high-
    light why Marion County Circuit Court does not have sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners sought all the same rem-
    edies as previously discussed, which sought to place direct
    limitations on the United States’ and Klamath Tribes’ deter-
    mined water rights through an injunction against OWRD
    from enforcing those determined claims. The determination
    of those water right claims, however, is within the exclusive
    jurisdiction of Klamath County Circuit Court.
    Because Marion County Circuit Court lacked sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction over the claim brought by petition-
    ers, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the
    petitions for judicial review.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions to dis-
    miss petitions.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A167380

Citation Numbers: 308 Or. App. 177

Judges: Ortega

Filed Date: 12/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024