Gibson v. Walsh , 308 Or. App. 119 ( 2020 )


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  •                                        119
    Argued and submitted December 12, 2019, affirmed December 23, 2020
    James E. GIBSON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Patrick Warren WALSH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Josephine County Circuit Court
    18LT11082; A168958
    480 P3d 990
    In this forcible entry and detainer action, tenant appeals a judgment that
    awarded possession of the rented premises to landlord. He contends that (1) the
    nonpayment of rent notice did not comply with ORS 90.394(3) because, in tenant’s
    view, it did not state the correct amount of monthly rent and (2) the trial court
    failed to rule on tenant’s counterclaim that landlord impermissibly interrupted
    tenant’s electrical service. Held: Tenant’s assignments of error were unpreserved.
    At trial, tenant contended that he was entitled to a deduction in rent for inter-
    ruption of electrical service, not that the rent amount on his notice was incorrect.
    Tenant’s claim about electrical service was unpreserved because he had never
    asserted that contention as a counterclaim; rather, he had raised it as a defense
    at trial and did not, on appeal, assign error to the trial court’s ruling that that
    was not a valid defense.
    Affirmed.
    Amanda C. Thorpe, Judge pro tempore.
    Harry D. Ainsworth argued the cause and filed the brief
    for appellant.
    No appearance for respondent.
    Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
    Landau, Senior Judge.
    LAGESEN, P. J.
    Affirmed.
    120                                                         Gibson v. Walsh
    LAGESEN, P. J.
    In this forcible entry and detainer (FED) action,
    tenant appeals a judgment that awarded possession of the
    rented premises to landlord. In four assignments of error, he
    contends that the trial court erred in awarding the premises
    to landlord for two different reasons: (1) the 72-hour non-
    payment of rent notice did not comply with ORS 90.394(3)
    because, in tenant’s view, it did not state the correct amount
    of monthly rent; and (2) landlord impermissibly interrupted
    tenant’s electrical service, in violation of ORS 90.375. Tenant
    requests reversal of the court’s judgment and remand of
    “the case for determination of Tenant’s claim for violation of
    ORS 90.375 due to interruption of electric service.” Landlord
    has not appeared on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    Generally, we review rulings in residential FED
    actions for errors of law. Community Development v. Stanley,
    
    248 Or App 495
    , 497, 274 P3d 211, rev den, 
    353 Or 127
     (2012).
    To the extent that we must review the trial court’s determi-
    nation of a factual question, we review for any evidence to
    support the court’s findings. 
    Id.
     As long as “there is evidence
    in the record to support the trial court’s findings, we state the
    facts as the court found them.” 
    Id.
     When evaluating whether
    there is evidence in the record to support a finding of fact, we
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevail-
    ing party and give the prevailing party “the benefit of every
    reasonable inference which may be drawn from the evidence.”
    Hendrix v. McKee, 
    281 Or 123
    , 126, 
    575 P2d 134
     (1978). We
    state the facts in accordance with this standard.
    This case arose out of a dispute between a landlord
    and tenant that ended in eviction. In April 2015, tenant
    rented a space from landlord and landlord’s father for his
    recreational vehicle (RV).1 The parties’ agreement was that
    tenant could rent the space “as long as he was not hooked up
    to any of the utilities and only stayed no longer than three
    months.” Landlord described this arrangement as “dry
    camping.” The initial agreement was that tenant would pay
    $200 per month in rent.
    1
    There is no written rental agreement in the trial court record.
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 119
     (2020)                             121
    Although the agreement had been for a maximum
    of three months, tenant ended up staying more than three
    years; landlord explained that, due to his father’s illness and
    then death, he was unable to “deal with the stress of anything
    else,” including dealing with his tenants. On January 1,
    2018, landlord raised the rent from $200 to $225.
    On March 26, 2018, landlord received a power bill
    that was significantly higher than usual for that time of year,
    and he suspected that tenant was using power. Landlord
    decided to end the tenancy and, on July 1, 2018, gave tenant
    a 60-day notice to vacate. Landlord and tenant had an argu-
    ment when landlord delivered the notice, and landlord put
    a padlock on the power box near tenant’s trailer to prevent
    him from using it. Tenant told landlord he was not “hooked
    to the electric anyway.” Later that day and the next, tenant
    created disturbances with another tenant.
    Landlord texted tenant on July 5, 2018, indicating
    that he might be willing to move tenant to another one of his
    properties. Tenant responded on July 6, 2018, expressing
    appreciation and indicating that he would be willing to talk
    the next day. Tenant next contacted landlord on July 23,
    2018, “texting [landlord] threats” and offering to pay land-
    lord $20 per month for access to power. At that point, land-
    lord felt certain that tenant had already been using power
    in contravention of the original agreement and decided not
    to place tenant on any of his other properties.
    After that confrontation, tenant texted several con-
    flicting messages over the course of several days about pay-
    ment of his August rent, listing different locations that land-
    lord could find his check. Then, on August 6, 2018, landlord
    received a letter from tenant with a check in the amount
    of $117.76 and another letter indicating that tenant would
    pay the remaining balance of the rent “when he was given
    access to the power.” Tenant’s letter stated that he was with-
    holding the remaining rent, which tenant calculated to be
    $107.24 (apparently $225.00 minus $117.76), because it cost
    him that amount to rent a hotel room to access electricity.
    On August 8, 2018, landlord personally returned
    tenant’s check and gave him a 72-hour nonpayment of rent
    122                                           Gibson v. Walsh
    notice of eviction. The nonpayment of rent notice stated the
    amount of rent owed as $225.
    When tenant did not vacate the premises, land-
    lord initiated this FED action based on nonpayment of rent.
    Landlord attached the 72-hour nonpayment of rent notice to
    the complaint. In his answer, tenant asserted two defenses.
    First, he alleged that the eviction notice was legally incorrect
    because tenant had paid his August rent. Second, tenant
    alleged that he was not properly served with the 72-hour
    nonpayment of rent notice. Tenant did not allege that the
    notice incorrectly stated the amount of rent due or raise
    any other defenses. Tenant also did not assert any coun-
    terclaims, although ORS 90.370(1), by its terms, authorizes
    tenant counterclaims “[i]n an action for possession based
    upon nonpayment of the rent.” See generally Timmermann
    v. Herman, 
    291 Or App 547
    , 422 P3d 347 (2018) (consider-
    ing tenant counterclaims under ORS 90.370 in FED action
    based on nonpayment of rent).
    At trial, both parties represented themselves, and
    their questions to each other covered an immense amount
    of territory, emotional, factual, and legal. At the close of the
    trial, the trial court found in favor of landlord. In so doing,
    it rejected tenant’s contention that landlord’s act of placing
    a padlock on the power supply box provided a defense within
    the context of an FED action. In reaching that conclusion,
    the court also reasoned that rental of an “RV space” did not
    mean that power was required to be provided. The court
    further noted that tenant might have some other claim
    against landlord for the conduct of shutting off the power,
    something the court expressly did not opine on. Based on
    those conclusions, the court declined to offset any amounts
    from the $225 in rent it determined was owed.
    As noted, on appeal, tenant argues that the trial
    court erred in two primary respects. First, tenant contends
    that the court erred both in determining that the rent due
    was $225 and that the 72-hour notice properly stated that
    that was the amount of rent due. Tenant’s theory on appeal
    is that he was never given proper notice of the January 1,
    2018, rent increase. This means, according to tenant, that
    the rent was never properly raised to $225 per month, which
    Cite as 
    308 Or App 119
     (2020)                                         123
    means both that the 72-hour notice was invalid for misstat-
    ing the amount of rent due, and also that the court erred in
    finding that tenant owed that much rent for August.
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that those
    contentions are not preserved. “For an issue to be preserved
    for purposes of appeal, it must have been raised with suffi-
    cient clarity in the trial court to put the trial court on notice
    that it needs to rule on the issue and for the opposing party to
    have an opportunity to address the issue.” Ploplys v. Bryson,
    
