State v. M. C. J. , 323 Or. App. 516 ( 2022 )


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  •                                516
    This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
    except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
    Submitted October 27, affirmed December 29, 2022
    In the Matter of M. C. J.,
    a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Respondent,
    v.
    M. C. J.,
    Appellant.
    Marion County Circuit Court
    21CC06018; A177406
    Matthew Tracey, Judge pro tempore.
    Alexander C. Cambier and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.
    filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General, and Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant
    Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before James, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
    Joyce, Judge.
    AOYAGI, J.
    Affirmed.
    Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
    323 Or App 516
     (2022)            517
    AOYAGI, J.
    Appellant appeals a judgment committing him to
    the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180
    days, based on his being unable to provide for his basic needs
    due to a mental disorder. See ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (provid-
    ing for civil commitment of a “person with mental illness”);
    ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (defining “person with mental illness”
    to include a person who, because of a mental disorder, is
    “[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs that are neces-
    sary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future”). In
    his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the evi-
    dence was legally insufficient to support a basic-needs com-
    mitment. He does not contest that he has a mental disorder,
    but he argues that the state failed to establish that he was
    unable to provide for his basic needs.
    We decline to exercise de novo review. See ORS
    19.415(3)(b) (providing that, in an appeal in an equitable
    proceeding, we have “sole discretion” whether to engage
    in de novo review of one or more factual findings); ORAP
    5.40(8)(c) (limiting de novo review to “exceptional cases”).
    Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if
    there is any evidence in the record to support them, and we
    review the court’s legal conclusions for legal error. State v.
    B. B., 
    240 Or App 75
    , 77, 245 P3d 697 (2010).
    To qualify as a “person with mental illness” under
    ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B), a person must have a mental disorder
    that causes the person to be “unable to provide for his or
    her basic personal needs in a way that leaves the person
    at nonspeculative risk of ‘serious physical harm’—meaning
    that the person’s safe survival will be compromised—in the
    near future, even though that risk is not imminent.” State v.
    M. A. E., 
    299 Or App 231
    , 240, 448 P3d 656 (2019). In this
    case, the trial court determined that, due to his mental dis-
    order, appellant was living in extremely unsanitary condi-
    tions and was not eating enough.
    We agree with the state that the evidence was legally
    sufficient to support a basic-needs commitment. Ultimately,
    we are persuaded that appellant was at nonspeculative risk
    of serious physical harm in the near future, albeit not immi-
    nently, from the combination of (1) the extremely unsanitary
    518                                           State v. M. C. J.
    conditions in his trailer, which included a dead dog covered
    in maggots that appellant believed was still alive and contin-
    ued to “pet,” multiple cats that were eating off the maggot-
    infested dog, and extensive animal urine and feces through-
    out the trailer; (2) appellant’s extreme lack of personal
    hygiene; (3) appellant’s limited access to food; (4) appellant’s
    thin and frail appearance, which was tied to his having
    lost a significant amount of weight, even though he was
    not yet medically underweight at the time of commitment;
    (5) appellant’s lack of electricity or propane in his trailer;
    and (6) appellant’s recent deterioration after the deaths
    of his mother and his girlfriend. Although we agree with
    appellant that the evidence was thin as far as quantifying
    the risk of serious physical harm in the near future, we are
    persuaded that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to
    establish the necessary degree of risk. See State v. N. S., 
    306 Or App 140
    , 146, 472 P3d 818 (2020) (“[A] determination of
    whether the evidence was sufficient for commitment must be
    made in light of the whole record.” (Emphasis in original.)).
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A177406

Citation Numbers: 323 Or. App. 516

Judges: Aoyagi

Filed Date: 12/29/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2024