State v. Jackson ( 2022 )


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  •                                        789
    Submitted March 28, affirmed May 25, 2022
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JOSHUA RAY JACKSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Deschutes County Circuit Court
    18CR55781; A174381
    511 P3d 82
    Defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, challenging the trial
    court’s finding that he violated a condition of probation requiring him to “obey
    all laws” after he was convicted of a separate offense. Defendant argues that the
    judgment of conviction was legally insufficient evidence of his failure to obey all
    laws because it was entered after a no contest plea. Defendant does not contend
    that any of the procedural safeguards required for the acceptance of a no contest
    plea were absent in his case, nor does he assert that he was unaware of the conse-
    quences that entering that plea could have on his probation. Held: A judgment of
    conviction is sufficient evidence to prove that defendant violated probation, even
    if that conviction stemmed from a plea of no contest. Consequently, the trial court
    did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, in finding that defendant
    failed to obey all laws, and in revoking his probation.
    Affirmed.
    Raymond D. Crutchley, Judge.
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
    Section, and Sarah De La Cruz, Deputy Public Defender,
    Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General, and Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney
    General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
    Kamins, Judge.
    KAMINS, J.
    Affirmed.
    790                                           State v. Jackson
    KAMINS, J.
    Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking his
    probation, challenging the trial court’s order finding that he
    violated a condition of probation requiring him to “obey all
    laws.” We conclude that a judgment of conviction is sufficient
    evidence to prove that defendant violated probation, even
    if that conviction stemmed from a plea of no contest, and
    affirm.
    While on probation for coercion and harassment,
    defendant entered a no contest plea to a new harassment
    charge and was convicted of that offense. The state moved
    to revoke defendant’s probation on the basis that he violated
    the probation condition to “[o]bey all laws.” ORS 137.540(1)(j).
    At the show cause hearing, the state’s only evidence was the
    judgment of conviction for harassment. Defendant moved to
    dismiss, arguing that evidence of the conviction was legally
    insufficient, because it arose from a no contest plea, whereby
    he did not admit guilt. The trial court denied the motion.
    Defendant then testified that he did not commit harass-
    ment and explained that he pleaded no contest because
    it was “the fastest way through this process.” The court
    found that defendant violated the condition and revoked
    probation.
    On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
    erred in denying his motion to dismiss, in concluding that the
    state proved that he failed to obey all laws, and in revoking
    his probation. With regard to each claim of error, defendant
    argues that the judgment of conviction was legally insuffi-
    cient evidence of his failure to obey all laws because it was
    entered after a no contest plea, raising both the question of
    whether a conviction stemming from a no contest plea can
    serve as evidence that defendant violated his probation and
    the question of whether that evidence is legally sufficient for
    a trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that
    defendant failed to obey all laws. See State v. Donovan, 
    305 Or 332
    , 335, 
    751 P2d 1109
     (1988) (noting that the state must
    prove that a defendant violated a condition of probation by
    a preponderance of the evidence). Those are legal questions
    that we review for errors of law. State v. Hardges, 
    294 Or App 445
    , 448, 432 P3d 268 (2018).
    Cite as 
    319 Or App 789
     (2022)                              791
    A person charged with a crime may plead “guilty,”
    “not guilty,” or “no contest.” ORS 135.335. The no contest plea
    was made available in Oregon “to provide for an ‘Alford’ type
    of plea.” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
    Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code, Final Draft
    and Report § 252, 149 (Nov 1972) (citing North Carolina v.
    Alford, 
    400 US 25
    , 
    91 S Ct 160
    , 
    27 L Ed 2d 162
     (1970)). “An
    Alford plea is a guilty plea in which the defendant does not
    admit commission of the criminal act or asserts that he is
    innocent.” State v. Sullivan, 
    197 Or App 26
    , 28 n 1, 104 P3d
    636 (2005), rev den, 
    340 Or 673
     (2006) (concluding that it
    was not plain error for a trial court to rely on an Alford plea
    as an admission of facts justifying a sentence enhancement).
    With an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt “but
    admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him of the
    offense.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F3d 1267,
    1273 (11th Cir 2014).
    Before entering a judgment of conviction from a
    plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court must “mak[e]
    such inquiry as may satisfy the court that there is a factual
    basis for the plea.” ORS 135.395. The “ ‘factual basis for the
    plea’ refers to facts concerning the defendant’s guilt—i.e.,
    facts regarding whether the defendant committed the crime
    to which the defendant is pleading.” State v. Heisser, 
    232 Or App 320
    , 329, 222 P3d 719 (2009). The convicting trial court
    must also “address[ ] the defendant personally and deter-
    min[e] that the defendant understands the nature of the
    charge,” inform the defendant of the rights they are waiving
    and certain potential consequences of the plea, and deter-
    mine “that the plea is voluntary and intelligently made.”
    ORS 135.385(1)-(2); ORS 135.390(1).
    Although defendant did not affirmatively admit
    guilt in the criminal proceeding, he did not contest the
    charges against him and acknowledged that a factual basis
    supported those charges. The trial court did not err by
    considering the judgment of conviction as probative as to
    whether defendant failed to obey all laws. Defendant does
    not contend that any of the procedural safeguards required
    for the acceptance of a no contest plea were absent in his case,
    nor does he assert that he was unaware of the consequences
    792                                         State v. Jackson
    that entering that plea could have on his probation. As a
    result, the trial court was entitled to rely on the judgment
    of conviction as evidence that defendant committed a crime
    and to weigh that evidence against the credibility of defen-
    dant’s testimony at the probation hearing. Further, given
    the record in this case, we conclude that the judgment of
    conviction was legally sufficient evidence for the trial court
    to find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
    failed to obey all laws in violation of ORS 137.540(1)(j).
    Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did
    not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, in finding
    that defendant failed to obey all laws, and in revoking his
    probation.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A174381

Judges: Kamins

Filed Date: 5/25/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024