Dept. of Human Services v. R. H. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                        383
    Submitted April 26, affirmed June 15, 2022
    In the Matter of H. H.,
    a Child.
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    R. H.,
    Appellant.
    Coos County Circuit Court
    20JU06410; A176617 (Control)
    In the Matter of C. H.,
    a Child.
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    R. H.,
    Appellant.
    Coos County Circuit Court
    20JU06411; A176618
    512 P3d 1279
    Father appeals a juvenile court judgment establishing dependency jurisdic-
    tion over his two children, C and H. After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the
    court concluded that DHS had proved four jurisdictional allegations as to each
    child: that father sexually abused C (creating a risk to both C and H), that father
    leaves the children with unsafe care providers, that father lacks the parenting
    skills necessary to safely parent the children, and that father has exposed the
    children to domestic violence. Father contends that the court erred in asserting
    jurisdiction over each child. Father requests discretionary de novo review, partic-
    ularly as related to the jurisdictional finding on sexual abuse. Held: The juvenile
    court did not err in asserting jurisdiction over each child. The Court of Appeals
    declined to exercise discretionary de novo review. Under the normal standard of
    review, the juvenile court’s sexual-abuse findings were supported by legally suf-
    ficient evidence. It follows that the juvenile court did not err in asserting depen-
    dency jurisdiction over the children. As for the other jurisdictional bases, father’s
    challenge to those bases was contingent on his prevailing on the sexual-abuse
    basis.
    Affirmed.
    Megan Jacquot, Judge.
    384                      Dept. of Human Services v. R. H.
    G. Aron Perez-Selsky and Michael J. Wallace filed the
    brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney
    General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before James, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
    Joyce, Judge.
    AOYAGI, J.
    Affirmed.
    Cite as 
    320 Or App 383
     (2022)                                               385
    AOYAGI, J.
    Father appeals a juvenile court judgment establish-
    ing dependency jurisdiction over his two children, C and H.
    In his first assignment of error, father contends that the
    court erred in asserting jurisdiction over C. In his second
    assignment of error, father contends that the court erred in
    asserting jurisdiction over H. For the following reasons, we
    affirm.
    The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
    petition with the juvenile court alleging that conditions or
    circumstances were endangering C’s and H’s welfare so as
    to bring the children within the court’s jurisdiction under
    ORS 419B.100(1)(c). A contested jurisdictional hearing was
    held, after which the court concluded that DHS had proved
    four jurisdictional allegations as to each child: that father
    sexually abused C (creating a risk to both C and H), that
    father leaves the children with unsafe care providers, that
    father lacks the parenting skills necessary to safely parent
    the children, and that father has exposed the children to
    domestic violence.1
    Father requests de novo review on appeal, partic-
    ularly with respect to the sexual abuse finding. De novo
    review may be requested in this circumstance. See ORS
    19.415(3)(b) (allowing discretionary de novo review in “an
    equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from
    a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of paren-
    tal rights”). However, it is in our “sole discretion” whether
    to grant de novo review, 
    id.,
     and we exercise that discre-
    tion only in “exceptional cases,” ORAP 5.40(8)(c). We are
    unpersuaded that de novo review is warranted in this case.
    Cf. Dept. of Human Services v. T. H., 
    313 Or App 560
    , 562,
    496 P3d 704, rev den, 
    368 Or 637
     (2021) (denying de novo
    review in similar circumstances).
    Rather than make new factual findings on appeal,
    we therefore “view the evidence, as supplemented and but-
    tressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light
    most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess
    1
    Mother admitted to certain allegations as to her, and she is not a party to
    this appeal. We limit our discussion to the jurisdictional bases regarding father.
    386                        Dept. of Human Services v. R. H.
    whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient
    to permit that outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. P.,
    
