State v. D. S. , 301 Or. App. 311 ( 2019 )

311
Submitted April 5, 2017, affirmed December 11, 2019
In the Matter of D. S.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
D. S.,
Appellant.
Douglas County Circuit Court
16CC03165; A162412
454 P3d 6
William A. Marshall, Judge.
Joseph DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the
brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge,
and Linder, Senior Judge.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed.
312 State v. D. S.
PER CURIAM
Appellant appeals a judgment committing her to
the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period
not to exceed 180 days. The trial court committed appel-
lant on the ground that her mental illness made her unable
to provide for her basic needs (and one additional ground).
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). Appellant contends that the evidence
is insufficient to support her commitment on either ground.
We affirm because the evidence is sufficient to support the
basic-needs commitment under our recent decision in State
v. M. A. E., 299 Or App 231, 448 P3d 656 (2019).
Our review is for legal error. State v. S. R., 267 Or
App 618, 619, 341 P3d 160 (2014). M. A. E. explained the
standard for a basic-needs commitment under current ORS
426.005(1)(f)(B), under which appellant was committed:
“[A] person meets the ‘basic needs’ definition of a ‘[p]erson
with mental illness’ under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) if the per-
son is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs
in a way that leaves the person at nonspeculative risk of
‘serious physical harm’—meaning that the person’s safe
survival will be compromised—in the near future, even
though that risk is not imminent.”
M. A. E., 299 Or App at 240 (second brackets in M. A. E.).
There, we concluded that evidence that the appellant’s men-
tal illness would prevent her from obtaining food absent
commitment was sufficient to support a basic-needs commit-
ment. After noting that some of the evidence was too conclu-
sory to support commitment, we explained that some was
“barely” adequate:
“Nonetheless, other evidence in the record adequately—if
barely—supports an inference that appellant would quickly
suffer harm if she were released from the hospital, stopped
taking her medications, and decompensated. Specifically,
[appellant’s treating psychiatrist] testified that providers
like ‘soup kitchens’ would not be willing to serve appellant
if she appeared in the psychotic, agitated, and violent state
that likely would result if she were released. Moreover, [the
psychiatrist] believes that appellant would not be able to
make food arrangements for herself in that unmedicated
state.”
Id. at 241.
Cite as 301 Or App 311 (2019) 313
The record in this case contains evidence virtually
identical to that we deemed “barely” adequate, but ade-
quate nonetheless, in M. A. E. Specifically, it contains evi-
dence permitting the finding that appellant would not be
able to meet her food needs. Like the treating psychiatrist in
M. A. E., appellant’s treating psychiatrist testified that, in
his opinion, appellant would not “be able to go into a store,
or a restaurant, or a shelter that provides social services
and obtain what she needs to eat” and that she would not,
in her condition, be able to obtain food, shelter, or medical
care. Appellant’s daughter, who had brought appellant to the
hospital shortly before the commitment hearing, testified
that, at that time, appellant lacked the ability to buy food
for herself in the condition that she was in. Finally, similar
to the evidence in M. A. E. that “soup kitchens” would not
be willing to serve the appellant in her unmedicated state,
the precommitment investigator here testified that appel-
lant would not be able to act in “a normal enough manner to
engage in transactions for food and shelter or other things
that she would need to stay alive.”
In sum, the evidence in this case is not materially
distinguishable from that which M. A. E. held was sufficient
to support a basic-needs commitment.
Affirmed.