    188 Or App 49
    , 58, 69 P3d 1257 (2003). Here, although cer-
    tain statements made in passing in the trial court may have
    touched on the issue, the issue was not pressed with suffi-
    cient clarity to allow landlord to respond fully. In particu-
    lar, tenant never disputed that his monthly rent was $225;2
    his contention was that he was entitled to a deduction from
    that amount because of landlord’s act of putting a lock on
    the power supply. Thus, tenant’s contentions regarding the
    amount of monthly rent do not provide a basis for reversing
    the trial court’s judgment.
    Next, tenant argues that the trial court erred in
    determining that landlord had no obligation to supply elec-
    tricity and that we should remand to allow the court to deter-
    mine what damages tenant might be entitled under ORS
    90.375. Assuming for the sake of argument that tenant is
    correct that the trial court erred, that error does not provide
    grounds for reversal in the context of this case. Although
    tenant contends that we should remand to permit the court
    to consider what tenant characterizes as an “unpled” claim
    or counterclaim under ORS 90.375 for landlord’s act of cut-
    ting off the power, the problem for tenant is that tenant
    never filed a counterclaim or asked the court to rule on a
    counterclaim. Rather, defendant raised his contentions about
    the power as a defense to landlord’s claim of possession for
    nonpayment of rent, and the trial court ruled that it was
    not a defense, while expressly recognizing that tenant might
    have some other claim. As defendant has not assigned error
    to the trial court’s ruling that defendant’s contentions about
    2
    We note that, when tenant withheld amounts from his August rent, the
    amount withheld, when added to the amount tendered to landlord, added up to
    $225.
    124                                                         Gibson v. Walsh
    the power supply did not constitute a valid defense in this
    FED action where, as here, no counterclaim was filed,3 those
    contentions supply no basis for reversing the trial court’s
    judgment.4
    Affirmed.
    3
    Tenant cites Timmermann, 
    291 Or App at 547
    , for the proposition that
    “ORS 90.370 makes a counterclaim for a violation of ORS 90.375 a defense in an
    action on a nonpayment of rent notice.” But the problem here is that tenant never
    pleaded any counterclaims. This is significant because landlord was not afforded
    a fair opportunity to answer and defend against affirmative counterclaims by
    tenant.
    4
    Tenant argues that the trial court agreed to consider his unpleaded coun-
    terclaims. The record reflects, however, that the court agreed to consider tenant’s
    statutory arguments as defenses and did not understand tenant to be asking it to
    consider those arguments as counterclaims.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A168958

Citation Numbers: 308 Or. App. 119

Judges: Lagesen

Filed Date: 12/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024