    257 Or App 633
    , 639, 307 P3d 444 (2013). Viewed in that
    light, we conclude that the evidence in the record—which
    we do not describe, as doing so would be of little benefit to
    the parties, the bench, or the bar—was legally sufficient to
    allow the trial court’s finding regarding sexual abuse.
    As for the other three jurisdictional bases—unsafe
    care providers, lack of parenting skills, and domestic
    violence—father does not appear to seek independent review
    of those findings. When a juvenile court makes multiple
    findings in support of dependency jurisdiction, a parent who
    appeals the dependency judgment may choose to challenge
    only the ultimate ruling on dependency jurisdiction—in
    which case we will affirm if the evidence supports any one
    jurisdictional basis—or may choose to challenge individual
    jurisdictional findings independent of the ultimate ruling
    that dependency jurisdiction exists. In the latter case, we
    may reverse individual jurisdictional findings even if we
    affirm the ultimate ruling on dependency jurisdiction. See,
    e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. T. N. M., 
    315 Or App 160
    ,
    168, 501 P3d 76 (2021) (concluding that the evidence was
    sufficient to support jurisdictional allegations A and F, but
    insufficient to support allegations B, C, D, and E, and there-
    fore reversing in part and remanding for entry of “a judg-
    ment establishing jurisdiction based on allegations A and F
    only” and for the removal of “any dispositional orders relat-
    ing to allegations B, C, D, or E”).
    Here, father assigns error only to the ultimate rul-
    ing on dependency jurisdiction as to each child, without sep-
    arately assigning error to any individual jurisdictional find-
    ings. Father identifies a single “question presented,” which is
    whether there was sufficient evidence to establish jurisdic-
    tion. In his argument, father addresses each jurisdictional
    finding—as he must to challenge the ultimate jurisdictional
    ruling, see Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 
    194 Or App 219
    , 236, 94 P3d 885 (2004), rev den, 
    38 Or 374
     (2005)—but
    he focuses on the sexual abuse finding and, when he reaches
    the other findings, signals that we need review them only if
    we have overturned the sexual abuse finding. Specifically,
    after addressing the sexual abuse finding, he prefaces his
    Cite as 
    320 Or App 383
     (2022)                                              387
    arguments regarding the other jurisdictional findings with
    the statement that, “without the finding that father sexually
    abused one of the children, the remaining allegations and
    evidence are insufficient to support jurisdiction.” (Emphasis
    added.) Lastly, father’s only request for relief is that we
    “reverse the jurisdiction judgment.”
    We take a pragmatic approach to interpreting assign-
    ments of error, where interpretation is necessary. See Village
    at North Pointe Condo. Assn. v. Bloedel Constr., 
    278 Or App 354
    , 359-61, 374 P3d 978 (2016). We also recognize that, in
    this context, it may not be entirely clear what the Oregon
    Rules of Appellate Procedure require in terms of assigning
    error to individual jurisdictional findings. Accordingly, we
    take this opportunity to clarify that, if an appellant wants
    us to review a particular jurisdictional finding independent
    of our conclusion as to whether dependency jurisdiction
    exists, the best practice is to assign error to that individual
    jurisdictional finding (in addition to assigning error to the
    ultimate jurisdictional ruling),2 and then incorporate that
    issue into the questions presented, the argument, and the
    relief requested. Alternatively, if a party seeks review only
    of the ultimate jurisdictional ruling as to a child, it is suf-
    ficient and compliant with the rules to assign error only to
    that one ruling.
    Here, for the reasons previously described, all indi-
    cations are that father is seeking review only of the ultimate
    jurisdictional ruling and the specific jurisdictional finding
    regarding sexual abuse. We understand his arguments
    regarding the other jurisdictional findings—unsafe care
    providers, lack of parenting skills, and domestic violence—
    to depend on his prevailing on appeal as to the sexual abuse
    finding. Having affirmed the sexual abuse finding, which
    alone gives rise to dependency jurisdiction, we therefore do
    not independently address the other jurisdictional findings.
    Affirmed.
    2
    That approach is consistent with the rules for assigning error. See ORAP
    5.45(3) (“Each assignment of error must identify precisely the legal, procedural,
    factual, or other ruling that is being challenged.” (Emphases added.)).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A176617

Judges: Aoyagi

Filed Date: 6/15/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024